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Abstract 
In 1950 Ethiopia became an African pioneer by introducing an industrial 
modernisation policy to attract foreign capital and technology transfer. It took 
further pioneering steps in the early 1960s by using its investment incentives 
scheme to support indigenisation of industry and SMEs. However, during the 
1970s and 1980s while many countries were learning fast from the experiences 
of others, these early initiatives were suppressed in Ethiopia, and only 
reintroduced in the early 1990s with a narrow approach to enterprise start up, 
and few lessons learnt. 
This thesis examines the role and impact of incentives, constituting 
exemptions from paying duties on imported capital goods and income taxes, 
on the choices of industry, location and size of enterprises in Ethiopia. It uses 
theories predicating the reasons for entrepreneurial motivations to start 
enterprises, and draws on statistics from 4246 projects licensed for investment 
incentives over 1992-98, as well as new evidence generated from a follow up 
in-depth investigation of six SMEs. The thesis concludes that the influence of 
investment incentives on the industry, location and size of SMEs start ups is 
limited. Antecedent factors like entrepreneurial experience, level of training 
and financial resources, alongside market and infrastructure were the triggers 
and determinants of SMEs start ups. 
However, the study found that sometimes the value of the licence for 
investment incentives was superior to the holder when used, not as tax breaks 
as intended, but as a moderator of access to state controlled resources like 
enterprise sites. Projects that received licences looked viable for bank credit, 
and the authorities provided some projects with preferential (and subsidised) 
access to resources. 
The study suggests that enterprise support initiatives should focus on key 
driving forces of enterprise development, such as entrepreneurs' technical and 
managerial skills, better access to land, infrastructure and streamlined 
procedures for business legalisation. 
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1. Introduction to the Study of the Role and Impact of 
Investment Incentives on SMEs Development in Ethiopia 
This chapter introduces the nature of and underlying reasons for this thesis. It also 
briefly introduces the methods used in the enquiry and its findings. Finally, the 
chapter outlines the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 The nature of the study 
This thesis is about the role and impact of investment incentives on small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) start-up and growth in Ethiopia. These SMEs, as 
defined in chapter two, employed 6-50 people and a minimum of birr 250 000 
(approximately £25,000) investment in physical assets such as machines and 
equipment at start up. The investment incentives used to induce enterprise start 
ups and growth consisted of two main components. Entrepreneurs - or the 
enterprises they set up - were exempted from paying duties on imported capital 
goods and income taxes subsequent to the establishment of the enterprises. 
Section 1.2 discusses the underlying reasons for the thesis. The discussion begins 
in 1950 when the enterprise support initiative that this thesis reports on, the 
Ethiopian investment incentives scheme (hereafter the IIS), was first introduced in 
Ethiopia. The discussion shows, first, in 1950 Ethiopia was a pioneer in Africa in 
the use of these incentives to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in 'modern' 
industry and hence technology transfer. Second, Ethiopia pioneered again in the 
early 1960s in using the IIS to support indigenisation of industry and SMEs start 
ups. However, Ethiopia tried to use the same IIS policy and instruments for this as 
it had for attracting FDI. Third, at the time when global actors (including those in 
Africa) were improving their policies on local enterprise and SME development, 
from 1975-90 the Derg regime in Ethiopia halted private enterprise development, 
nationalised enterprises and abolished the IIS. Fourth, when the Derg 
reintroduced the IIS in 1990 the reforms made to the scheme were too little and 
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too late. The Derg lost power in 1991. The post-Derg period, which this thesis 
focuses on, was characterised by a move back to the old IIS policies. As in the past, 
the IIS prevailed as the single most important enterprise support initiative in the 
country. But the implementation of the scheme learnt little from other countries' 
experiences, and was insufficiently integrated with other policies to bear fruit. 
The thesis, therefore, shows the results of the post-Derg period in Ethiopia, the 
advances and constraints of the rather narrowly defined IIS policy and 
instruments, and points to the possible improvements in the future. 
Over the period 1992-98, where the empirical evidence for the thesis was collected, 
the IIS accepted projects from categories of activities referred to as 'pioneer' 
and/or'promoted'l. With a view to inducing more indigenous start ups, largely 
SMEs, domestic entrepreneurs were required to deploy a minimum start-up 
capital of birr 250 000 in physical assets like machines and equipment. Foreign 
capitalists, however, depending on the exchange rates, were required to put in 
about birr 3.5 million. In return, as this study found out, eligible entrepreneurs 
were offered tax benefits from 5 to 30 per cent of the purchase value of imported 
capital goods, and an exemption from paying 35 per cent income tax. The period 
over which entrepreneurs were exempted from paying income tax depended on 
the location and the nature of the activities of the new enterprises. Accordingly, as 
details in chapter three will show, enterprises that chose to set up in locations and 
activity types preferred by the government were given additional income tax 
exemptions ranging from one to five years. 
'Pioneers' refer to activities like irrigation farms and engineering enterprises that have 
relatively long payback periods. 'Promoted activities' refer to relatively short payback period 
activities like rainfed agriculture. Pioneer activities commanded more support than 
promoted activities. Likewise, relatively undeveloped areas received longer periods of 
income tax exemptions. 
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This thesis is based on 4246 indigenous projects that obtained an IIS licence over 
1992-98, and a follow up in-depth investigation of six cases of SMEs2. The period 
1992-98 was chosen because there was no reliable data on IIS licensed and assisted 
enterprises before 1992. Moreover, over 1992-98 the IIS was pursued with vigour 
for a number of reasons. Most of all the government placed trust in the IIS that it 
would strengthen the production capacity of enterprises by creating, among other 
things, differential sector and spatial impacts and spillover effects. The IIS was 
also used, for example, to signal to indigenous and foreign capitalists that the 
government was moving away from a socialist system of enterprise organisation 
that characterised the socialist Derg era. Finally, because IIS's tariff and tax 
reductions that benefit the private sector were compatible with policies of major 
donors and creditors like the World Bank, the IIS was at the centre of economic 
policy measures that the government took with a view to obtaining external 
development assistance. 
1.2 Reasons for studying IIS impacts on SMEs development 
In much of the literature developing countries' investment incentives are linked 
with attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) (Asiedu, 2002; Gastanaga, Nugent 
and Pashamova, 1998, and Cockroft, 1992). In some of this literature FDI is 
considered as a key provider of investment necessary for capital formation, 
management and skills often without the obligation of loan repayment. Besides 
attracting FDI, investment incentives are regarded as a means of increasing 
competition, positive external economies and spillover effects in a host country 
(Root and Ahmed, 1979; Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova, 1998). However, 
careful reviews of experiences, particularly from Africa, show some unpleasant 
Leaving the details to chapter four, the total population of the projects (4246) came from all 
over Ethiopia and represented the range of activity types that the IIS supported. The selected 
case studies were drawn from the Addis Ababa region. These were set up during the study 
period and included three IIS assisted and three non-IIS assisted ones. 
4 
outcomes of FDI for the host countries (Cockroft, 1992; Reis, 2000 and Mytelka, 
2000): that the technology brought was capital intensive and import dependent; 
and the balance of payments did not improve due to FDI because outflows in the 
form of dividends, management fees, and royalties on know-how exceeded the 
inflow of capital that subsequently resulted in welfare losses. 
The concern of this thesis is the impact of investment incentives on indigenous 
SMEs, an area that the literature has given little attention to. The rest of this 
section sets out the reasons for studying IIS impacts on indigenous Ethiopian 
SMEs development. The reasons that emerge from the discussion are based on 
IIS/SMEs development in Ethiopia and the global SMEs policy developments and 
trends. The discussion below follows three key periods that define IIS/SMEs 
development in Ethiopia: 1950-74 (the imperial era), 1974-91 (the Derg era) and 
the period since 1992 (the post Derg era). 
First, the imperial era (1950-74): State activism in economic growth and 
development was vital in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s as there was a need for 
building the countries that had gained independence with little existing 
indigenous capital and entrepreneurship. In post independence Africa the 
industrialization agenda in particular took centre stage of government policy. 
History showed that industrialisation was an essential part of growth and 
development, bringing an increase in employment and income and boosting 
exports (Frimpong-Ansah, 1992; Stewart et al, 1992; Jenkins, 1992; Mytelka, 1988). 
The type of industrialization that African governments adopted was mass 
production industrialization based on large scale factory production (Mytelka, 
1988)3. At the time the prevailing economic doctrine also justified mass 
The pursuit of this strategy resulted in widely debated and recorded consequences including 
de-industrialisation of African manufacturing, agricultural crisis and debt crisis (see, among 
others, Riddell, 1990; Stewart, Lall and Wangwe, 1992; Frimpong-Ansah, 1992 and on 
Ethiopia, Berhanu Abgaz, 1994). 
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production industrialization that came about through increased investment 
particularly in new machines and equipment and often via FDI. In short, mass 
production industrialization was thought to provide the advantage of positive 
economies of scale and labour specialisation (Sengenberger, Loveman and Piore, 
1990). 
The industrialization logic and process in Ethiopia, which started after the Italian 
occupation of 1935-41, were largely similar to the rest of Africa (IGE, 1955 and 
Eshetu, 1994). As part of its industrialization drive Ethiopia introduced the 
investment incentives scheme in 1950 (IGE, 1950). The key objective of this 
scheme, as shown in Table 1.1, was to induce foreign investment, technology, 
skills and management in the manufacturing industry. The incentive instruments 
used were exemptions from the payment of custom duties on imported machinery 
and income tax. The incentives, by inducing the use of modern and capital 
intensive machines and equipment, were meant to increase the size of 
establishments. Size of an establishment, in turn, was thought to be positively 
linked with high productivity (IGE, 1955: 17). Following the adoption of the 
scheme a handful of enterprises (like the Wonji Sugar factory and Ethio-Japanese 
Textile Share Com) were established with the participation of foreign capital 
(Schwarz, 1968) along what is now known as the Addis Ababa-Nazareth corridor 
(hereafter the corridor). 
Table 1.1 Mapping changes and continuity in the use of the instrument of 
investment incentives in Ethiopia during 1950-98 and global SMEs 
policy trends 
pointers Imperial era: Derg era: Post Derg era: 1992-1998 
1950-1974 (Ethiopia as a pioneer) 1974-1991 (Ethiopia slips) (no learning from others) 
ITS policy 1950-63: induce foreign investment, 1974-90: HS discontinued 1992-96: ITS reintroduced to 
objectives technology transfer and (PMGE, 1975a and 1975c) induce more jobs, increased 
management in mainly large scale domestic and foreign 
manufacturing enterprises and big investment, and balanced 
corporations (IGE, 1950). Ethiopia regional development, etc. 
was ahead of the game in Africa. Several new/major 
expansion industry areas 
were opened for private 
sector development (TGE, 
1992). 
1963-7_4: US reformed to induce 1990-91: ITS reintroduced in 1996-98: objectives as in 
private domestic and foreign 1990. Objectives included 1992-96 above (FDRE, 
investment and technology in new increasing domestic 1996a and 1998b) 
and major expansion projects in resources use, introducing 
manufacturing, agriculture, science, technology and 
transport and tourism (IGE, 1963 know-how, creating 
and 1966). employment and balanced 
inter-regional development. 
Sectors included new/major 
expansion projects in 
manufacturing, agriculture, 
agro-industries and hotels 
(PDRE, 1990) 
IIS policy oje: exemptions from the payment Type: over 1990-91 Typs: exemptions from the 
instruments of custom duties on imported exemptions from the payment of custom duties 
machinery and income tax. payment of custom duties on imported machinery 
Dim: over 1950-63 in favour of on imported machinery and and income tax. 
foreign owned large manufacturing income tax. Dim: in favour of smaller 
enterprises. In the 1960s entry Dim: (1990-91) in favour of indigenous productive 
requirement for domestic investors smaller indigenous and sector enterprises and less 
was lowered. productive sector developed regions. 
enterprises, and less 
developed regions 
Ethiopia's and National: selective state intervention 1974-90: socialist economic Stabilisation and 
global policy, series of five year policies guided by central liberalisation, private sector 
economic development plans. planning. development and 
management 1990-91: mixed economic decentralisation (Befekadu context policy (UNIDO, 1991). and Berhanu, 2000) 
Global: some interventionist state Resurgence of neoliberal Consensus that state and 
policies and mass production economic policies (along market complement each 
industrialization paradigm with some interventionist other (Schulpen and 
including in Africa (Mytelka, 1988; state policies e. g. in Eastern Gibbon, 2001). 
WDR, 1997) Europe and SSA) (WDR, 
1997). 
Global SMEs In many countries SMEs were Re-emergence of SMEs and SMEs policies and 
policy trends regarded as less important units spread of SMEs policies and institutions like Scottish 
(Sengenberger, Loveman, and Piore, institutions (Sengenberger, Enterprises (McQuaid, 
1990) Loveman, and Piore, 1990; 1997) & SMEs development 
Pedersen, et al, 1993; and in SSA (ADR, 1997 and 
Rogerson, 2001) Rogerson, 2001) 
Source: own construction 
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The 1950 investment code did not allow indigenous enterprises to draw benefits 
from the incentives scheme. The neglect of the emerging indigenous enterprises 
and entrepreneurship, and issues around indigenising enterprise management 
were hence raised as concerns that might stifle sustained industrialization in 
Ethiopia (Teferra, 1959: 33-34). In line with such arguments, it seems, reforms 
were made to the IIS code (IGE, 1963 and 1966). The new codes aimed to assist 
indigenous (largely small) enterprises in the manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing sectors of the economy. This policy development was an important 
step in recognising the roles of SMEs in the industrialization process particularly 
at a time when SMEs were generally considered as marginal contributors to 
growth and were hardly the subjects of policy debate (Sengenberger, Loveman, 
and Piore, 1990). 
Second, the Derg era (1974-91): The momentum for enterprise development and 
attracting foreign investment was halted by the Derg government that 
nationalised enterprises and abolished the investment incentives scheme (PMGE, 
1975a and 1975c). Subsequently Ethiopia fell under the category of 'hostile' and 
'problem' countries for FDI for most of the 1970s and 1980s (WIR, 1994: 93 and 
Helleiner, 1992: 55)4. 
While private enterprise development was on hold in Ethiopia, the period from 
the late 1970s through the 1980s saw the resurgence of neoliberal economic 
policies and alternative models to the mass production industrialization. As part 
of the latter, new theory and evidence (that came under the rubric of 'flexible 
specialisation') put SMEs at the centre stage of the industrialization debate both in 
developed and developing countries (Piore and Sable, 1984 and Pederson et al, 
1993). It was argued that flexible and affordable technologies, and the lean and 
Shortly before its fall in 1991 Derg reintroduced the IIS, and the content of the new reform 
was largely adopted in the 1992 IIS code (Table 1.1). 
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flexible organisation of SMEs have made these units withstand recessions and 
become net contributors to employment, innovation and growth (Sengenberger, 
Loveman, and Piore, 1990). To take advantages of these strengths institutions and 
wide ranging support initiatives (like business advice and finance) were devised 
(Sweeney, 1997). In some countries efforts towards promoting FDI were combined 
with local enterprise developments. SMEs role in Africa's industrialization and 
development also shifted from 'policy periphery' to occupy an increasingly more 
central role (ADR, 1997 and Rogerson, 2001: 115)" 
Third, post Derg era (1992 and after): As part of the structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP), Ethiopia brought in legislation that offered a wide range of 
measures including incentives, institutional structures to coordinate FDI, and 
processes that simplified the approval for investment and profit repatriation 
(TGE, 1992). The 1992 IIS code, like the 1990 one, aimed to pursue objectives 
including increased domestic resources use, introducing science, technology and 
know-how, creating employment and balancing inter-regional development (see 
Table 1.1). The scheme also aimed to assist new and major expansion projects in 
manufacturing, agriculture, agro-industries and hotels. By lowering the entry 
requirement into the scheme, the policy favoured smaller indigenous and 
productive sector enterprises and less developed regions. The instruments of 
incentives, however, remained exemptions from the payment of custom duties on 
imported machinery and income tax. Moreover, apart from the IIS, policy 
measures contained in SAP barely brought any initiatives towards enterprise 
development (like enterpreneurship development, enterprise finance and access 
to land). The IIS, however, outside its remit and in an uncoordinated manner, 
In Scotland, for example, the Scottish Development Agency (later Scottish Enterprise) was 
set up to conduct diverse objectives such as the promotion of new ventures, attraction of 
inward investment and improving the export performance of enterprises (MaQuaid, 1997: 
201). 
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started to address some of the constraints to enterprise development such as 
access to enterprise sites. 
To summarise, therefore, the Ethiopian IIS system was an innovation in Africa 
when it was introduced 1950. However, when IIS was reintroduced in the early 
1990s it had not moved on. 
The above historical account of IIS/SMEs development in Ethiopia (which was 
drifting away from the global SMEs policy and institution development) raises 
several concerns that this thesis seeks to addresses: 
First, the Ethiopian investment incentives scheme lacked learning from own and others' 
experiences. Clearly the IIS prevailed as a key government policy towards assisting 
enterprise development in Ethiopia. The original (1950) IIS objectives and 
instruments were compatible with the underlying economic doctrine that equated 
industrialization with capital formation through large scale/capital intensive 
investment only supplied by FDI. In this regard the IIS was an innovation. 
However, as the role of SMEs became widely recognised since the 1970s, 
enterprise development in Ethiopia was either suppressed or stagnated in the 
number and type of instruments of support. As the IIS was successively 
reintroduced (in 1990,1992 and later) it was meant to promote multiple objectives 
(like increasing jobs, investment and regional development) with the same limited 
instruments of exemption from paying duties and income tax. The consequences 
of these developments were that: 
(i) by drawing on scarce resources and the attention of policy makers, the IIS 
limited the scope for developing other enterprise support initiatives. 
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(ii) over time the IIS has become a mythical device for enterprise development in 
that, without any substantive evidence, it has been believed to have created, 
among other things, industry and spatial impacts6. 
(iii) assigning the role of promoting indigenous enterprises through the 
Ethiopian Investment Authority (EIA) which was meant to attract FDI, has 
also caused some problems. For example, the set up of a reserve schedule 
and lower entry criterion for indigenous enterprises discriminated against 
smaller size foreign enterprises that would have been sources of capital and 
skills transfer. 
Second, can tax based investment incentives influence entrepreneurial decisions such as 
choics of industry and location. The main economic reason behind investment 
incentives is that by reducing the cost of investment at start up and/or increasing 
the potential for earning profits, investment incentives influence entrepreneurial 
decisions in favour of particular features of an enterprise such as its industry and 
location (WIR, 1994 and UNCTAD, 1996). However, the theory barely considers 
circumstances that influence entrepreneurs' behaviours, such as their resource 
base, education levels, and social and psychological features that influence the 
take up rates and uses of incentives. Evidence from Borin et al (1994) and this 
thesis demonstrate that many entrepreneurs in Ethiopia are less flexible between 
industries and locations, among other things, due to constraints of physical 
infrastructure and financial resources. This means that investment incentives 
barely benefit SMEs that many researches regard as more likely units to ensure 
local ownership and control and create considerable opportunities for 
employment, income distribution, spatial development and industrialization in 
LDCs (see, among others, McCormick, 1993; Cortes et al (1987)). 
As chapter three will show, with the exception of Schwarz et al (1968), the impacts of the IIS 
had hardly been studied. Even the Schwarz et al study was methodologically flawed and out 
of date. 
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The above concern is supported by studies, albeit limited, that show that the 
impact of investment incentives on enterprise development was contested. In 
developing countries such as Ghana, Argentina and India where duty and income 
tax exemptions prevail these instruments neither sufficiently influenced 
entrepreneurial decisions nor promoted government objectives (Ingram and 
Pearson, 1981; Borello, 1995 and Subrahmanya, 1998). However, impacts of 
investment incentives in developed countries were much more positive. For 
example, for some enterprises they were an important influence to locate in 
assisted areas (Allen, et al, 1986 and Giaoutzi et al, 1988). 
Third, investment incentives are likely to undermine indigenous technological capability 
building: Evidence suggests that investment incentives encourage the import and 
build up of physical assets such as machines and equipment that tend to be 
underutilised and less linked with domestic resource use (Mulatu, 1982 and 
Cockroft, 1992). Moreover, inducing the import of capital goods is likely to 
undermine indigenous technological capability development - that is learning the 
technology, its specification and design, process, making use of local resources, 
relevant to local environment and demand - factors that many regard as more 
important than a mere acquisition of production techniques (Mytelka, 1992; 
Najmabadi and Lall, 1995 and Forbes and Wield, 2000). 
The above issues form some of the central arguments of the thesis. Moreover, as 
already stated, the thesis used 4246 IIS licensed projects and the in-depth 
investigation of six selected case SMEs. Among the reasons considered for 
thoroughly investigating IIS impacts on SMEs was the fact that IIS assistance was 
increasingly extended to small and medium-sized projects. The IIS applied to 
enterprises that employed a minimum of birr 250 000 at start-up. Almost two in 
three of the 4246 projects had proposed capital investment of less than birr 500 
000. Moreover, at start up more than 80 per cent of the enterprises employed less 
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than 50 people. These meant that, by the very nature of the size distribution of 
Ethiopian enterprises, most of the IIS clients were SMEs7. However, relatively 
larger projects with proposed capital investment more than birr 5 million 
accounted for less that 20 per cent of the total IIS licensed projects. As to micro 
enterprises, these could not have been selected because over 1992-98 the IIS 
structure systematically bypassed enterprises that employed capital less than birr 
250 0008. 
In the size structure of Ethiopian enterprises, SMEs are strategically positioned 
between micro and large enterprises9. By studying the process of SMEs start-ups 
and growth, and the IIS impacts thereon, this study was able to uncover economy- 
wide enterprise development constraints and opportunities. Moreover, as 
supported by theory and evidence discussed in chapter two, SMEs have 
distinctive strengths particularly in generating and maintaining jobs. Hence the 
thesis makes a case in favour of supporting SMEs development, far more 
effectively than through investment incentives, because these units serve as an 
Evidence from other less developed countries (for example, McCormick (1993) on Kenya) 
shows that SMEs have low representation in the size structure of enterprises. Clearly the 
criteria used to define enterprises across countries have influence over such a conclusion. 
However, contrary to such evidence, Ethiopia tends to have a relatively higher 
representation of SMEs. For example in mid-1990s Ethiopia had 2731 small and 642 medium 
and large manufacturing enterprises (CSA, 1997e and 1997b). This means that well over 80 
per cent of Ethiopian manufacturing enterprises were SMEs. There was a similar size 
structure in the IIS licensed projects as well as IIS assisted start ups. A great many IIS 
assisted start ups were small (or at best medium) enterprises that were in footwear, oil 
extracting and flour mill industries and employed one plant/product line operation. 
There were other, more personal, reasons for undertaking this study. These include my 
interest in the development of the Ethiopian enterprise sector and its support initiatives. My 
interest in this area, which provided strong motivation for studying the IIS in Ethiopia, 
emerged from the issues and questions confronting me when I was working as an economic 
and social development policy analyst in Ethiopia over the period 1985-95. 
In common use of the language, in Ethiopia 'business' meant running such activities like a 
corner shop or a restaurant but not a manufacturing or engineering enterprise. Conversely a 
'firm' referred to a manufacturing or engineering enterprise. In this thesis I consider the role 
and impact of the IIS on all kinds of enterprises that met the IIS criteria. Therefore, I have 
used a less confusing term 'enterprise' to mean both 'business' and 'firm'. 
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engine to transform the fragile agriculture-based economy of Ethiopia into a more 
dynamic enterprising economy. 
Finally, the thesis also links IIS on the one hand and SMEs start-ups and early 
growth on the other. These links were, again, caused by the nature of the IIS 
assistance to enterprises. IIS incentives that came in the form of duty and income 
tax exemptions were targeted at enterprise start-up and early growth stages, 
respectively. However, the thesis put some limits to the kinds of start-ups it 
considered. First, although some major expansion programmes and foreign direct 
investment (FIJI) did benefit from the IIS, these were not considered in this thesis 
as they constitute only a small fraction (under five per cent) of IIS assisted 
projectslo. Second, enterprise start-ups through spin-offs and franchises were not 
studied as neither of these two was characteristically common to Ethiopia. Third, 
the informal sector operates largely underground and so did not benefit from the 
IIS, hence these businesses were not studied. Fourth, with the view to focusing on 
the role and impact of the IIS, the units studied received no official assistance 
(government or otherwise) except from the IIS. Finally, this study did not aim to 
evaluate the entire IIS. The IIS had a range of objectives like export promotion but, 
as discussed earlier, it had only limited means to promote those objectives. This 
enquiry, therefore, focused on areas where objectives had a means of 
implementation as in incentives to influence entrepreneurs' choices over sector, 
location and size of enterprises. 
1.3 Research hypotheses and questions 
Policy makers in Ethiopia were convinced that investment in physical assets 
(particularly the acquisition and adoption of new machines and equipment) 
would serve as an engine of growth, industrialization and spatial distribution of 
10 Over 1992-98 the IIS succeeded in granting licences to 129 foreign projects or investors 
compared to 4246 indigenous ones. 
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wealth. The authorities hence provided investment incentives, as outlined above, 
to induce enterprise start-up in 'preferred' locations and 'pioneer' and 'promoted' 
activities. The main research problem of this study was, therefore, to explore the 
validity of the assumption that the IIS influences entrepreneurial choices of type, 
location and size of enterprises. 
At the early stage of the development of this thesis, the preliminary evidence 
generated and reported in chapter four showed that in Ethiopia enterprise start- 
up crucially depended on, among other things, the attributes of entrepreneurs 
(including their number, financial resources, awareness level of enterprise 
assistance provided), market and available infrastructure. Hence, with regards to 
the role assigned to the IIS, I anticipated a rather limited impact as summarised in 
hypothesis one (Hi): 
" Hl: the influence of investment incentives on the timing, type, location and 
size of IIS assisted SMEs was limited. 
Although I expected that investment incentives played a limited role, in the 
course of my in-depth field study of IIS assisted SMEs start-ups, I observed an 
unintended but more important function of the IIS. This unintended function of 
the IIS was related to two fundamental enterprise start-up problems: that, first, 
entrepreneurs had problems of access to state controlled and allocated resources 
like land and bank credit. And, second, entrepreneurs faced enormously 
complicated procedures of business legalisation. Both these circumstances were 
unacceptable to the entrepreneurs. However, my argument began, in return for 
some tolerance or acceptance of the legitimacy of government control particularly 
over land, some IIS licence holders were provided privileged access to key 
enterprise start-up resources. I encapsulated the gist of this argument in 
hypothesis two (H2): 
" H2: some entrepreneurs sought the support of the IIS, in addition to its fiscal 
incentives, for its role as a gateway to resources (land, credit and utility) 
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required for enterprise start-up, and to ease the otherwise bureaucratic 
business legalisation processes. 
In addition to exploring the foregoing hypotheses11, the research raised several 
questions for investigation at national, regional and enterprise levels. These 
questions included: what were the rationales for the IIS, and what direct and 
indirect benefits (and costs) did the IIS cause to entrepreneurs and the society? 
What enterprise start-up and early growth constraints did the entrepreneurs face, 
and how did the IIS help them to overcome these constraints? And how did IIS 
benefits influence (if they did) entrepreneurs' decisions over the choices of the 
type, location and size of the new enterprise? Here the notion of influence was 
conceptualised as entrepreneurs actively seeking and using IIS assistance in their 
decision to start-up an enterprise. 
At the centre of the foregoing research hypotheses and questions was the role and 
impact of the IIS on SMEs start-up and growth. Hence these hypotheses and 
questions led to the pursuit of the following objectives: 
" to review and evaluate influential literature on SMEs and thereby identify 
strengths of and rationale for promoting them; 
" to identify the rationale for and objects of investment incentives as means of 
promoting enterprise development; 
" to describe and analyse the Ethiopian enterprise economy and thereby show 
enterprise development opportunities and constraints, and discuss policy 
initiatives towards the enterprise sector (focusing on IIS/SMEs); 
" to identify and develop the methodology for the enquiry; 
11 Hl and H2 focus on the role and impact of the IIS on three dimensions of enterprise start up, 
that are the choices of industry, location and size. Note that in the hypotheses the timing of 
enterprise start up is considered as an implicit outcome/impact of the IIS. Two dimensions 
of time are built into Hl and H2. The first is where the IIS influences an entrepreneur as a 
source of motivation to start up an enterprise sooner rather than later (this is dealt with in 
Hl). And the second dimension of time is where IIS assists entrepreneurs, who have already 
started implementing a project, to cut the lead time to start an enterprise (this is discussed 
along with H2). 
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" to discuss and evaluate whether the IIS has influenced entrepreneurial 
decisions over choice of the type, location and size of enterprises; 
" to discuss and show how the IIS served as a gateway to resources and eased 
bureaucratic procedures; 
" to provide recommendations for the development of the Ethiopian 
enterprise economy. 
To meet these objectives, explore the hypotheses and answer the questions set out 
above, the development of the thesis was firmly based on the conceptual 
framework and methodology outlined below. 
1.4 Conceptual framework and methodology 
The conceptual framework developed and employed in this thesis followed the 
approaches by Miles and Huberman (1994) and Blackmore and Ison (1998). The 
main purpose was to determine the boundary of the core area of the study. Hence, 
at the heart of the study, and this framework, were the IIS and the entrepreneurs 
it induced to set up enterprises (as shown in Figure 1.1). Figure 1.1 also shows: 
First, the environment for enterprise development (labelled C): this environment 
is made up of forces that impinge on the role and impact of the IIS and the 
enterprises it assists. These forces, however, are numerous to list and it is difficult 
to establish their relationships and measure their relative influence over the IIS 
and assisted enterprises (AEs). However, this whole system includes: (i) forces 
close to AEs - these are suppliers of capital goods, labour, credit, enterprise site, 
competing and collaborating enterprises, and linkages that exist between these 
enterprises. (ii) social and economic infrastructure and institutions like skills 
training institutions and roads, non-IIS enterprise support initiatives and 
federal/regional level government departments that license and regulate 
businesses. (iii) factors profoundly built into the cultures, religions and 
psychology of Ethiopians that motivate or inhibit entrepreneurial development 
and impinge on the nature of goods and services produced and consumed. And 
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(iv) forces that seem distant to the IIS and enterprises but still affect enterprise 
development, including world politics, economy and technology, human and 
environmental disasters. This whole system provides the positive and negative 
incentives for enterprise development. 
The degree to which the elements of the environment were studied and reported 
in the thesis varied depending on the expected impacts of these forces on the IIS 
and the AEs. Accordingly, some elements of (i) and (ii) above, and forces that 
emerge from, and are very much intertwined with government enterprise policies, 
the history, culture, religion and geography of Ethiopia and that impact of the IIS 
and AEs were carefully selected and reported in the thesis. In short, the review of 
literature on theory and practice of enterprise start up (notably SMEs), and the 
study on Ethiopian enterprise economy have examined the extent to which this 
whole system environment (C) supports the success of the IIS in inducing 
enterprise start up. 
18 
Figure 1.1 Framework of environment for enterprise development, the 
investment incentives and enterprises start up systems 
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Second, the IIS system (labelled A): The IIS is a sub-system of the whole system 
for enterprise development. It was a deliberate creation of the government to 
induce entrepreneurs to set up enterprises in selected areas and believed to have 
contributed to the overall development of enterprises. The IIS system has clearly 
marked boundaries as entry into the system was based on criteria defined by 
regulation or law. Accordingly, entrepreneurs who positively perceive the 
screening process for incentives and pass the eligibility criteria, as required by 
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regulation, enter into IIS system. The Ethiopian Investment Authority (EIA) and 
regional investment offices grant entrepreneurs an investment licence, and the 
units (in the terminology of this thesis) became AEs. It follows, therefore, that the 
IIS system was made up of three inter-linked components: 
" IIS policy making domain - the body of the government that decided on 
the role and contents of investment incentives. 
" The institution (EIA and regional investment offices) that delivered 
investment incentives to the entrepreneurs or enterprises. 
" The domain that consisted of assisted entrepreneurs /enterprises 
through the IIS. 
The IIS was largely a top-down enterprise support initiative, that is investment 
incentives and the institution that delivered them were put in place with no or 
little participation from the entrepreneurs. However, since the mid 1990s some 
piecemeal changes to the level of incentives and the procedures for acquiring 
them were taking place in an interactive way between the forces within the IIS 
system. To reflect on this development a two way relationship (although 
admittedly weak) was conceptualised between the three components of the IIS. 
The IIS system, therefore, constituted the core area of the thesis, and the 
exploration of hypothesis one (Hl) rested on this system. 
Third, a redrawn or extended boundary for the IIS system (labelled B): As stated 
above, the core IIS system boundary (A) was closed to entrepreneurs/ enterprises 
that did not meet the entry criteria for the scheme. However, over the course of 
my ground level study I discovered that the IIS system provided benefits that 
were not essentially part of the system. In this sense, therefore, the IIS system was 
open outwards and assisted AEs to draw some benefits from elements of the 
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environment outside the IIS core boundary (A)12. These external benefits that AEs 
drew on emerged from resources controlled and allocated by the government and 
its institutional support. Hence it was essential to reconceptualise IIS's role and 
boundary. From this re-drawn IIS boundary (shaded area B) some AEs got easy 
and/or free access to enterprise site, better access to energy source and bank 
credit, and easier enterprise licensing procedures. Even access to foreign exchange 
(allocated by the government including that originally supplied by multilateral 
donors like the World Bank) was made available on a priority basis to AEs so that 
the money could be used to purchase capital goods. 
Moreover, it was conceptualised that the forces that determine the boundary of B 
were both within and outside the IIS system (A). However, the most potent forces 
that shape this boundary (B) were the entrepreneurs and the AEs13 themselves. To 
generate benefit outside the IIS system, the entrepreneurs primarily targeted areas 
where property rights were controversially set and/or vaguely defined (for 
example in land). AEs then used multiple strategies (like acknowledging the 
government's controversial stance over the ownership and allocation of land, 
lobbying or seeking favour through unethical practices like bribery) to reap the 
benefits. The precise content of AEs non-IIS benefits, therefore, partly depended 
on the attributes and resources of the entrepreneurs. For example, entrepreneurs 
that were better educated made better use of information about laws and 
regulations related to such resources as land. Hence, unlike the core IIS boundary 
12 To show this outward openness the boundary of A is marked by broken lines. Also note that 
the boundary of B disproportionately incorporates resources and institutions owned and/or 
managed by the government. 
13 Changes in the boundary between the firm and its environment is not new. Amendola and 
Bruno (1990) theorised and observed constantly changing boundaries of the firm especially 
at a time when the firm undergoes radical innovation. According to Amendola and Bruno 
the firm chooses a deliberate strategy that takes elements of the external environment as part 
of its activity - in other words the firm internalise part of the external environment. Chataway 
and Wield (1994) expanded on this with a similar approach. 
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(A), the boundary of B was loose, and to denote this looseness a boundary that 
was irregularly shaped and made of small dotted lines was put round it. 
Many AEs' strategies for acquiring key enterprise start up resources and the 
benefits thereof were associated with the IIS. These non-IIS AEs benefits, as I will 
base this argument on hypothesis H2, had profound impacts in terms of the pace 
of enterprises start up and the choice of location and size of some enterprises. 
Moreover, exploring the complex political, economic and social forces that 
changed the core IIS boundary in itself has become an interesting part of the 
thesis. The exploration of H2 focuses on three most important areas to the 
entrepreneurs: access to enterprise site, energy and credit sources. 
To sum up, from this description and discussion, it follows that boundaries A and 
B and the forces that influence them were the primary focus areas of the thesis. As 
will be reported in chapter four, the conceptual framework, that specified these 
core areas of the study, helped to identify the nature and location of data, review 
theory and practice on SMEs development, and construct background literature 
on the Ethiopian enterprise economy. 
Answers to the questions and exploration of the hypotheses of the study required 
reasonably adequate and reliable data. However, such data on Ethiopian 
enterprises were scarce. Moreover, the heterogeneous nature of SMEs and poor 
physical infrastructure of Ethiopia have severely limited collecting survey based 
data. The conclusions of the thesis are, therefore, based on a wide range of data 
that include macro statistics (particularly that showed the regional distribution of 
enterprises and IIS licensed projects and start ups), past survey results and 
selected case of SMEs. These sources produced data that were complementary in 
that each source confirmed or challenged the conclusions which emerged from the 
other. Data were obtained through interview questionnaire and desk study. 
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Also because of the nature of the enterprises studied and the context of the study, 
in the thesis theories from different disciplines were used. The dominant rational 
for investment incentives is economic - that is entrepreneurs get motivated by 
incentives and start up enterprises in a particular location or industry because 
these incentives reduce start up costs and/or increase the potential for making 
profits. However, the economic logic behind incentives was found inadequate 
because it does not explain, for example, the social and psychological reasons of 
entrepreneurs for starting up enterprises. Hence theories drawn from the 
disciplines of economics and social-psychology were used to identify the complex 
factors that motivate SMEs founders (such as the motives for profits, need for 
independence and/or achievement). Moreover, literature that showed strengths 
of SMEs, among other things, in job creation and concerning the rationales for 
assistance (including through the provision of investment incentives) were used. 
The context of this study (particularly location and industry aspects of IIS impacts 
on the start up of SMEs) has also influenced the selection and use of strands of 
theories from industrial economics and spatial studies. 
1.5 Major findings and the big picture of the study 
Drawing on theory and the empirical evidence generated for the study, the thesis 
found that, in the main, enterprise start-up and entrepreneurs' decisions on the 
type, location and size of enterprises were triggered and caused by the attributes 
and resources of the entrepreneurs and the socio-economic environment including 
institutional sector entry barriers. More specifically the thesis found that, first, the 
increase in the number of enterprise start-ups in the 1990s was, among other 
reasons, due to the end of the civil war and the introduction of a better enabling 
environment. Second, for many SME founders formal and informal training, 
accumulated experience and interest in the chosen sector, the threat of 
unemployment and market opportunities were some of the factors that provoked 
start-up in a particular activity type. Third, the IIS did not influence 
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entrepreneurs' location decisions because IIS benefits were too small to 
compensate for costs like loss of central market and infrastructure. 
However, the thesis found that the IIS positively influenced enterprise size at 
start-up due to, first, duty exemptions which increased savings to the 
entrepreneurs by up to 13 per cent of the total cost of machinery. And second, 
with a view to meeting IIS entry criteria, some of the entrepreneurs studied 
increased the start-up capital of their enterprises. 
To sum up, structural deficiencies such as entrepreneurs being resource poor, and 
inadequate physical infrastructure, made the IIS a less effective enterprise support 
initiative. Consequently, the huge government revenue foregone (over 1992-98 
this was birr 526 million from duties alone) on subsidising start-ups was largely 
ineffective. Moreover, most of the IIS direct and indirect benefits accrued to 
enterprises that were least likely to require government support to choose a 
particular activity and location. Therefore, hypothesis one was fully supported, 
that is that the influence of investment incentives on the timing, type, location and 
size of IIS assisted enterprises was limited. And the conclusion that emerged was 
that the assumptions that the IIS influenced entrepreneurs' decisions on the 
choices of sector and location were deeply flawed. 
The study, however, found that the IIS licence was more useful to the holder 
when used, not as a device for investment incentives as originally intended, but as 
a moderator of access to state controlled resources like enterprise sites. It was 
found that entrepreneurs with subsidised access to an enterprise site saved about 
18 per cent of the total enterprise start-up cost, higher than the 13 per cent savings 
from imported machinery. Furthermore, owing to institutional support some IIS 
assisted entrepreneurs considerably reduced the lead time for acquiring these 
state controlled resources. Therefore, hypothesis two was also supported: that 
some entrepreneurs sought the support of the IIS, in addition to its fiscal 
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incentives, for its role as gateway to resources (like land and bank credit) required 
for enterprise start-up. 
However, for reasons given later, part of H2 that referred to IIS's role as 'easing 
the bureaucratic business legalisation processes' was not proved correct. 
To conclude, what objects the IIS did or did not influence constituted only part of 
the story of this thesis. As will be shown in concluding chapter eight, the bigger 
picture of the thesis emerges from a critical re-examination of the reasons why the 
IIS proposition was flawed and why it mediated access to resources. It emerges 
that the IIS was neither sufficiently coordinated with other enterprise support 
initiatives, nor primarily considered the needs, potentials and constraints of the 
entrepreneurs. In short the scheme was too prescriptive and attempted to address 
multiple objectives with inadequate means. 
The thesis, therefore, suggests a major change in the thinking behind using an 
investment incentives scheme as a device for enterprise development. This change 
needs to recognise that encouraging physical capital accumulation, albeit 
important, is not everything for the development of the enterprise sector. 
Enterprise support initiatives should focus on the key driving forces of enterprise 
development, such as developing entrepreneurs' technical and managerial skills, 
providing better access to land, finance and infrastructure, and providing 
streamlined procedures for business legalisation. 
A brief structure of the thesis is set out below. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Following this introduction, chapter two provides the theoretical foundation of 
SMEs promotion and start ups. Focusing on recent developments in the SME 
literature, and instruments of investment incentives, the chapter deals with 
concepts and reasons for promoting enterprises. The core of chapter three is the 
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Ethiopian enterprise economy and the investment incentives scheme (IIS). In 
chapter three recent developments of the enterprise economy, its structure, 
linkages, constraints and institutions that provide support (like the IIS) are 
discussed. Chapters two and three combined set the background for the 
development of the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter four outlines the reasons as to why and how different sources of 
evidence were used in the thesis. Moreover, the chapter explains the data 
collection and analysis methods used. Finally, the chapter describes how the 
fieldwork was conducted and the problems faced. 
Chapter five documents the main findings of the enquiry into the roles and 
impacts of the IIS on SMEs development. These findings were based on enterprise 
level qualitative and quantitative data, macro level statistics, and extensive 
interviews with authoritative personalities on the enterprise sector of Ethiopia. 
Chapter six discusses and evaluates the impact of the IIS on enterprise start-up. 
Based on hypothesis one (Hl) of the thesis the chapter explores objects of 
investment incentives (enterprise start-up and entrepreneurial decisions over the 
type, location and size of an enterprise) and whether these were influenced by the 
IIS. Chapter seven, based on hypothesis two (H2) of the thesis, discusses IIS's 
unique role in enterprise start-up resource mobilisation and business legalisation. 
Chapter eight provides the summary and conclusion of the thesis. The chapter 
draws out the bigger picture of the thesis and makes recommendations. Finally 
contributions and original claims of this thesis and directions for further research 
are outlined. 
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2. The Theoretical Foundation of Promoting SMEs Start-ups 
and Growth with Emphasis on the Instrument of 
Investment Incentives 
2.1 Introduction 
The subject of this thesis is the role and impact of investment incentives on 
enterprises, notably SMEs start-up and growth. In particular the thesis looks at 
whether investment incentives have influenced entrepreneurs' decisions over the 
timing of enterprise start-up and the choices of type (or industry), location and 
size of enterprises. 
The literature reviewed in this chapter is closely tied in with the subject of the 
thesis and falls into four broad categories. The first category addresses the 
theoretical and empirical literature that discusses the re-emergence of SMEs out of 
the shadow of large enterprises over the past three decades. Among the extensive 
literature in the area I have identified and examined those that (i) were most 
influential in terms of providing the rationales for assisting SMEs; (ii) those that 
were most identifiable with SMEs development in less developed countries 
(LDCs). Section 2.2 below covers this first part of the literature review. 
The second theme of the chapter is the rationales for and objects of investment 
incentives as a means of promoting enterprise development. Based on this theme, 
section 2.3 examines the role and meaning of and rationales for investment 
incentives. The section particularly addresses the key factors that investment 
incentives are expected to influence. Section 2.4 deals with the third theme of the 
chapter which looks into the broader factors (other than investment incentives) 
that influence entrepreneurs' decisions over the location, type and size of the new 
enterprise. In addition, and in line with the second hypothesis of the thesis, 
section 2.4 reviews the literature on how state and business interest group 
interactions impact on enterprise start-ups and development. 
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The fourth theme of the chapter is the actual performance of investment incentives 
in terms of enterprise start-up and growth in different countries. In assessing the 
performance of investment incentives, section 2.5 takes into account earlier 
discussions on investment incentives and the broader factors that impact on 
enterprise start-up and growth. Finally, by bringing together the key points that 
emerge from the four major themes of the chapter, section 2.6 concludes the 
literature review on SMEs and investment incentives. Section 2.6 also makes 
connections with the key hypotheses and questions of the thesis. The literature 
reviewed under the above four broad categories or themes aims to show the trend 
in the development of the SME literature and support initiatives. 
2.2 Theory and evidence on the re-emergence of the SME sector 
The section begins (in 2.2.1 below) in the early 1970s when SMEs are believed to 
have 're-emerged'. At the outset, note that by SMEs 're-emergence' it was meant 
not that these units made a comeback from extinction, but that their relative 
importance had increased with regard to certain essential qualities like job 
creation, competition and innovation. Section 2.2.2 discusses the key literature 
most identifiable with SMEs development in LDCs. Finally section 2.2.3 further 
examines the agencies and rationales for promoting SMEs development. 
2.2.1 Did the SME sector re-emerge? 
Following the Fordist model of production, consumption and organisation, until 
the early 1970s enterprise size was increasing to take advantage of positive 
economies of scale and specialisation of labour. However, according to wide- 
ranging sources, during the 1970s an 'important reversal in the size structure' 
began to occur - that is production and employment were concentrating in the 
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SME sector (Storey and Johnson (1987), Sengenberger, Loveman and Piore, (1990), 
OECD (1993) and Curran (1999))14 
How significant was this claim and what explained the comeback, if there was 
one, of the SME sector? These questions are carefully examined as there were 
widely divergent views on the actual and potential contributions of SMEs. Some 
of the claims, as Curran (1999) observed, attempted to 'oversell' SMEs' 
contributions. Others were sceptical about the role of and evidence on SMEs' 
contributions (as in Little et a1,1987). One important factor that contributed to 
such divergent views on SMEs strengths was the concept of enterprise size. 
Therefore, before considering the reason for and statistical claims on SMEs re- 
emergence, I first address the conceptual problems. 
First, the concept of an SME. To begin with an SME, as a unit of analysis, 
combines two units: small and medium enterprises. In this sense an SME is a 
simple mental construct because at any particular time and context an enterprise 
can only be either small or medium but not both. Any conclusion on an SME is 
therefore susceptible to a bias to one particular size. Complicating this further, 
enterprise size definitions and subsequent interpretations widely vary within and 
between developed and developing countries (see Box 2.1)15. The very term SME 
was meant to minimise these variations in size definitions (Storey, 1994: 13) but, as 
we will see below, this did not seem to have solved the problem. 
In the context of LDCs, there were also some divergent views over the share of 
SMEs in the size structure of enterprises. Some (as in Peres and Stumpo, 2000: 
14 It is important to note that there was other official and research based literature that 
provoked further work on small enterprises in different countries. One of these was the 
Bolton Commission Report in UK (1971) that gave due emphasis to exploring constraints of 
small firms and areas of support needed to avoid losing them. The review in this section 
largely addresses the underlying strengths of SMEs. SMEs constraints and policy 
implications come in the subsequent sections. 
15 Definitions of key terms like an SME or any other important discussion that create some 
digression in the chapters are given in boxes. 
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1644) perceived that relative to large enterprises, SMEs had a higher share in the 
size structure of enterprises and hence contributed more to employment. Others 
(for example, Navaretti, 1994: 4) considered SMEs as the 'missing middle' in the 
size structure of enterprises. Neither of these views has universal validity. The 
actual share of SMEs in the size structure of enterprises vary between countries 
reflecting the circumstances of those countries, and the variations also depend on 
the way SMEs are defined. 
Box 2.1 Approaches to defining the size of an enterprise 
Approaches to defining the size of an enterprise: what is an SME, and does it 
exist? Curran and Stanworth (1986) argued that people tend to have 
preconceived notions of size - small and/or large. The concept of size, 
therefore, includes (or is based on) the researcher's definition, or that of the 
enterprise's owners or employees - an approach referred to as 'grounded 
definitions' of size. 
But widely applied SME definitions, as an approach, use qualitative and/or 
quantitative measures. Within largely quantitative approaches the two 
common roots to size definition of an enterprise are using economic and 
statistical criteria. The economic criterion refers, for example, to an 
enterprise's relative share of a market, independent existence and the role of 
the owner in management. Statistical definitions, in turn, refer to quantifiable 
variables such as employment and the size of capital invested. Most 
academics and institutions (such as Harper, 1984, Storey, 1994, and World 
Bank, 1994) prefer to use statistical measures based on employment. These 
groups argued that measures based on employment were inflation-proof, 
transparent, comparable and easily available. However, making adjustments 
for seasonal and part-time labour, family labour, and over-time labour remain 
practical problems. 
Enterprise size, which is a dynamic concept, varies considerably between and 
within countries reflecting features of sectors of an economy, legal status and 
ownership structures of enterprises. In the USA an enterprise employing as 
many as 500 persons could be small (Siropolis, 1990: 8), but in Ethiopia (as 
discussed below) an enterprise employing 50 persons could be classified as 
large. The very concept of an SME was coined by the European Council, in 
part, to minimize such variations in size definitions (Storey, 1994: 13). 
However, enterprise size variations persist, making SMEs elusive units. 
Regardless of the measures used, however, a large number of researchers 
agree that there is no universally acceptable definition of a small 
enterprise/SME (Storey, 1994, Sengenberger et al, 1990, and Harper, 1984). 
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Instead the purpose of definition, and simplicity and clarity of criteria, are 
more important than the actual cut-off points. 
Defining the size of an Ethiopian enterprise: as of 1998, in Ethiopia there 
was neither official nor uniform definition of enterprises in general and SMEs 
in particular. However, different agencies and individuals defined an 
enterprise following both qualitative and quantitative approaches and 
classified them as cottage/craft, micro, small, medium and large. For 
example, the Development Bank of Ethiopia defined small enterprises as 
those that start up with less than three million birr (Getachew, 1998). The 
Central Statistical Authority (CSA, 1997d) also defined: 
" medium and large manufacturing enterprises as those engaging 10 or 
more persons and using power-driven machines. Small manufacturing 
enterprises were those engaging less than 10 persons and using power-driven 
machines. 
" cottage/ handicraft manufacturing enterprises (regardless of 
employment size) were those that mainly used non-power-driven machines. 
CSA gave neither size definitions for non-manufacturing enterprises nor 
provided separate definitions for medium and large manufacturing 
enterprises. 
Researchers/ consultants too used different definitions. For example, for the 
purpose of supporting rural based small manufacturing enterprises, Cameron 
(1988) defined these units as those 100 km away from Addis Ababa, 
employing less than 50 persons and birr 10 000 fixed capital at start-up. 
Shiferaw (1994) and Axe (1994) have defined small, medium, SME and large 
enterprises as those units employing 6-15,16-50,6-50 and >50 persons, 
respectively. Among other reasons, this latter definition was meant to serve 
for all sectors of the economy and researchers have started using it to 
construct and analyse survey based data (as in Abdela, 1995). I, therefore, 
adopted the 6-50 employment based definition of SMEs plus a minimum of 
birr 250 thousand capital investment at start-up. 
Second, the statistical claims on the re-emergence of SMEs. Statistics (see, for 
example, Sengenberger, Loveman and Piore, 1990) seemed to show that SMEs 
made some positive employment growth relative to large enterprises. But such 
statistical claims were superficial because a careful assessment of the employment 
contribution of SMEs needed to consider, among other things, (i) the fact that fast 
birth and death rates were (and are) common characteristics of small enterprises, 
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(ii) among the survivors only a few small enterprises grow in size and (iii) the 
decline in employment in large enterprises was small (Storey and Johnson (1987), 
Storey (1994) and McCormick et al (1997)). What this meant was that, taking birth, 
attrition and growth rates of SMEs and large enterprises, the net employment 
contribution of SMEs may actually have been modest. 
Moreover, in the literature the employment measure and contribution of SMEs 
were given emphasis, casting doubts over the presence of other strengths of SMEs 
such as competition, innovation and export. For example, the evidence on 
innovation was mixed or did not place SMEs in a better position than large 
enterprises (OECD, 1993). There were also wider issues like earning levels and 
quality of jobs in the SME sector. Referring to small enterprises, Storey and 
Johnson (1987: 41) showed that as the new jobs created were reflections of 
recessions, many of these jobs were part-time and poorly paid. Overall, though, a 
careful reading of the literature suggests that the SME sector, especially in 
employment measures, did in fact make a comeback (albeit only moderately) since 
the early 1970s. 
Third, the reasons for the re-emergence of the SMEs sector. Many have dwelt on 
the reasons for the re-emergence of the SME sector (see among others, Piore and 
Sabel, 1984, Sengenberger, Loveman and Piore, 1990, and Curran, 1999). Of these 
Piore and Sabel's (1984) The Second Industrial Divide has been most influential in 
terms of providing (a) the evidence on sustained growth of the small enterprise 
and craft sector of Italy and (b) theory, referred to as flexible specialisation, for the 
re-emergence of the small enterprise sector. According to the flexible 
specialisation thesis, two major forces favoured the comeback of SMEs. First, 
technical-organisational efficiency - such as the advent of affordable technology - 
have overcome the 'scale economy' constraint. This was also looked at within the 
context of the ability of small enterprises (as opposed to large ones) to withstand 
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economic turbulence (such as recession/instability of demand). Secondly, the role 
of social or political influence (captured by small enterprises through, for 
example, lobbying) favoured small enterprises (Piore and Sabel (1984) and 
Sengenberger, Loveman and Piore (1990: 5)). 
However, the flexible specialisation thesis, although given much prominence, was 
not adequately able to conceptualise and explain the dynamics of SMEs 
development. Its notion of flexibility was limited to technology while the notion 
of flexibility, as discussed in Massey, Quintas and Wield (1992), included wide 
ranging practices like part-time and temporary work, generalist skills and 
contracting out. What is more, counter-evidence produced from Italian clusters 
(Paloscia, 1991, and Brusco, 1995 and other European clusters like Baden- 
Wurttemberg (Semlinger, 1995) seriously challenged the stability of the thesis 
itself. For example, Paloscia (1991) argued that in the late 1980s, contrary to the 
1970s and early 1980s, the regions of Milan and Lombardy were no longer 
dominated by small enterprises. 
James Curran (1999: 8-9), writing from UK experience, provides a comprehensive 
list of factors that contributed to the re-emergence of SMEs: the re-assertion of an 
enterprise culture, change in technology, economic restructuring and 
globalisation, income effect and new patterns of consumer behaviour, a rise in 
unemployment since 1979, increased out-sourcing and vertical disintegration of 
large enterprises, reduction in red tape and privatization. 
Following the foregoing theories and evidence over the last ten plus years, 
research and public policy, therefore, picked up the themes of new jobs, 
distinctive niches, competition, innovation, flexibility and cooperation and 
became synonymous with SMEs development. These theories and evidence also 
led to a variety of ways of assisting SMEs including through networking, business 
link and finance. For example, owing to SMEs' generally acknowledged lean and 
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flexible structure, networking among these enterprises were considered to 
provide benefits like access to new markets, increased productivity and resources 
use (such as by avoiding duplications of functions among members of the 
network) (Mallidi et a1,1999, and Mezgar et al, 2000). Furthermore, as it will be 
shown below, because these theories and evidence focused on SMEs, they 
appealed to the circumstances of LDCs. 
2.2.2 SME theories and practice and the LDCs 
The two pieces of literature that were most identifiable with SMEs in LDCs and 
contributed to the burgeoning literature thereof were Schumacher's small is 
beautiful and the theory of clusters. 
First, small is beautiful: in his book small is beautiful Schumacher (1973) 
passionately argued for small enterprise in the developing countries for fighting 
the 'inappropriate' large scale technology (of developed countries). In small 
enterprises, Schumacher sought creation of jobs at low capital investment, 
promoting reliance on indigenous resources, levelling out rural-urban income 
differences and environmental considerations16. 
Second, cluster or collective efficiency theory: this is attributed to the work of 
Schmitz and colleagues at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, on LDC 
clusters (Schmitz 1992,1995,1997, and Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). The cluster 
study found that (i) clusters, such as Sinos Valley in Brazil, Sialkot in Pakistan and 
Agra in India, existed outside the developed world. (ii) successful clusters were 
those that were demand driven and acted collectively. Schmitz argued that 
clustering of enterprises internalises local external economies, generating 
competitive advantages to members of the collective. These benefits of clusters, it 
16 With a view to proving this philosophy, an intermediate technology development group 
(ITDG) was set up. ITDG assists small scale producers by providing technical skills and 
technology appropriate to their needs with the ultimate objective of improving the quality of 
lives of these producers (ITDG, 2001). 
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was argued, provided prospects for economic development through small 
manufacturing enterprises in the LDCs. 
The concept of SME clusters is related to the concept of SME networks referred to 
above. Both networks and clusters require enterprises to collaborate and share 
facilities (like warehouses and service centres). However, the cluster and 
networking concepts are different. SME clusters require much more geographic 
proximity and sectoral homogeneity of enterprises (see, for example, Schmitz, 
1995). SME networks, however, are spatially and functionally flexible. These 
characteristics of networks mean that they require better infrastructure and 
information and communication technologies, factors that are scarce in most 
developing countries. Nonetheless there are examples of agency assistance to 
networks that tend to encourage innovation of processes and products as in some 
UNIDO assisted networks (Rogerson, 2001). 
Strengths of developing countries SMEs: As many would argue the beauty of 
small enterprises does not ensure success. SMEs must have unique strengths to 
succeed and bring about socially desired changes. Then the question would be 
whether SMEs in LDCs, as in developed countries, possess strengths, say in 
employment generation, innovation and/or enhance the industrialisation process? 
First, a view supported by many researchers suggests that SMEs in LDCs create 
considerable opportunities for employment, income distribution spatial 
development and industrialisation (see, among others, McCormick, 1993, Cortes et 
a1,1987). At the heart of this argument is that these units tend to be labour 
intensive and spatially and sectorally flexible (that is not constrained as much as 
large enterprises are by infrastructure and market conditions). Given that capital 
is expensive for developing countries, the argument follows, SMEs use more of 
the surplus labour of LDCs. The implication of this argument is that the same 
logic, at least with equal emphasis, cannot be made for large and micro 
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enterprises. The majority of micro enterprises would never grow to maturity or 
peak as they start by offering 'safe' products with a known and fairly certain 
market leading them to intense competition that limits profits and growth 
potentials (McCormick, 1993). Even when other circumstances like infrastructure 
permit, large enterprises require a huge investment at start up that only a few can 
afford17. 
Second, SMEs are more likely to ensure local ownership and control (Kamalkhani, 
1991 and Storey, 1982: 25) than large enterprises. In some countries (such as Kenya 
- McCormick, 1993) the majority of large enterprises tend to be owned by foreign 
subsidiary enterprises. Instead of being invested locally and creating linkages, the 
profits of foreign owned companies are often repatriated. Harper (1984) associates 
the benefits of small enterprises with LDCs to local economies. He notes that small 
enterprises serve as sources of employment for the local poor and women, and 
provide access to local products for the poor. He also argues that small enterprises 
provide more job satisfaction using less management, and more of the profits 
from small enterprises are reinvested in the local economy. 
Third, the argument that generated wider debate but less consensus was the role 
of LDCs SMEs in innovation18. The argument that runs against SMEs being 
innovative was based on the view that savings enabling the introduction of new 
machines and/or allowing the undertaking of research and development activities 
were more likely to be generated in capital intensive (less wage payment) 
situations (Cortes et al, 1987: 8). But Cortes et al dismiss this view and refer to 
17 Again there is a need to be wary of enterprise size definitions. As Little et al (1987) study on 
India showed, labour intensity tended to be higher in the range 26-99 workforce than in the 
10-19 (p. 125). Little et al (1987: 17), hence went on to conclude that 'very small 
establishments (fewer than 10 workers) are destined for extinction unless they become a 
protected species'. 
18 The debate here is not on SMEs in developing countries pioneering the development of new 
machines and products but whether these units adopt new machines and equipment. 
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those who undermine the innovative capacities of SMEs as 'distant observers' 
(Cortes et a1,1987: 8). Based on country studies Cortes et al advanced the view that 
SMEs adopt new technology often in a series of steps that include using 
secondhand technology, learning to repair it, and finally buying (importing) new 
machines. McCormick's argument (1993) supports this later view that SMEs have 
the potential to generate local technological learning and develop technical 
progress and industrialisation. 
Finally, it needs to be noted that there are many more but dispersed and less 
substantiated arguments in favour of SMEs in LDCs. It is also important to 
highlight that SMEs are not always beautiful. These units sometimes operate in 
'bad' working conditions and pay the workforce less (Cortes et al, (1987) and 
Bromley (1985)). 
To summarise, the theories and evidence reviewed above give some hope for the 
development of SMEs in LDCs. SMEs potential and actual job creating strength is 
particularly strong in LDCs. Following such strengths of SMEs, therefore, policy 
makers and donors may need to take wide ranging initiatives to assist SMEs. 
However, the challenges are that making LDCs SMEs flexible and networked 
requires more assistance in information and communications technologies, 
physical infrastructure, business culture and skilled labour. Section 2.2.3 below 
further explores agencies and the soundness of rationales for SME promotion. 
2.2.3 The rationales and agencies for promoting SME development 
Who wants to promote SMEs, and why? Before seeking answers to these 
questions it is important to note two contradictory developments that occurred 
over the last two decades. First, 'government activism' in the economy steadily 
declined. This was for various reasons including the increased power/influence of 
financial markets and globalisation (Arestis and Sawyer (1998: 1) and factors 
referred to as 'government failure' (like excessive state control of the economy 
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leading to corruption, bribery and nepotism) (WDR, 1991: 131). These 
developments led to measures like privatisation and deregulation. The second, 
contrary to the first development, was the birth of a 'new industry' that was 
committed to promote and support enterprises (Bridge, et a1,1998). 
Who are these promoters of private sector enterprise? Chataway (2000) identifies 
agents of private sector enterprise promotion that include the private sector itself, 
NGOs, the state, bilateral and multilateral donors. These blocks of agencies 
consisted of a plethora of organisations largely based in the developed countries 
(DCs). In the 1990s even agencies like the World Bank softened their stance on 
interventions and endorsed 'market-friendly' intervention (WDR, 1991). Sweeney 
(1997: 157) noted that in the 1990s there were too many enterprise promoting 
agencies producing confusing and ill-coordinated initiatives (at least 250 different 
types of policies and programmes to support SMEs and entrepreneurship 
throughout the EU). By the DCs standards the number of private sector promoters 
and the initiatives in LDCs are fewer, nonetheless enterprise (especially SMEs) 
development is at the forefront of the economic policies of many developing 
countries (Rogerson, 2001, and Peres and Stumpo, 2000). 
To return to the question of why agencies would want to promote SMEs, 
promoting agencies themselves, academics and consultants (Loucks, 1988, 
Sengenberger et a1,1990, OECD, 1993, and Storey, 1994) provided a long list of 
reasons for intervention in SME development including: job creation, innovation, 
fostering entrepreneurship, competition, serving a niche market, promoting 
regional development and conserving the environment (as discussed in section 
2.2.1). But do these strengths of SMEs necessarily require assistance, or in other 
words, which markets failed to justify intervention? 
On the face of it reasons for promoting SMEs may be grouped under alleviating 
supply and demand side constraints to SMEs start-ups and growth. Most 
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recurring supply-side problems range from (small) enterprises' inability to 
influence government policy, to a list of 'gaps'. These gaps include: the lack of an 
analytical approach to problem solving, learning gaps (experience and 
knowledge), and resource gaps - most importantly finance. On the demand side, 
for example, Tendler and Amorim (1996) state that enterprises tend to fail to take 
up supply side support such as credit and training. Hence, Tendler and Amorim 
argue that demand side support (including purchases by government 
departments) to small enterprises is more effective than supply side support. 
Moreover, intervention instruments too may be grouped under hard and soft 
supports. 'Hard support' includes such measures as finance and premises, 
whereas 'soft support' deals with training, consultancy, marketing and other 
advice. 
Going back to the key question of how sound were the reasons for intervention, 
Storey highlights the contradiction that committed 'free market' governments 
resort to active intervention in the small enterprise sector but also found 'very 
little' justification for doing so (Storey, 1994: 255). According to Storey (1994), who 
studied a range of enterprise support initiatives, there were only a few initiatives 
that were sound in terms of a 'market failure' argument. First, the comparative 
weakness of small enterprises, that was their 'relatively high cost of compliance 
with government regulations' (Storey, 1994: 256) has generated a valid 
justification for intervention. Second, the presence of the 'appropriability' problem 
in the high technology firms provided a reason for support because unless small 
enterprises were able to appropriate the fruits of their own inventions the desire 
to be innovative will fail and financiers will withdraw their backing. The other 
reasons for enterprise support that Storey looked at included promoting 
competition and strengthening production chains through subcontracting. 
39 
Most of the market failure arguments for promoting SMEs were, however, driven 
by the logic of welfare economics. The view of this thesis is that welfare economics 
should not be the only guide for supporting enterprises. As Hodgson argued 'the 
objectives of firms are culturally and institutionally specific' (Hodgson, 1996: 410). 
This meant that entrepreneurs have many strategies like seeking to maximize 
profit and creating jobs (for themselves and members of the community). In a 
given context, therefore, such objectives need to be considered. 
Beyond 'market failure' arguments, there were also signs that private sector 
enterprise promotion in some LDCs has become a means of promoting the 
different agenda of the agencies involved in the business of assisting enterprises. 
For example, in his Tanzanian study Hewitt (1999) noted the existence of different 
motives for promoting the private sector - while the Tanzanian government 
agenda was to overcome economic crisis and secure donors' financial assistance, 
donors like the World Bank sought to promote transition from state to private 
sector. 
Finally those in the business of assisting the operations of private enterprises need 
to consider the form that assistance should take. As we will see in the next section, 
the question of 'how to intervene' needs to address issues like: (i) identifying 
targets and levels of intervention (such as SMEs, large and/or rural enterprises, 
microenterprises, etc. at the national, regional and local level). (ii) developing 
principles of intervention such as involving targets in problem assessment and 
design of the support system/structure (Argyris, 1970). (iii) identifying 
instruments that enhance (or work directly on) the objectives/rationale for 
intervention. 
To sum up, the foregoing discussion showed that agencies (notably governments) 
initiate enterprise support policies with a view to maximising SME strengths like 
job creation, innovation and promoting competition. Governments also step into 
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private enterprise development to alleviate some constraints to SME development 
like shortages of finance. Within the LDC context, SMEs were promoted for 
reasons that include creating jobs, income distribution, spatial development and 
industrialisation. The discussion also notes that although there were many 
enterprise support initiatives, some of these initiatives lacked coordination and a 
convincing rationales. Inadequate reasoning for an initiative, I will argue, is a 
serious problem as this suggests that a particular instrument(s) used to assist 
SMEs may not have addressed their problems and subsequently achieved the 
objectives of a programme. 
Within the foregoing broader context of supporting SMEs, the following section 
looks at investment incentives, its concept, rationales and instruments. As I will 
demonstrate in the next section, from the outset it has to be noted that assisting 
enterprises through investment incentives stretches over several decades 
preceding the theory and evidence that explained the re-emergence of SMEs. 
Investment incentives were used to assist large (often manufacturing) enterprises. 
The foregoing literature review, however, supports that, first, assisting SMEs 
through investment incentives, traditionally reserved to large manufacturing 
enterprises, has become a reality19. And, second, the reviewed literature 
underpinned the thinking behind any intervention - that is addressed questions 
like who, why and how to assist SMEs. 
19 There are several examples in this direction both in developed and developing countries. In 
the UK, for example, in 1999 the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced a scheme referred 
to as enterprise management incentives scheme (EMIS) to encourage successful managers to 
set up new enterprises by allowing them share options worth up to £100 000 free of income 
tax (The Economist, Nov. 6,1999). In developing countries, including as this study on Ethiopia 
would show, out of appreciation of the role of SMEs governments assist and protect them 
from competition from large foreign enterprises through investment incentives schemes. 
41 
2.3 The meaning of and rationale for investment incentives 
Being central to this thesis, this section focuses on the instrument of investment 
incentives as a means of promoting enterprise start-up and growth. The section 
proceeds with the role, meaning and sources or 'determinants' of investment 
(section 2.3.1). Secondly, the meaning and types of investment incentives are 
addressed in section 2.3.2. Here, what investment incentives are supposed to 
influence (the objects of investment incentives) will be discussed. Finally in section 
2.3.3 the rationales for investment incentives are considered. 
2.3.1 Role and causes of investment 
The theory of economic growth places significant attention to investment20, and 
shows close correlations between growth in output (specially manufacturing 
output), income and export and investment (or capital accumulation) (Lewis, 
1955, and Kaldor, 1978). The theory identifies technology embodied in new 
equipment and machines as the key determinant of growth (as these equipment 
and machines enable the production of more output per unit of input or the same 
level of output for less use of input). More capital accumulation, therefore, was 
meant to create economies of scale and accelerate growth. 
The theory of economic growth had significant policy implications for LDCs. It 
suggested that LDCs had to invest a higher proportion of their national income on 
new techniques of production21. The theory also meant that LDCs that could not 
invest and create new techniques of production should import those techniques. 
Those countries that were limited by or lacked the necessary resources (like 
20 Investment by households, governments and NGOs matter to growth, development and 
poverty reduction. However, the focus of this section, following the conventional literature, 
is on investment by private enterprises. 
21 Such policy implications were most obvious from W. Arthur Lewis's conclusion. Based on 
historical data from developed countries, Lewis concluded that investing 10-12 per cent of 
national income achieved 3 to 4 per cent of growth in income (Lewis, 1955: 202). For LDCs 
this meant that an even higher proportion of their income had to be invested to bring about 
growth and bridge the gap between them and DCs. 
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engineers, R&D fund) for investment still had to import these technologies even 
when it required borrowing and/or aid money. The other vehicle for technology 
transfer was attracting foreign direct investment (FIJI). 
However, as was found later, sources and conditions for growth were much more 
complicated than acquiring production techniques (Arrow, 1974). For example, 
knowledge that was not embodied in the new technology, that is 'disembodied 
knowledge' and learning-by-doing, were found to have contributed in causing 
growth. Moreover, as the examples given in Anderson (1990) show, growth in 
agriculture was partly due to improved husbandry and in manufacturing was 
partly due to improvement in organisation and reduction in managerial 
inefficiencies. Further, the state of skill, education and health of the population of 
a country, its institutions and the available public works like roads and natural 
resource endowment also contributed to growth. 
A far stronger area of literature also gave due emphasis to building technological 
capabilities as sources of sustained growth than a mere acquisition of technique of 
production. According to this later literature, technological capabilities are largely 
internal to the firm and include firm specific or private knowledge (tacit 
knowledge), skills and management that emerge from in-house learning, 
innovation, and organisation that enables not only the development of new 
products but also improve on existing processes (see, among others, Navaretti, 
1994, Najmabadi and Lall, 1995, Forbes and Wield, 2000, and Chataway and 
Wield, 2000). 
The foregoing brief review of the literature suggests a narrow and broad view of 
investment. The narrow view considers investment as capital formation - the 
acquisition or creation of physical assets to be used in production (as in Coen and 
Eisnes (1987: 980). The broader view of investment considers learning and creating 
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technological capabilities as a means of sustaining growth and development22. 
These narrow and broad views of investment correspond to two views on 
technology put forward by Rhodes and Wield (1994). The first is that technology 
is 'machine-centred' where technological activities are perceived in terms of 'the 
production or use of hardware and their software' (Rhodes and Wield, 1994: 86). 
And the second view considers technology 'as a body of knowledge, one which 
centres on the accumulated body of learned principles, procedures, skills (... ] 
deployed in the pursuit of technological goals or tasks' (Rhodes and Wield, 1994: 
88). Here note that the latter view takes into account what the narrow view 
undermines: knowledge emerging from production methods, work organisation 
and 'machineless technology'. 
In terms of policy implications, the narrow view of investment prescribes 
'transfer' of technology while the broader approach suggests creating and 
building technological capabilities. As argued in Rhodes and Wield (1994: 87), 
among the limitations of 'machine-centred' view of technology was its focus 
towards machine intensive production systems. This could cause adverse 
consequences in many developing countries as machine intensity not only is 
incompatible with their resource endowment and market, but also expensive to 
acquire and implement. 
Many developing countries, including Ethiopia, took on board the narrow view of 
investment and pursued the policy of technology transfer. The consequence of this 
strategy for LDCs, as Mytelka (1992) showed, was to undermine indigenous 
technological capability development. Mytelka (1992), based on her study of Cote 
d'Ivoire, demonstrated that technologies imported by LDCs or 'transferred' via 
FDI produced products and services similar to that where the machines 
22 This thesis, following the purpose and definition of the Ethiopian investment incentives 
scheme, follows the narrower view of investment. The emerging broader view of investment, 
however, will be discussed in the conclusion of the thesis. 
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originated. This strategy, Mytelka (1992: 224) argued, missed the 'purpose' of 
industrialisation - that is learning the technology, its specification and design, 
process, making use of local resources, relevant to local environment and demand. 
Moreover, particularly with regards to FDI, there were adverse welfare 
implications too, for example, where investment returns have been repatriated 
(Reis, 2001) without being invested locally so that linkages are created. Overall, 
what this review suggests was that the simplistic view of investment has been 
challenged, and over time the literature moved on to making investment and 
growth meaningful to people by linking technology to employment, development 
and reduction of poverty (Sen, 1975, Smillie, 1991, Jalilian and Weiss, 2001). 
So far I have discussed the role of investment in growth and development. But 
what causes investment itself? According to the conventional theory of 
investment, a range of factors 'determine' or cause investment. These factors 
include: growth in output and per capita income, level of interest rate and 
increase in bank credit, high expected rate of return on investment, increase in 
consumer demand, political stability and favourable terms of trade (Oshikoya, 
1994, Driver and Moreton, 1992 and Galenson, 1984). As this study will 
demonstrate, non-conventional causes of investment may also include factors like 
licensing procedures for investment and access to resources like land and energy 
sources. 
The direction of effect (positive or negative) that some of the causes of investment 
produce are not always clear. Similarly, whether growth causes investment or the 
vice versa are not always clear (Jalilian and Weiss, 2001). But general growth 
theories and empirical evidence, as stated already, suggest a positive correlation 
between output growth and per capita income growth and investment (Driver 
and Moreton, 1992 and Oshikoya, 1994. ). This relationship is often based on a 
linear link between savings, savings mobilisation and investment - that is higher 
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output/per capita income is supposed to result in a higher level (in proportion to 
national income) of savings which in turn leads to a higher level of investment. 
I will argue that the assumed linear relationships between savings and investment 
may not be always clear. In some developing countries in particular, high income 
levels may not necessarily ensure either a high level of savings or investment. 
High income levels may be wasted on cultural practices like high expenditure 
during holidays, weddings and funerals which reduce the available savings. 
Similarly, unless the banking and taxation systems are strong, savings may not be 
mobilised and converted into investment. The role of government spending on 
private investment also matters. As seen in former socialist countries, growth in 
per capita income did not affect private investment as private investment was 
limited by law. 
2.3.2 Meaning and types of investment incentives 
As the foregoing literature review showed, assisting developing countries 
(manufacturing) enterprises has its root in the theory of development economics. 
Following this theory many developing countries, and African countries after 
independence, have introduced investment incentives (Galeson, 1984). Without 
going into the details of historical developments of investment incentives23 below 
I will explore the meaning and types of investment incentives. 
The meaning of investment incentives: What are the factors (or objects) that 
investment incentives are supposed to influence? The answer to this question 
forms an integral part of the definition of investment incentives. The World 
Investment Report (WIR) defined investment incentives as 'government measures 
23 UNCTAD (1996) refers to the first argument for investment incentives as made by the 
welfare economist Pigue in 1920. However, although historical records are dispersed and 
difficult to synthesise, there are indications that investment incentives were in use in the 
early days of industrialisation. This is apparent from Adam Smith's 1776 writing, in which 
he opposed particular encouragements, duty drawbacks, bounties and restraints such as 
tariffs - on the ground that these distort the operations of the market (Smith, 1976: 450-451). 
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designed to influence the size, location or industry of an investment by affecting 
its relative cost or potential for profit, or by altering the risks attached to it' 
(UN/WIR, 1994: 290). In a similar vein, UNCTAD (1996) endorsed the definition 
of investment incentives as: 
... any measurable economic advantage afforded to specific enterprises 
or categories of enterprise by (or at the direction of) a government, in 
order to encourage them to behave in a certain manner' (UNCTAD, 
1996: 3). 
Investment incentives are, therefore, targeted to influence enterprise behaviour 
with regards to the size, location and sector of an investment. Moreover, 
investment laws of individual countries (see, for example, OECD, 1979) showed 
that investment incentives target enterprise start-up itself by granting incentives 
to both indigenous and foreign enterprises. However, in practice the notion of 
incentives (and their consequences) being wholly 'measurable' is unrealistic (see 
chapter four). 
Types of investment incentives: The literature identifies three types of 
investment incentives (UNCTAD, 1996, and OECD, 1979): 
fiscal incentives: tax based concessions, for example on investment, profit, 
value added, import of goods like machines, equipment and raw materials. 
The main instruments of fiscal incentives are duty and income tax 
exemptions. Levels of concessions are often expressed in terms of per cent 
and number of years (holidays). Fiscal incentives are commonly used by 
developing countries facing shortages of financial resources to support 
enterprises. 
financial incentives: these are direct grants and subsidies to enterprises. 
Grants for the purchase of machines and equipment, buildings; subsidised 
access to industrial sites, grants for labour and/or other operating costs, and 
training subsidies. Upper/lower limits to the size of financial incentives may 
be set as a per cent of investment capital, profit, etc. Developed countries, 
relative to developing countries, use more financial incentives for 
enterprises. 
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other incentives: these include the provision of specific infrastructure, as in 
enterprise zones, and subsidising training, preferential access to foreign 
exchange, etc. 
Fiscal incentives are, therefore, only one component of investment incentives. And 
there are key differences between fiscal and financial incentives. Among other 
things, the effects of fiscal incentives: 
are contingent upon or follow entrepreneurial action and result. This means 
that exemptions from import duties and income taxes depend on the actions 
of actual importing and making profits. 
unlike financial incentives no direct financial resources are required to grant 
incentives. 
are less flexible. Fiscal incentives do not provide immediate cash flows that 
may be employed in different ways. 
From the nature of investment incentives it therefore follows that many factors 
affect enterprise and economy wide impacts of investment incentives. These 
factors include: 
the level and type of tax rates and tax accounting systems. This means that 
(a) whether a tax exemption is based on 5 or 50 per cent of value determines 
the level of incentives. (b) for income tax purposes, for example, small 
enterprises may not be readily available to tax authorities. In this case 
whether taxes are exempted or not matters very little. Import duties, on the 
other hand, are easy to administer at the point of entry. (c) whether tax 
accounts exist and tax collectors are incorruptible also matter. 
relative costs (or substitutability) of resources: relative costs of labour, capital 
and costs of raw materials influence the options for import and domestic 
acquisition of these resources. Interest and inflation rates also affect the use 
of borrowed money for investment and hence the use of incentives. 
the attractiveness of a particular sector and location for investment also 
matters. Political stability is also a factor for investment to take place and 
hence incentives to be used. 
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time lag for policy to work. For example, in Ethiopia income tax incentives 
are granted on the assumption that enterprises will be set up and make 
profits within one to five years. 
associated services such as access to enterprise site and utilities also affect the 
use of incentives. 
Why were the objects of investment incentives such as influencing the behaviour 
of enterprise with regards to the size, location and sector so important? And how 
sound were the reasons for investment incentives? With these questions in mind, 
below I consider the rationale for investment incentives. 
2.3.3 The rationales for investment incentives 
Studies (Galenson, 1984, and UNCTAD, 1996) present arguments for investment 
incentives within the context of foreign investment. I will argue that those 
arguments can legitimately be expanded to include indigenous 
enterprises/investment. Hence the rationale for investment incentives may 
include: 
(1) the infant industry argument: this is essentially an economic development 
argument to support a specific activity like engineering where there is a need 
for a long learning period and profitability of investment may well be in the 
long term. If private enterprises are reluctant to invest in such activities then 
there is a 'market failure' argument for granting investment incentives. In 
these cases investment incentives are believed to promote entrepreneurial, 
managerial and technological capability building. Incentive-induced 
imported technology promotes the transfer and diffusion of technology. As 
Wade argued, given that more external benefits are created relative to the 
social costs of supporting enterprises, then 'a prima facie case for 
intervention' is created (Wade, 1990: 13)24. 
24 Note that Wade's (1990: 12) argument was broader than simple accumulation of physical 
assets. This was apparent from his argument in assisting a firm that invests in acquiring and 
mastering technology (including involving 'reverse-engineering) through tax incentives for 
the potential loss of staff who leave the firm and get employed in a competing firm. Such 
assistance, Wade argued, reverse the possible underinvestment by firms as they envisage 
losing their potential benefits. 
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(2) the externality/spillover effect: a related but not necessarily similar 
argument for investment incentives was the logic of economies of scale. It is 
believed that increase in the size of an enterprise in socially desirable sectors 
is associated with diffused knowledge and transferred technology that 
produce external benefits. From the benefits of scale economies and 'learning 
by doing' incentives result in declining cost, and declining cost makes 
enterprises competitive. However, it can be argued that this rationale has a 
downside - that is (a) technology transfer may well result in the introduction 
of 'inappropriate' technology and/or discourage the development of 
indigenous technological capabilities. And (b) support agencies are taken as 
best judges of the future/performance of an economy. 
(3) the promotion of regional/sectoral linkages: a similar rationale to the above 
is the strengthening of regional and sector linkages. Uneven distribution of 
resources, economic activities and income levels poses particular concerns 
for the health of a nation including in terms of political stability. An OECD 
document (1979: 13) strongly states that financial incentives are 'key 
instruments for regional policies'. Investment incentives strengthen regional 
(and sectoral) linkages and bring regional economies to the heart of 
development activities. The realisation of this, however, rests on the 
presence of factors like social and physical infrastructure. Secondly, 
substantial individual investments (that is with assistance) are also believed 
to generate sequential investment that creates spillover effects in selected 
areas and sectors. 
(4) to compensate for lost return due to other distortions such as high interest 
rates/land costs. 
What level of incentives is sufficient to generate the desired effect? There are 
some general principles used in providing incentives to enterprises. First, 
incentives are provided if net social benefits are greater than private benefits. 
Hence, the difference between private and social benefits constitutes the level of 
incentives that will be granted to private enterprises (UNCTAD, 1996: 9). Second, 
investment incentives should make a noticeable impact on the performance of 
individual enterprises. However, I argue that in practice it is very difficult to 
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reckon the difference between private and social benefit and hence the 'real' 
amount of incentives to be granted. 
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, investment incentives are only a small 
part of broader factors that impact on enterprise start-up and growth. Hence with 
a view to putting the role and impact of IIS on enterprise start-up in context, 
below broader factors that influence the objects of investment incentives (that is 
enterprise start-up, entrepreneurial decisions on type, location and size of an 
enterprise) are studied. The section starts by outlining the enterprise start-up 
process and how investment incentives fit into the process. 
2.4 Theories of SME start-ups and growth 
2.4.1 Enterprise start-up processes 
Enterprise (or business) 'start-up' study, according to Birley (1989) consists of 
processes that involve decisions to set up an enterprise and mobilise resources to 
begin operation. Enterprise start-up decisions, in turn, are influenced by complex 
factors. Gibb, for example, has identified four of these key factors: the motivation, 
commitment and ability of the founder, the idea (that is viability and acceptability 
in the market) and the physical and financial resources of the founder (Gibb, 
1987b: 25). 
Studies (among others, Gibb, 1987b and Fisher, 1988) have put key enterprise 
start-up factors in stages. For example, Fisher identified five stages of the process 
of enterprise start-up and stabilisation (Fisher, 1988: 90): 
1. idea generation. Intention to start-up a business (production and/or service) 
and the motivating factors are the main elements at this stage. 
2. validation and conceptualisation of enterprise idea. At this stage decisions 
are made on the type of product or sector that would be undertaken, and 
location of the enterprise. 
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3. preparation on start-up. Here feasibility of the project is tested in terms of its 
market potential and strategy, and finances, legal and organisation formats 
are decided. 
4. initial implementation. At this stage premises and machines are purchased 
or rented, labour is contracted, etc. and the new enterprise is born. 
5. stabilisation. This is an early stabilisation stage. The new enterprise either 
promises success or failure. 
The purpose of investment incentives is to influence the choices of sector, location 
and size of an enterprise that refer to elements of stage two of the process of 
enterprise start-up. Investment incentives are also meant to influence enterprise 
idea generation (stage one). Moreover, through post start-up tax relief, they are 
meant to stabilise the growth of new enterprise start-ups. 
Here entrepreneurs' cognition, that is their mental process of perception, memory, 
learning, problem solving and decision making (as, for example, in Daniels and 
Henry, 1998) is important. Entrepreneurs' decisions may rest on information from 
the environment or their own experience. But decisions in smaller enterprises may 
not be based on adequate or actively researched information. In this regard, 
Driver and Merton (1992) noted that many small firms are risk averse, largely 
because they have limited information and/or the perception that the cost of 
information may exceed the benefit of it. 
25 In the same vein, a study by Gelderen et al (2001) showed a strong relationship between an 
entrepreneurs' ability to use information and his/her success. The authors identified four 
characteristics of strategies used by founders of small enterprises: reactive, opportunistic, 
complete planning and critical point strategy. The authors' definition of strategy included 
both that formally written down and loosely followed sketches in the mind of the 
entrepreneur. Based on 80 founders of small firms in the Netherlands, the authors found a 
positive and significant relationship between success (growth of enterprises, investment, 
profits, etc. ) and the critical point strategy that founders followed. The reasons for this were 
apparent from the characteristics of the four strategies: those entrepreneurs that followed a 
reactive strategy were driven by situations, and made little proactive use of information. 
Those that adopted an opportunistic strategy, although proactive in terms of using 
information, deviated from their original course of action as opportunities arose. Complete 
planning strategy was not only expensive to carry out but also of less use as the uncertain 
environment changed. This left the critical point strategy as most successful as it focused on 
'the main issue at stake' (Gelderen et al, 2001: 177). 
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The next sections discuss sources of enterprising ideas, and factors that influence 
the choice of product, location and size of an enterprise. 26 
2.4.2 Sources of enterprising ideas 
Before considering sources of enterprising ideas, here I start by clarifying the 
concept of the entrepreneur. Who is the entrepreneur? The extensive literature 
consulted (see, among others, Casson, 1987, and Binks and Vale, 1990) defines the 
entrepreneur in terms of his/her characteristics such as foresight, confidence, 
intelligence, perception and risk-taking. Gray (1998) who provides a 
comprehensive discussion on the typologies of entrepreneurs, shows how often 
entrepreneur characteristics (definitions) were two-way classifications: as 
craftsman vs. opportunistic and growth oriented vs. survivors. For example, Gray 
(ibid) explains that those entrepreneurs who were better educated, socially adept, 
actively seek and use information, and are the least driven by circumstances to 
start enterprises as growth oriented. Whereas survivors were situation driven 
(unemployment, redundancy, lack of alternative opportunity) and with only 
limited survival skills. According to Siropolis (1990: 42) 'survivors' include 
entrepreneurs that went into business for the 'wrong reason' such as being 
demoted, passed up for promotion, or fired. They had an uncertain outcome as far 
as success was concerned. 
Some authors refer to entrepreneurs as people without wealth but having the 
insight to create businesses from scratch; others portray them as owners of 
businesses or owner-managers. In short, the literature does not provide a 
universally accepted definition of the entrepreneur. The view I have taken in this 
26 The relevance of contingency theory, or the 'law of situations' for the discussion in this 
section is acknowledged. The theory asserts that features of an enterprise are determined in 
such a way that the new enterprise fits into its environment (Carlisle, 1975). Enterprises, 
however, do not always fit into the environment they operate in. As the introduction chapter 
showed enterprises attempt to change their environment. For example, some of the cases 
studied here adopted technologies that were not labour saving, and some others changed the 
property right regime, etc. 
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thesis is that any SME founder or owner-manager is an entrepreneur. This 
founder does not necessarily start with a fundamentally 'new' idea. Given the 
presence of a demand /supply gap or inefficiency in the production of existing 
product/service, entrepreneurs react to these situations and set up an enterprise 
and become owners and/or managers. Based on entrepreneurs' motivations and 
performance a distinction, as in Gray (1998), will be made between those who are 
growth oriented and those that are survivors. 
What are the sources of enterprising ideas? The reference point for enterprise 
ideas is the entrepreneur, the elusive agent of change (Schumpeter, 1961) or one 
with positive attributes of self-esteem obtained from parental encouragement 
(McClelland, 1961) or one whose entrepreneurial drives come from a troubled 
childhood and lack of security (Kets de Vries, 1985). Following economists' 
arguments (for example, Baumol, 1968, and Casson, 1987), demand for the 
entrepreneur is chiefly caused by individual profit opportunities or a return to 
entrepreneurial activities. And supply of the entrepreneur is determined by 
factors like mobility of people from non-entrepreneurial activities to 
entrepreneurial activities (or example, salaried managers and manual work to 
entrepreneurial work), entrepreneurial individuals from the indigenous 
population, net immigration, cultural attitudes and removal of barriers to entry. 
The social-psychological approach to the study of entrepreneurs (or example, 
Cooper, 1986 and Stokes, 1998) looks into entrepreneurial traits, motives and 
backgrounds. Cooper (1986) puts the influence upon the decision to found an 
enterprise under the headings of: 
(i) the entrepreneur and antecedent influences upon the entrepreneur including 
family, religion and educational background, psychological make-up, age, 
earlier career experience, and opportunity to form entrepreneurial groups, 
(ii) the incubator organisation, the organisation for which the founder had 
worked before (geographic location, nature of skill and knowledge acquired, 
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motivation to stay with or leave the organisation, and experience in small 
business setting), and 
(iii) various external factors such as availability of knowledge about 
entrepreneurship, societal attitudes towards entrepreneurship, ability to save 
seed capital, accessibility and availability of venture capital, accessibility to 
customers, support services, opportunity for interim consulting and 
economic conditions. 
Further, entrepreneurial attributes such as initiative, risk taking, independence or 
autonomy, need for achievement, control, leadership, and hard work (Gibb, 1987a: 
6) may come from (a) pull factors like desire for independence, exploiting 
opportunities, work experience, financial incentives, and (b) push factors such as 
redundancy, unemployment and disagreement with previous employers. 
Some SME studies make some broad generalisations some of which may not have 
any cross-country or temporal validity. For example, based on UK studies, Stokes' 
(1998) emphasis was placed on entrepreneurs' background including age, gender 
and ethnic origin as sources of entrepreneurship. The 35-50 and over 65 age 
groups were identified as the more likely entrepreneurs27. With reference to 
gender, women (as founders of enterprises) were said to be under-represented, 
and a married person has a better chance in succeeding in owning and running a 
small enterprise (Stokes, 1998: 35). With regard to social and class background, 
those who come from the lower middle class and those with a less academic 
background tended to run small enterprises. It was also suggested that minority 
ethnic groups in the West seemed to have better chances of setting-up small 
enterprises (because of inequality of job opportunities in the mainstream sector of 
the economy). This is again a woolly conclusion as not all ethnic groups produced 
an above average number of entrepreneurs. As Gray (1998: 48-49) argued, the 
27 The assertion here is that while the 35-50 age group consists of those who wait until 
accumulating assets, the over 65 age group are those who go into business when their 
pension is inadequate to live on or they are forced to retire. 
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enterprising characteristics of some minority ethnic groups were more to do with 
social forces like family influences and an ability to network than being an ethnic 
group per se. 
2.4.3 Causes of features of an enterprise 
2.4.3.1 Influences on what to produce 
In the theory of firm (for example, Greer, 1992: 237) two factors are crucial for an 
enterprise to start offering a product or a service. These factors are motivation (to 
earn profit) and ability to make the attempt. Any factor that reduces the 
motive/ability of a potential entrant is referred to as barrier to entry (ibid, p. 237). 
These barriers (that also refer to growth and exit of enterprises) constitute a 
multitude of factors such as competition with established firms, mobility from one 
industry or location to the other, minimum economies of scale and sunk costs 
(that is the presence of relatively large investment that will not be recovered on 
exit). 
Most elements of barriers to entry will be taken up in the discussion below. Here I 
specifically address founder decisions on product or service at enterprise start up. 
These depend on founders' understanding of the market: what buyers want (the 
quality/quantity of product/service) and the enterprises' ability to react to 
buyers' needs (in terms of business strategy these are referred to as key success 
factors - Grant, 1998. This also extends to the analysis of product/service close 
substitutes as buyers would be sensitive to price changes and switch to 
substitutes. The implications are that if the buyer is sensitive to price or quality 
then the new enterprise has to compete on price or quality. 
It follows, therefore, that to develop a product/service that is commercially viable 
and establish a share in the market place the entrepreneur has to conduct market 
research on products/ services supplied and consumed, size and type of 
enterprises. This is the prediction of theory of the firm, which in my view, does 
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not always reflect the reality in the SMEs sector in general and those in LDCs in 
particular. The theory of the firm also barely discusses entrepreneurial 
product/services choices at start up - its preoccupation on markets tends to be for 
established (often large) enterprises. Some founders of SMEs are known for not 
undertaking market research (but establish a single product and limited channels 
of distribution) (Bridge et a1,1998: 117). 
According to the SMEs literature, however, the most important factor in 
determining the choice of a particular product/service is the founder. In this 
regard, Binks and Jennings concluded that in the small enterprise sector ... the 
decision as to what to produce is often made before the new entrepreneur has 
actually decided to set up his own business. ' (Binks and Jennings, 1986: 7). This 
means that a product/sector known to the founder through experience, hobby, 
formal or informal training and family tradition provide a good part of 
explanations for taking up a new enterprise. Along similar lines, Fisher (1988: 92) 
argued that the choice of a product is 'highly predetermined by the work 
experience and history of the potential new firm founder'. However, although the 
extent of influence was not stated, some SMEs literature considers external 
inducement factors as having influence over the choice of a sector (or a particular 
product/service). Bridge et al (1998) listed many of these inducements including 
loan services, financial incentives and access to premises. 
2.4.3.2 Influences on where to produce 
Entrepreneurs' location decisions - that is central or peripheral regions, and urban 
or rural sectors - depend on many things including differences in infrastructure, 
product and labour markets and levels of government support. For example, 
referring to Alfred Marshall's clusters, Krugman offers three explanations as to 
why and when manufacturing enterprises concentrate in one location. First, 
concentration offers firms the opportunity to pool industry-specific skills. Second, 
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localised industry supports production of non-tradable inputs. And third, 
information spillover enables firms to use better production functions (Krugman, 
1995: 550-551). In other words, both demand and supply factors make 
manufacturing concentrate in a few sites. Demand for manufacturing output may 
come from agriculture, but a large part of the demand for manufacturing actually 
comes from manufacturing itself - hence the market gets larger where 
manufacturing concentrates (Krugman, 1995: 551). 
Fotopoulos and Spencer (1999) who studied the spatial variation of the Greek 
manufacturing enterprises found that new firm formation was positively affected 
by public spending on infrastructure, regional specialisation and wealth and 
labour productivity of a region. The key policy implication that emerged from this 
study was that public investment in infrastructure building was crucial in spatial 
new firm start ups. 
Oakey and Cooper (1995) discussed that agglomeration, as in Krugman (1995), 
may result in high cost of sites (especially in cities), and higher labour costs 
undermine the positive sides such as higher quality labour and services like 
banks. Similarly concentration of enterprises in specific locations may not be 
socially desirable most notably when spatial development issues, such as 
increasing incomes and differing activities between regions of a country, pose 
concerns for political stability and national security (Hamer, 1985: 3). 
In enterprise location decisions, the founder's environment also has a key role to 
play. Cooper (1986: 109) argued that'[slince founders tend to start firms where 
they are already living and working, there must be organisations which will hire, 
bring into the area, and train the engineers, scientists, and technical managers who 
may someday become technical entrepreneurs'. Further, according to Cooper: 
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If an area is to develop and maintain technical entrepreneurship, 
organisations which can serve as incubators must be present, be 
attracted, or be created. (Cooper, 1986: 109). 
Cooper referred to 'technical entrepreneurship' - that is those in the engineering 
firms - but his explanations on location factors and entrepreneurial attributes 
seem to be generally true. 
The literature referred to also showed that non-economic factors also affect 
founders location decisions. Oakey and Cooper (1995: 348) highlighted that 
'personality factors may be important when choosing a plant location, thus 
forcing a compromise between economic and psychological factors'. Based on the 
Brazilian experience, Hamer (1985: xii) argued that '[f]irms do, in fact, appear to 
ignore unfamiliar territory unless they belong to that minority committed to a 
major move: Consequently, Hamer argued, '... it is not surprising that 
hypothetical or actual packages of municipal incentives do little to alter 
behaviour' (Hamer, 1985: xii). 
To summarise, new enterprise formation is associated with public investment in 
infrastructure, market (both demand and supply side), entrepreneurial attributes 
including their social and psychological attachment to a particular location. 
2.4.3.3 Factors that influence enterprise size 
Enterprise size is a feature of an SME study because, as the foregoing sections 
showed, the argument for SMEs is largely based on size. There is a substantial 
volume of literature on factors that determine enterprise size (including on small 
enterprises - see, among others, a survey by You (1995). 28 
28 You (1995) related determinants of small enterprise size to four strands of theories: 
microeconomics of minimum economies of scale, transaction cost theory, theories of 
industrial organisation and business life-cycle model. You (1995) discussed that, first, in the 
conventional microeconomics (also referred to as technological) approach, minimum 
economies of scale (and scope) determine size. The foundation of the minimum economies of 
scale is a fall in average unit costs owing to increases in the scale of output. Second, 
according to the institutional/transaction cost theory, using markets to make transactions 
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However, the literature on factors that determine enterprise size at start up 
(notably for SMEs), with the exception of limited recent contributions like Gorg et 
al (2000), is generally thin. Gorg et al (2000) nominated industry size and growth, 
minimum efficient scale (MES), and changes in the macro economic environment 
as explanations for enterprise size at start up. Based on their statistical analysis of 
the Irish firms, the authors found that large enterprises did not enter markets 
where MES was low (this was, on the one hand, to avoid competition but on the 
other hand in search of a larger market). Most interestingly, the authors also 
concluded that while generally industry size and growth determined start up size 
of large enterprises these factors did not influence the start up size of small 
enterprises. 
Studying enterprise size at start up, I will argue, is more complicated than 
determining statistical relationships on selected variables. Several questions need 
to be asked and answered: what is the measure of size and why do enterprises 
across and within an industry choose different intensity of capital? 
To begin with, as the discussion in Box 2.1 showed, there are several criteria 
(including employment, capital investment, sales and profits) that can be used to 
define an SMEs size. Leaving aside the post enterprise start up size measures like 
sales and profits, SME size defining criteria at start up can be narrowed down to 
factors employed (only to labour and capital invested). Since investment 
incentives focus on fixed investment (plants, machines and equipment) 
involved such costs as search, contract, and means of discouraging opportunism. The extra 
transaction costs of organising production (which often rises with the size of a firm) was the 
limiting factor for the size of the firm (Coase, 1988). Third, industrial organization theories 
put forward explanations such as entry and exit barriers, monopolies, and competition as 
determinants of firm size. Fourth, the life-cycle model, which dealt with birth, growth, 
maturity and decline of firms was popular in the small firms literature (Stanworth and 
Curran, 1981, Gibb and Scott, 1986, and Storey, 1994). The life-cycle theory describes stages 
from business idea generation to business organisation, maturity and stability. I argue that 
the major weakness of the life-cycle model is that stages do not apply to all firms as some 
firms obviously start at a higher stage than others. Moreover, as discussed before, not all 
small enterprises grow to maturity or peak. 
60 
momentarily we can also limit the discussion on size to capital investment 
criterion. But what constitutes capital investment is another issue. If capital 
investment is only to MES of the technique employed (as the conventional firm 
theory would suggest)29 then this will be very simplistic, and, as Lazonick (1991: 
94) argued, intellectually inadequate. When a firm chooses a technique (high or 
low fixed cost) there is the invisible capacity - emerging from unique 
combinations with other inputs that result in different levels of output. This 
means that a particular technique of production does not produce one unique 
isoquant/output for every firm. Firm specific capabilities (such as organisation 
and skills) make up the difference. 
A related issue is enterprise size at start up across and within an industry. 
According to Lazonick (1991: 95) 'business strategy' - that is choice of an industry 
and supplying a particular product and/or service - suggests a certain level of 
capital intensity in production and hence affects enterprise size. Also within an 
industry entrepreneurs choose different intensity level of machines. This, again, is 
very much related to entrepreneur related factors (resources, strategy, and the 
level of risk taken), and a question of factor substitution. Employment and capital 
measure of size do not always go together for the presence of factor substitution. 
What the above discussion shows is that implicit assumptions of microeconomics 
and industrial organisation theories on enterprise size are rather simplistic. For 
these theories easy substitution of factors and perfect information about factor 
prices led them to the simplistic analysis of U shaped cost curves. As I will 
demonstrate in this thesis, not all entrepreneurs start business with perfect 
information nor do they install machinery that enables them to achieve a declining 
cost curve that easily. However, entrepreneurs may deploy a variety of strategies 
29 MES raises the question of how many plants and production-lines make up an enterprise. 
This again suggests that the definition of an SME includes its legal personality (that is the 
extent to which different units/plants are legally independent). 
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including using second hand or craft technology: they step-wise build upon fixed 
capital with a view to learning not only the technology but also the reliability of 
the market, and the quality of labour force operating the machines. At an initial 
stage of technology adoption, entrepreneurs may not even know of the existence 
of cost effective technology. Even when the existence of a particularly effective 
technology was known that technology may not be affordable, and when 
affordable it may not be chosen because of technical and demand limitations. 
More importantly, the choice of a technology itself would be influenced by other 
stronger factors such as experience, skill and financial resources of the founder(s). 
It is also important to state that the literature says little about other factors, in my 
view, that have significant influence on enterprise size at start up and the start up 
process itself. To give a few examples, first, it is not only the profit motive of 
'business strategy' that determines enterprise size but also entrepreneurs' other 
motives like whether the entrepreneur wants to increase employment (say for 
relatives). Second, enterprise size depends not only on the productivity of labour 
and capital (as the theories tend to focus on) but also on institutions and physical 
infrastructures like energy and water sources, the financial market that provides 
credit to the entrepreneurs, macro-economic variables like wages, interest rates 
and exchange rate levels. Third, as this thesis will demonstrate, the role of the 
state (regulation of the number and size of enterprises, for example), availability 
of foreign exchange for the purchase of machinery and other inputs are also 
bound to affect enterprises (including start-up pace, size and location). State 
control on resources like enterprise site and utilities also impact on enterprise 
development. Finally, as section 2.4.4 below shows, the way business and 
government interact with each other also has considerable impact on enterprise 
development. 
2.4.4 Business interest groups and enterprise development 
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In chapter one I stated hypothesis two (H2) which suggested that the IIS licence 
and structure provided entrepreneurs with access to resources that were outside 
the IIS system. Does this hypothesis have any theoretical backing? Drawing on 
theories of public choice and institutional economics, this section briefly discusses 
an aspect of business and state interaction. 
Institutions such as government agencies, political parties, economic organisations 
like enterprises and social organisations provide a range of (positive and/or 
negative) incentives that shape human interactions (North, 1990). For example, 
governments provide formal rules, laws and structures for contracts which, 
among other things, define property rights. In some societies these rules are 
inadequate and/or manipulated by agents like business interest groups, 
bureaucrats and politicians in practices commonly referred to as 'rent-seeking 
activities' (Udehn, 1996: 28). Bhagwati (1984) referred to these same practices, 
which in his view led to social wastage, as 'directly unproductive activities' 
(DUPs). 
Rent-seeking behaviour/DUP is about interest groups (like business agents) 
attempting to influence policy in their favour. The common form of rent-seeking is 
lobbying for a privilege that provides a monopoly to supply goods and services, 
tariffs, quotas, protection from branches of industry, direct transfers in the form of 
subsidies and income (Dunleavy, 1991: 28). To get and maintain such privileges 
interest groups use multiple strategies including petitions, lobbying elected 
representatives, raising issues in the media, commissioning research, involvement 
in consultations, public campaigns, demonstrations, attempts to obstruct policy 
implementations, non-cooperation with government, boycotts or non-compliance, 
strikes/industrial action and civil disobedience (Dunleavy, 1991: 20). 
Rent-seeking is said to be positively associated with corruption like paying bribes 
(Udehn, 1996: 28). But, as Self argued, interest groups and politicians work 
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reciprocally -a two way traffic: '... pressure groups cannot succeed unless they can 
also win the support of politicians. Public choice theorists stress the significance of 
an exchange relationship between politicians and interest groups for mutual 
advantage. ' (Self, 1993: 31). 
Rent-seeking behaviour is also said to be detrimental to an economy and society. 
Some claimed that deadweight losses from rent-seeking behaviour, as a 
proportion of the national income lost, accounted for 7.5 and 15 per cent of the 
Indian and Turkish economies respectively in the 1970s (Colander, 1984: 9). 
Colander also suggested solutions like providing information, adjusting property 
rights and changing institutions to curb rent-seeking behaviour. The extreme 
neoliberal solution is to prevent governments from intervening in the workings of 
an economy at all (Udehn, 1996: 29). These views on rent-seeking behaviour are, 
however, disputable. For example, Samuels and Mercuro (1984) looked at rent- 
seeking behaviour as an attempt to change existing property rights -a rejection of 
the status quo property relations. From whichever angle issues emerge, in this 
thesis I maintain the view that interest group and rent-seeking behaviour impact 
on enterprise start-up process and development. 
To summarise, sections 2.3 and 2.4 above raised issues that are central to this 
thesis. From the synthesis of strands of theories it has emerged that: 
First, the impact of investment incentives on enterprise development depends on 
several factors: entrepreneurs' awareness and perception of incentives and the 
size of benefits from incentives. Moreover, whether entrepreneurs respond to 
government objectives is crucial. Entrepreneurs' response to investment 
incentives, in turn, depends on the nature of the entrepreneurs themselves (like 
their resources and ability and willingness to move between locations and activity 
types), market, government regulations, institutional and physical infrastructure. 
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Second, the key enterprise features that the IIS is expected to influence are sector 
(product and/or service), location and size of an enterprise. These key features of 
an enterprise are closely related and mutually reinforcing. For example, an 
entrepreneur's choice of a sector influences the location of the enterprise or vice 
versa. Both sectoral and location decisions are also likely to influence enterprise 
size. Similarly the strategy of choosing a sector in part determines the size of 
investment in machines and equipment. As the previous discussions showed, the 
key determinant of the decisions on a sector, location and size of an SME is the 
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur (along with his/her attributes and resources), in 
turn, is strongly influenced by the broader social, psychological and economic 
forces. In considering IIS impact on enterprise size, therefore, these factors will be 
taken into account. It is within this context that the next section reviews the 
literature and presents the evidence on the impacts of investment incentives on 
SMEs start-up and growth. 
2.5 Impacts of investment incentives on SMEs start-ups and growth 
As the earlier sections showed most countries, poor or rich, promote their 
enterprise sector including using investment incentives. The literature I studied 
showed many examples of countries that used investment incentives schemes 
including those from South East Asian countries (as in Wade, 1990). However, 
there were only a few studies that showed the performance of the investment 
incentives schemes in different countries. The review presented below, therefore, 
focuses on a limited number of studies published to show the effectiveness of 
investment incentives schemes. With a view to reflecting on the nature of 
enterprises and entrepreneurs and their operating environments (and 
subsequently the outcomes of the schemes) I have discussed separately the 
impacts of investment incentives in LDCs and DCs. 
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Impacts of Investment Incentives in LDCs: LDCs largely depend on fiscal 
incentives to encourage domestic and foreign enterprises to invest in their 
economies (UN/WIR, 1992, Galenson, 1984). Ghana was typical in using fiscal 
incentives that provided entrepreneurs with duty and income tax exemptions to 
promote enterprise development. Ingram and Pearson (1981) studied the impacts 
of investment incentives on enterprise start-ups in Ghana by looking at seven 
enterprises that benefited from the scheme in the 1970s. Ingram and Pearson 
(1981: 849) found that '... [the] policy set created positive private profits for five of 
the seven firms in spite of the fact that all but one were socially unprofitable. ' 
Since only one of the seven firms was socially profitable, the conclusion of the 
study was that the sample enterprises did not effectively promote government 
objectives but created 'large social costs' (Ingram and Pearson, 1981: 839). 
Argentina used investment incentives to alter spatial patterns of industrial 
enterprises. But, according to an extensive study by Borello (1995), investment 
incentives in Argentina did not promote spatial development. Policy failure was, 
among other things, because entrepreneurs' decisions failed to take account of 
information (example, production cost) in supported regions. Moreover, 
entrepreneurs had a 'distorted and biased view of the interior of the country and 
insufficient information on promotion schemes and production costs' (Borello, 
1995: 587). 
India supported its small industries since independence in 1947 through diverse 
incentive measures (like fiscal incentives, reservation of products for government 
purchase, concessional bank interest rates, etc. ) (Subrahmanya, 1998). The overall 
impact of these support measures, however, was that small enterprises remained 
small because growth meant more licensing regulations, loss of guaranteed 
market, high financial and labour cost, etc. (Subrahmanya, 1998: 39). 
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A study made on Colombia (Cortes et a1,1987: 149) found that in Colombia, as in 
many LDCs, small and medium industry 'start-up has been essentially a result of 
entrepreneurial effort and resource mobilisation; neither the credit system nor 
government programs appear to have played a significant role'. Note that this 
later finding was an overall summary of all government support programmes 
without singling out the impacts of the investment incentives. 
Impacts of Investment Incentives in DCs: Grant (1996) analysed the effect of US 
state-sponsored economic development policies (EDPs) on new enterprise 
formation. These EDPs included five supply side policies: (i) tax policies that 
reduce the tax burden imposed on corporations, (ii) debt financing programmes 
that make or guarantee loans to business, (iii) labour market deregulation policies 
that lower the cost associated with labour, (iv) geographically targeted policies 
meant to stimulate development in selected areas within states, and (v) regulatory 
policies designed to reduce the costs for corporations in complying with 
environmental standards (Grant, 1996: 35). 
Using cross-sectional time series data (on all the EDPs but item five above), 
Grant's study showed that: 
... only one of the four policy types - debt 
financing - significantly 
increased new business formation. (Grant, 1996: 40). 
The implication of this finding, according to Grant, was that new enterprises 
favour 'states which provide financial assistance for fledging enterprises' (Grant, 
1996: 40). Overall, Grant concluded that 'state-sponsored EDPs advocated by 
proponents of state entrepreneurship were found to have negligible effects. ' 
(Grant, 1996: 41). 
An Irish study (Lenihan, 1997) looked at the impact of grants on indigenous 
enterprises in terms of the concepts of additionality, deadweight and 
displacement (for clarification of concepts see Box 2.2). The finding of the study 
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was that the regional grant to enterprises resulted in 20 per cent of additional jobs 
(but up to 79.4 per cent deadweight) (Lenihan, 1997: 727). 
Box 2.2 Concepts and measurements of impact analysis of enterprises 
support: deadweight, displacement, additionality and viability 
Questioning the rationale for a particular support initiative to enterprises is 
perhaps where an enquiry starts. But the issues that follow include the 
notions of deadweight, displacement, additionality and viability. While 
viability of a supported enterprise or a scheme in the long term is perhaps 
easier to understand, understanding and measuring net additionality is more 
complicated. Additionality refers to the principles that, firstly, a scheme does 
not result in diversion of resources from other activities, and secondly, 
supported enterprises would not exist (on the same scale, location or time) 
without public support. Additionality is very much related to the concept of 
deadweight. It is not always the case that growth or start-up of an enterprise 
is determined (or even necessarily supported) by a particular support. Some 
enterprises successfully start up or grow without support. The concept of 
deadweight then applies to those entrepreneurs (enterprises) that take public 
support but who would have started up anyway (Gray, 1998, Lenihan, 1997, 
and Storey, 1994). In reckoning deadweight, measures like assisted 
enterprises that survived and created more jobs may be used. 
In the light of the objectives of this thesis, first, the concept of deadweight is 
expanded to cover different levels and the degree to which entrepreneurs 
would have started business without assistance. Hence deadweight in this 
thesis considers the degree to which investment incentives influenced the 
timing, location, size and sectoral choice of the entrepreneurs. If IIS has 
influenced enterprise start up dates or locations and industries 
identified/ chosen by the policy makers, or positively affected the size of the 
enterprise then it has created some degree of additionality (and there would 
be only partial deadweight with regards to the variables it failed to influence). 
However, if the IIS failed to influence any of these variables then there would 
be a total deadweight. Second, as subsequent chapters show, quantitative 
evidence on IIS that shows all levels of deadweight is difficult to generate. 
Hence whenever it is not possible to find direct evidence, an indirect measure 
of deadweight is used (for example, whether the IIS was factored into the 
decision to start up an enterprise at a particular time, location industry and 
size. This is used as an indicator of the presence or absence of deadweight. ) 
Finally the concept of displacement. This refers to support to some 
enterprises that could make them better able to compete and therefore 
possibly lead to the forcing out or displacement of existing enterprises. 
Similar to the concept of deadweight, displacement can be seen at different 
levels: due to the activities of the assisted enterprise another enterprise (often 
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a direct competitor to the assisted ones) may cease operation or part of the 
operations of the unassisted enterprise may be adversely affected. In the 
thesis incidences of this process will be considered. It has to be said, however, 
that the literature only emphasizes displacement (the negative side) without 
giving equal consideration to the possible positive multiplier effects due to 
the assisted enterprises such as an increase in number and/or size which 
could actually encourage new activities to emerge. 
A study based on 100 UK enterprises that received industrial investment 
incentives found that for some enterprises incentives were an important influence 
to locate in assisted areas (Allen et a1,1986). Similarly, a comprehensive study 
made on some regions of European states showed that tax incentives (for 
enterprise start-up and expansion) were 'a necessary condition for an effective 
regional development strategy for SMEs (Giaoutzi et al, 1988: 12). 
To sum up, the evidence from the countries studied above was inconclusive in 
suggesting that investment incentives were an effective means of promoting 
enterprise development. However, it was clear that investment incentives worked 
better in DCs than LDCs. This may be due to the fact that DCs offered direct 
financial grants to enterprises and/or the enterprises operated in an environment 
(including institutional and infrastructure) that was supportive to enterprise 
development. 
On the basis of the evidence studied above, I argue that perhaps many other 
reasons made the performance of investment incentives different between and 
within DCs and LDCs. For example, firstly, the size and composition of the 
enterprises that receive investment incentives affect performance. This means that 
whether an enterprise is small, large or capital intensive may make a difference in 
the take-up and use of support. Second, the type and level of 'investment 
incentives' provided, such as the level of duty exemption, matter in terms of the 
take-up and performance of support. Third, a range of other country specific 
circumstances like availability and cost of credit (or enterprise site) affect the 
performance of investment incentives. Overall, the message that emerged from 
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these limited country studies was that investment incentives as a idea of 
promoting enterprise development was a contested one. Any generalisation about 
the effectiveness or otherwise of investment incentives was heavily subject to 
caveats. As I will reiterate below, this conclusion is central to my argument. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the literature reviewed demonstrates, among other things, that a 
modest SME strength in job creation generates many enterprise support 
initiatives. Furthermore, the literature shows some trends/ developments 
particularly relevant to policies towards the SMEs sector: 
that, in recent years, in spite of the decline in the active role of a government 
in the economy, governments, NGOs and donors 'market-friendly' 
intervention in the private enterprise sector (notably SMEs) has been steadily 
increasing. 
" that the number of enterprise support initiatives proliferated but some of the 
initiatives were less coordinated, and lacked adequate rationales to merit the 
commitment of public resources. 
" with a view to increasing support take-up and impact (also reducing cost) 
recent enterprise support initiatives have increasingly become demand 
driven - especially SMEs networks have become vehicles to provide 
information and enhancing the process of innovation. 
" relative to the number of SME support initiatives there was only limited 
knowledge of the effectiveness of these initiatives. 
Drawing from multiple discipline areas, the literature also shows sources of 
enterprising ideas, and factors that influence entrepreneurs' decisions on the type, 
location and size of an enterprise. The review found that entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial choices on the type and location of an enterprise were largely 
determined by resources and the socio-cultural background of the entrepreneur. 
Enterprise size, in turn, was influenced by the available technology, 
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entrepreneurial resources and strategy. In this regard investment incentives have 
had only a minimum role to play. 
The discussion in this chapter also showed that investment incentives (which were 
diverse in content) were common instruments of enterprise promotion/ 
development in DCs and LDCs. But there was only limited knowledge about the 
impact of these instruments on enterprise start-up and growth. The available 
limited evidence offered only ambiguous outcomes - with more likely positive 
outcomes occurring in DCs that had better infrastructure and offered grants in the 
form of financial incentives. 
As this chapter demonstrated, the nature of entrepreneurs and enterprises, the 
size of benefits from investment incentives, institutional and social infrastructure 
crucially determine the effectiveness of an investment incentives scheme. Focusing 
on these issues the following chapter, therefore, discusses the background on the 
Ethiopian enterprise economy and the IIS. 
The above conclusions are the theoretical basis of this thesis. At this juncture it is 
also important that the conclusions of this chapter are linked with the conclusions 
from section 1.2 in chapter one. As shown in section 1.2, when the IIS was 
introduced in Ethiopia in 1950 it was an innovation. Ethiopia pioneered in Africa 
in using the IIS to attract FDI and technology transfer, and build large scale 
manufacturing enterprises. In the early 1960s it also took the lead in Africa in 
using the fIS to assist its indigenous enterprises. However, when the IIS was 
reintroduced in the early 1990s the lessons from other countries on SME 
development (reviewed in this chapter) were not considered. Instead Ethiopia, 
once again, used supply driven IIS to support enterprises that were less likely to 
be assisted through the IIS. Against this background, and the hypotheses made in 
chapter one, the thesis set out to investigate the role and impacts of the IIS on 
enterprise start-up and growth in Ethiopia. What was the rationale for investment 
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incentives in Ethiopia? Was it an effective instrument to influence entrepreneurs' 
decisions over the choices of location and sector of their enterprises? This thesis 
seeks answers to these and many more questions. 
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3. The Ethiopian Enterprise Economy and the Evolution of 
the Investment Incentives Scheme 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two discussed the literature on the foundations of promoting enterprises, 
particularly focusing on the rationale and impact of investment incentives on 
enterprise start-up and growth. The conclusions of chapter two showed that, 
among other things, enterprise and entrepreneur characteristics, infrastructure, 
type and size of investment incentives hugely contribute to the effectiveness of an 
investment incentives scheme. This chapter builds on chapter two in that, with a 
view to looking at HS impacts, it thoroughly studies features of Ethiopian 
enterprises, entrepreneurs and investment incentives. The chapter addresses two 
major areas: first, the genesis and current state of the Ethiopian enterprise 
economy and, second, the evolution of the Ethiopian investment incentives 
scheme (IIS) and other non-IIS enterprise support institutions and services. 
The discussion on these major areas serves different purposes. First, it sets out the 
background of the development and constraints on the Ethiopian enterprise 
economy and its support initiatives. By documenting these background 
developments in this chapter, subsequent chapters of the thesis will focus only on 
current issues of the research problem. Second, the discussion in this chapter also 
supports the research design issues (chapter four) and the conclusions of the thesis 
(chapter eight) which reflects on the breadth and depth of the enterprise support 
system of the country. Finally, the chapter also defines some concepts used in the 
thesis and clarifies the nature and extent of enterprise support initiatives available 
for the selected case. 
In the rest of this chapter sections 3.2 and 3.3 review the evolution and current 
state of the Ethiopian enterprise economy. Section 3.4 discusses the genesis and 
current state of the IIS, and section 3.5 examines the non-IIS enterprise support 
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institutions and services. Finally section 3.6 provides the conclusion to the chapter 
and the links to the key hypotheses of the thesis. 
The evidence on the past and recent state of the Ethiopian economy, the IIS and 
other policy initiatives comes from wide ranging sources. These include official 
policy documents on the IIS and the economic adjustment programme, conference 
proceedings, survey reports and statistical documents. 
3.2 Background to the Ethiopian enterprise economy 
This section briefly discusses the origins of modern enterprises30 in Ethiopia. 
3.2.1 The earlier historical context 
Apart from the five years of the Italian occupation (1936-41), Ethiopia is the only 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) country that never fell under foreign rule. Ethiopia is 
also the only SSA country to have developed its own written language. Ethiopia's 
recorded history goes back to at least the Aksumite Empire of the late B. C. and 
early AD (see among others, Bahiru, 1991, and Pankhurst 1961). The Aksumite 
empire had a prosperous trade-based economy that minted its own currency and 
built a civilization that still is alive. The empire was converted to Christianity in 
370 AD and continued to thrive until the emergence of Islam in the seventh 
century. The rise of internal rebellion and the emergence and expansion of Islam, 
that resulted in the loss of trade routes, were among the reasons for the fall of 
Aksum. Aksum was replaced by a less prosperous Zagwe dynasty which later 
ended in 1270. 
30 Defining 'modern enterprises' in Ethiopia is a complicated matter. If an enterprise uses some 
machines, commercial energy and paid labour then I will refer it to as modern enterprise - 
that is not handicrafts nor subsistence agriculture. Similarly by 'enterprise economy' I refer 
to acts of producing (goods and services) and selling for gain by agents (private, government 
and cooperative) rather than to subsistence agriculture and craft sectors. 
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The period that followed the Zagwe dynasty was characterised by internal 
conflicts (as in the 'era of princes', where regional lords had more power than the 
monarchy), great internal migration (mainly of the Oromo people) and absence of 
a permanent capital. Regional unrest forced rulers to spend considerable time 
moving from one part of the country to another. It was with the founding of 
Gonder in 1636 that the country once again found a permanent capital. 
In pre-Gonder Ethiopia craftsmanship was a common production practice of 
households, churches and monasteries, and courts of the emperors. With the 
emergence of Gonder the demand and supply factors for the development of 
handicrafts arose. But until the late 19th century a modern enterprise economy 
neither grew out of handicrafts nor was introduced to Ethiopia through the 
import of foreign technology. 
3.2.2 The modern Ethiopian enterprise economy 
3.2.2.1 The beginning 
The origin of modern enterprise in Ethiopia was related to a combination of 
factors that include the introduction of foreign technology, the development of 
modern infrastructure and education and the emergence of urban centres. The 
construction of the Franco-Ethiopian railway (1897-1915), the introduction of 
telecommunications and postal services in 1899 and the construction of roads like 
Addis Ababa-Alem and Dire Dawa-Harar were among the key markers of 
modern enterprise development in Ethiopia. After centuries of bartering 
Ethiopian money started to be printed in 1894 and the Bank of Abyssinia was 
opened in 1905. The set up of the first non-religious school, Minilek II, followed in 
1908, and then hospitals, hotels, etc. were set up in Addis Ababa at about the same 
time (Bekure, 1980). 
With regards to the set up of processing establishments, owing to its importance 
to national security, earlier governments established firearms factories as in Gafat 
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in 1860s and Ankober in 1874. Then the first printing factory was opened in 1897. 
Food processing factories like flour and oil mills were set up in the early 20th 
century, particularly in towns that emerged along the Ethio-Djibouti railway. 
The pace of modern enterprise building was hampered by the Italian occupation 
of Ethiopia (1936-41). During the occupation period, the Italians built over 6000 
km of roads (Eshetu, 1995) and initiated numbers of small enterprises but only a 
few of the projects were completed and 'suited to the needs of the Ethiopians' 
(Korten, 1972: 31). According to Bekure (1980) only 4 factories that served Italian 
soldiers were opened. This slow progress in enterprise building during the 
occupation may have been attributed to the fact that Italy had only a short spell in 
Ethiopia. But it can also be argued that Italy never wanted peripheral Ethiopia for 
anything more than a source of raw materials. In a nutshell, the occupation period 
produced long term adverse consequences for the development of modern 
Ethiopia. One example of this was that the Italian invasion resulted in the 
execution of three-quarters of educated Ethiopians (Korten, 1972: 28) that 
contributed to the subsequent slow pace of enterprise development in the country. 
Apart from some piecemeal developments in modern enterprises, the structure of 
the economy (output, employment and use of technology) barely changed in the 
period before 1941. However, post 1941 three contrasting phases of enterprise 
development (mainly manufacturing) followed. Following, among others, Eshetu 
(1995) I will briefly account below for the major developments that took place (i) 
during the period 1941-74 where a genuine industrialisation process can be said to 
have taken place. (ii) 1974-91 where Derg reorganised enterprise development 
along socialist lines. And (iii) the post-1991 features of enterprise development. 
3.2.2.2 The period 1941-74 
According to Ethiopian economic historians (see details in Shiferaw Bekele, 1995) 
the industrialisation process of Ethiopia started in earnest in the post Italian 
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occupation. Two major signifiers of the post 1941 developments were (a) the 
introduction of incentives and facilities with a view to attracting foreign capital 
and (b) the introduction and implementation of three successive five year 
development plans (1957-74). In response to increased demand for consumer 
goods in urban centres, especially by the ruling class and royal family, and a 
shortage of foreign exchange for importing those goods, the manufacturing sector 
was promoted with a bias for import substitution strategy. The private sector was 
encouraged by putting protective tariffs up and provision of special investment 
incentives (IGE, 1968: 218). 
In terms of achievements the development plans produced some positive but 
below target results. In 1950 there were 126 manufacturing establishments mostly 
located in Addis Ababa. These manufacturing establishments had a salaried 
workforce of 10,000 (Shiferaw Jammo, 1995: 22). Over the period 1953-61 the net 
value index of manufacturing increased by 2.5 times and manufacturing 
employment increased by 40 per cent (Eshetu, 1995: 205). Between 1963 and 1974, 
54 more manufacturing plants were established (Sileshi, 1988: 260). Most of the 
enterprises were owned by members of the royal family, the ruling class and 
foreign nationals (mainly Italians, Greeks, Armenians and Indians) residing in 
Ethiopia (Sileshi, 1988: 260). 
The structure of manufacturing was dominated by food and textile industries that 
were dependent on imported raw materials. There were barely any heavy and 
metallurgic industries. Concerning the non-manufacturing activities, agricultural 
technology too remained backward. In 1960 Ethiopia had only around 1000 
tractors, and an insignificant amount of fertilizer consumption. Services (including 
distributive trade and transport) rose from 10 per cent of GDP in 1950 to 23 per 
cent in 1969, and 34 per cent in 1974 (Shiferaw Jammo, 1995). Overall industry was 
not in any position to play the role of 'the engine of growth'. Over-reliance on 
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foreign investment and technology, archaic feudal institutions (especially in 
providing access to land), reliance on import substitution strategy, a poor 
engineering base in manufacturing and an inadequate supply of power and 
infrastructure were some of the factors accounting for the low performance of the 
three five year development plans (Shiferaw Jammo, 1995). Some of these same 
factors contributed to the eruption of the 1974 revolution. 
3.2.2.3 The period 1974-91 
Political and economic crises prompted the overthrow of the Imperial 
Government of Ethiopia in 1974. Two of these crises were, first, the monarchy 
failing to extend power outside its own circle and being unable to control 
discontent particularly among the intelligentsia and the military. Secondly, being 
the key means of livelihood for most Ethiopians, pervasive ownership of rural and 
urban land by members of the royal family, the church, few landlords and 
absentee landlords caused landlessness and poverty (see details in Clapham, 
1988). 
With a view to releasing resources for socialist economic development the military 
government (the Derg) introduced several radical changes including 
nationalisation of land and main undertakings like industries, radio and television 
transmissions, insurance and banking. As a consequence, however, the emerging 
capitalist class, as Befekadu (1994: 36) noted, became 'diminutive' and joined the 
informal sector. What was more, some of the better trained people (including 
doctors and engineers) and entrepreneurs left the country. 
Meantime the Derg continued new institution building such as rural and urban 
grassroots organisations (known as kebeles), leading the economy through the 
central planning and resettlement programmes. Successive national plans 
envisaged increasingly greater shares for the state and cooperative sectors. During 
the Derg time handicrafts and small scale industries accounted for only 5 per cent 
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of total industrial output, and were allowed to operate on a cooperative basis both 
to increase productivity and to prevent the comeback of a capitalist class 
(Clapham, 1988: 149-50). 
After 17 years of experiment results were disappointing. Land reform failed to 
enlarge the size of peasant cultivation and hence land fragmentation and 
agricultural technology remained unchanged. Consequently, agricultural output 
and the livelihood of the peasant did not improve (Desalegn, 1985). Moreover, 
with the exception of the Derg's initiatives in setting up a few state farms (Itana, 
1994) and 10 heavy industries (Sileshi, 1988) the economy remained 
predominantly subsistence (agriculture) and vulnerable to the vagaries of nature. 
Even among the few state owned enterprises (224 of them) nearly half were loss 
making year in year out (Kuma, 1994). According to Kuma, price control, lack of 
competition and over staffing were some of the reasons for the poor performance 
of public enterprises. Overall, during the Derg era, for over a decade the economy 
grew at a negative rate or less than the growth in population. Civil war and 
drought also contributed to the bad performance of the economy (see details in 
Eshetu and Mekonen (1992) and Befekadu and Berhanu (2000)). 
Here I emphasise the strong implication of Derg's policy for enterprise 
development. Because it was stifled as a matter of policy, the state and 
cooperative sectors either limited or crowded out the activities of the private 
sector. There were strict licensing procedures for the private sector such as 
applying capital ceilings for running undertakings. Credit and foreign exchange 
were also geared towards the state and cooperative sectors. Entrepreneurial spirit 
was undermined and people were more attracted to politics, civil services and the 
army than setting up their own enterprises (particularly in the productive sectors). 
The economic environment was not hospitable for FDI to operate in Ethiopia 
either. During this period it was the informal sector and illegal trade that thrived. 
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3.2.2.4 Post 1991 developments 
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) (1991-95) underwent yet another 
round of change in the system of government. First, the new government 
embraced the free market economy and abandoned socialism and central 
planning. This policy paved the way for, among other things, the introduction of 
an economic reform programme of stabilisation and liberalisation. Second, on the 
grounds that the capitalist sector was weak, TGE made a commitment to intervene 
in the economy. Third, with a view to solving internal conflicts, rivalry and 
regional imbalances, power was decentralized to regional governments (see, for 
example, EPRDF, 1994). These changes were introduced with the support of 
multilateral creditors and donors and a section of the population at home. The 
new government got this support on the grounds that it accepted democratic 
principles including free elections. 
Hence in 1992, the TGE launched comprehensive reform measures which 
specifically consisted of stabilisation of prices, budget and current account deficits, 
price and trade liberalization, encouragement of the private sector, privatisation, 
and other reforms in the fiscal and the civil service systems (see, for example, 
TGE/IMF/WB, 1993). The IIS became a key economic and political instrument of 
intervention in the economy and aimed to address regional imbalances (Proc. No. 
15,1992; TGE, 1992). 
Besides the economic reform programme, the government pursued a 
development strategy referred to as Agriculture Development-led 
Industrialisation (ADLI) (EPRDF, 1994). ADLI, as a long term strategy, was 
adopted to redress the failures of export led growth and import substitution 
industrialisation strategies (Tegegnwork, 1995). The strategy aimed to raise the 
productivity of smallholder agriculture, labour intensive and domestic raw 
material using industries and bringing small scale industries into centre stage. The 
strategy primarily focused on agricultural development in order to increase the 
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domestic market for industrial development. According to this strategy, 
development proceeds with small farm development through improved practices, 
then rural infrastructure building, and at stage three development of commercial 
farms follows. The ultimate goal of ADLI was to transform the economy in favour 
of industry. 
Two major limitations to the strategy were identified by researchers (Befekadu 
and Berhanu, 2000: 197). First, the strategy failed to address the major weakness of 
Ethiopian agriculture that was low labour productivity. Second, the institutional 
framework put in place for accessing land has become a constraint to the success 
of the strategy. This means that an increase in commercial farming was hampered 
because of the constitutional arrangement that prohibits private ownership of 
land. 
Over the period 1992-98 the economy grew by 4.4 per cent per year. Savings and 
investment also recovered. For example, gross capital formation recovered from 
10 per cent of GDP before the reform to an average of 15 per cent of GDP during 
the reform period (Befekadu and Berhanu, 2000). There were different 
interpretations of the sources/causes of growth. Government sources (as 
discussed in Tambek, 1996: 2) and The Economist (March 13,1993) suggested that 
'good policy' has contributed towards high growth in the economy. However, the 
critics were sceptical of the statistics saying that the year-on-year growth was due 
to low factor base. For example, in 1993/94 the economy attained the level it was 
in 1989/90 (Addis Tribune, 23 August 1996). They also note that growth in 
agriculture in particular was due to favourable weather conditions. But whatever 
explanation was accepted it would be difficult to dismiss the contributions of 
weather and 'good policy' to growth. In short, developments in the 1990s too had 
several implications for enterprise development. The introduction of an enabling 
environment and the IIS were key positive developments. 
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The discussion above showed that the growth of the Ethiopian economy in 
general and the enterprise sector in particular were stunted for a long time. The 
causes of such slow pace enterprise development were not simply economic in 
nature nor the consequences of the policies of a single era. Below, owing to space 
limitations, I will briefly state some of the broader causes of underdevelopment of 
the Ethiopian enterprise sector. These include: 
First, as economists have always emphasized, inadequate savings, investment and 
incentives, inappropriate use of technology and the excessive role of the state in 
the economy have contributed to the slow pace of enterprise development (Sileshi, 
1988, Eshetu and Mekonen, 1992). Further, drought and environmental 
degradation, war and civil unrest, turbulent political transition and inadequate 
democracy, centralisation of power and unfavourable external relations like terms 
of trade and debt have been the other causes of underdevelopment of the sector. 
Backward technology and poor infrastructure (including roads, energy, marketing 
arrangements and irrigation agriculture) again contributed to slow pace enterprise 
development (Shiferaw Jammo, 1995: 54). 
Second, part of Ethiopia's culture has been adversely impacting on development. 
For example, high profile of warriors and/or fighting, the support of a win-lose 
attitude, opposition to change, an authoritarian environment for children's 
upbringing, women being limited to domestic work, inward-looking attitudes and 
rigid habits (of food and drink) have been hindering the broader social and 
economic development (Habtamu, 1995, and EEA, 1997b). 
Third, religion and feudalism too were adversely impacting on entrepreneurship 
and enterprise development. The explanation for lack of entrepreneurship in 
Ethiopia that Ayalew (1995) discussed was the constraining 'dominant value' that 
was encapsulated by the feudal system and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. For 
centuries, the feudal system resisted change and despised enterprising people and 
82 
activities, notably crafts and commerce. Common superstition has always been 
held against the artisans and merchants (for example taking them as devils or 
subjecting them to low status). The church puts its attention on 'life after death' 
and the worthlessness of worldly life. 
Moreover, although Ethiopia has been proud of its written language, education 
has never played an essential role in development either as an input to 
development or as an element of change to undesirable cultural practices. This 
was primarily because until the early twentieth century Ethiopia's educational 
tradition was built around religious institutions (monasteries and mosques) with 
the primary objective of serving religion. Such religious education was not related 
to practical skills like pottery and weaving. The clergy who were relatively 
unconcerned with the mortal world were only instrumental in transmitting such 
practices as the observance of religious holidays and lengthy fasting times 
(Teklehaimanot, 2000). Major internally or externally induced technological 
changes, for example, were considered as threats to religion and tradition. 
Pankhurst (1968: 722) cited examples of opposition to changes that were 
spearheaded by members of the church: that new technology such as Sahla 
Sellassie's 19th century grinding mill was condemned by the priests as the work of 
the devil and the cinema house and the bicycle were, respectively, referred to as 
'house of Satan' and 'horse of Satan'. 
Finally, Ethiopia's long and cherished independence also caused its isolation, 
resulting in marginal contribution of external knowledge and technology to its 
development. As historians showed (for example, Bahiru, 1991) being a 
landlocked country during Italian occupation of Eritrea (1890-1941) - and perhaps 
since Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993 too - had been a constraint in 
terms forging trade and other relationships with the rest of the world. 
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Section 3.3 below expands the discussion on enterprise development in Ethiopia 
particularly looking at features like structures of and linkages between enterprises 
in the 1990s. 
3.3 Key features of the present Ethiopian enterprise economy 
3.3.1 The social, political and economic state of Ethiopia 
Statistics on the Ethiopian economy are depressing. Recent major social and 
economic indicators of the country, in relative and absolute terms, were either bad 
or seemed to be deteriorating. As Table 3.1 shows, by the end of the 20th century 
infant mortality, life expectancy and illiteracy rates were the worst in the world. 
Table 3.1 Some social and economic indicators of Ethiopia 




- in millions (mid 1998) 61.3 628 3515 
- annual growth rate % (1992-98) 2.8 2.6 1.7 
GNP per capita (US$, 1998) 100 480 520 
life exp. at birth (years, 1998) 43 51 63 
illiteracy (% of pop. age 15+) 65 42 32 
infant mortality/ 1000 live birth (1998) 155 87 58 
urban pop. (% of total, 1998) 17 33 31 
production Structure (% of GDP) 
- agriculture 51.2 55.5 49.8 
- industry 10.6 6.7 6.7 
- services 38.1 37.8 43.5 
Source: World Bank (1999) and Befekadu and Berhanu (2000). 
In 1998 Ethiopia had 61.1 million people, making it the second most populous 
country in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). But Ethiopia's population grew faster than 
the averages of SSA and low income countries, depressing the already low level of 
GNP per capita (US$ 100). Looking at the prospects for the Ethiopian economy 
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was even more frustrating. Ethiopian economists (Befekadu and Berhanu, 2000) 
estimated that 55 and 58 years are required for Ethiopia to reach the SSA and low 
income countries averages31 
The enterprise sector of Ethiopia was small, in the early 1990s the private 
enterprise sector accounted for only 13 per cent of the GDP (Borin et al, 1994: 1). 
This meant that Ethiopia's economy was predominantly subsistence agriculture 
and in 1998 more than 4 out of 5 people lived in rural areas. Some dated and some 
recent statistics showed that Ethiopia's physical infrastructure like roads and 
telephone lines were also too low. For example, by the end of 1980s Ethiopia had 
only 24.5 km road per 1000km2 area (ONCCP, 1989). Similarly, according to WDR 
in 1997 Ethiopia had three telephone lines per 1000 population (WDR, 1999/2000). 
3.3.2 Structures, linkages and constraints of Ethiopian enterprises 
This section explores the current state of the Ethiopian enterprise system. The 
discussion here recognises that, first, enterprises are born into existing 
opportunities and constraints. Hence such factors like enterprise size, ownership 
type and/or forward and backward linkages affect the long term performance of 
an enterprise and impacts of policies like the IIS. Second, the output, employment, 
regional distribution, etc. contributions of new enterprise start ups (be it due to 
the IIS or not) are only understood within the context of existing structures. And, 
third, to the extent that it encourages the import and use of foreign technology the 
IIS may actually disturb the existing linkages between enterprises, for example, in 
terms of using local resources. 
31 Based on the assumption that Ethiopia, SSA and low income countries' economies on the 
average grow at 7,4 and 4 per cent, respectively. 
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3.3.2.1 Size and ownership structures of enterprises 
The size structure of enterprises: the private sector in Ethiopia was almost 
supplanted by the public sector between 1974-91. However, in the 1990s the sector 
was on track for fast recovery and growth. Recent statistics showed that (Table 
3.2) about two million people in Ethiopia were earning their living in 1.1 million 
enterprises listed under the categories of manufacturing (small, medium, and 
large), distributive trades (DTEs), and cottage and craft enterprises (CCEs). Most 
of the jobs were created in the CCEs and DTEs. However, a relatively higher 
proportion of wealth, in terms of per capita value added, was created in the 
medium and large manufacturing enterprises (MLMEs) and DTEs. Small scale 
manufacturing enterprises (SSMEs) were the poorest performers in terms of 
manufacturing value added. 














MLMEs 642 91199 5799 20527 
SSMEs 2731 8929 188 699 
DTEs 212670 548483 4674 38465 
CCEs 892719 1311745 2043 7007 
Total 1108762 1960356 12704 6480 
Sources: CSA (1997b, 1997c, 1997d and 1997e) and own calculation. 
All sizes of manufacturing enterprises tended to concentrate in Addis Ababa and 
Oromia regions. For example, according to CSA data for 1996/97, overall 68 per 
cent of medium and large manufacturing enterprises were located in Addis Ababa 
and 48,21, and 13 per cent of all manufacturing enterprises were, respectively, 
located in the Addis Ababa, Oromia and Amhara regions. 
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Following CSA definitions (see Box 2.1 in chapter two) the dynamics of the 
number and ownership patterns of enterprises have changed in the 1990s. The 
number of medium and large manufacturing enterprises (that employed 10 or 
more people) in 1992,1994 and 1996, respectively, were 263,499 and 642. Of these 
enterprises privately owned medium and large manufacturing enterprises were 
131 (42.1 per cent), 330 (66 per cent) and 473 (73.7 per cent). Privatization of public 
enterprises and new business start-ups accounted for the increase in private 
enterprises. The food subsector accounted for 40 per cent of the 2731 privately 
owned small scale manufacturing enterprises (SSMEs). Similarly 40 per cent of the 
total SSMEs were located in Addis Ababa. Of the total cottage and craft industries 
(CCEs) 572011 (or 64 per cent) were rural based. In 1996 there were 212670 
distributive and trade service establishments (DTEs) which employed 548500 
people. In terms of spatial distribution, DTEs tended to be evenly distributed all 
over the country. 
Private enterprises were also emerging in agriculture (cash crops such as tea, 
coffee, and sesame), transport and construction sectors. But there were no reliable 
data on the number and distribution of most of these activities. In the banking 
sector, however, five private banks with 39 branches had been set up by 1997. 
Among the branches 21 were in Addis Ababa and the share of private banks in the 
total banking services was less than 5 per cent (Yonas, 1999). 
There was also a large number of economic activities performed by the informal 
sector that included household type establishments or activities which were 
neither registered businesses nor had operating licences. The informal sector 
activities generally tended to be small in scale and low in the level of organisation. 
Productivity and income were also low. However, the sector had always been an 
important job provider. For example, in 1996 the informal sector provided 
employment to 7330969 people. These activities have had little access to the 
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organised input and product markets like credit, technology and public utilities, 
nor did they get government support in the form of incentives (CSA 1997a). 
Ownership structure of enterprises: sole proprietorship and partnership were the 
dominant forms of ownership structures (Table 3.3). Share and private limited 
companies were rare in the country but have had representations in the MLMEs 
and DTEs. In spite of the recent privatisation drive, public enterprises were still 
represented in the DTE and MLMEs subsectors32 
Table 3.3 Enterprise/establishment numbers and ownership types (1996/97) 
Ownership type Wholesale Retail Services MLMEs SSMEs CCEs 
Sole proprietor 7096 118861 78023 323 2622 881377 
Partnership 421 3197 1165 40 71 10588 
Share Company 29 56 4 12 4 - 
Private Limited C. 169 148 848 70 9 - 
Cooperatives - 201 17 18 16 738 
Public Enterprises 65 455 512 169 - - 
Others - 813 491 10 9 16 
Total 7780 123731 81060 642 2731 892719 
Sources: CSA (1997b, 1997c, 1997d and 1997e). 
Data on characteristics of Ethiopian entrepreneurs were patchy partly due to the 
highly aggregated nature of CSA data. Based on these limited data, some features 
of entrepreneurs are reported below. 
3.3.2.2 Some characteristics of Ethiopian entrepreneurs 
Data generated on Ethiopian entrepreneurs (Table 3.4) showed that women were 
less educated than men and fewer women owned and managed enterprises. For 
example, in the small scale manufacturing enterprises (SSMEs) sector the total 
literacy rate for the entrepreneurs was 89 per cent, but in this total women's 
32 Note that the category 'others' refers to ownership such as joint ventures. 
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literacy rate was only about 17 per cent. Similarly, for ownership and 
management of enterprises, men accounted for 74 per cent in the SSME sector. 
There were, however, exceptions at sub-sectoral levels. For example, in the 
manufacturing of food subsector (where women make traditional food like injera) 
women accounted for 52 per cent of the total ownership and management of 
enterprises. These data could be interpreted in terms of potentials. For example, as 
opportunities (like education) are provided opportunities for women 
entrepreneurs in the market increase. 
Table 3.4 Some characteristics of Ethiopian entrepreneurs (1994-96/97) 
Characteristics of owners/managers number per cent 
1. sex profiles: 
(a) Small Scale Manufacturing Enterprises 2913 100 
Male 2158 74 
Female 755 26 
(b) Medium to Large scale Manufacturing 
Enterprise (sole proprietors only): total 320 100 
Male 267 83 
Female 53 17 
2. literacy rates: 
Small Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (total) 2913 89.3 
Male 2118 72.7 
Female 795 16.6 
3. other characteristics of SMEs (total) 85 100 
(a) pre enterprise start up occupation 
- trade 35 
- similar to the new enterprise 29 
- other 36 
(b) motivations: 
- need for diversification 34 
- need for independence 40 
- creating own employment 14 
- other 12 
(c) entrepreneurial types: 
craft 51 
opportunistic 49 
Sources: CSA (1997b), CSA (1997e), and Borin, et al (1994). 
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Borin et al's survey (1994) also showed that 35 per cent of the entrepreneurs came 
from the trade sectors or had been operating in a similar business as the new 
business (29 per cent). Regarding motives for setting up enterprises, entrepreneurs 
were motivated by the desire to be independent (40 per cent) and the need for 
diversifying their businesses (34 per cent). The Borin et al survey (1994) labeled 51 
and 49 per cent of Ethiopian entrepreneurs as 'craft' and 'opportunistic' 
entrepreneurs. 
3.3.2.3 Linkages between enterprises 
There are mutually beneficial relationships between and within sectors of an 
economy. The classic example is the relationship between agriculture and 
industry where agriculture makes labour, raw materials, market and capital 
contribution through taxation and/or through foreign exchange earning from 
agricultural commodities. Industry also supplies capital and consumer goods to 
agriculture. Linkages could also be between subsectors (food vs. engineering) or 
between sizes (small vs. large enterprises) of a particular sector. For example, 
there are forward and backward linkages33 or supplier and buyer relationships. 
Such linkages help promote technology transfer, create more jobs and value 
added and possibly make use of more domestic resources. Consequently, the 
existence of linkages help save foreign exchange and build domestic capacity or 
self-reliance. In spite of these potential benefits summaries of research conducted 
by Mekonen Ayalew in 1995 and 1997 showed that: 
(i) linkages between subsectors, and small and large scale manufacturing of 
Ethiopia were weak. Between 1984-96 the backward and forward linkages 
between small-scale industries and large-scale industries were about 30 and 
13 percent. This meant that 70 per cent of demand for capital goods, 
33 A forward relationship is about inputs, like semi processed inputs as in ginned cotton or 
leather, taken as a raw material by a producer further up the line of production. Backward 
linkage is the opposite where finished products like implements and spare parts are used by 
an enterprise as an input. 
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chemicals, spare parts, etc. by small-scale industries were met through 
imports. Similarly 87 per cent of raw and semi-processed inputs of large- 
scale industries were either internally produced or imported (Mekonen 
Ayalew, 1995). 
(ii) in spite of claimed benefits like access to inputs, technical advice and 
guaranteed markets, linkages between agriculture and industry in general 
were weak. Linkages between agriculture and agro-industry subsectors like 
food and beverages too were found to be weak. This was generally because 
agricultural incomes were too low to purchase modern industrial 
implements, chemicals and other inputs. Second, those chemicals and 
machinery (fertilisers and tractors) were imported which meant that there 
was either limited or no domestic production. Third, inadequate 
infrastructure for transporting agricultural and industrial inputs and outputs 
also limits the possibilities for forging linkages between sectors (Mekonen 
Ayalew, 1997). 
There are other forms of relationships between enterprises that might be 
considered. These relationships include subcontracting, joint ventures, franchising 
and export trading companies. In Ethiopia there seemed to be limited joint 
ventures and sub contractual arrangements in the agro-industry sector. Dejene 
(1994) reported on contract farming arrangements made between farmers and 
Wonji Shewa Sugar Estate. However, in Ethiopia records on business practices 
like franchising were unheard of. A weak level of linkages was largely due to 
limitations in the legal processes (as most business relationships in Ethiopia were 
informal), standards and quality of products, an under-developed system of 
information and transportation, a limited number of indigenous enterprises, etc. 
(Borin et al, 1994). The implication of all this was that the opportunity for business 
developments through, for example franchising and subcontracting, was limited. 
Below I will consider broader enterprise development opportunities and 
constraints. 
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3.3.2.4 Enterprise development opportunities, needs and constraints 
The prospect for enterprise development in Ethiopia was not all grim. There was 
some encouraging potential for enterprise development including a huge supply 
of low wage labour, land and land based resources. According to EIA documents 
(1997a), agriculture, horticulture and agro-industries were potentially profitable 
sectors. There were also proven reserves of metals like gold and platinum. 
Cultural heritage and archaeological sites were attractive to the development of 
the tourism sector. Domestic demand for consumer goods was also high. In recent 
years there were signs of improvement in the export sector too. The traditional 
export commodities of Ethiopia (coffee and skins and hides) were now expanding 
to tea, cut roses and organic sesame. In manufacturing emerging non-traditional 
exports included tractors, trailers and television sets assembled in Ethiopia. 
According to the Financial Times (June 22,2000), a recent African Competitiveness 
Report (that measured the direction and extent of change between 1996 and 1999) 
showed an improvement in Ethiopia's overall competitiveness index. 
Accordingly, Ethiopia ranked 17 out of 22 countries in 1998, and 11 out of 23 
countries in 1999. The improved political climate for business was said to be the 
major factor for the change. 
However, all was not well. Recent CSA survey documents showed some 
enterprise start-up and growth problems (Table 3.5). The nature of the problems 
varied between and within subsectors. The top start-up and growth problems 
were identified as lack/shortages of capital, raw materials and premises and 
obstructions from government regulations. The survey documents also showed 
that medium to large manufacturing enterprises faced huge capacity utilisation 
problems. Out of 208 enterprises that responded to the survey questionnaire 26,65 
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and 12 per cent, respectively, had shortages of raw materials, absence of demand 
for products and frequent breakdown of machinery34. 
Table 3.5 Major enterprise start-up and growth problems by enterprise groups 
(1996/97) 
Start up Constraints total number per cent 
Small Scale Manufacturing Enterprises 2731 100 
- lack of sufficient initial capital 975 36 
- lack of supply of raw materials 420 15 
- lack of working capital 324 12 
- obstacles from govt. rules and regulations 185 7 
Distributive Trade Enterprises 212673 100 
- lack of sufficient own capital 89483 42 
- lack of premises 32124 15 
- government regulations 13065 6 
Cottage and Craft Enterprises 892755 100 
- lack of sufficient capital 429688 48.1 
- inadequate skills 101397 11.4 
- lack of supply of raw materials 58884 
6.6 
Major growth problems 
Small Scale Manufacturing Enterprises 1304 100 
- demand constraints 246 19 
- shortages of raw materials 173 13 
- lack of working capital 99 10 
Medium-large Manufacturing Enterprises: 618 100 
- absence of market 214 35 
- shortages of raw materials 117 19 
- lack of working capital 34 6 
Sources: CSA (1997b, 1997c, 1997d and 1997e). 
A large survey on distributive trade enterprises used questions which specifically 
asked for the type of public assistance that entrepreneurs would like to receive. 
Out of a total of 212668 respondents the top four support areas which received 
more than 10 percentage points were: access to bank loans (38 per cent), access to 
34 From the survey report on MLMEs it was not clear whether entrepreneurs were asked and 
responded to politically sensitive questions like access to land. 
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land (16 per cent), access to premises (16 per cent) and better government 
regulations (11 per cent). 
To summarise, the discussion in section 3.3 above (and that in section 3.2) showed 
that the growth of the Ethiopian economy in general and the enterprise sector in 
particular were low. From the discussion it emerged that causes of Ethiopia's 
continuous decline into poverty were due to consequences of governments 
policies and factors deeply built in the culture, religion and history of Ethiopia. 
The next two sections review Ethiopia's enterprise development institutions and 
instruments used to support enterprises. Building on the discussion in section 1.2 
in chapter one (see also Table 1.1) section 3.4. discusses the IIS, and accounts for 
the evolution and performance of the scheme. Section 3.5 will discuss the non-IIS 
enterprise support initiatives focusing on those covering a wider section of the 
enterprise sector. 
3.4 The evolution of the Investment Incentives Scheme and its institutions 
As discussed in chapter one (section 1.2) the introduction of the IIS in Ethiopia in 
1950 was an innovation. Consistent with the economic doctrine at the time, the 
scheme aimed to attract FDI and technology transfer. As the discussion in this 
section will show, since the 1950s the IIS has been changing in objectives and also 
to a degree in content. However, while the changes were evolutionary, the 
national and global contexts in which these changes have taken place were 
dramatically different. In fact to some extent the reintroduction of the IIS in the 
early 1990s can be seen as a move backwards to the 1950s context. The section also 
reviews the overall changes and continuity in the assumptions of the IIS and the 
provisions given to enterprises under the support scheme. The review mainly 
focuses on, first, the objectives, the nature of incentives and institutions of the IIS. 
Second, an assessment of impacts of the IIS over 1950-74. And, third, the 
rationales for sustaining the IIS for over fifty years. 
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3.4.1 The IIS policy and impacts (1950-74) 
IIS objectives and types and levels of enterprise support: Section 3.2.2 above 
showed that in 1950 Ethiopia there were barely any modern enterprises to speak 
of. Consequently, the first investment incentives (see the definition in Box 3.1) 
policy was enacted to encourage foreign capital investment in Ethiopia (IGE, 
1950). The key objective of the investment code was promoting manufacturing by 
offering new enterprises exemptions from the payment of (i) customs duties on 
imported machinery into Ethiopia and (ii) profit tax for five years from the date of 
commencement. Another decree passed in 1956 (IGE, 1956) expanded the areas 
eligible for five years of income tax exemptions to enterprise start up in the 
transport and mining sectors. However, the latter policy set a minimum 
investment of birr 200,000 to qualify for IIS support. 
Box 3.1 The definition of investment incentives in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian investment codes (for example, TGE, 1992, and FDRE, 1996a) 
defined investment as expenditure of capital on machines, equipment, 
buildings, etc. with a view to establishing a new enterprise or 
expanding /upgrading the capacity of an existing enterprise. The investment 
codes aimed to influence the size, location and sector of existing enterprises as 
well as to encourage new enterprise creation. 
The two major instruments that made up the Ethiopian investment incentives 
codes were: exemptions from the payment of duties on imported capital 
goods and the payment of income tax. Income tax exemption (1992-98) was 
for up to a period of three years in Addis Ababa and five years in some 
peripheral areas from the date of commencement of an enterprise. In the 
context of the discussion in chapter two (section 2.3), these investment 
incentives were essentially 'fiscal incentives'. However, the investment codes 
of Ethiopia has always used the broader definition - that is 'investment 
incentives' and hence in this thesis I also used 'investment incentives' instead 
of fiscal incentives. 
Although the IIS policy of the 1950s was about attracting FDI it had some 
limitations from the start. First, the scheme was exclusively for non-Ethiopians. 
The consequence of this was that emerging and/or expanding indigenous 
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enterprises were excluded from the benefits of the scheme. Secondly, the scheme 
was not attached to particular policy objectives like addressing regional income 
inequality and/or increasing employment. Third, and most importantly, the 
scheme did not have institutional mechanisms for its promotion and 
implementation. 
The 1950 investment policy was considerably revised in 1963 (IGE, 1963) and 1966 
(IGE, 1966). Following the 1966 revision, IIS incentives were provided to private 
foreign and domestic enterprises (however, the authorities did not consider the 
fact that encouraging indigenous SMEs development might require different 
policies). Second, by way of institution building, an investment committee (with a 
permanent office and staff in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) was 
created. The new committee was in charge of promoting and implementing the 
policies of the scheme. Furthermore, the revised law showed that (i) the scope of 
activities encouraged were widened to cover agriculture, industry, mining, 
transport and tourism areas. (ii) the categories supported included both new and 
expanding enterprises. But the type and level of investment incentives were, as 
before, five years of income tax and import duty relief. 
Evaluating IIS impact (1950-74): In the literature limited references were made 
about the outcomes of the investment incentives schemes. The data used to 
evaluate IIS achievements were patchy, contradictory and dubious. The 
methodology used to evaluate the IIS was also flawed. With these notes in mind 
the evidence below was from the available limited literature on IIS outcomes. 
Shiferaw Jammo (1995: 2) indicated that investment increased from birr 68 million 
to birr 128 million between 1960 and 1965. But the author did not show the 
evidence that the increase in investment was actually due to the IIS. Duri (1974: 
295) concluded that agricultural activities did not respond to the IIS support 
because the complex land tenure system that lacked, for example, clear land titles 
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and inadequate access to fertile but peripheral areas of the country, were the 
problems. Mulatu (1982: 75) found that Ethiopian manufacturing enterprises were 
capital intensive due to a foreign technology bias, built into the investment 
policies of the imperial time. 
Schwarz et al concluded that: 
... in a number of large investments, extensive privileges were sought, 
granted, and fully utilized. In many cases the incentives granted were 
necessary for the investment to take place. (Schwarz, 1968: 91). 
However, the Schwarz et al study was methodologically flawed. Firstly, neither 
growth in specific sectors nor increased inflow of foreign investment directly 
measure the performance of the incentives scheme as the authors thought. Sectors 
of the economy may have grown as a result of increased use of existing capacity. 
Moreover, growth in the economy and foreign investment may in fact have been 
due to the provision of better infrastructure like roads and power supply that 
were concurrently put in place. Owing to these confounding factors, therefore, I 
dispute the conclusion that the IIS had exerted an impact on the start-up of new 
enterprises. 
Secondly, Schwarz et al's study focused on macro level impacts of foreign 
investment in manufacturing, hence the main concern of this present study 
(impacts of the IIS on indigenous projects including non-manufacturing sectors), 
was barely considered. The study also failed to question the rationale for IIS 
enterprise start up support in the first place. It follows that from the Schwarz et al 
study it cannot be concluded that all the then new enterprises necessarily required 
support. 
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3.4.2 The IIS policy during 1990-98 
3.4.2.1 The IIS during the Derg era (1990-91) 
As discussed before the IIS was discontinued between 1974-1990. However, a 
badly performing economy, civil war, drought and international isolation 
compelled the Derg regime (1974-91) to change its policy of excessive state control 
of the economy by the end of the 1980s. Derg's reform measures came under the 
rubric of mixed economic policy, the key part of which was the reintroduction of 
the IIS in 1990. The objectives of the 1990 investment code (PDRE, 1990) included: 
promoting economic and social development, increased use of domestic resources, 
introducing science, technology and know-how, generating employment 
opportunities, generating and saving foreign exchange earnings and promoting 
balanced inter-regional development. 
Moreover, through the same decree, a large number of activities were opened for 
both joint and individual undertakings in the areas of agriculture, agro-industry, 
manufacturing and hotels. But activities like postal and communications services, 
air, rail and large scale shipping transport, and radio and television broadcasting 
services were reserved for the state. 
The types of investment incentives were, as before, exemptions from payments of 
customs duties and income taxes. However, Decree No. 17/1990 (PDRE, 1990) had 
made a major break with the preceding IIS policies in that it added regional and 
size dimensions of activities into the support system. As Table 3.6 shows, the level 
of income tax relief (in number of years) took into account the size of new start-up 
and expansion investment projects in agriculture, industry and hotel sectors35. 
35 Because of its centrality for this enquiry, details of location and sector specific IIS support in 
this and subsequent periods are presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. 
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Table 3.6 Location and activity based income tax privileges in years (1990) 
Incentives by New Enterprises Expanding Enterprises 
sector and size (in 
'000 birr) 
standard provisions in provisions for 
provision preferred expanding 
location enterprises 
Agriculture: 
- less than 300 - 2 - 
- 300 - 750 2 3 1 
- 750 - 2000 3 4 2 
2000 and above 5 6 3 
Industry: 
-50-500 - 2 - 
- 500 -1000 2 3 1 
-1000 - 5000 3 4 2 
5000 and above 5 6 3 
Hotels (> birr 300) - 2 - 
Source: PDRE, 1990. 
In Table 3.6 IIS 'standard provision' and 'provisions in preferred location', 
respectively, referred to IIS support to locations not particularly chosen and those 
chosen (like peripheral locations) by the authorities. In preferred locations IIS 
support was for a longer period and included more small activities in the scheme. 
For example, an enterprise starting up with an investment capital of birr 2 million 
or more was meant to receive five years of income tax exemption under the 
'standard provision' scenario. However, if the enterprise was set up in a 
'preferred location' then the tax exemption period was increased to six years. 
Activities like hotels, however, always received limited support in the form of 
both duties and income tax exemptions. 
Decree No 17/1990 (PDRE, 1990) also provided an institution for the 
administration of investment. Accordingly, an independent investment committee 
with a permanent office and staff was created. This time, however, there were 
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many sectoral committees for the administration of investment each granting 
licences for investment incentives. 
Once more with the fall of the Derg in 1991 the IIS policy was discontinued. 
Evidence that I referred to suggested that over 1990-91 a total of 86 applications 
were made for IIS support and of these 75 were approved by the Investment 
Office of Ethiopia (Tsegaye, 1992: 360). However, whether these projects were 
subsequently implemented was not clear. The IIS impact of this period was, 
therefore, difficult to evaluate largely because of the short period available for the 
policy to have worked. 
3.4.2.2 Post 1991 developments of the IIS 
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-95) reintroduced the IIS in 1992 
(TGE, 1992). Subsequently, the same policy has been published as a law twice 
(FDRE, 1996a and FDRE, 1998b). All three major IIS laws of the current 
government have almost similar objectives of creating more jobs, increasing 
domestic and foreign private investment and promoting integrated and balanced 
regional development. 
Although the latest series of IIS laws had similar objectives to that of the Derg 
policy in 1990, there were differences. First, the new codes were enacted under 
better enabling macro economic policy framework and Ethiopia restored better 
relations with the rest of the world. Second, in the new series of investment codes 
the scope of activities that were entitled for incentives were increased (to include 
insurance and banking activities, telecommunications, energy, health and 
education sectors). 
Third, recent IIS laws systematically provide more incentives to domestic 
entrepreneurs and protection to smaller enterprises from competition from 
foreign companies. This was done in two ways: first, by raising the minimum 
entry requirement for foreign capital to US$500,000 compared to only birr 250,000 
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(approximately US$ 35700) for domestic entrepreneurs. And second, by creating a 
reserve schedule for domestic entrepreneurs alone. Furthermore, with a view to 
encouraging expatriate Ethiopians to do business in Ethiopia the definition of 
'domestic investor' has also been broadened to include '... a foreign national, 
Ethiopian by birth, and desiring to be considered as a domestic investor' (FDRE, 
1998b). 
There was no change to the types of investment incentives, hence these remained 
exemptions from paying customs duties and income taxes. However, there were 
some changes in the details of the new code. First, exemptions from customs 
duties were extended to almost all capital goods. And, second, exemptions from 
income taxes were made on a more discretionary basis. To this end Reg. No. 
7/1996 (COM, 1996) has introduced the concepts of 'pioneer' and 'promoted' 
activities that receive differential support based on the location of the activity. 
Here what made the new IIS laws different to those enacted in 1990 was that more 
focus was given to regional balancing of economic activities and sectoral 
integration. 
Table 3.7 shows the number of years that enterprises were exempted from paying 
income taxes as provided in the investment codes of 1992 and 1996. Note that for 
the purpose of implementing the IIS the country was divided into three area 
categories: the Addis Ababa and Addis Ababa-Nazareth corridor, less developed 
areas and intermediate or other locations36. There were also two statuses of 
enterprises - new and expanding. For example, focusing on new enterprises only, 
Table 3.7 shows that, first, in the 1992 entrepreneurs who set up enterprises in the 
supported activities within Addis Ababa and Addis Ababa-Nazareth corridor 
36 A map of Ethiopia that shows these areas is given at the beginning of the thesis (page vi . ). In 
the subsequent discussions, and whenever required, readers are reminded to refer to the IIS 
package given in Table 3.7 and the corresponding area map. 
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were entitled up to 3 years exemption from paying income taxes. Again in 1992, 
entrepreneurs in the intermediate and relatively less developed areas received 
three to five years more IIS support (that is in addition to those in Addis Ababa 
would have received). 
Table 3.7 1992 and 1996 income tax provisions (in years) by enterprise status 
and location 
enterprise by IIS 1996 pioneer 1996 
status /location provision, activities promoted 
1992 activities 
1. AA and AA - 
Nazareth Corridor 
- new 3 3 1 
- expanding 2 2 1 
Less Developed 
Areas 
- new 8 5 3 
- expanding 6 2 1 
Other Locations 
- new 6 4 2 
- expanding 4 2 1 
Source: COM (1996) and COM (1993) 
Second, in 1996 the category of 'supported activities' was differentiated as 
'pioneer' activities (activities that the government targeted the most of its 
incentives) and 'promoted' activities. However, in terms of number of years, in 
1996 exemptions from paying income taxes declined to a maximum of five years. 
But 'pioneer' activities and less developed areas were less affected by the change. 
Hence, in Addis Ababa, in 1996 the same privilege of incentives (as in 1992) was 
maintained to 'pioneer' activities while 'promoted' activities received only one 
year income tax incentives. Similarly, note that more preference was given to 
'pioneer' than 'promoted' activities in locations further away from Addis Ababa. 
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By way of institutional development, first, a national authority (Ethiopian 
Investment Authority) and regional investment offices were set up to propose 
policies and oversee the activities of the IIS. Second, streamlined procedures for 
receiving and processing applications for IIS licences (for a fee of no more than 
birr 200) were created. A one-stop-shop (OSS) was also introduced in 1996 to 
provide services like operating licences for businesses and work permits for 
employing expatriates. 
3.4.2.3 Defining the nature and scope of the thesis: IIS role and impact (1992- 
98) 
In this section I consider the most recent literature on IIS impact and then 
summarise the core IIS parameters that are relevant for the study period of the 
thesis (1992-98). 
Since the IIS was reintroduced in 1992 studies made on Ethiopian enterprises have 
barely considered the link between investment incentives and enterprise start-ups 
and growth. The few studies recently made (for example, Admit and Getachew 
(1996) and Solomon (1996)) largely focused on description of the reform packages 
and considered (based on patchy macro data) the likely outcome of intended 
investment on employment and spatial development. These studies did not 
empirically investigate the response of entrepreneurs and enterprises to 
investment incentives. 
One major exception, however, was a study made by Gavian and Gemechu who 
looked at the impact of investment incentives on commercial farms (Gavian and 
Gemechu, 1994). Gavian and Gemechu studied 14 commercial agriculture 
investors or entrepreneurs (see definitions in Box 3.2), five of which were IIS 
licensed. Gavian and Gemechu found that, first, the entrepreneurs employed (or 
were keen to employ) modern inputs such as tractors and threshing machines. 
Second, they also observed that there were high costs associated with business 
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legalisation, financial problems like acquiring capital, poor infrastructure and 
problems of pushing investors to go to hot, disease-ridden areas in the west and 
south of the country (Gavian and Gemechu, 1994). 
Box 3.2 The concepts of the entrepreneur and investor in the Ethiopian 
conditions 
According to Proclamation No. 37/1996 (FDRE, 1996a) an 'investor' was 
defined as 'a person or business who has made an investment ... to establish a 
new enterprise or to expand or upgrade one that already exists'. Also, as I will 
show later in this thesis, it is important to note that in Ethiopia ownership and 
management of an enterprise are often embedded in the same individual or a 
small group of individuals. But the notion of an investor, as it was understood 
in Ethiopia, was not compatible with the common definition of an 'investor'. 
For example, according to The Collins English Dictionary an 'investor' is 
someone who lays out and/or devotes money and resources to enterprises 
with the expectation of profit. Many Ethiopian investors (who set up, own 
and manage their own enterprises) go through the process of idea generation, 
resource mobilisation, and business legalisation. The notion of 'investor' was, 
therefore, limiting because it did not necessarily convey the characteristics of 
an individual or groups of individuals who set up enterprises. 
The Ethiopian investment code understanding of an 'investor' was similar to 
the concept of the entrepreneur (entrepreneurship) defined, according to The 
Collins English Dictionary, as 'owner or manager of a business enterprise who, 
by risk and initiative, attempts to make profit'. In this thesis I used the 
concept of entrepreneur over 'investor' because it gave a better meaning to 
the role of the people who set up, own and run enterprises with the assistance 
of investment incentives. 
What was most interesting about Gavian and Gemechu's study was that they 
asserted that IIS licensed entrepreneurs sought the IIS licence to be able to have 
access to bank credit and improve on their legal standing before the court 
(enforcing contracts, for example) (Gavian and Gemechu, 1994: 149-150). 
However, what Gavian and Gemechu did not show was whether the IIS made any 
difference to entrepreneurial choices of location and type of activities in 
commercial agriculture and whether the IIS licence was used to provide 
entrepreneurs access to the most important resource, that is farm land. 
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To summarise, the above discussion showed that the IIS incentives were used to 
influence entrepreneurs' decisions over the size, location and sector of enterprises. 
Secondly, IIS benefits to the entrepreneurs also depended on the rates of both 
duty and income taxes, the type and location of activities. In short the IIS was 
meant to: 
" support enterprise start-up: through subsidising imported capital goods by 
exempting entrepreneurs from the payment of import duties. As the findings 
of this study will show in chapter five, on the average eligible entrepreneurs 
benefit up to 13 per cent of the value of imported capital goods. 
support at early stage of enterprise growth: by granting entrepreneurs 
exemptions from the payment of 35 per cent of business income tax from one 
to five years (as of 1996) from the date of commencement of the enterprises. 
Entrepreneurs actual benefits from the scheme depended on the type and 
location of activities (as explained in Table 3.7 above). 
Based on the above specifications, therefore, the core questions that this thesis has 
addressed were that: (i) did the investment incentives influence entrepreneurs' 
decisions on the choices of type, location and size of an enterprise (if so how)? 
And (ii) did the IIS licence serve as a gateway to resources like enterprise plots? 
Section 3.5 below reviews non-IIS enterprise support initiatives and institutions 
that were running as of 1998. 
3.5 Non-IIS institutions and instruments for enterprise development 
The review in this section covers enterprise services delivered by the government, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and professional associations. 
3.5.1 Enterprise support institutions and services provided by the 
government 
3.5.1.1 HASIDA/DAHSI 
Outside the investment incentives scheme by far the largest government run 
enterprise support institution was the development agency for handicrafts and 
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small scale industries (DAHSI). DAHSI's predecessor handicrafts and small-scale 
industries development agency (HASIDA) was set up 1977 marking a major shift 
in government policy towards the enterprise sector. It was following the set up of 
HASIDA that the 1966 investment code was scrapped by the Derg government 
because the code was incompatible with socialist enterprise organisation. 
HASIDA was thus introduced to prevent the growth of capitalism in Ethiopia. 
Other justifications for HASIDA were that small scale industries and handicrafts 
generate employment, produce agricultural tools and implements and were 
considered as a means of mobilising indigenous capital for industrialisation. 
HASIDA was entrusted with the power to generate policy that promote and 
coordinate the development of small scale industries and handicrafts. It was also 
created to campaign against the cultural stigmatisation of communities that 
produce handicrafts. 
HASIDA's support to small enterprises focused on providing vocational training 
and marketing skills and organising cooperatives of small scale industries and 
handicrafts. The approach was a more of a 'hands on' method of cooperativization 
which gradually led to fewer members staying in the cooperatives. The new 
agency, DAHSI, was set up in 1995 to assist and promote small scale industries 
and handicrafts. As in the past, training and research development were the main 
instruments of enterprise support. But unlike the Derg time DAHSI focused on 
individuals rather than cooperatives. 
Apart from DAHSI promotional publications trying to portray some positive 
images emerging from their activities, data that showed the impacts of DAHSI 
activities were patchy. For example, between 1993 and 1997 a total of 591 people 
were trained in carpentry, bamboo work, textile production, weaving and 
spinning, metalwork and woodwork. Similarly between 1991 and 1995 another 
557 people were trained in management (DAHSI, 1997: 14). Similar to many of the 
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other enterprise support beneficiaries, most DAHSI assisted trainees were from 
Addis Ababa and most of them were school leavers and the unemployed with 
limited resources for business start-ups. My overall observation was that given 
that trainees need other resources and conditions like finance to start up 
businesses, DAHSI efforts made only marginal impacts. 
3.5.1.2 Other enterprise related government agencies 
Specialised agencies for the development of the enterprise economy: These 
included, first, the Engineering Design and Tools Enterprise (EDTE) that dealt 
with capacity building in the areas of: 
" engineering design and manufacture of machine and equipment with the 
aim of producing better suited products for local small and medium 
industries, 
" tool design (moulds, dies, jigs, fixtures, etc. ) and tool making with the aim of 
creating a strong domestic technology base for industrialization, 
" training national staff in the basic skills of product development, engineering 
design, tool design, prototype and tool making (Terefe, 1996: 49). 
Second, the Science and Technology Commission (ESTC) was overseeing science 
and technology activities, promoting research including by providing small grants 
to research projects. Third, the Food Research and Development Centre, 
established in 1987, was working towards acquiring and adapting food processing 
technologies from the rest of the world (Terefe, 1996: 49). Fourth, the Ethiopian 
Management Institute (EMI) also had competencies in research, training and 
consultancy. However, this and the above institutions operations were very much 
limited to Addis Ababa region and/or focused on public sector enterprises. 
Enterprise agencies and programmes operating under sectoral ministries: 
Ministries like education, finance, industry, agriculture, energy, etc. influence 
enterprise policies and performance. For example, as of 1998 there were 17 
vocational schools and institutions of higher education that had direct and 
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indirect contributions to the enterprise sector. But over 75 per cent of the 
graduates of higher institutions went to the public sector and the rest went to 
NGOs, large enterprises, and some remain unemployed. Wolde-Emmanuel (1996) 
reported that the private sector created about 2 per cent of jobs for 1994/95 
commercial college graduates. He also noted that in the small enterprise sector 
employers took multi-purpose employees because specialists were often under- 
utilised. 
New and emerging enterprise support initiatives (as of 1998): The Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MTI) had some new programmes for the private enterprise 
sector. First, the micro and small enterprises agency has been set up by Regulation 
No. 33/1998 (COM, 1998a). The agency aimed at encouraging, assisting and 
coordinating institutions and initiatives oriented towards the micro and small 
enterprises sector. These were timely objectives as the development and delivery 
of none of the enterprise support initiatives were coordinated. Secondly, in 1998 
an export promotion agency was set up to promote traditional and new export 
commodities. The export promotion agency also has a 'trade service point' for 
providing trade related information and facilitating import and export trade. With 
a view to setting up an industrial estate the government also made plots of land 
and premises available to the project. In agriculture a livestock marketing 
authority was also set up (Brook Debebe, 1999). 
Proc. No. 103/1998 (FDRE, 1998a) allowed the set up of private capital goods 
leasing businesses. These businesses were believed to provide alternative sources 
of capital to the banks and address shortages of capital at enterprise start-up stage. 
Proc. No. 40/1996 (FDRE, 1996b) also provided the legal framework for the set up 
of micro financing institutions that extend credit to peasant farmers and 
entrepreneurs that set up small enterprises. 
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As of 1998 there were some studies in the making that were aimed at supporting 
enterprises. Two examples of these were (i) Enterprise Ethiopia -a programme 
designed to stimulate enterprise start-up, expansion and diversification (UNDP, 
1998). (ü) setting up a seed capital fund to serve small scale enterprises to meet 
their financial needs at start-up (EIA, 1997b). 
3.5.2 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Chambers of Commerce 
and Professional Associations 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs): such as Urban Development Support 
Service, Ethiopian Relief Organization, Redd Barna Norway, and African Village 
Academy and donors like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
and the European Union were providing limited support to the enterprise 
economy of Ethiopia. These NGOs and donors, for example, were involved in 
providing some credit schemes (Terefe, 1996: 50). 
Chambers of Commerce and Professional Associations: Institutions like 
chambers of commerce and sectoral associations that promote the interests of the 
business sector were generally limited in number and services they deliver. 
Founded in 1947 the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce (AACC) was the oldest 
and relatively better organised. In 1998 there were 36,000 AACC members from 
the import and export trade sector, manufacturing and services (AACC Directory, 
1998/99: 13). The Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce (ECC) was founded in 1978 
and had members from 11 cities/towns. 
Non-profit making associations of the private sector did not have a long tradition 
of association, nor had they enjoyed a supportive legal framework. It was only in 
the 1990s that professional associations began to emerge. According to Taye (1997) 
there were at least 67 non-profit making associations that represented the interests 
of the private sector. According to Borin et al (1994: 97-98) the contributions of 
these associations to their constituencies were limited to holding seminars and 
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exhibitions. Most did not participate in government policy making, lobbying and 
channelling of information. These professional associations were ineffective 
because of financial limitations, lack of office premises, lack of equipment and 
trained personnel. 
3.5.3 Summary to Sections 3.4 and 3.5 
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 showed institutions that were in the business of supporting 
enterprises and entrepreneurs over the study period (1992-98). The discussion 
showed some common elements about these institutions, that: 
0 institutions were limited in number and the type of services like training and 
finance they deliver, 
" there was a lack of cooperation between support institutions themselves, 
" supporting institutions tended to be concentrated in Addis Ababa, 
" support (at least for major programmes like the IIS) was not demand driven, 
and 
" support was single theme based like the IIS and DAHSI focusing on capital 
subsidy and training respectively. 
The discussion above (and that given in section 1.2 in chapter one) showed that 
the IIS was an innovation when it was introduced in 1950. Since then (with the 
exception of 1975-90) the IIS has been a key economic and political policy for 
enterprise development in Ethiopia. Over the years the policy showed some 
changes: from inducing foreign capitalists to set up large manufacturing 
enterprises to assisting indigenous SME start ups in many activity areas. The 
policy also shifted in terms of purpose, for example, from simply encouraging 
enterprise start up to pursuing specific regional development objectives. The 
changes made to the IIS, however, were inherently piecemeal in nature, and most 
importantly, did not draw on other countries' experiences on local enterprise and 
SMEs development. 
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Over this fifty plus years an area where learning did not take place was in IIS's 
instruments of support - that is exemptions from paying duties and income taxes 
remained unchanged. The fact that EIA supported enterprises by augmenting 
capital invested meant that the entrepreneurs themselves were neglected. Physical 
assets, essential as they may be, would not be organised without the 
entrepreneurs. As I will show later, entrepreneurs faced constraints including 
inadequate infrastructure and finance. The IIS authorities failed to address these 
problems directly nor introduce innovative support measures that were tried and 
tested in the rest of the world. Section 3.6 below provides the overall conclusion of 
the chapter and makes links with the research propositions of the thesis. 
3.6 Conclusion and links with the questions of the thesis 
In spite of its long history of indigenous culture, literature and government 
Ethiopia's continuous decline into abject poverty is puzzling. My background 
study showed that Ethiopia's past, its long and cherished independence also 
caused its isolation, resulting in marginal contribution of external knowledge and 
technology to the development of the country. Because education was either 
lacking or misguided it failed to play a role in development either in providing 
skilled personnel or a means to challenge undesirable cultural practices. Sustained 
hostility to major innovations and/or foreign technology partly created the 
current barriers to the development of dynamic enterprises and institutions. 
In recent years government development policies too were misguided as, for 
example, the Derg's policy which stifled the development of the private sector as a 
matter of policy. In the 1990s the enterprise sector was dominated by less value 
adding small producers. Linkages between different sizes and groups of 
enterprises were very weak. And business relationships like subcontracting and 
franchising hardly existed. Consequently opportunities for technology transfer 
and creating more jobs and value added were limited. Backward technology and 
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poor infrastructure including roads, energy and marketing arrangements were 
major bottlenecks to enterprise start-up and growth. But still there is some 
potential for enterprise development such as low wage labour, land and land 
based resources. An enabling macro-economic framework was a positive 
development for the business sector. 
From the discussions above and that presented in chapter one (section 1.2) it can 
be concluded that Ethiopia's enterprise policy in the early 1990s failed in two main 
areas. First, it failed to address problems of SMEs like finance, access to energy 
sources and plots of land. And second, it failed to learn from other countries' 
experiences on local enterprise and SMEs development and introduce policies that 
worked for SMEs. Instead Ethiopia's main enterprise initiative (the IIS) regressed, 
and was reintroduced in the same way as it had been in the 1950s. It is against this 
background that the subsequent chapters will show how these narrowly defined 
IIS policy and instruments failed to impact on SMEs start up and early growth. 
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4. Research Strategy and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
The thesis is based on multiple sources of data including macro statistics and 
evidence from an in-depth study of selected sample of SMEs. This chapter outlines 
the rationales for the contrasted sources of data, and describes how data collection 
and analysis methods were selected and employed37. 
Section 4.2 below discusses the reasons for using the different sources of evidence. 
The design and implementation of case studies required careful consideration of 
how to generate sufficient and reliable data. Section 4.3, therefore, particularly 
reports on the procedures and criteria used in selecting a sample of SMEs. In 
section 4.4, I discuss the basis of selection and types of data collecting methods 
and procedures used. I also document here my experience of the fieldwork. 
Section 4.5 briefly considers the analytical methods used in the analysis and 
discussion sections of the thesis. Finally section 4.6 provides a brief chapter 
summary. 
4.2 Considerations made in choosing research strategies 
There is a degree of confusion in the use of some terms in the research methods 
literature. The particular terms referred to here are those associated with the 
general route taken to conduct research, variously dubbed research style or 
approach (Bell, 1993), strategy (Yin, 1994 and Robson, 1993), paradigm (Cuba, 
1990), and approach or framework (Thomas, 1998). With a view to avoiding such 
multiple (and sometimes confusing) terms, following Robson (ibid), I have used 
the term 'strategy' to mean the general route taken to address research questions 
37 For the purpose of this thesis the case for both qualitative and quantitative data was 
compelling. However, because of its limited relevance, this section will not discuss the 
theoretical perspectives of positivists and constructivists on quantitative and qualitative 
data. 
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(as in involving the choice between case study, survey, experiment or archive 
based information). A research 'method' here refers to specific device or 'tactic' of 
data collection and analysis (as in interviewing and data organisation). 
The rest of this section focuses on, first, the basic parameters considered in 
choosing research strategies. Section 4.2.1, therefore, explores the link between the 
research questions and hypotheses and the possible research strategies. In section 
4.2.2 the strengths and weaknesses of the research strategies employed in the 
study are carefully assessed and discussed. 
4.2.1 Linking research strategy and questions and hypotheses 
As highlighted in the earlier chapters, two major reasons justified the conduct of 
this research. First, investment incentives as an idea of enterprise support 
initiative was a contested concept. And, second, barely any empirical study was 
available on the role and impact of the IIS on enterprise start-up and growth. 
Hence the research specifically set out to explore the relationship between 
investment incentives and enterprise start-up and growth in the Ethiopian 
context. From these premises, two focal areas of research emerged: 
(i) the theoretical concern about investment incentives and the assumptions 
taken by IIS policy makers: How did investment incentives influence 
entrepreneurs' decisions on, for example, location and size of enterprises (if 
indeed they did)? From the literature reviewed (chapter two) it is apparent that 
investment incentives may have worked in some developed countries but not in 
some less developed countries. But in Ethiopia the authorities kept granting 
investment incentives to entrepreneurs believing that these incentives influenced 
entrepreneurs' decisions over choices of the type, location and size of enterprises. 
Government statistics showed that 4246 projects were licensed for the IIS over the 
period 1992-98, and of this total 1163, a little more than a quarter, were set up. 
However, some nagging questions remained unanswered, like did the IIS really 
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provide support to the entrepreneurs and switch entrepreneurs' decisions on the 
type and location of enterprise start-ups? 
Based on the broader literature reviewed on the effectiveness of the investment 
incentives (chapter two) and the preliminary evidence collected from Ethiopia 
(section 4.3 below), I was sceptical about the possible impacts of the IIS, as 
reflected in hypothesis one (Hl): 
" H1: the influence of investment incentives on the timing, type, location and 
size of IIS assisted SMEs was limited. 
This hypothesis, as will be explained later, was subjected to thorough exploration. 
(ii) the mediating role of the IIS: my scepticism about the IIS impact raised 
another set of questions: if the IIS was less important in influencing 
entrepreneurial decisions, then why did the authorities keep providing (and some 
entrepreneurs keep seeking) its support? Asking these questions may appear 
naive because, it could be argued, the IIS authorities may have continued 
delivering the IIS support as they did not know it had little impact on enterprise 
start-up. However, these questions were asked because, as the discussion below 
shows, the authorities were providing preferential access to other benefits for IIS 
participants. 
Prior to the extensive field work in 1998, I conducted a preliminary study that 
involved visiting some enterprises and institutions most related to the IIS 
operations. From this preliminary study I noted that, in addition to subsidising 
investment capital on machines, some entrepreneurs used the IIS licence and 
structure to get easier and cheaper access to enterprise sites, bank credit and 
utilities. Moreover, it appeared that some entrepreneurs used the IIS structure to 
ease the bureaucracy of business legalisation. From this observation a second 
hypothesis emerged: if IIS mediated benefits were in part or fully captured by the 
entrepreneurs, then enterprise start-up pace, size and location could be affected, 
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perhaps significantly. Based on this grounded exploration of how the IIS system 
influenced entrepreneurial behaviour on the take-up of IIS support, I 
encapsulated the gist of the arguments in hypothesis two (H2): 
" H2: some entrepreneurs sought the support of the IIS, in addition to its fiscal 
benefits, for its role as a gateway to resources (land, credit and utility) 
required for enterprise start-up, and to ease the otherwise bureaucratic 
business legalisation processes. 
I will also argue that these non-IIS benefits are far superior to benefits that emerge 
from investment incentives. Furthermore, an in-depth exploration into the 
question of why entrepreneurs needed the IIS licence and structure to get access to 
land and credit also reveals some interesting insights into the workings of the 
enterprise economy. 
Before I embarked on the search for empirical evidence that answered the above 
questions, I developed a conceptual framework (chapter one, Figure 1.1) that 
showed the US system, including its key component of assisted 
entrepreneurs/enterprises, and the environment it operated in. The conceptual 
framework also guided the study on aspects of the non-IIS benefits (as well as 
disentangling this from IIS benefits) that some assisted enterprises drew on. For 
example, providing assisted enterprises with easy or subsidised access to serviced 
enterprise sites was never part of the IIS function. However, following hypothesis 
two (H2), it had now become an IIS mediated benefit to some participants. 
To assist the enquiry questions like what were the rationales for initiating the IIS, 
what were entrepreneurs' motives for decisions on enterprise start-up in relation 
to the use of the IIS, and why did the entrepreneurs seek non-IIS assistance were 
asked (see Appendix 1). Because the foregoing, largely 'why', 'how' and 'what' 
questions, lead to a rigorous exploration of the issues (Yin (1994), Miles and 
Huberman (1994), and Thomas (1998)) a case study research strategy was chosen. 
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The SME literature too upholds a case study research strategy because it enables 
an in-depth enquiry into the impacts of a given support system: 
[I]t is only by means of in-depth discussion with small business owners 
that the effectiveness of policy initiatives can be judged (Bridge et at, 
1998: 217). 
However, for the reason given below a survey based research strategy was not 
appropriate. 
Reasons for not using a survey research strategy38: As Box 2.1 in chapter two 
showed, SMEs as units of analysis are heterogeneous and limit generalisation 
from cases studied to the population. The large sector and spatial diversity of 
Ethiopian SMEs, therefore, meant that a significant size sample survey had to be 
conducted. However, there were several limitations to conducting a survey: first, 
generating data based on a survey research strategy would have been limited by a 
number of difficulties that are very much to do with the heterogeneous 
characteristics of entrepreneurs and SMEs. With limited time and resources 
available for the study, generating a sufficient number of SMEs to represent, 
among other things, sector, region and size criteria would have been difficult. 
Second, the physical and social infrastructure of Ethiopia, discussed in chapter 
three, would have barely supported a survey strategy. For example, owing to the 
unreliable means of communication (postal, telephone, and roads), sample survey 
responses would have been low. Moreover, poor survey responses would be 
likely to be biased in favour of large enterprises which often were 
owned/managed by relatively educated personnel. Researchers' experience (for 
example, Workie, 1997) also suggested that many IIS assisted entrepreneurs were 
38 Note that the core questions of the research did not necessarily require the use of a survey 
research strategy. It was possible to address most of the questions using a small sample of 
case SMEs and other data sources, including macro data. 
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least likely to have provided (or kept) sensitive data on taxes (including that paid 
and saved due to the IIS). 
Finally, a sample survey presupposed a known population of enterprises. 
Although recent statistics give estimates, at the start of this research there was no 
knowledge of the population size of Ethiopian enterprises in general and those 
supported by the IIS in particular. These problems, therefore, would have made 
the process of drawing a sample and subsequently making a meaningful analysis 
of data a rather precarious exercise. 
All the foregoing, therefore, meant that a closer contact and a thorough enquiry of 
selected cases were essential. Therefore, acknowledging the need for more macro 
based data and the limitations of a survey strategy, I decided to generate primary 
and secondary data from multiple sources as outlined in section 4.2.2 below. 
4.2.2 Foundations of using mixed research strategies 
The literature (for example, Yin (1994) and Robson (1993)) suggested that sources 
of evidence such as surveys, case studies and archive information constitute 
research strategies. Table 4.1 shows a mixture of these strategies that were 
employed in this research. While using these sources of evidence I have taken into 
account several factors including: the nature of the research questions and 
hypotheses, practical limitations of conducting a survey, the fact that the research 
context was Ethiopia where the infrastructure was limited, and resources 
available to me within the scope of the research project. 
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Table 4.1 Strengths, weaknesses and complementing research strategies 
used in the research 
strategy/source strengths weaknesses complementing 
of evidence strategy 
macro data showed some weakness on use data from land 
characteristics of what switches lease and inland 
population of IIS licensed entre- revenue offices, use 
enterprise (dynamics of preneurial case SMEs and 
start up: activity type, choices, did not stakeholders 
location, etc. ), and stages answer specific interview data 
of start ups questions 
related to IIS 
past survey showed entrepreneurial did not show use case SMEs and 
results characteristics of the entre- interview other 
population preneurial stakeholders 
response to IIS 
incentives 
IIS policy showed historical did not provide use macro, case 
documents developments (eg. enterprise level SMEs, etc. data 
changes in the incentives data 
structure and role of the 
private sector) 
interview key showed IIS providers may be use as many 
stakeholders and other stakeholders subjective stakeholders as 
perspective on IIS possible 
impacts 
selected sample showed entrepreneurial restricted use past survey data 
of SMEs decisions, enterprise start generalisability and/or macro data 
up processes and including inland 
constraints and levels revenue data on 
and impacts of IIS revenue foregone 
due to the IIS 
Source: Own Construction 
The strengths and weaknesses of each source of evidence are briefly described in 
Table 4.1. In addition below I briefly comment on each source of evidence. Macro 
or national data provided information on the population of the research - that was 
all IIS licensed projects over 1992-98. These data showed, among other things, the 
spatial and sector patterns of the IIS supported enterprises. The interpretation of 
these macro level data were enriched by the interviews conducted with what I 
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referred to as stakeholders. These stakeholders included representatives of IIS 
policy makers and staff of EIA, regional investment offices, professional 
associations and representatives of institutions like the Land Lease Office. These 
stakeholders had professional interest, as promotors or collaborating supporters 
of enterprises, in influencing the application and effects of the IIS. Archive based 
information, notably that related to IIS policy documents, provided vital 
information on the evolution of the scheme. 
Finally, using a selected sample of SMEs enabled me to carry out a rigorous 
enquiry into how the IIS support initiative worked and impacted on enterprise 
start-up at different stages. By combining entrepreneurial features from past 
surveys, I was also able to anticipate entrepreneurial responses to IIS incentives. 
Moreover, three of the six case studies were unassisted enterprises which helped 
to me to study (a) the difference that the IIS support makes to enterprise 
development and (b) the state of enterprise development immediately outside the 
IIS system boundary. 
To sum up, these multiple sources of evidence provided me with a unique 
opportunity to generate diverse qualitative and quantitative data on how and 
when events such as enterprise start-up took place. Furthermore, these sources 
provided data that describe and interpret events in such a way that each source 
can confirm or challenge conclusions emerging from others 39 
Unlike the more straightforward collection of macro data and the interviewing of 
IIS authorities, the design, selection and data collection from the case studies 
required some careful procedures. Section 4.3, therefore, specifically discusses the 
procedures and criteria used in SME selection. 
39 Details of legal and statistical documents and interviewees are given in sections 9.2,9.3 and 
9.4, respectively, of the Reference section. 
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4.3 Procedures and criteria for selecting SMEs 
4.3.1 The preliminaries of case study selection 
In early 1998, a pre-fieldwork exercise was conducted with a view to: (i) selecting 
enterprises to feature in the study, (ii) determining the procedures for 
approaching enterprises, (iii) testing the feasibility of interview questions and the 
subsequent recording and processing procedures of data, and (iv) collecting data 
that included macro statistics on IIS supported enterprises. 
The preliminary fieldwork proceeded in steps, first, by describing the wider socio- 
economic environment, and subsequently identifying beneficiaries of different 
enterprise support initiatives like the IIS and DAHSI (as discussed in chapter 
three). Further, preliminary data on IIS assisted enterprises (including regional 
and sector dimensions) were collected. Subsequently, classification and 
preliminary analyses were conducted to show enterprise size, age, sector and 
location patterns. One key preliminary finding was that, in 1998, there were over 
1000 small to large enterprises thought to have been set up with IIS support. The 
question then followed, which and how many of these enterprises should feature 
in the study? 
Following the reasons given in section 4.2, I decided to conduct a study of a 
selected sample of case SMEs. The subsequent question was selecting what 
Thomas (1998) referred to as 'challenging cases' - those cases with limited scope 
but informing the whole area of IIS policy. In other words, and complementing 
other data sources, I wanted to focus on a few cases, each serving as an instrument 
not for its own sake but to address the bigger IIS policy issues, as the literature 
suggested (Stake, 1995: 3). 
Further, before deciding on the categories and number of enterprises that would 
feature as case SMEs, I also stated certain conditions relevant for selecting the 
cases: 
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the cases should address key IIS assumptions/ objectives - that is, the case 
enterprises should reflect on the expectation that the IIS support might 
produce differential sectoral and regional benefits and impacts. This meant 
that the cases needed to be drawn from the categories referred to as 'pioneer' 
and 'promoted' activities (as defined and discussed in chapters one and 
three). 
the preliminary enquiry (also see section 4.3.4) found that many 
entrepreneurs, for example as many as two out of three in Addis Ababa, that 
would have qualified for IIS support were successfully starting up 
enterprises without support. This raised the question of why some 
entrepreneurs sought IIS support to start up enterprises, while others went it 
alone. The question led to the inclusion of some unassisted enterprises (UEs) 
as case studies. 
other factors that had a direct bearing on the choice of case enterprises such 
as size-age criterion were taken into account. 
The inclusion of enterprises that qualified for the IIS support but did not take 
licences (UEs) in the study served some key purposes. First, UEs enhanced the 
assessment of the effectiveness of the IIS including in addressing issues like 
deadweight and displacement, and stages in the adoption of IIS subsidised 
technology. Second, in line with H2, UEs provided more information on how non- 
IIS institutional support (that some AEs enjoyed) impacted on enterprise start up. 
Using UEs as a devise, these non-IIS institutional supports offered to AEs were 
disentangled from IIS benefits and thereby the performance of AEs were assessed 
on the basis of the total public support they enjoyed. The inclusion of UEs in the 
study, therefore, has enhanced the possibilities of making broader generalisations 
about the IIS direct and indirect impacts. 
4.3.2 SME age-size criteria 
Following the Ethiopian definition of enterprise size (see chapter two, Box 2.1), a 
typology of enterprises was developed. The typology, which applied to all types 
of activities, was: 
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" micro enterprises (up to five employees) 
" small enterprises (6-15 employees) 
" medium-sized enterprises (16-50 employees) 
" large-scale enterprises (greater than 50 employees) 
Following the underlying reasons for studying SMEs, outlined in chapter one, the 
cases came from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which employed 6- 
50 people at the time of start-up. These SMEs were indigenous and eligible for IIS 
support. 
It is already stated that the first IIS law goes back to 1950. But I fixed the timescale 
of this study to cover 1992-98, that was the period since the IIS was reintroduced 
in 1992. The choice of this period was based on, first, enterprises which enjoyed 
similar IIS support in the pre-1974 environment were nationalised and some of the 
first generations of owners and managers were unlikely to be available for the 
study. Second, I also believed that only if enterprises were fairly new would 
owners be able to remember and reflect on events that took place at the time of 
set-up and subsequent development of the enterprise. Third, I also thought that a 
close SME age cohort that operated in a similar macro environment would deal 
with confounding factors such as differences in age and policy environment. 
Finally, I have also avoided selecting SMEs which had just commenced operation 
because of the possible difficulties in identifying the benefits of the IIS right after 
start-up. Therefore, the selected case SMEs were those set up since 1992 and in 
1998 at least two years old. 
4.3.3 Number, activity type and location of case SMEs 
Sector composition and number of case SMEs: following a careful application of 
the criteria set out above I finally decided to study six SMEs three of which were 
AEs and other three UEs. These SMEs were carefully chosen (see section 4.3.4 
below) and represented activities that the IIS authorities referred to as 'pioneer' 
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(like engineering industry), 'promoted' (such as consumer goods industry) and 
those in between 'pioneer' and 'promoted' (those that combined agro-industries 
and services). In my decision on the number of SMEs I took into account the 
cooperation of entrepreneurs40. This was because experience (for example, 
Workie, 1997) showed that some entrepreneurs did not cooperate with researchers 
and were not used to intensive qualitative research. 
Location of case SMEs: The six SMEs were drawn from the Addis Ababa region. 
Choosing the location of these SMEs, as the discussion below shows, was a 
complicated matter that rested on several considerations. 
To begin with, in theory the IIS was expected to encourage enterprise start up 
within a particular region and/or cause inter-regional movement of capital 
investment, that is from least IIS-assisted to most assisted areas. The study 
addressed the possible increase in enterprise start up in a particular region in 
different ways. First, macro data that related the regional distribution of start ups 
and IIS benefits, that is revenue foregone due to the IIS, were used. Second, an in- 
depth study of data from Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa-Nazareth corridor and 
Oromia regions was made41. In addition to these statistics the extensive interviews 
I had with the IIS authorities from Addis Ababa and Oromia regions provided 
evidence to assess the location impacts of the IIS. Third, following the selection of 
case SMEs, I also discovered that four of the six selected enterprises had 
significant operations in at least one region outside Addis Ababa. Hence founders 
40 Anticipating that some proposed SMEs may refuse to be involved in this study a reserve list 
of SMEs was produced. As expected one enterprise pulled out because its operation was 
hugely affected by the then Ethio-Eritrean conflict. This enterprise was replaced from the 
reserve list. 
41 These areas have had significance in IIS and non-IIS assisted enterprise development in the 
country. And these areas also have had contrasting features: the Addis Ababa and Addis 
Ababa-Nazareth corridor were the least IIS assisted areas, while the Oromia region covered 
least IIS assisted (Addis Ababa-Nazareth corridor) and most IIS assisted areas like the 
Borena zone. 
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of these SMEs were also asked whether their operations outside Addis Ababa 
were related to IIS incentives. 
Moreover, as the subsequent chapters will show, the choice of SMEs from Addis 
Ababa was influenced by the particular significance that the authorities attached 
to inter-regional movement of capital investment (often from Addis Ababa to the 
other parts of Ethiopia). My extensive consultations with EIA members of staff 
revealed some limited inter-regional investment capital movements. Examples of 
this included (i) cases in which some entrepreneurs from Addis Ababa that set up 
enterprises along the area commonly called as the Addis Ababa-Nazareth 
corridor, and (ii) land-based enterprises that were set up in the regions such as 
Afar in the east and Metema and Humera in the northwest of Ethiopia. However, 
my consultations with EIA members of staff did not result in suitable cases for this 
study. This was largely because the Addis Ababa-Nazareth corridor received 
similar level of IIS incentives as the Addis Ababa region and had more or less 
similar infrastructure and market potentials. The few entrepreneurs who set up 
farms in remote parts of Ethiopia needed the hot climate and tracts of land that 
Addis Ababa could not have provided. These meant that an outflow of investment 
capital from Addis Ababa had little to do with the limited IIS incentives provided 
in the region. 
Furthermore, the selection of location of case studies was considered in 
conjunction with issues of industry choice and size that the thesis pursued. For an 
entrepreneur from Addis Ababa, while location based IIS incentives suggested 
moving out to the regions, industry choice (like engineering firms) and enterprise 
size, among other things, required better infrastructure and a larger market hence 
these tended to keep enterprise start-up within Addis Ababa. Based on these 
broader considerations, therefore, I was convinced that an entrepreneur from 
Addis Ababa would face the most challenging enterprise start up decision: should 
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he/she seek the best IIS location based incentives at the expense of better 
infrastructure and market in Addis Ababa? 
Finally, enterprise start up in Addis Ababa had some unique features too. For 
example, in terms of submitting proposed projects for IIS support, Addis Ababa 
had the highest share of projects relative to the other regions (40 per cent over 
1992-98) but project implementation rate was the lowest due to the political 
economy of non-IIS incentives distribution (including the provision of access to 
land and utilities). Issues around non-IIS incentives relates to the concerns of 
hypothesis two. Therefore, with a view to thoroughly exploring both Hl and H2, 
investigating SMEs start up in Addis Ababa was considered the best approach. 
In short the foregoing sections set out the scope and criteria of selecting case 
SMEs. The next section deals with how the cases were actually selected. 
4.3.4 Selecting 'challenging' cases of SMEs 
Depending on the circumstances, the literature (for example, Langrish, 1993) 
suggested approaches such as looking for comparable units (age, size, etc. ), 'best 
practice', and consulting informed people to generate cases for a study. However, 
with only patchy information on the whereabouts and features of Ethiopian 
enterprises, these approaches were unlikely to produce cases with the above 
required features like size and age. My first thought was taking a direct approach 
which envisaged visiting enterprises until suitable cases emerged. However, this 
option was quickly ruled out as it was an inefficient option in terms of time and 
resource use. The second and favoured approach to selecting cases from a large 
and chaotic sector of SMEs was, therefore, to proceed with the construction of a 
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list of potential case studies based on information (however inadequate) from 
directories42 and databases of government departments. 
The case study SMEs were finally drawn from the enterprise summed up in Table 
4.2. The table shows the number of enterprises set up or those which became 
members of the Addis Ababa Chambers of Commerce (AACC) between 1992 and 
1998. Over 1992-98, the total number of IIS supported and successfully started 
enterprises in Addis Ababa was 165 (of which two were micro enterprises that 
employed less than six people). The data summarised in Table 4.2 suggested that 
EIA, through the IIS, assisted small to large enterprises, and notably medium and 
large ones. In total, 110 or 67 per cent of the AEs met the criterion of an SME43. It 
was also found that over three quarters of these AEs engaged in the 
manufacturing sector (where 30 per cent of these manufacturing AEs were in the 
footwear industries). Most of the large enterprises tended to be in the construction 
industries, and large AEs, as they were in Addis Ababa, were not typically that 
numerous in the rest of the country. 
42 The two most relevant business directories were the Addis Ababa Chambers of Commerce 
(AACC) and the Federal Ministry (and Addis Ababa Regional Bureau) of Trade and 
Industry (MTI). The AACC directory Addis Ababa Business Directory, 1998-99 (AACC, 1998), 
had over 36,000 businesses from trade, manufacturing, and service sectors. The MTI 
Directory of Private Industries in Addis Ababa (MoI, 1993), listed 3691 small to large 
manufacturing enterprises. In the MTI directory, names and addresses of enterprises, and 
labour force and capital, and the line of activity and production capacity was provided. 
However, for the purpose of selecting cases for the study both AACC and MTI directories 
had serious limitations. The MTI directory in particular was out of date. Neither sources 
provided information on the age-size measures of a enterprise nor whether an enterprise 
received IIS support or not. Neither directory, therefore, was used for the purpose of 
selecting the cases. 
43 As discussed in chapter one, the proportion of SMEs in the total AEs was more than 80 per 
cent (that is more than 67 per cent ratio I found for Addis Ababa). This was because 
enterprises that set up outside Addis Ababa on the average were much smaller. 
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Table 4.2 Sample frame summary: number of enterprises established 
(and/or members of AACC) between 1992-98 in Addis Ababa 
Source of data small medium large total 
EIA 27 83 53 163 
TIB 269 90 31 390 
AACC - - - 537 
Sources: Unpublished data, EIA (March, 1998); TIB (March, 1998); and AACC 
(March 1998) 
AACC and TIB data covered enterprises with employment size greater than or 
equal to six. TIB data showed 31 enterprises that employed more than 50 people; 
and 12 of the 31 enterprises employed more than 100 people. Most importantly, 
EIA and TIB sources suggested that roughly one in three of SME start-ups were 
recipients of IIS support. AACC data, which needed adjustment for double 
counting, showed 537 enterprises registered since 1992. The number of enterprises 
(summarised above) in spite of some limitations44 was the best at the time and, 
therefore, was used to guide the selection process of case SMEs. 
The final list of SMEs selection also considered issues like the availability of 
information such as the precise enterprise location (address), enterprise size and 
year of establishment, and ease of physical access to enterprises. In particular 
selecting UEs was more problematic than AEs as verifying the application of the 
. 'minimum 
investment capital' criterion (birr 250 000 as for the AEs) at start-up 
was difficult to substantiate. It was only through subsequent visits that I was able 
to verify that the chosen UEs did fulfil the 'minimum investment capital' criterion, 
a criterion so important in determining entry into the IIS system. 
44 EIA sources tended to produce more 'large' enterprises. This was partly due to (i) the fact 
that AEs in Addis Ababa included all sectors, and (ii) it appeared that some AEs reported 
more jobs perhaps in order to get priority for support. But when enterprises commenced 
operation (and registered with TIB) they tended to be smaller than shown in plans or shortly 
after start up. AEs could have easily been in both AACC and TIB databases. 
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Table 4.3 shows some of the features of the selected six cases of SMEs. Note that, 
first, AE1 and UE1 came consumer goods manufacturing industries (footwear 
industry); and AE2 and UE2 from engineering enterprises that were likely to be 
investment capital intensive. Finally AE3 and UE3 came from the agro-industries 
and services that included road transport. 
Table 4.3 Some features of cases of SMEs 
enterprises year of size at legal zone in 
start up start up form Addis 
(jobs) Ababa 
Footwear Factory (AE1) 1992 8 SP 5 
Footwear Factory (UE1) 1992 6 SP 14 
Engineering enterprise (AE2) 1994 30 PLC 18 
Wood/metalwork enterprise 1992 40 SP 7 
(UE2) 
Agro-industrial and Commercial 1995 26 PLC 25 
Company (AE3) 
Chemicals and Trading 1992 18 PLC 19 
Company (UE3) 
Source: Own Construction (based on information supplied by the entrepreneurs) 
Second, these SMEs were not equal or identical. All enterprises differ in terms of 
their staple products/services, establishment time, or the characteristics of the 
people who own/manage these enterprises. Third, the legal form of organisation 
of these SMEs (column 4) was PLC and sole proprietors (SP). AE2, AE3, UE2 and 
UE3 had significant operations outside the Addis Ababa region. 
Section 4.4 below discusses the data collection methods used, and reflects on my 
experience of the field work. 
4.4 Methods of data collection and conducting the fieldwork 
4.4.1 Choosing data collection methods 
The preceding sections clearly suggested that the study required the generation of 
both quantitative and qualitative (or behavioural) data. The search for 
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quantitative data focused on both the cases of SMEs (like resources of 
entrepreneurs) and macro statistics on outcomes of the IIS (like the number of new 
enterprise start-ups and jobs created). Similarly, qualitative data referred to 
responses of the authoritative individuals and case SME entrepreneurs about the 
IIS rationale and impacts and motives for starting up enterprises. 
To generate these data, first, macro statistics were collected from the relevant 
government agencies (like EIA). Second, survey reports were purchased from 
Central Statistical Authority and/or from the relevant agencies. Third, from the 
libraries (National Library, Addis Ababa University, Commercial College of 
Addis Ababa, and EIA) IIS and enterprise development related archive 
information were generated. 
To capture behavioural responses a face-to-face semi-structured interview method 
was conducted. To this end an interview questionnaire was prepared (Appendix 
1). Most of the interview questions focused on the road that entrepreneurs took to 
enterprise start-up, and entrepreneurs' and authorities' view of the IIS influence 
on enterprise start-up and growth. Most of the behavioural type interview 
questions such as 'what motivated you to set up this enterprise? ' were open- 
ended, that is the questions did not limit responses of entrepreneurs. Moreover, as 
per the foundations of the thesis, questions explored the processes and constraints 
of enterprise start-up and/or licensing for the IIS. 
Although a time-consuming exercise, the semi-structured interview method had 
advantages over other methods like a self-administered questionnaire, because a 
semi-structured interview was flexible in wording and ordering of questions, and 
follow-up of responses (Robson, 1993: 229). Moreover, particularly in the 
Ethiopian setting and with limited time and resources, the best method of 
ensuring quality of work and response rate was to establish a direct contact and 
undertake face-to-face interviews with the entrepreneurs and authorities. 
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4.4.2 Testing for interview questions and interviewing procedures 
Prior to embarking on the fieldwork, as outlined in section 4.3.1, aspects of the 
interview questions and interviewing procedures were subjected to testing. Key 
areas of testing focused on clarity, wording and sequence of interview questions, 
time required for interviewing and recording responses, and access procedures to 
SMEs and institutions. Consequently, owner-managers of AE1 and UE1, two 
officials from the then Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation 
(MEDAC) were approached, and the tests were carried out. All the visits went 
well and produced useful lessons including that: 
" there were indications that proposed SMEs' addresses, taken from business 
directories and government departments, were unreliable. Consequently, 
more information was needed to make contacts with the SMEs. 
" access to and cooperation from the entrepreneurs required support facilities 
like a 'to whom it may concern letter' to introduce myself, the research 
project, and the institution that I was affiliated to. Subsequently, during the 
fieldwork supporting letters were used (Appendix 2). 
" it emerged that some respondents did not speak English, therefore, interview 
questions originally set in English were translated into Amharic. 
" the preliminary visit also suggested that questions that sought behavioural 
responses needed recording on tapes whereas quantitative data could be 
filled in on pre-prepared forms. A practice recording of interviews on a 
portable machine was also carried out. 
After making these corrections I set out to conduct the main fieldwork. 
4.4.3 The main fieldwork 
Between July-October, 1998, the main fieldwork was conducted. Data, as per the 
plan, were collected from owner-managers of six SMEs, and most senior members 
of the agencies that were directly or indirectly related to enterprise development. 
These agencies included the Ethiopia Investment Authority (EIA), Development 
Bank of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa Land Lease Office, Ethiopian Electric Power 
131 
Corporation, and Addis Ababa Private Industries Association. (A list of names of 
interviewees and institutions that took part in the study is provided in Section 
9.4). 
Further, as per the plan, primary data was obtained through a pre-prepared 
interview questionnaire that was partly recorded on tapes and partly filled in on 
forms. Large sets of macro data on investment licence holders were generated 
from national and some regional level investment offices. Finally, national survey 
reports that showed different aspects of enterprise development, and relevant 
published and unpublished government department data on enterprise 
development were collected. Of this later information the most relevant were the 
laws and regulations about the incentive system that date as far back as the 1950s. 
Interviews with all the entrepreneurs except AE3 and UE2 were recorded directly 
on tapes. Interviews made with AE3 and UE2 were recorded on paper because the 
entrepreneurs were not happy to leave information on tapes. 
There were, however, several problems faced while conducting the fieldwork. I 
have already said that addresses were not always accurate; more often telephone 
numbers did not work or when working they failed to connect the businesses 
registered to the phone numbers. Second, obtaining data from SMEs was not easy 
due to some entrepreneurs' fear of giving away tax-related information to tax 
authorities. Third, the entrepreneurs were suspicious of outsiders (including 
myself) mainly taking them as competitors in their trade. Fourth, it took a long 
time to see or talk to people in charge of the SMEs involved. While some 
entrepreneurs were genuinely too busy to respond to questions, others did not 
seem to understand the value of the information to the research project. I assured 
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entrepreneurs that the data they gave would be kept in confidence (Appendix 2). 45 
Moreover, over July-October 1998 I spent sufficient time getting to know and 
establishing trust with the entrepreneurs. 
Access to public institutions (such as EIA, 010 and AACC) was smoother except 
for the extensive security check (mainly related to the then Ethio-Eritrea conflict) 
at the gates of public premises. Officials of public institutions (especially at EIA) 
provided full co-operation to the research project. Two members of EIA's statistics 
division in particular collected and organised information on revenue foregone 
due to IIS from the Customs Office to the benefit of this study. 
Section 4.5 below briefly discusses the methods used in the analysis and 
discussion sections of the thesis. 
4.5 Analytical methods 
In the thesis different analytical methods were used. First, interview tapes were 
transcribed and documents were translated from Amharic into English. 
Subsequently, various methods46 of data organisation and analysis were used. 
Methods that describe, group and compare large enterprise data such as by 
location were used. Then from such quantitative data tables were produced. From 
qualitative data summaries and themes were generated. Then confirmation and 
exploratory analyses were performed by subjecting data sources to triangulation. 
45 Accordingly, at their request, names of entrepreneurs and enterprises of AE, and UE, have 
been kept anonymous. 
46 Institutions like UNCTAD (1996) tend to prescribe social cost benefit analysis (SCBA) to 
measure the efficiency of an incentives system. However, this study has found the SCBA 
method less relevant and applicable. SCBA looks into the wedge between social and private 
benefits to justify support and/or success of an incentives system, in effect leaving out 
behavioural influences of the IIS. Secondly, SCBA requires a large volume of quantitative 
data, and some of these data (like the opportunity cost of labour and capital; and 
environment) were difficult to generate. 
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As has been discussed so far the thesis was constructed around two central 
hypotheses, which from a methodological point of view, provided clarity and 
focus to the enquiry. However, the hypotheses were not tested using statistical 
inferences. Instead the hypotheses were explored using a range of evidence 
including opinions of users and providers of the IIS, independent observers, 
unassisted entrepreneurs, macro statistics that showed, among other things, 
location and activity types of enterprise start-ups related to the IIS. To support the 
conclusions I also drew on other research findings and theory. 
The thesis combined quantitative and qualitative evidence to specifically study, 
among other things, the following key areas: 
(i) investment incentives and the process of enterprise start-up 
The link between investment incentives and enterprise start-up is key to the 
enquiry. However, more than the simple incentives-start-up (input-output) 
relationship this thesis gave profound importance to the process of enterprise start- 
up. This was because an input-output study conceals many of the constraints that 
entrepreneurs face in the process of enterprise start-up that a support initiative 
ought to have addressed. Consequently, in this thesis I explored the influences of 
the IIS on the process of enterprise start-up by identifying the following stages 
and processes: 
" enterprise idea generation leading up the stage of acquiring an IIS licence, 
" setting up and completing physical construction (or implementation) of a 
project, and 
" commencing producing goods and services. 
The discussion in chapter six uses the model on stages of the enterprise start-up 
process (from idea generation to implementation and early growth). 
(ii) the importance of institutions and political decision making 
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Hypothesis two (H2) took the thesis beyond the narrow IIS system boundary and 
showed that some SMEs sought the IIS support to capture other superior benefits. 
These superior benefits were provided by the non-IIS government agencies at 
different levels: some received subsidised access to government controlled 
resources like land; others used the IIS to overcome the otherwise onerous 
bureaucracy of resources mobilisation. For a better understanding of how an 
enterprise support initiative like the IIS works, I therefore gave focus to the role of 
institutions and the politics of it. In this regard, following Schaffer and Wen-Hsien 
(1985), in chapter seven I used a model that portrayed the political economy of 
access to public services by SMEs entrepreneurs. 
(iii) enterprise support output and impact 
This thesis, as stated from the outset, is a study of roles and impacts (intended and 
unintended) of the IIS on enterprise start up and early growth. An impact study of 
a support initiative, as argued in Chen (1990), has to establish two conditions. Of 
these, the first and necessary condition, is the presence of outcomes associated 
with a particular support initiative (in the IIS context this includes outcomes such 
as numbers of enterprise start-ups). The second and sufficient condition of 
impacts study is establishing the presence of causal relationships between 
outcomes (including unintended outcomes) and the content of support (the 
investment incentives). The thesis, therefore, in addition to the direct impacts of 
investment incentives, investigated the consequences of the mediating role of the 
IIS. Finally, following the literature reviewed in chapter two, I have questioned 
whether the provision of the IIS had sound rationales. 
4.6 Chapter summary 
The nature of the questions and hypotheses that this study raised required 
reasonably adequate and reliable data on enterprises. Unfortunately such data on 
Ethiopian SMEs were scarce. Because of the large spatial and sectoral diversity 
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between enterprises, among other things, I was also not able to conduct a survey. 
Therefore, generalisations made in the thesis were based on evidence originating 
from multiple and complementary sources. 
Reflecting on the types of activities and locations that the IIS provided support to, 
six carefully selected SMEs were used as cases. To complement evidence from case 
SMEs, national statistics (that showed, among other things, the regional 
distribution of enterprises and IIS licensed projects and start ups), archive 
information and past surveys results were used. These sources of data put 
together provided sufficient and reliable evidence to make some generalisations 
about the nature and impacts of the IIS on SME start-up and early growth. 
Chapter Five presents the findings that emerged from some of the sources of data 
outlined above. 
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5. Main Findings of the Enquiry into the Role and Impact of 
the IIS on Enterprise Development 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the main findings of the enquiry into the role and impact of 
the IIS on enterprise development with particular emphasis on SMEs. Following 
the strategy and methods set out in chapter four, the findings were drawn from 
the following major sources: 
" macro data on 4246 IIS supported projects collected and collated from the 
EIA and regional investment offices, 
0 evidence from six cases of SMEs, 
" over two dozen interviews conducted with authoritative individuals on 
enterprise development within and outside government (altogether 
representing 10 agencies), 
0 quantitative data from 9 agencies that were involved in the enterprise 
development such as the Land Lease Office. 
These sources, as stated before, generated diverse qualitative and quantitative 
data that showed how and when events like enterprise start-up took place. 
Moreover, they provide data that describe and interpret events in such a way that 
each confirms and/or challenges conclusions emerging from the others. 
In section 5.2 I present macro statistics that show the dynamics of IIS assisted 
activities for the period 1992-98. These statistics suggested an emerging pattern of 
location of enterprises in Ethiopia. The findings presented in sections 5.3 and 5.4 
were largely based on qualitative data and interpreted the macro statistics set out 
in section 5.2. Specifically, section 5.4 presents profiles of the case SMEs and 
entrepreneurs and whether their behaviour had been affected by IIS benefits. 
Contrasting evidence and explanations to those that emerged in section 5.2, on the 
recent location patterns of enterprise start-up in Ethiopia are presented in section 
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5.5. The evidence presented in Section 5.5 shows the strength of the IIS as a 
mediating instrument in providing assisted enterprises with access to enterprise 
start-up resources, notably serviced enterprise sites. Section 5.6 summarises the 
main findings of the study47. 
5.2 The dynamics and cost of IIS Assisted Enterprises: the macro picture 
The data presented in this section show temporal, spatial and sector trends of IIS 
assisted activities. The data are organised by status of a project as completed, 
under implementation and 'inert' projects (that is projects which were never 
implemented). Finally, summaries of data based on totals and averages are 
presented and discussed. As a crude measure of IIS efficiency, the ratio of all IIS 
licensed and started up enterprises to the total IIS licensed enterprises is also 
reported. 
5.2.1 Temporal dynamics of IIS Assisted Enterprises 
At the national level the number of licensed projects for investment incentives 
increased from 542 in 1992/93 to 821 in 1997/98, and over the period 1992-98 a 
total of 4246 indigenous entrepreneurs were licensed (Table 5.1). However, a 
closer look at cumulative figures for 1992-98 shows that: 
(i) of the total IIS licensed projects only 1163 (that is 27 per cent) were 
successfully set up (Table 5.1, last column), 
(ii) enterprise start up rates were low in 1992/93 and 1993/94 (four and 15 per 
cent, respectively) but these rates jumped to 30 or more per cent over 1994-98 
(Table 5.1 last row), 
(iii) the aggregate size of capital invested in the successfully set up projects was 
only 20 per cent of the plan. Consequently, the 1992-98 birr 6.7 million 
average size of IIS licensed projects dropped to birr 4.8 million as enterprises 
started up (Table 5.1, last column). 
47 Note that owing to the huge amount of information collected and summarised, in most cases 
the direct voices of interviewees are reserved for the subsequent discussion chapters. 
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Table 5.1 The dynamics of licensing for investment incentives and actual 
enterprise start ups, 1992-1998 (enterprises size in mil. Birr and 
number, and ratios in per cent)48 
Enterprises 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 1992- 
1998 
IIS licensed: 
number 542 528 696 897 762 821 4246 
capital 3750 3192 4731 6062 4541 6006 28282 
size ratio 6.9 6.0 6.8 6.8 5.9 7.3 6.7 
(capital/project) 
actual start-ups: 
number 23 79 233 310 237 281 1163 
capital 57 500 1718 812 1278 1197 5562 
size ratio 2.5 6.3 7.3 2.6 5.4 5.0 4.8 
(capital/project) 
New start up/IIS 
licensed (in per cent): 
number 4 15 33 35 31 34 27 
capital 1.5 16 36 14 28 20 20 
Source: EIA unpublished data and own calculation. 
The explanations for the above observations are strongly interrelated and are set 
out below. 
First, the discrepancy between IIS licensed projects and enterprise start ups: Of 
the total 4246 licensed projects over 1992-98,27,16 and 57 per cent respectively 
were successful start ups, projects under implementation and projects that have 
never been tried out (inert projects). Extensive interviews and discussions 
48 As EIA data were aggregated, the overall size structure of IIS licensed projects cannot be 
inferred from Table 5.1. However, based on IIS licensed project files at EIA that had 
complete information on investment capital, data set was compiled on 377 projects (out of 
4246). This data set showed that 64 per cent of IIS licensed projects were proposed with or 
less than birr half a million, and 20 per cent with more than birr 5 million. I refer to this 
finding as an important point because, as chapter six will show, it suggested that the size of 
projects initiated at less that birr half a million start-up capital (close to the IIS entry criterion) 
was in part influenced by the IIS incentives. 
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conducted with informed officials explain why so many licensed projects failed to 
convert into successful start ups: 
(i) in the early 1990s licensing was not based on carefully planned projects. As the 
investment code was passed in 1992, subsequent to the fall of the Derg regime, 
the euphoria among entrepreneurs and the EIA meant that some of the 
licensed projects did not undergo rigorous project appraisal procedures, and 
the viability of these projects was not checked. 
(ii) problems of access to and cost of enterprise sites: following experience from 
the Derg era, prior to the land lease holding system investment applications 
were made on the expectation that enterprise sites would be obtained free of 
charge (or applicants wanted to stay in the queue for land allocation). It took 
about two years to enact the land lease policy - by the time the policy was 
enacted in 1993 many entrepreneurs were already discouraged from doing 
business. Secondly, many project plans in 1992-93 did not include land prices. 
With the introduction of the land lease policy, enterprise sites became 
expensive. Consequently, many investment licence holders failed to raise the 
money to pay for the lease price of land. 
(iii) problems of access to bank loans: some projects were prepared on the 
assumption that bank credit would finance capital costs like machines and 
equipment. However, as subsequent sections will show, tough collateral 
conditions of the banks meant that many licence holders had to abandon the 
idea of setting up an enterprise. 
(iv) entrepreneurs, especially Ethiopians who returned from abroad, did not 
predict what might be awaiting them by way of bureaucracy and 
infrastructure. Entrepreneurs faced cumbersome bureaucracy in conducting 
start up processes ranging from simple business registration to resource 
mobilisation which subsequently led them to abandon plans. 
(v) low business confidence: a constellation of factors including the fragile nature 
of peace and stability in parts of Ethiopia and policy uncertainty, especially 
over access to land, discouraged enterprise start up. 
Second, the rate of enterprise start up, however, improved over time: Relative to 
1992/93 and 1993/94 over 1994-98 start up rates improved. This was largely due 
to two things. (i) some of the conditions that discouraged enterprise start up (i. e. 
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those stated above) improved. For example, the land lease policy enacted in 1993, 
although expensive, did give entrepreneurs the opportunity to lease land. 
Moreover, peace and stability in the country had hugely improved since 1993/94. 
(ii) interviewees also said that in recent years entrepreneurs became more aware 
of the benefits of preparing and submitting more viable projects for IIS support. 
These improvements enabled a higher proportion (34 per cent in 1997/8) of 
entrepreneurs to implement their projects. 
Third, the reasons as to why enterprises at start up exhibited lower levels of 
capital and employment than at plan/project approval stage: Table 5.2 
summarises these reasons which spread over successive stages of enterprise start 
up. First, in the pre-IIS licensing stage entrepreneurs have different incentives and 
tendencies to inflate project costs (Fikre, 1998). For some entrepreneurs who 
propose larger projects the incentives were non-IIS benefits like easy and cheaper 
access to resources like enterprise sites, and simplified facilities (such as through 
one stop shops provided by the authorities like the EIA. For some entrepreneurs 
proposing smaller projects the incentive for over-estimation of costs was to do 
with meeting the entry criterion for the IIS, that is the birr 250 000 minimum 
capital requirement. Finally, employment records particularly at pre-licensing 
stage, included inflated seasonal labour. EIA data shows that only 18 percent of all 
jobs created were permanent49. 
49 EIA unpublished data (1998) showed planned and actual jobs created in IIS licensed 
activities. Accordingly, over the period 1992-98 the 4246 IIS licensed projects were expected 
to generate 598390 jobs, or 141 per project. However, 1163 projects that started up created a 
total of 266284 jobs showing an increase in the average employment size per new enterprises 
to 279. However, these figures were dubious. In seasonally affected activities like coffee 
hulling, construction and farming a large proportion of the jobs were temporary. The 
statistics referred to showed that only 18 percent of all jobs created were permanent (that 
meant about 50 permanent employees per enterprise). 
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Table 5.2 Explanations for the difference between investment and employment 
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Sizes during start 
up and after 
- project costs - loose - tough loan collateral - need to learn 
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estimation of project methods - loss of income 
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- employment of leasing land or privileges 
record buying premises and 









- policy uncertainty 
Source: own construction 
Second, as projects were reviewed and accepted for licensing investment and 
employment sizes hardly changed. This was attributed to (a) the IIS guidelines 
that were weak in ensuring the quality of projects submitted for support (projects 
received an IIS incense by virtue of meeting the size and industry rules). (b) even 
when attempts were made to improve on the quality of projects submitted, staff at 
EIA and regional investment offices lacked the capacity and skills to fully assess 
projects submitted for licensing (Sileshi, 1998). 
Third, as entrepreneurs prepare to implement projects their expectation of and 
ability to raise the necessary finance for buying premises, enterprise site and 
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import machines fell because of tough collateral requirements for bank loans. 
Moreover, as evidence from the case studies will show, as some projects officially 
started project plans were only partly implemented. This was due to lack of 
experience in selecting, importing and installing the full range of machines and 
equipment at start up, perhaps a factor that accounted for a large part of the gap 
between sizes at start up and plan stages. Some enterprises also lost their income 
tax exemption privileges as they did not make a profit shortly after start up. 
5.2.2 Spatial and sector patterns of IIS Assisted Enterprises 
As discussed in chapter three, the traditional location pattern of Ethiopian 
enterprises has been dominated by Addis Ababa and the Addis Ababa-Nazareth 
corridor. However, the 1992-98 data on IIS licensed projects showed what 
appeared to be a shift in this traditional pattern of enterprise location (Table 5.3). 
From Table 5.3 some key observations emerge: 
(i) the share of Addis Ababa in the total IIS licensed projects was 65 per cent 
(the highest in the country) in 1993/94 but declined to 31 and 39 per cent in 
1997/98 and over 1992-98, respectively. In terms of IIS assisted actual 
enterprise start ups Addis Ababa's share was as high as 44 per cent in 
1993/94 but dropped to 17 and 16 per cent in 1997/98 and 1992-98. 
(ii) in spite of the fact that the IIS was meant to assist a large part of the country 
collectively labeled as 'other' regions, enterprise start-up rates in these 
regions were below 5 per cent of the total over 1992-98. 
(iii) the common feature in both Addis Ababa and the 'other' regions was that 
converting IIS licensed projects into actual enterprise start ups was lower 
than the rest of Ethiopia. 
(iv) in contrast to Addis Ababa and 'other' regions, regions such as Tigray and 
SENNPR showed better implementation of IIS licensed projects. 
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Table 5.3 Regional dynamics of project licensing for the IIS (enterprise 
number and capital in mil. birr) 
Region 1993/94 1997/98 1992/98 
TL OE(ER) TL OE(ER) TL OE(ER) 
Addis Ababa 
enterprise no. 342 35 (10) 254 47 (19) 1677 193 (12) 
capital 2019 141 (7) 3164 397(13) 13026 1208 (9) 
Amhara 
enterprise no. 29 12 (41) 53 29 (55) 362 109 (30) 
capital 166 65(39) , 187 142 (76) 1264 401 (32) 
Oromia 
enterprise no. 99 19 (19) 170 48 (28) 937 329 (35) 
capital 271 50 (18) 794 97 (12) 4210 1165 (28) 
SENNRP 
enterprise no. 15 4(27) 182 128(70) 484 226 (47) 
capital 242 12(5), 501 345 (69) 1551 675 (44) 
Tigray 
enterprise no. 25 7 (28) 23 12 (52) 380 256 (67) 
capital 255 210 (82) 154 185 (120) 3354 1869 (56) 
Other regions 
enterprise no. 18 2 (11) 139 17 (12) 406 50 (12) 
capital 239 22 (9) 1206 31(3) 4877 244 (5) 
Ethiopia 
enterprise no. 528 79 (15) 821 281(34) 4246 1163 (27) 
capital 3192 500 (16) 6006 1197 (20) 28282 5562 (20) 
Source: EIA unpublished data and own calculation. TL= total licensed, OE = 
operating enterprises, and ER = efficiency rate (OE/TL) in per cent. 
The key questions that follow these observations are: why in both Addis Ababa 
and 'other' regions was implementing licensed projects such a problem? Why, in 
the first place, if Addis Ababa and the corridor were already preferred for 
investment (particularly manufacturing investment) and the IIS was to have 
affected the location of industry moving it outside this zone, did the EIA award 
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the largest number of licences to the Addis region? What were the factors that led 
to this and what alternatives did the authorities have? These questions are 
explored in turn below. 
First, project licensing and enterprise start up in Addis Ababa and the Addis 
Ababa-Nazareth corridor: Addis Ababa (and the corridor) have always attracted 
new enterprises in the manufacturing and services sectors for two basic reasons. 
First, they have always enjoyed better infrastructure, business agglomeration and 
market over the rest of the country. They have the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, 
and the highway that connects ports in east and Kenya in the south. The two high 
density industrial clusters of Ethiopia, Akaki and Kaliti, are also located along the 
Addis Ababa-Nazareth corridor. Consequently economic expansion and physical 
growth of Addis Ababa has been along the south east, that is the Addis Ababa- 
Nazareth corridor. Second, in particular over 1992-94, when most parts of 
Ethiopia lacked peace and stability to conduct business, Addis and the corridor 
had relative peace that enabled them to start enterprises and conduct business. As 
evidenced in Table 5.3, both these factors led to a higher expression of intent to set 
up enterprises in Addis Ababa over 1992-98. Accordingly entrepreneurs that 
chose to set up manufacturing and service sector enterprises in Addis Ababa 
accounted for 46.5 and 60 per cent of the total IIS licensed 1848 and 1237 projects 
respectively. 
The answer to the question why the authorities granted licences in Addis very 
much depends on the conditions for obtaining an IIS licence and the benefits that 
the licence accrues to the entrepreneurs. According to the IIS rules all 
entrepreneurs need to meet the industry entry criterion to get exemption from the 
payment of duties on imported capital goods. Then in addition to the industry 
criterion, all entrepreneurs need to meet the location criterion that enables them to 
receive additional incentives that vary according to the chosen locations (in the 
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least developed areas the period of exemption from the payment of income tax is 
the longest - that is five years, whereas in Addis Ababa and the corridor this 
period is only one year). As section 5.2.3 will show, the benefits from income tax 
exemptions are smaller than the benefits from exemptions from the payment of 
duties. Moreover, exemptions from income tax depend on entrepreneurs making 
profits within the grace period. 
Many entrepreneurs too were more interested in an IIS licence that gave them 
entitlement with exemptions from the payment of duties on imported capital 
goods -a benefit not linked with the location criterion. Hence because of better 
location advantages (perhaps that exceeded benefits from exemption from income 
taxes) many entrepreneurs proposed projects in the 'pioneer' sectors in the Addis 
and the corridor (Table 5.3). The authorities, therefore, had no legal ground to 
deny entrepreneurs an IIS licence with all its entitlement within Addis Ababa and 
the corridor. Moreover, licensing projects for an IIS in Addis and the corridor was 
consistent with the IIS objectives of increasing investment, employment and 
technology transfer. If anything the problem with the IIS authorities was their 
attempting to influence the regional pattern of enterprise development with an 
inefficient IIS instrument. While the IIS rules led the authorities to grant a large 
number of applicants from the Addis Ababa and the corridor, however, they did 
not come up with alternative intervention instruments such as developing basic 
social and physical infrastructure and entrepreneurship to encourage enterprise 
development in less developed areas-50. 
50 In spite of the fact that there was a large number of IIS granted projects in Addis Ababa and 
the corridor, enterprise start up in the zone has been constrained by the exorbitant land lease 
price. The lease price in Addis Ababa was as high as birr 4300/m2 while this dropped in 
smaller towns outside Addis Ababa and the corridor as low as birr 5/m2 (Tahir Aman, 1998). 
Note that only 30 and 28 per cent of the total start ups (497 and 152) in the manufacturing 
and service sectors, respectively, were implemented in Addis Ababa. 
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Least developed regions51: In the least developed regions (referred to 'other' 
regions in Table 5.3) IIS licensing increased from 18 in 1993/94 to 139 in 1997/98. 
However, of the total licensed projects 93 (67%) and 21 (30%) were in two large 
urban centres, Dire Dawa and Harar, respectively. In terms of planned capital 
investment Dire Dawa alone had 91 per cent of proposed investment. Actual start 
ups in Dire Dawa were only 2 in 1993/94 and 17 in 1997/98. This was because, 
like Addis Ababa, in large urban centres access to and cost of land were major 
problems to enterprise start up. In the sparsely populated less developed areas, in 
spite of being offered the best IIS assistance, there were only a few start ups 
because these regions had poor infrastructure and market. Most of all because the 
less developed regions were sparsely populated and home to nomadic people 
they had inadequate number and quality of local entrepreneurs to take advantage 
of the IIS support. 
Intermediate regions: Regions that gained from the spatial distribution of 
enterprises were those in the middle like SENNPR and Tigray. Better enterprise 
start-up in these regions was because, contrary to the 1970s and 1980s, for most 
parts of the 1990s these regions were free of civil war and enjoyed better political 
stability. Regional government officials in Tigray and SENNPR also provided 
entrepreneurs with easier access to enterprise sites (Hammond, 1994). As a 
consequence of the sum of such positive developments the two regions in 
particular performed well above the national average of enterprise start-up rate. 
Finally, did the IIS switch enterprise start-up away from the centre? I 
acknowledge Addis Ababa's relative loss of position but I contest the suggestion 
that the IIS was a factor in switching entrepreneurial location decisions specially 
away from Addis Ababa. To advance my argument (see also chapter 6) 1 use (i) 
51 These include four of the 11 regional units of the country: Afar, Benishangul and Gumz, 
Gambela and Ethiopian Somali Region, and the cities of Dire Dawa and Harar. 
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data on IIS 'assisted' enterprise start ups (in addition to IIS licensed projects) as 
the basis of the discussion on enterprise location patterns especially over Addis 
Ababa versus the rest of Ethiopia. (ii) along with the 1992-98 IIS 'assisted' 
enterprise start up patterns I use data that show the historical spatial pattern of 
enterprise developments. And (iii) I propose to focus the discussion on activities 
that Addis Ababa and the other regions have in common. Item (iii) is important 
because the Addis Ababa region (as a city) cannot be compared with other regions 
on the basis of activities like mining and plantations. The better indicators would 
be the services and manufacturing sectors that most regions, with varying degree, 
seem to have. Because the IIS gives more emphasis to the manufacturing sector 
than services, the evidence produced here focuses on the manufacturing sector 
enterprises of small-large sizes (as shown in Table 5.4). In Table 5.4, columns 2 and 
3 refer to cumulative data on small to large enterprises of Ethiopia. Columns 4 and 
5 refer to the 1992-98 IIS licensed projects and actual start up in the manufacturing 
sector. Column six adds up columns 2,3, and 5 and shows the total of small to 
large manufacturing enterprises in the country. 
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Table 5.4 Changes in the spatial patterns of manufacturing enterprises: 

























Addis Ababa 43.0 68.2 46.5 29.6 45.4 
Amhara 14.1 6.2 5.9 3.8 11.5 
Oromia 22.9 11.1 21.0 22.5 20.9 
SENNRP 7.9 5.4 15.5 32.3 10.7 
Tigray 5.7 3.3 5.1 8.6 5.6 
Other regions 6.4 5.8 6.0 2.6 5.8 
Total 100=2731 100=642 100=1845 100=497 100=3870 
Source: EIA (1998) unpublished data, CSA 1997b and 1997e and own calculation. 
Table 5.4 show that, first, for all sizes of enterprises, whether IIS assisted or not, 
there was a skewed distribution of manufacturing enterprises in favour of Addis 
Ababa and this persisted until the present time. Addis Ababa (and major urban 
centres like Nazareth) always attracted relatively larger enterprise. In spite of 
being least assisted through the IIS, Addis Ababa however continued to attract 
manufacturing enterprises. An exception to this evidence is the SENNRP were 160 
or more small enterprises started up largely with out drawing on IIS benefits (see 
section 5.2.3 below). Second and more importantly, in spite of being classified as 
'most assisted' through the IIS, the least developed 'other' regions did not gain a 
share in the national distribution of manufacturing enterprises. Regions like 
52 CSA 1997b and 1997e are cumulative data on (i) medium and large enterprises, and (ii) small 
enterprises, respectively. Medium and large enterprises are often reported together hence 
there were no separate data on SMEs. Of the total medium and large enterprises 169 were 
public and 473 private enterprises. EIA data for the 'secondary sector' refer to manufacturing 
consumer goods, metals, pharmaceuticals, etc. IIS-assisted start up are those projects that 
had an IIS licence but were not necessarily assisted through the IIS, as a good number of 
them did not receive the support. There was a possibility of double counting as IIS assisted 
start ups from the early 1990s may have been counted in the CSA 1997b and 1997e data. 
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Benishangul and Gumuz had no any size of manufacturing enterprises either in 
the CSA data or the recent IIS-assisted start ups. In short, therefore, the IIS did not 
explain the spatial distribution of manufacturing enterprises. 
To summarise, the discussion in this section showed that Addis Ababa (with or 
without the IIS support) still dominates in the spatial pattern of enterprise 
development in Ethiopia. However, the IIS does not necessarily support a more 
radical investment in new industries. Meanwhile some regions have done better 
but this is not necessarily to do with the IIS. The regions that have not been doing 
better in enterprise start ups are not getting the support they need. Overall, 
therefore, the IIS is not properly integrated into a holistic package of policies - 
industrial, SME and regional. 
5.2.3 Cost of providing the IIS 
Sources and size of revenue foregone: At EIA, for the first time, I initiated and 
took part in the collection and collating of new data on revenue foregone due to 
the IIS. Accordingly, I found that with the view to promoting enterprise start-up 
through the IIS over 1992-98 a total of birr 526 million government revenue from 
import related taxes has been foregone. Of the total revenue foregone import 
duties accounted for 48 per cent, and import related sales and excise taxes, 
respectively, accounted for 51 and 1 per cent. In terms of use activities described 
as services and manufacturing received 42 and 50 per cent respectively. Primary 
activities that were supported by the IIS benefited only about 8 per cent of the 
revenue foregone. Such a low benefit in the primary sector was in part owing to 
delays in the rural land lease policy and the precarious peace situation in the 
countryside in the early 1990s. 
Based on evidence from the Customs Authority and EIA, I found that the most 
common import duty and sales taxes were 5 and 10 per cent, respectively. These 
taxes together provided individual IIS entrepreneurs with about 13 per cent of the 
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value of imported capital goods. However, as the tax rates applicable to some 
small tools and implements were relatively higher than heavy machines it is 
possible that entrepreneurs that imported small implements with the IIS 
assistance may have saved more that 13 per cent of the value of the imported 
goods (see details in Box 5.1). 
Box 5.1 Tax rates and method of calculating revenue foregone to the IIS 
(i) tariff and income tax rates 
The IIS benefit to the entrepreneurs come from exemptions from import 
duties and income taxes. The level of tax rates play a significant role in 
determining the level of these benefits. According to Proc. No. 36/1996 
(PDRE, 1996c), income tax from business was 35 per cent. But to the best of 
my knowledge up until the end of 1998, there were no data that showed 
revenue foregone from income tax exemption. As it will be argued later in the 
thesis, entrepreneurs' benefit from exemptions from income taxes, relative to 
import duties, was very limited. Hence, the evidence below focused on 
exemptions from import duties including sundry taxes like sales and excise 
taxes. 
Some Representative Tariff Items and Duty Rates (1993-97) 




Tools and implements (of which): 
- hand saws and hand saw blades 30 30 
- spades and shovels 30 20 (1997) 
Construction and agricultural machinery (of which): 
- graders, levellers, road rollers 55 
- agricultural mach. 55 
(seeders, combine harvesters-threshers) 
Machine-tools (of which): 
- for working metal (thread rolling, tubes) 55 
- for working wood (sawing, milling, 
sanding, drilling, splitting, slicing, paring) 55 
Machine tools for making or repairing footwear 55 
Sewing machines 10 5 (1997) 
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Motor Vehicles (of which): 
- goods transport 10 10 
- special purpose (eg crane lorries, concrete-mixer 
lorries, mobile drilling derricks) 20 5 (1996) 
Source: Customs Authority/MoF (1993,1996 and 1997). 
Over 1992-93 the tariff structure of Ethiopia has been significantly reformed, 
for example, the maximum tariff rate has been cut from 230 per cent (ad 
valorem) to just 40 per cent (see details in Arega, 2000). Tariffs on heavy 
machines like agricultural, construction and goods transport were reduced to 
5 per cent. However, tax rates applicable to small tools and implements were 
subject to duty rates as high as 30 per cent. In addition to duties all imports 
were subject to a uniformly 10 per cent (of value) sales tax and a varying 
excise tax. 
(ii) estimating revenue foregone: With the help of two statisticians from the 
EIA (and their counterparts at the customs office) government revenue from 
import duties and sundry taxes amounting birr 420.6 million was collated. 
These collated data came from Addis Ababa (Laghar and Bole Airport) and 
the port of Mitsiwa before the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. We estimated that these 
locations put together cleared 80 per cent of imports, and by implication 80 
per cent of the revenue foregone. Further, with total agreement with the 
experts involved, we estimated that the 100 per cent revenue foregone would 
amount to birr 526 million. However, one has to be wary of these estimates as, 
for example, entrepreneurs were exempted from income tax and this has not 
been included in the estimation. 
What was more interesting was the fact that 93 per cent of the foregone revenue 
concentrated in Addis Ababa (60 per cent) and Tigray (33 per cent). With only a3 
per cent share, the country's largest region Oromia trailed in third place (Table 
5.5). 
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Table 5.5 Regional distribution of revenue foregone from import duties and 
sundry taxes due to the IIS, 1992.98. 
Region Revenue Foregone percentage share 
in total 
Addis Ababa 313.5 59.6 
Amhara 8.4 1.6 
Oromia 17.7 3.4 
SENNPR 6.9 1.3 
Tigray 172.5 32.8 
Other regions 6.8 1.3 
Ethiopia 526 100 
Source: EIA unpublished data and own calculation. 
Earlier in Table 5.3 1 noted that SENNPR region was among the best performers, 
but according to Table 5.5, SENNPR did not receive the best of the foregone 
revenue. Hence, the question was, what explained the spatial pattern of the use of 
revenue foregone, especially as it did not clearly follow IIS performance? I found 
that the major explanation for this discrepancy was that both Tigray and Addis 
Ababa produced the most capital intensive secondary and tertiary sector activities 
such as in manufacturing and hotels and appropriated most of the revenue 
foregone. This can clearly be seen from Table 5.3 where the national average of 
capital per new enterprise over 1992-98 was birr 4.78; an average project set up in 
Addis Ababa and Tigray, respectively, had birr 6.25 and 7.30 million. As briefly 
discussed above events such as cessation of the war, and better infrastructure also 
favoured these two regions in initiating relatively sizeable projects. 
Non-tax revenue costs of providing the IIS: It was clear that, in addition to the 
cost of birr 526 million revenue foregone from import duties alone, the IIS 
involved other costs. First, the direct costs of IIS administration at the national, 
regional and zonal levels involved at least 500 staff at a cost to the tax payer. 
Second, as I will demonstrate in section 5.5, the IIS also resulted in some huge 
indirect costs associated with the provision of subsidised resources like enterprise 
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sites to some AEs. Third, although interview based evidence was patchy, the 
authorities noted incidences of IIS displacement effects. For example, in 1998 some 
old cooking oil processing enterprises were going out of business due to the 
increase in new enterprises that entered the market with IIS subsidized 
investment capital. 
The foregoing section showed the spatial and sectoral patterns of IIS assisted 
enterprises start ups. But the macro statistics did not show how many IIS licensed 
projects actually drew on IIS benefits. The next section looks at the evidence on IIS 
incentives utilisation rate. 
5.2.4 IIS incentives utilisation rate 
At a national level EIA data did not show IIS incentives utilisation rate, therefore, 
I used a smaller data set collected from the Oromia region (Table 5.6). I will argue 
that these data were significant because (i) they covered the period 1992- 97 and 
761 licensed projects for the IIS. (ii) Oromia also covered the two extreme areas 
that the IIS supports - that was the central location of Addis Ababa-Nazareth 
corridor and remote areas like Borena. However, as Oromia's share in the total 
revenue foregone (Table 5.5) was only 3.4 percent of the total, any generalisation 
from these figures is likely to result in a possible over-estimation of the number of 
enterprises that benefited from IIS. 
What emerged from the Oromia data was that most entrepreneurs who had an IIS 
licence and set up enterprises actually did not use IIS incentives. Referring to 
Table 5.6, over 1992-97 Oromia produced 761 projects that were licensed for IIS 
support. Of these projects 360 (47 per cent) were either completed and started 
operation or were under implementation. Of the 360 projects which were in the 
implementation phase and/or completed and commenced operation, only 131 
(36.4 per cent) were effective beneficiaries (users) of the IIS support. Therefore, the 
key conclusion that emerged from these data was that as many as 64 per cent of 
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IIS licensed entrepreneurs actually set up enterprises without drawing on the 
support. 
Table 5.6 Actual beneficiaries of the IIS support (1992-97) 
IIS'assisted' projects or enterprise 
start ups 
Totals (per cent) 
total IIS licensed projects (TL) 761 (100) 
projects completed (OE) and/or 
under implementations (UI) 
360 (47) 
Effective IIS users 131 (17) 
Effective IIS users/TL 17.2 per cent 
Effective users /OE+UI 36.4 percent 
Source: Oromia Investment Office (1997), and own calculation. 
(OE = complete%operational project, UI = project under implementation, and 
TL = total licensed projects. ) 
To sum up, data presented in this section showed that over 1992-98 licensing for 
the IIS has been steady but only a few enterprises were set up. Moreover, about 64 
per cent of the enterprises that were IIS licensed and set up did not benefit from 
the support. Most of the IIS benefit (foregone revenue) also went to enterprises 
that were set up in Addis Ababa, a region least supported by the IIS and which 
produced relatively fewer successfully set up enterprises. 
Based on views from government and professional agencies, section 5.3 below 
interprets the evidence presented above. 
5.3 Rationale for supporting SMEs: views from government and 
professional agencies on enterprise development 
Over a dozen well informed officials in Ethiopia's enterprise policy and 
development were engaged to discuss the most important start-up and growth 
problems of SMEs, and the relevant public support that these units were 
receiving. Moreover, the interviewees were asked to identify and discuss the role 
and impact of the IIS. Most of these interviewees came from the EIA and 010, the 
Addis Ababa Association of Private Industries (API) , and the then Ministry of 
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Economic Development and Cooperation (MEDAC). Results of the discussions are 
summarised below. 
5.3.1 SME start-up and growth problems 
The discussions uncovered the following SME problems: 
0 historically the private sector has been constrained - in the 1970s and 1980s, 
due to ideological reasons, privately owned enterprises have been 
marginalised. 
" national structural problems - poor physical infrastructure (like power, roads 
and telephone lines, and water supply) was hampering enterprise 
development. 
institutional structures (business information system, promotional services, 
consultancy and advocacy agencies, institutions for developing technical and 
managerial skills, banking, etc. ) were inadequate. 
" adjustment reform policies (for example, energy reform, devaluation, and 
interest rates) were adversely affecting business by increasing the costs of 
machines and raw materials. 
" the tax system was prohibitive, for example, corporate income tax was as 
high as 35 per cent, and manufacturers who used imported raw materials 
were paying double sales taxes at the point of entry and final sale at the 
factory gate. 
high cost of and difficult access to land and premises have made the pace of 
enterprise start-up and growth slow. 
" enterprise start-ups confronted a cumbersome bureaucracy of registration 
and licensing (for operation, import and export) - especially for those 
involved in professional businesses as in the health sector, and those 
operating in more than one region. 
" chronic structural problems of entrepreneurs and enterprises themselves - 
traditionally entrepreneurs were culturally stigmatised; most entrepreneurs 
were less educated and used limited information in developing business 
ideas; many entrepreneurs tended to imitate the ideas of others; enterprises 
were low resource based and external financing was limited by bank 
collateral conditions; dire shortage of skilled technical and managerial 
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personnel who can run businesses; shortages of markets for products; 
inability to maintain product quality; haste to take enterprise to maturity and 
tendency to open side businesses before achieving success in the first 
attempt. 
In spite of these multitudes of problems faced by the enterprise economy, the 
interviewees identified only a few programmes, including the investment 
incentives scheme (IIS), and skills training through the development agency for 
handicrafts and small scale industries (DAHSI) (these enterprise support 
initiatives have been comprehensively discussed in chapter three). However, the 
respondents agreed on the need for providing more support for the development 
of enterprises. In broad terms, the interviewees advanced two lines of arguments: 
" first, providing neutral (non-discretionary) enterprise support - such as 
providing information, skills development, better enabling environment 
(notably more reform in the tax system), cut the bureaucratic hurdles in 
business licensing; and better social and physical infrastructure. 
" second, selective interventions like offering differentiated bank credit rates, 
generous support for the export sector, setting up schemes like enterprise 
zones and business incubators. 
Interviewees also made suggestions that included the set up of an independent 
government department to advise entrepreneurs on business idea development, 
and involve entrepreneurs in the policy making process. Some respondents went 
further and argued for a fundamental cultural change that goes through the entire 
education system and encourages entrepreneurship. 
IIS licensing procedures and costs were some of the factors that entrepreneurs 
considered prior to seeking investment incentives. Hence before I consider the IIS 
impacts on enterprise start-up in section 5.3.3, in section 5.3.2 I will describe IIS 
structure and procedures for granting an IIS licence. 
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5.3.2 Institutional framework for delivering the IIS 
The IIS was a nationwide scheme with structures laid down at the federal, 
regional and zonal administration levels. The Ethiopian Investment Authority 
(EIA) was the federal nucleus for all matters of the IIS administration including 
overseeing foreign investment, and those activities which required federal level 
trade and operating licences. EIA (which also represents the Addis Ababa region) 
initiated relevant policies, issued investment permits and followed up investment 
projects. Regional (and zonal) investment offices performed corresponding 
administrative functions, not included in the EIA jurisdiction. 
The key departments and units of the EIA and regional investment offices 
included the licensing, registration and coordination department (LRCD), the 
policy research and information department (PRID), the project evaluation and 
follow up department (PEFD) and the records office. 
5.3.2.1 Screening processes for granting IIS support 
Entrepreneurs who sought an IIS licence first approached the EIA or, depending 
on the legal jurisdictions, the regional investment offices. On a first visit 
entrepreneurs were given two identical application forms (for birr 5 each) along 
with the necessary guidelines to complete the forms. The forms required a brief 
description of the proposed project, and information on the production/ service 
capacity of the project, its fixed and working capital, staple raw materials and 
output, and market for outputs. 
In addition entrepreneurs were required to provide a list of machines that were to 
be imported along with the price proformas. Entrepreneurs were also required (a) 
to provide design plans if a project was in the health and education sectors that 
required national standards. (b) incorporated bodies needed to provide copies of 
memoranda of understanding and articles of association on the formation of their 
company (or in the case of a foreign company, legal existence of the company and 
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minutes on the decisions for setting up in Ethiopia). (c) for Ethiopian companies 
summary registration from relevant departments, if already done, had to be 
produced. (d) other requirements included passports and residence permits for 
non-Ethiopians. I noted that those entrepreneurs who were less educated and/or 
less able to capture and make use of this information, needed support to 
understand and complete an IIS application form. Unfortunately there was only 
limited official institutional support in this area. 
Duly completed forms were submitted to and recorded at EIA's Records Office. 
Subsequently, technical and legal aspects of the applications were simultaneously 
assessed by sub-units of the licensing, registration and coordination department 
(LRCD) and the project evaluation and follow-up department (PEFD). Technical 
aspects of the review dealt with a project's environmental impacts and whether 
the type of proposed activity (and its location) merited incentives as laid down in 
the regulations. The legal aspects of the assessment considered the status of the 
entrepreneur (or investor) in Ethiopia, the legal form of business association and 
requirements related to third party notifications of the business formation. Finally, 
following the satisfaction of the EIA staff on the foregoing basic criteria, 
entrepreneurs were granted investment licences, with specified privileges. 
From the interviews I conducted with the authorities and EIA files referred to, 
entrepreneurs who met the basic sector or industry criterion of the IIS had a 100 
per cent chance of obtaining the IIS licence. Overall, the licensing procedure 
leading up to and including the granting of the licence took ten to sixty days. 
Because of lesser legal requirements small or sole proprietor projects, like a flour 
mill, were granted licences within ten working days. However, many medium to 
large projects had difficulties in meeting the legal requirements in business 
registration. The Ministry of Justice, which had staff shortages, was performing 
business registration, and third party notification of articles of association was 
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done at the Ministry of Information. This third party notification in particular 
required the publication, in a national newspaper, of article of association. Such 
publications not only depended on clearance from the Ministry of Justice but also 
on whether the very few national newspapers had space for printing these 
notifications. 
The number and technical capability of staff at EIA or Investment Offices also 
played a part in delaying the licensing procedure. Some projects (for example, in 
the chemical sector) required longer time and more information to work out their 
possible environmental consequences. With few staff and support services like 
computers, as an official admitted, delays were inevitable. Finally, other 
applicant-related problems, like failure to provide all the required information in 
good time, also delayed the licensing procedures. 
5.3.2.2 Following up project implementation 
As my interview with three most relevant staff (two from EIA and one from 
Oromia investment office) showed, licensed projects were also monitored. Copies 
of all licensed projects were passed to the project evaluation and follow-up 
department (PEFD) for continuous follow-up and monitoring. PEFD's follow-up 
of projects was performed using such means as sending out standard forms, 
telephone calls, and field visits. The main objective of follow-up was to do with 
control: checking investment licence holders did not pass privileges to a third 
party, imported machines were deployed for the purposes of the project and the 
minimum capital requirement for support was fulfilled. 
The interviews showed that IIS licence holders rarely broke regulations. However, 
there were a few incidences, for example, where generators and vehicles were 
used for purposes other than specified in IIS licence. There was also a case, from 
Debre Zeit, where the entrepreneur failed to install proper plant treatment for a 
tannery and as a result the environment was damaged. In these and similar 
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circumstances, PEFD took measures like making the offenders pay tax benefits 
back to the government, and/or closed down operations like the tannery in Debre 
Zeit. Regional investment offices also broke off land deeds with offending 
entrepreneurs. 
With limited success, the PEFD follow-up exercise also monitored whether the IIS 
objectives (like jobs and social and environment impacts) were fulfilled. Project 
follow-up was carried out to support entrepreneurs in project implementation. 
Through the follow-up mechanism, project implementation problems were 
identified and advice was provided on sites, or other agencies (such as the land 
lease office) were approached to help entrepreneurs solve their start-up problems. 
Finally, according to the interviewees, the outcomes of the follow-up exercise 
were used to generate feedback for making changes to the IIS regulations. 
Overall, the PEFD's follow-up reports and the interviews showed that there were 
gaps between the plan and implementation of IIS licensed projects, for example, 
there were so many inert projects (see below). Often, relative to plans, 
implemented projects were smaller in terms of capital and labour employment. 
The time for project implementation was also often overrun. The whole follow-up 
exercise also showed two weaknesses. First, most of PEFD functions (and the 
benefits) were focused on larger and often foreign-owned projects. Secondly, 
except for monitoring purposes, the PEFD did not evaluate the overall IIS impacts. 
5.3.3 The rationales for and impacts of the IIS 
IIS roles and rationales: Interviewees' reasons for SME support through the IIS 
included these units' ability to create more jobs, and address regional 
development inequality. The interviewees also provided the following rationales 
for the IIS: 
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develop a sustainable economic base by moving investment into 'essential 
activities' like irrigation farms and engineering firms that require heavy 
investment and a long payback period. 
support the disadvantaged business environment outside Addis Ababa and 
Nazareth areas. 
Overall, the IIS rationales that the interviewees provided formed three 
overlapping scenarios for enterprise support: 
" sector dimension: pioneer/promoted over other activities; 
" spatial dimension: peripheral over central regions, and 
" enterprise size dimension: relatively larger over smaller enterprises. 
These scenarios, however, did not necessarily follow consistent arguments. For 
example, the argument that favoured disadvantaged areas did not recognise the 
fact that small and micro enterprises were disadvantaged owing to lack of 
collateral to secure bank credit, lease land, or premises. 
I found that the IIS avoided supporting relatively small enterprises (those with 
start-up capital less that birr 250 000) on the grounds that these enterprises were 
too numerous to provide support to and effectively administer the support. 
Furthermore, it was argued that, smaller enterprises tended to cover their 
investment capital and become profitable quicker than larger enterprises. 
Therefore, if small enterprises were excluded from the scheme, the argument ran, 
the adverse revenue impact due to the IIS would be minimised. 
IIS impacts: Was the IIS working, and if so what was the evidence? First, the 
interviewees provided no evidence to support that the IIS influenced on 
entrepreneurs' choice of activity types. The authorities made it clear that they did 
not put pressure on entrepreneurs to change the type of their proposed activities. 
Therefore, what happened was that entrepreneurs who chose to enter to 'pioneer' 
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and/or 'promoted' activities did receive IIS incentives simply by the virtue of 
choosing those activities. 
Second, regarding the IIS influence on entrepreneurs' choice of enterprise 
location, interviewees claimed that this had an impact: 
the fall in the share of Addis Ababa (relative to other regions) in the total IIS 
licensed projects from 65 per cent in 1993/94 to 31 per cent in 1997/98 (also 
see Table 5.2). 
that many new IIS supported enterprises were set up along the Sululta and 
Burayou roads as opposed to the traditional Addis Ababa-Nazareth corridor. 
" that in 1997-98 alone some 60 new projects moved out of Addis Ababa in 
favour of the surrounding Oromia region. 
I consider the strength of this evidence against the competing evidence and 
explanation in section 5.5. In section 5.5 I will also argue that the key factor behind 
recent changes in location patterns was mainly to do with the land lease policy, 
especially as it was applied in Addis Ababa. 
To sum up, based on the perspectives of enterprise policy makers who took part 
in this study, section 5.3 showed that entrepreneurs were facing major constraints 
like access to enterprise sites, bank credit and inadequate infrastructure. However, 
policy makers responded to these constraints by offering entrepreneurs IIS 
incentives, which according to them impacted only in terms of influencing the 
location pattern of enterprises. But what did the entrepreneurs make of the IIS 
incentives? In section 5.4 I explore the enterprise level impacts of the IIS. 
5.4 The Investment Incentives Scheme and enterprise start up and growth: 
evidence from selected cases of SMEs 
The evidence in this section was drawn from the six case study SMEs. Below, first, 
the entrepreneurs and their enterprises are introduced (section 5.4.1). Then section 
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5.4.2 summarises a rather large volume of data organised around themes like 
motives for enterprise start-up and roles and impacts of the IIS53. 
5.4.1 Entrepreneur and enterprise profiles 
AE1 Shoe Factory: Located at the heart of Merkato, the largest business centre in 
the country, AEI's staple product was leather shoes of all ranges. The product was 
supplied to retailers in Addis Ababa, two of which were shops owned by the 
family of Begashaw who owns AE1 (Begashaw, 1998). A barely educated man, 
Begashaw was 46 when he found AE1 in 1992. Begashaw, however, came from a 
family that had a successful hotel and a hardware shop. He also had experience in 
selling shoes since 1982. 
The idea of setting up AE1 was initiated in 1990 following two developments: 
first, two of Begashaw's sons completed their pre-university studies but did not 
get a place at the university. Begashaw recalled that at the time 'except for the 
army job prospects for the youths were dismally low'. Second, the public policy 
environment changed and a mixed economy policy was declared which allowed 
individuals to own and run more than one business. 
At start-up, to overcome his (and his sons') inadequate skills in shoe production 
Begashaw needed an experienced partner in shoe making. But Begashaw knew 
little about the IIS and proposed a project with only birr 50 000. He said that he 
'was not aware of the minimum amount of investment [birr 250 000] required to 
obtain investment incentives'. He then, among other sources, borrowed birr 120 
000 from the bank by putting up his house as a collateral. The additional money 
raised increased the size of investment in the project plan. Subsequently, the 
revised plan was granted an IIS licence that enabled the enterprise to import its 
major machines (sewing, skiving and stitching) without the payment of duties. 
53 For simplicity, entrepreneurs and enterprises are sometimes referred to as AE UE etc. 
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However, Begashaw did not take the opportunity of exemption from paying 
income tax, as he explained, because he was not able to keep records for tax 
purposes as required by the law. 
In 1998 the overall operations of the factory were very low. Owing to lack of 
demand, the factory was operating only up to 3 out of 6 working days per week 
for months. Patchy records also showed that the factory produced no more than 4- 
5 dozens of pair of shoes a day. Further, the factory had no short to medium term 
investment plan. In terms of employment measures, however, AE1 grew from 8 in 
1992 to 20 in 1998. 
UE1 Shoe Factory: Kadir founded his leather shoe producing factory (UE1) in 
1992 at the age of 31 (Kadir, 1998). UE1 was located in Woreda 14, commonly 
known as Arat Killo area. Apart from finding limited working space in 1992 and 
the founder's familiarity with the area, UE1's location was not particularly 
favourable for business as it was largely occupied by government office blocks. 
However, Kadir had opened two outlet shops in other parts of Addis Ababa. 
As a young man Kadir came to Addis Ababa from rural Ethiopia. In Addis Ababa 
he was first an apprentice, then upon obtaining skills in shoe making he set up a 
shoe repair shop that was not legally registered. Consequently the Addis Ababa 
city administration deemed the business illegitimate and the shop was 
demolished. Kadir managed to rent a small house and soon started operating 
again but this time in the informal sector. As Kadir's underground business 
(including small scale shoe production) thrived he invited two of his younger 
brothers to join him in the business as well as supporting their studies in Addis 
Ababa. Kadir explicitly said that his 'desire to be independent and provide work 
for relations' were the motives for starting up and running the business. 
According to Kadir, change in government and policy in 1991 was the major 
factor for UE1 to have evolved and become a legally registered business in 1992. 
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Kadir thought, only to be proved wrong, that the new policy would let him 
operate freely and provide him access to land and working premises. However, 
one may argue that the growing scale of UE1's informal operation could have 
played a part in UE1's founder leaving the informal sector. 
Similar to AE1, UE1 was eligible for IIS incentives. However, Kadir did not seek 
IIS incentives for reasons that included his own distrust of politicians and 
bureaucrats and inadequate knowledge of the IIS. At start-up UE1 production 
tools and machines were purchased from local suppliers. Relative to AE1, most of 
UE1's tools (except for a couple of sewing machines) were either mechanical or 
semi-electrically operated. This, among other things, suggested that enterprises 
like UE1 that used simple and locally available capital goods, in addition to 
paying taxes, have saved on energy. 
At start up in 1992 UE1 employed 6 workers and in 1998 the workforce increased 
to 17. But, similar to AE1 above, in 1998 UE1 operated way below full capacity 
level, that was 4 out of 6 working days per week. Owing to difficulties in 
obtaining an industrial site, UE1 had no investment plans in sight (although the 
owner was contemplating opening up a textile trading house that only required a 
small floor space to run). 
AE2 Engineering Enterprise: AE2 was a medium size engineering enterprise that 
commenced production in 1994. The enterprise had in-house capacity to design, 
build and erect industrial, commercial and residential structures in steel. Its main 
expertise was in making fuel depot canopies, over and underground tanks, roof 
and wall systems. The enterprise also produced and supplied corrugated iron 
sheet directly to the market. Owing to the economic significance of these activities 
of AE2, the IIS treated it favourably and, in addition to import duty exemptions, it 
was granted three years of exemption from paying income tax (Asegid, 1998). 
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AE2, located in Woreda 19 of Addis Ababa, was found by a husband and wife. The 
manager Germa, who was 42 in 1994, was a civil engineer by training and he had 
the experience of working for the government in Ethiopia and in the UK and USA. 
The choice of this engineering firm was initiated by the prospect of good profits 
that depended on a 'huge market' for products like corrugated iron sheet. To 
achieve their objective, AE2 founders built modern plant and office premises (on 
1800 m2 government granted industrial site) and employed qualified staff. They 
attracted an experienced and qualified workforce mainly from those known to 
them in the government sector. One such significant addition was the acting 
manager who had a BSc degree in civil engineering and an MBA from 
Birmingham University, UK. The founders were also risk conscious as they sought 
IIS incentives to minimise the risk of losing a business that required huge 
investment and working capital (AE2's capital, mostly investment on second-hand 
machines, was birr 10.2 million in 1998). 
Soon after AE2 was set up, however, many newcomers including those that 
became dominant like DH Geda, East African Company, the Midrock Group, 
Ethiopian Steel entered the market and reduced AE2's market share. AE2 was also 
dependent on high value (multi-million birr) imports of raw steel that required, in 
1998, over birr 7 million working capital. In addition, owing to the Ethio-Eritrea 
conflict birr 3.5 million worth of merchandise was stranded at the port of Assab. 
According to the acting manager, largely owing to the shortage of raw material 
and working capital, AE2 never used more than 15 per cent of its capacity. But in 
spite of all these problems AE2 was growing, for example, its workforce grew 
from 30 in 1994 to 51 in 1998. The enterprise also contributed birr 832 622 in 
income tax in 1998 but, as it will be explained, AE2 did not benefit from IIS 
income tax privileges. 
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UE2 Wood and Metalwork Enterprise: Semu, as the first born among five 
brothers and sisters, succeeded to his dead father's business as a manager at the 
age of 22 in 1985 (Semu, 1998). The pressure of running the business and looking 
after the family did not allow Semu to study beyond grade 12. Moreover, the 
business he inherited had only a limited future as it dealt with selling unprocessed 
wood (locally known as atana) used in the housing construction sector. From the 
start Semu was prepared to change the business into his 'childhood ambition' of 
furniture production. Hence Semu, while still running the family business, was 
learning the skills of woodwork from small scale private operators around him. 
Beginning from the late 1980s circumstances started to turn in his favour. For 
example, due to the expanding private sector, demand for office and household 
furniture increased and this instigated the birth of UE2. 
Located in Mesalemia area, Addis Ababa, UE2 was born in 1992 and specialised in 
the manufacture of household and office furniture notably in the production and 
supply of school and hospital furniture and office equipment. Two new 
establishments (metal works and upholstery) were added to the major wood 
works factory. In terms of physical capital accumulation, in 1998 several operating 
lines were installed and these involved over 20 major machines in the wood works 
establishment alone, and five heavy trucks were purchased for transporting raw 
materials to the factory and finished products to all over the country. Following 
its conversion to a PLC in 1998 (with a birr 3 million registered capital) the head 
office has been expanded and the sales and accounts sections were modernised. 
UE2 employed an experienced workforce including some graduates of technical 
schools from Addis Ababa. The key staff were attracted and retained, among 
other things, by the above average wage that UE2 paid. For example, two of UE2's 
most experienced and skilled technicians were induced to leave a government 
wood factory when offered higher salaries (from birr 700 per month to birr 1000) 
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and 5 per cent of the net profit of the business. Inherited resources such as a large 
enterprise site also played a role in the set-up of the enterprises. 
Although eligible UE2 did not seek IIS's tax free import of machinery, equipment 
and heavy trucks. Step by step all machines and heavy trucks were purchased 
from local suppliers, as Semu explained, this was because 'the procedures at EIA 
were time-consuming ... and EIA support required a huge amount of 
finance at 
start-up. But we purchased our capital goods from local dealers sometimes on an 
instalment basis'. As of 1998, UE2 was one of the major contractors in the country 
in the production and supply of school and hospital furniture, office equipment, 
window, door and glass works. The business was continuously growing and was 
operating at its full capacity. A large investment plan was also under review (the 
major drawback of which, according to Semu, would be the availability of a 
serviced site). There was ongoing internal and external staff development 
(including training in computers). UE2 was also paying income tax (birr 25 000 in 
1998). 
AE3 Agro-industrial Company: AE3 was a brainchild of a retired beeswax trader 
who brought two of his daughters and colleagues to the business. AE3, whose 
headquarters was in Merkato, was set up in 1995 with an approximate investment 
capital of birr 20 million. The company initially started to operate mainly in the 
coffee hulling and export business, areas that the government considered as 
priorities and offered IIS incentives for. Coffee beans were purchased from all 
coffee growing regions and processed in Addis Ababa. Coffee was exported to 
regions as far as North America, the Far East and Europe (Amare Mamo, 1998). 
Moreover, since 1995 the scope of AE3 business spread to three major activities 
that included chemicals and plastics, a beeswax processing plant and transport 
services. Major expansion was made to the domestic transport services which 
were operating with 28 heavy trucks in 1998. The workforce of the company also 
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grew from 26 in 1995 to 400 in 1998. Working capital too has risen to over birr 20 
million. The head office was also reformed to cope with all these local and 
international operations. Moreover, a former government bank officer was 
brought in as a full time manager. The company was not only operating at full 
capacity but also intended to expand the business. Overall, as of 1998, AE3 was 
one Ethiopia's largest enterprises. 
UE3 Industrial Chemicals Company: UE3 was a company set up in 1992 and 
headed by a well educated and experienced agricultural specialist. When the 
British company ICI closed its operations in Ethiopia in 1990, Markos the general 
manager of UE3 recalled that, he was seriously concerned about his future 
employment. He went on to say that '... when you want to deliver services to 
farmers you obviously need money. But it was not financial motives that pushed 
me into this business' (Markos, 1998). 
After considering his options, Markos set up his own company in 1992 and started 
operating from its strategically located head office at Bole Road in Addis Ababa. 
UE3 operations included trading in agro-chemicals, veterinary services, industrial 
chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. The company also repackaged agricultural 
chemicals to suit the demands of farmers and field level chemical applications. 
UE3 was eligible for the IIS incentives but the founder did not seek the support 
because of the perception he held that the IIS was a bureaucratic organisation. 
Markos chose to do business in an area that he was interested, trained and 
experienced in. He studied agriculture, which Markos said was 'a discipline 
related to my father's occupation'. He had worked for the Ministry of Agriculture 
in regional projects and in Addis Ababa, and ICI. Markos also gave credit to the 
support he gets from his family and the work ethics and discipline that he 
inherited from his parents. There were also favourable circumstances that helped 
the successful start-up of UE3. The main one was that when ICI pulled out UE3 
170 
bought, at a reasonable price according to Markos, some second-hand investment 
goods including 3 vehicles, furniture and equipment from the company. 
Moreover, during the 'transition period' of system of government, Markos also 
unofficially bought what was otherwise a state owned enterprise site. This site 
was put aside to build a factory plant that would produce stationery materials. 
In 1998 the company was operating in coffee, cotton and food crops producing 
five major regions of the country and the business was expanding and attracting 
qualified staff. The staff were 18 in 1992 and increased to 22 in 1998. The education 
(and salary) level of employees was high - there were 8 staff (out of 22) who held a 
minimum of a first university degree. Further, employees were offered short term 
training on basic codes of handling chemicals at the facilities of major suppliers 
abroad. 
5.4.2 The road to enterprise start up: the 'why' and 'how' questions 
In this section, following a brief summary on case SMEs and entrepreneurs 
described above, entrepreneurs' motives particularly those related to IIS 
incentives for setting up enterprises are explored. 
5.4.2.1 Summary of entrepreneurs' motives for enterprise start-up 
Table 5.7 below summarizes some of the features of case SMEs and entrepreneurs 
described in section 5.4.1. 
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Table 5.7 Summary of some features of the entrepreneurs and enterprises 
enterprise start-up staple product/ jobs at age (at manager's 
(legal date service start-up start-up) education 
form*) and 1998 and sex of level 
manager (grade) 
AE1 (SP) 1992 shoes 8&20 46, M 12 
UE1 (SP) 1992 shoes 6& 17 31, M 10 
AE2 (PLC) 1994 corrugated iron 30 & 51 42, M University 
sheet, reservoir 
UE2 (SP) 1992 building 40 & 130 29, M 12 
structures, and 
office furniture 
AE3 (PLC) 1995 coffee hulling 26 & 400 47, M University 
and export 
UE3 (PLC) 1992 repackaging 18 & 22 38, M University 
and dist. of agri. 
chemical 
Source: Organised from information supplied by the entrepreneurs 
(SP = sole-proprietor, and PLC = private limited company) 
From the evidence in section 5.4.1 and Table 5.6 it follows that: 
all the SMEs were set up in the first half of the 1990s following the 
introduction of economic policy that was supportive to the private sector. 
Three SMEs (AE1, UE1 and UE2) were organised as sole proprietors while 
the other three started as private limited companies. The head offices of all 
the SMEs were in Addis Ababa, and all (except AE1 and UE1) operated in 
the regions other than Addis Ababa. 
the enterprises were set up and managed by men in their late 20s to 40s. 
Some used hired managers (AE2 and AE3) while others were run by owner- 
managers. Some owner-managers had at least a first degree from a 
university (AE2, AE3 and UE3) whereas the others attended school. Some 
former government employees also became either entrepreneurs (as in AE2 
and UE3) or senior member of staff in all the enterprises (except UE1). 
in terms of parental occupation, entrepreneurs of AE1, UE2, and AE3 came 
from trading families whereas UE1 and UE3 come from farming families. In 
all these SMEs immediate family members were key business partners. All 
172 
AEs entrepreneurs had successful experience of running their own 
businesses. 
considering staple products of the SMEs that ranged from consumer goods 
like shoes to construction materials like corrugated iron sheeting, all these 
activities were eligible for the IIS support. However, whether an enterprise 
received a 'pioneer' or 'promoted' status was at the discretion of the 
authorities as enterprises had more than one function that did not fall under 
one category. 
in terms of performance (for example, growth in employment and 
investment plan), from this small sample it cannot be said that AEs or UEs 
did better than the other group. 
What were the motives and triggers for enterprise start-up, and did the IIS have 
an influence on enterprise start-up? All the entrepreneurs gave more than one 
factor that had influenced them to start up their enterprises. Providing jobs for 
relatives featured as a reason for the set-up of AE1, UE1, UE2, AE3. The need for 
financial independence (AE1, UE1 and UE2) and the threat of unemployment 
(AE1 and UE3) were the driving forces behind the set-up of those enterprises. All 
upheld changes in the enabling environment that allowed entrepreneurs to 
engage in more than one business and employ capital without a ceiling. As far as 
the IIS was concerned, however, it was the founders of AE2 who took account of 
IIS benefits to set up the enterprise. 
To sum up, the evidence showed that, for all the entrepreneurs, the underlying 
reasons for being enterprising were based on personal interest and experience in 
particular activity type, available resources, and formal and informal training 
received prior to setting up the enterprise. 
54 Note that some of these characteristics of the entrepreneurs follow the entrepreneurial 
pattern described in chapter three. 
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5.4.2.2 Enterprise start-up resources 
Given its vital role in enterprise start-up, this section thoroughly examines 
entrepreneurs' resources base. Moreover, the section considers whether IIS had a 
role in organising the resources considered. Owing to the severity of problems 
experienced by the entrepreneurs, however, the focus below is on enterprise 
site/premises and finance. 
(i) investment capital: the six entrepreneurs, between them, used at least six 
sources of capital: past savings, ikoub55, asset sale, bank loans, family and 
friends. Only the manager of AE1 used a maximum of four of these sources 
of capital. One most interesting finding here was that while all AE 
entrepreneurs used bank loans as a source of finance, none of the UE 
entrepreneurs did. This, as I will argue in section 5.5, suggested a link 
between the IIS and access to bank credit. 
(ii) enterprise site and premises: All the six SMEs had made applications to the 
Addis Ababa City Administration (and Land Lease Office) to acquire 
enterprise sites. The EIA and/or ministry of industry (MoI) were involved in 
the process of site acquisition by supporting entrepreneurs' applications 
(Table 5.8). 
55 Ikoub is an Amharic term for a traditional saving institution, where people come together at a 
regular meeting and each member contributes a predetermined amount of money; and lots 
are drawn for each non-winning member until everybody wins. 
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Table 5.8 Acquisition of enterprise site: success and failure stories 
enterprise land area institution involved term of waiting time 
(m2) acquisition 
AE1 - Addis Ababa - 3 
Administration, MoI years(failed) 
AE2 1800 Addis Ababa freehold <a year 
Administration, EIA (succeeded) 
AE3 1909 Addis Ababa leasehold <a year 
Administration, EIA, (succeeded) 
and Lease Board 
UE1 - Addis Ababa - >3 years 
Administration, MoI (failed) 
UE2 2500 - inherited - 
UE3 1100 private/unofficial freehold 2 years 
(succeeded) 
Source: Organised from information supplied by the entrepreneurs 
AE2 and AE3 managed to acquire sites with the help of the EIA and other 
government agencies in the shortest possible waiting time. AE2, in particular, was 
given a free land holding status. UE3 bought land (and some property) from a 
private individual before the land lease policy became effective. UE2 wanted to 
lease an area of 10 000 m2 land but the manager failed to raise the birr 3 million 
land lease price, hence UE2 was set up on an inherited but small plot of land. AE1 
and UE1, however, in spite of waiting for over three years, failed to acquire 
enterprise sites. 
With regard to acquiring enterprise sites and premises entrepreneurs raised the 
following problems: (i) excessive bureaucracy and long waiting time. (ii) excessive 
corruption and abuse of power. (iii) high cost of land and site development. 
Entrepreneurs said that subsequent to the introduction of the lease policy in 1993, 
land prices in Addis Ababa increased, from free allocation, to as high as birr 4300 
m2. Entrepreneurs who considered moving to the outskirts of the city (like UE2) 
with a view to getting cheaper plots of land were confronted with severe 
bottlenecks of infrastructure like power and access roads. 
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Case SMEs adopted different coping strategies to overcome the problems of 
enterprise site/premises. Clearly AEs sought assistance from EIA to get access to 
land. Those who failed to acquire sites through the lease system (UE1 and UE2) 
rented premises by paying what was locally referred to as ye'kulf waga - or 'access' 
payment to a tenant of subsidised public premises for transferring the tenancy 
right to the entrepreneur. 
Overall, invariably all the entrepreneurs had encountered severe land/premises 
acquisition problems, and the evidence suggested that access to and cost of land, 
particularly in Addis Ababa, was a major factor that either made or broke 
enterprise start-up. 
5.4.2.3 Entrepreneurs' idea development and project implementation problems 
Entrepreneurs were asked to reflect on the problems they faced during project 
idea development and implementation stages, and whether they received 
public/private support in this regard. Responses to these questions are 
summarised below. 
Enterprise start-up problems: Each entrepreneur nominated most of the 
following problems as 'most severe' start-up problems: shortages of resources, 
notably land/premises and bank credit, shortages of skilled labour both in quality 
and quantity, shortage of information such as about market demand, onerous 
procedures and corrupt public officials, and cultural barriers to doing private 
business such that some officials distrust the private sector. Also a catalogue of 
infrastructural problems like shortages of power, water and roads were listed. 
Specific to the IIS, I found that entrepreneurs who purchased an imported 
machine from local dealers forfeited the main benefit from the IIS. Therefore, with 
the view to benefiting from the IIS entrepreneurs made direct import orders (that 
is avoiding local public/private dealers). This practice resulted in some adverse 
consequences: the first displacement effect was that owing to IIS licensed 
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entrepreneurs making direct import orders, local dealers or distributors of capital 
goods lost business. Second, IIS licensed importers also increased transaction costs 
(like search for suppliers and costs of handling imports). Moreover, entrepreneurs 
lacked experience in importing capital goods that led to mis-specification of 
orders. Both AE2 and AE1 reported delays in receiving import orders, and 
received mis-specified machines, costing both enterprises a huge amount of 
money. 
Becoming a legal entity: Following the Commercial Code of Ethiopia (IGE, 1960), 
all enterprises (except for those which started under birr 5000 capital) were 
required to register with Ministry of Trade and Industry (or respective regional 
bureaux). According to the entrepreneurs, the legalisation procedures were 
cumbersome - they involved difficult procedures of producing memoranda of 
association, third party notification, and multiple registration at the Ministry of 
Justice, and regional and zonal layers of administration. 
Support in business idea development and implementation: Respondents were 
asked if they had received any form of support (public or private organisations) 
through the process of enterprise start-up. The response especially that from UEs 
was an emphatic no. And all respondents said that they would have welcomed 
advice and support in the areas of machine import, project feasibility studies, 
accessing resources for project implementations, and entrepreneurial 
development skills. As discussed in chapter three, agencies that would have 
provided support to starting up enterprises were few and had limited capacity. 
According to the three IIS assisted entrepreneurs, the limited advice they received 
from the EIA was useful. The support came as part of the qualification process for 
the IIS, in which the EIA indirectly guided project document preparation. The 
other most common support that entrepreneurs trusted and relied on (moral, 
advice, and lobbying with officials) came from friends and connections in or 
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outside government. However, some of the so-called advisors had some 
shortcomings - in that they knew very little about what was involved in enterprise 
start-up and provided, as happened to AE1, wrong advice on machine orders. 
Section 5.4.3, beginning with entrepreneurs' awareness level of the IIS, explores 
whether the IIS influenced entrepreneurs' decisions over the choices of the timing 
of start-up, and the activity type, location and size of an enterprise. 
5.4.3 Impacts of the IIS on enterprise start-up 
5.4.3.1 Entrepreneurs' awareness levels of the IIS 
Entrepreneurs awareness levels about the IIS are summarised in Table 5.9. All the 
six entrepreneurs were aware of the general provisions of the IIS, and with the 
exception of UEl, all knew about IIS supports in their proposed activity areas. The 
main medium of information was the media (radio and newspapers). All 
entrepreneurs (except AE1 and UE1) knew about the IIS at the early stage of 
enterprise idea development. 
Table 5.9 Entrepreneurs' knowledge about the level of IIS support 
pointers enterprise/ 
entrepreneur 
knowledge about the general provisions of the IIS all 
IIS support in proposed activity area all but UE1 
IIS awareness stage relative to enterprise idea development: 
- early at planning stages AE2, AE3, UE2, UE3 
AE1, UE1 
- later at implementation stages 
Types of IIS support received (AEs only): 
direct support: 
- exemptions from customs duties AE1, AE2 and AE3 
- exemptions from income tax none 
- other support (eg tax relief on land development expenses) none 
indirect IIS benefits (providing access to land, credit and utilities) AEI, AE2 and AE3 
Source: Organised from information supplied by the entrepreneurs 
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The three assisted enterprises (AEs) received direct support in the form of 
exemptions from import taxes. However, for the reasons given in section 5.4.3.2 
below, none of these AEs actually received support in the form of relief from 
paying income tax nor taxes on other expenses incurred (like on R&D, site 
development, building construction, and machine installations). To varying 
degrees, all the AEs (especially AE2 and AE3) did get indirect benefits in the form 
of access to bank credit, enterprise site, and utilities. 
5.4.3.2 The IIS influences on entrepreneurs' start-up decisions and enterprise 
level IIS benefits 
The IIS influences on entrepreneurs' start-up decisions: The impact of the IIS on 
enterprise start-up was the key question that the research was designed to 
investigate. None of the three UEs, in spite of being eligible, sought IIS support. 
The owner of UE1, even with his limited knowledge of the IIS had had a 
tormenting experience in the hands of public agencies while looking for an 
enterprise site, and was extremely pessimistic about any support from public 
agencies. UE2 and UE3 perceived the EIA as a bureaucratic institution, and 
decided not to consider its support. 
AE entrepreneurs were asked whether they would have set up their respective 
enterprises had they not received the IIS support. Similarly, entrepreneurs of UEs 
were asked what impact the IIS would have had on their key decisions, such as on 
product choice, had they received the support. All responses were controlled to 
reflect variations in sector (product choices), location, scale of operation and 
timing of start-up decisions. Table 5.10 summarises the responses given by the 
entrepreneurs. 
First, the IIS influence on entrepreneur's decision on start-up timing: It was found 
that entrepreneurs' decisions on the particular timing of starting up their 
enterprises (entry timing) was unaffected by the IIS. Views of all the respondents 
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consistently agree that the choice of the particular time for enterprise start-up was 
to do with the general change in policy but not the provision of IIS incentives. On 
the actual pace of start-up, because of delays in obtaining investment licences, 
UE2 thought that the IIS would have slowed down the start-up process. 
Table 5.10 Summary of key enterprise start up decisions: did IIS have 
an effect? 






AE1 No No No Yes 
AE2 No Yes No No 
AE3 No No No No 
UE1 No No No No 
UE2 No? No No No 
UE3 No No No No 
Source: Organised from information supplied by the entrepreneurs 
Second, the IIS influence on entrepreneur's decision on product choice: None of the 
entrepreneurs' decisions (except AE2) was influenced (or would have been 
influenced) by IIS incentives regarding the choice of activity type. AE2, the 
engineering firm, considered IIS assistance because of 'entry into an unknown 
market where competition from imported products was strong'. The dominant 
factors that affected entrepreneurs' decisions in choosing their respective activity 
types were: 
entrepreneurial interest (strong personal attachment either following family 
tradition or own experience, for example, UE1, UE2, UE3 and AE2). 
entrepreneurial knowledge of and experience in the production and 
marketing of a particular product/service (through formal training in the 
field like UE3 and AE2, and on the job training like UE1, AE1). 
potential growth of and current profitability of the activity (as in AE3, AE2, 
UE1). 
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Third, the IIS influence on the entrepreneur's decision on the choice of enterprise 
location: The IIS was a total deadweight with regards to influencing the choice of 
location as no single entrepreneur associated enterprise location decision with 
specific benefits of the IIS. According to the entrepreneurs, their location decisions 
largely rested on factors like proximity to central location (product market, 
suppliers of raw materials and labour), good infrastructure (like roads, power and 
utility), availability of site and premises, proximity to the entrepreneur's 
residence, and other factors including availability of spare parts, consultants, 
insurance and banking services, and social services like health and education in 
the chosen location. 
Fourth, the IIS influence on entrepreneur's decision on scale of activity: Again 
none of the entrepreneurs (except AE1) thought that enterprise size at start up 
was (or would have been) influenced by IIS incentives. The owner of AE1 claimed 
that the IIS had positively impacted on the scale of his operation because he made 
a special effort to raise more capital and meet the minimum IIS entry requirement. 
Enterprise level IIS financial benefits: The conclusion that emerged from the 
interviews, summarized above, was that the IIS barely influenced entrepreneurs' 
key enterprise start-up decisions like the choices of location and activity types. 
That may be the case, but entrepreneurs did gain some financial benefits from 
exemptions from paying duties on imported capital goods (pre-enterprise start 
up) and income taxes (post-enterprise start up). 
First, pre-enterprise start up enterprise level IIS benefit: In Table 5.11 major 
machines and tools used by AE1 and UE1 are used to demonstrate the IIS 
financial benefits and losses of the two respective enterprises56. Both AE1 and UE1 
56 Organising data on tax savings made from exemptions from duties on capital goods was 
hindered by patchy records on the amount of machines and equipment imported by each 
case SME. Even when more and more data on the amount of machines and equipment 
imported were generated, the conclusions of case by case analysis did not improve as 
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were set up in 1992 before tariff rates were reformed mostly downwards. When 
Begashaw (founder of AE1) imported his machines (and Kadir, founder of UE1, 
purchased his from local distributors) the basic import tariff rate and sales taxes 
were 10 and 24 per cent, respectively. Based on these rates the total amount of 
duty saved by AE1 and (paid by UE1) amounted to about 25.4 per cent of value of 
the capital goods57. 
Table 5.11 Customs duty saved and paid: comparing AE1 and UE1 

















(1) set cutting knives, upper sole 39675 10 24 13489.5 53164.5 
(2) set cutting knives, insole 24140 10 24 8207.6 32347.6 
(3) 2 sewing machines 46590 10 24 15840.6 62430.6 
Total (1-3) 110405 37537.7 147924.7 
UE1: 
(1) 4 sewing machines @4 000 
birr each 11936 4064 16000 
(2) 1 skiving machine @ 12 000 8952 3048 12000 
(3) mechanically operated 
machines/tools 
41030 13970 55000 
Total (1-3) 61918 21082 83000 
Source: Organised from information supplied by the entrepreneurs, and own 
calculation 
individual entrepreneur savings from duties heavily depended on the tariff rates applied. 
Hence, below only two exemplar cases of AE1 and UE1 are discussed for illustration (for the 
national estimate of tariff rates see details in section 5.2 and Box 5.1). 
57 method of calculation: AE1 has incurred a total cost of birr 147 942.70 (purchase value plus 
duty saved) on the items given in Table 5.11. Savings from the IIS that was birr 37537.70, 
therefore, amounted to 25.4 per cent of the total cost of imported capital. The pre-tax 
purchase value of machine and tools for UE1, therefore, were approximated by deducting 
25.4 per cent of the total cost as duties paid at customs office. Total cost of imported machine 
and tool, obviously, included costs of CIF and domestic distributors' profits. Consequently, 
the amount of 'duties' paid by UE1 may have been overestimated. 
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However, following the reform in the structure of Ethiopia's customs tariff in 
1993, rates significantly fell, reducing IIS supported entrepreneurial benefit over 
1993-98 to around 13 per cent of the value of capital goods imported58. 
Although tariff rates have been falling and foreign exchange was made available 
for the entrepreneurs, other aspects of adjustment programme (such as 
devaluation, adjustment on prices of utilities and increase in interest rates) were 
adversely affecting their businesses. Some SME managers, therefore, argued that 
through the IIS the government was trying to compensate businesses for the high 
cost of doing business due to the adjustment programme. This meant that the IIS 
did not add to the finances of the entrepreneurs involved in the case study. 
The two footwear factories (AE1 and UE1) provided some striking evidence on 
the likely influence of the IIS on investment and adoption of modern machines. As 
discussed before, UE1 not only paid taxes on imported goods but also used more 
locally produced tools. Moreover, most of the tools used by UE1 were simple, in 
that they were operated in either a mechanical or semi-electrical way. These tools, 
therefore, not only consumed less energy but also provided more jobs. The fact 
that enterprises like UE1 were less energy dependent meant that these enterprises 
tended to be regionally flexible. The evidence I generated from both cases of SMEs 
and interviews with the authorities showed that IIS incentives certainly 
encouraged capital importing by individual entrepreneurs. This meant that AEs 
incurred more transaction costs like CIF, and lost linkages between specialised 
capital importing local companies that provided advisory services like on 
installation, repair and maintenance of machines. 
58 For example, in 1998 ELNAL, a button producing PLC, imported machinery worth birr 1.5 
million and saved birr 202 000 from IIS import related taxes (EEA, 1999). This amounted to 
13.5 per cent of savings, closely confirming the 13 percent national estimate I made in section 
5.2. 
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Second, post enterprise start-up impacts of the IIS59: entrepreneurs were asked 
whether more income tax relief (in years) would have induced investment to 
move into remote regions. Three of the entrepreneurs (AEI, AE2, UE2) said that 
they would not be persuaded by any number of years or level of tax incentives to 
go to the regions. The reasons behind this position were based on simple cost and 
benefits analysis: infrastructure (roads, power, etc. ), availability of skilled labour, 
problems of separating work place from residence areas, and even law and order, 
according to the entrepreneurs, worsen if they move out of the centre. Some of the 
enterprises (AE2, UE2, AE3 and UE3) were already operating in the regions 
(including in the remote regions). AE3 founders welcomed any improvement to 
the tax system but tax concessions would not have influenced where they have 
operated. UE3 was happy to operate where his enterprise was welcomed, and for 
UE3 the most important issue was not receiving incentives but eliminating 
existing barriers to enterprises especially in business registration and legalisation 
in the regions. 
Regarding income tax benefits, none of the assisted enterprise benefited from 
income tax relief, for different reasons. AEs' exemption from income tax was 
conditional on enterprises keeping financial records. The relatively smaller 
enterprise (AE1) missed out on tax benefits on the grounds that the enterprise 
could not afford resources for keeping records. Moreover, because AE1 had the 
incentive and legal rights that did not require record keeping, he preferred fixing 
a long term and favourable flat tax rate with local tax authorities. Secondly, the 
relatively bigger enterprises (like AE2) started operations at less than full capacity 
and hence were barely profitable after start-up. By the time the business had 
59 From the interview I had with entrepreneurs, in the post enterprise start-up situation, the 
following emerged as key constraints to enterprise growth: inadequate or lack of enterprise 
site/premises, punitive tax system, lack of transparency and efficiency in the bureaucracy, 
inadequate infrastructure, lack of access to banks and to the services of utility companies. 
But the IIS assistance failed to directly address these problems. 
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become profitable the income tax exemption privilege had expired. Overall, the 
important conclusion that emerged from the case SMEs was that exemption from 
paying income tax was not of any consequence either to the set up or growth of 
the three AEs. In this regard, therefore, the IIS was a total deadweight. 
Finally, I asked entrepreneurs if there were trade offs between IIS benefits and 
costs due to licensing procedures and waiting time for an investment licence. 
Views, however, were markedly different between AEs and UEs. UEs thought 
that the investment authorities were bureaucratic, costing enterprises money and 
valuable start-up time. AEs' views (overall) tended to confirm the official view, in 
that the procedures were simple, the birr 200 licence fee was 'peanuts' to pay, and 
waiting time for a licence took a maximum of two months. 
To summarise, the evidence from cases of SMEs presented in section 5.4 showed 
that IIS incentives did not motivate entrepreneurs to start up enterprises. Nor 
were entrepreneurs' decisions over the choices of location influenced by IIS 
incentives. However, the choice of type of activity and enterprise size were 
marginally influenced by IIS incentives. Moreover, as I will argue in section 5.5 
below, some AEs used the IIS licence and structure and drew on some superior 
benefits from subsidised and/or easy access to enterprise site, bank credit and 
utilities. 
5.5 Access to key enterprise start up resources 
Based on the macro statistics presented in section 5.2, the investment authorities 
claimed that IIS incentives influenced the location pattern of enterprise start-up in 
favour of locations outside the dominant region Addis Ababa. However, the 
evidence that emerged from the case SMEs, and reported in section 5.4, led to the 
conclusion that the IIS did not influence entrepreneurial location choices. Section 
5.4 also showed that, some entrepreneurs used IIS licence and structure to get 
subsidised access to one or more enterprise start up resources like enterprise sites. 
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In this section I present a rival explanation to the statistics given in section 5.2 that 
appeared to have shown a new pattern of enterprise location. Owing to their 
importance to the entrepreneurs, the evidence presented in this section focuses on 
land, credit and energy. As of 1998 the state had an absolute monopoly in the 
ownership and distribution of these resources. Because the claim and counter 
claim on the spatial effect of IIS incentives revolved around Addis Ababa versus 
the rest of Ethiopia, land based data were particularly collected from the Addis 
Ababa land lease office. Two national agencies, the Development Bank of Ethiopia 
(DBE) and Ethiopia Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO) also served as source of 
evidence. 
The presentations below summarise answers to questions like whether the 
relevant agencies, as claimed by the entrepreneurs and investment authorities, 
allocate land, credit and power on a discretionary basis. And, if that was the case, 
how important were the benefits in affecting location patterns of enterprises? 
Section 5.5.2 below deals with access and cost of enterprise sites, and section 5.5.3 
focuses on electric power and bank credit. 
5.5.1 Access to and cost of enterprise site 
5.5.1.1 Brief background to the political economy of access to land 
The constitution of Ethiopia showed that the government retains ownership of all 
land in the country (FDRE, 1995a). However, land continued to be made available 
through the land lease proclamation passed in 1993 (TGE, 1993). Following the 
constitution and the lease policy, the nine regional states and the two city 
governments passed their own land lease policies to regulate the acquisition and 
transfer of land. At the national level, duration of lease broadly varied between 
activity types - while the maximum lease period was 99 years, for example in 
manufacturing the lease holding period was 60 years. 'Prices' of lease too varied 
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between regions and locations within regions and specific use of land. Land 
allocation was also based on auction and non-auction lease holding systems60 
The procedures put in place for leasing land (especially as practiced in the Addis 
Ababa land lease office (LLO)) were burdensome and involved huge transaction 
costs to the entrepreneurs. Identification and preparation of an area into plots, 
developing area maps, and specifying the uses (like industry and/or service) and 
building regulations took a considerable amount of time and resources. Auctions 
were also infrequent and met the demands of only a few entrepreneurs. For 
example, over 1995-98 the Addis Ababa LLO held 20 rounds of auctions, offering 
a total of 385 individual plots of land of which only 150 plots of land were leased 
to entrepreneurs. This figure compares poorly with the number of entrepreneurs 
that would have sought land as there were 1677 IIS licensed projects in Addis 
Ababa alone over 1992-98. 
Interviews I conducted with land lease officials and entrepreneurs in Addis Ababa 
provided several reasons for the poorly handled land leasing: that land auction 
was a new practice to the country, the LLO had only a few bidders at one 
particular time, plots were often not to the liking of entrepreneurs (notably in 
terms of size, location and time of availability), and auction was expensive to 
entrepreneurs, in that bidding increased the land price. Factors like where the 
entrepreneurs lived and the social environment they had also limited them to 
their immediate areas. To overcome these difficulties, as one senior Addis Ababa 
LLO officer explained, IIS licence holders were assisted to get access to enterprise 
sites (Fikre Buta, 1998). 
60 Auction based land lease holding, in which a minimum of three people took part, was the 
dominant policy on accessing entrepreneurs to land holding. The non-auction sub-system, 
started in 1997, allowed entrepreneurs to choose better serviced sites and pay lease prices 
decided by the authorities. (There were also two other subsystems, cooperative and lottery 
allocation. However, these subsystems applied only to those who required land for building 
private residential houses. ) 
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To sum up, via regulations and memoranda (not made part of the investment 
code) some IIS licence holders were given priorities to have access to enterprise 
sites. Moreover, as I will show below, land was leased to these entrepreneurs at 
subsidised lease prices. 
5.5.1.2 Cost of enterprise site 
This section shows, first, the significance of the cost of enterprise sites in the total 
enterprise start-up cost and, second, the extent to which subsidised land was 
allocated to some IIS licence holders in Addis Ababa and the rest of Ethiopia. 
(i) Data on Addis Ababa: two sets of data were used61: 
" data set one was based on information on 'lease acquisition requested' 
obtained from EIA. These data covered 78 Addis Ababa based projects which 
were granted investment licences between 1992-97 and had complete data on 
land requirements and investment plans. 
" data set two was based on 'lease acquisition accorded' obtained from the 
Addis Ababa LLO. These data covered 1997-98 land lease holdings accorded 
to a total of 169 IIS licensed enterprises of which only 63 had information on 
size and value of land acquired, and total investment at start-up. 
The most common location of the sites in data set two was in the outskirts of 
Addis Ababa in places like Kaliti. In these locations lease 'prices' varied from birr 
185 to 1800 per m2 and the average price of 169 enterprise sites was birr 392 m2. 
However, in the heart of Addis Ababa notably in Merkato and Piazza lease price 
was as high as birr 4300 per m2. The average lease price, birr 392 m2, used in this 
calculation was, therefore, lower than what would have been representative of the 
whole of Addis Ababa. 
61 In both data sets a big variation ranging from 180 000 m2 to 446 m2 (on acquired land) and 76 
000 m2 to 350 m2 (at plan stage) were observed. Such large tracts of land were often acquired 
by foreign companies such as MIDROCK Eth. Hence with a view to reflecting site 
requirements and costs for only indigenous enterprises these few foreign owned company 
statistics were excluded from both data sets. 
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These 78 and 63 projects from the first and second sets of data, respectively, were 
organised and compared in Table 5.12. Accordingly, the cost of land in total 
enterprise start-up cost accounted for 18 per cent (reckoned at the actual average 
lease price this amounted to doubling the amount made at the application stage). 
The average land size of enterprises was higher after plots were leased as opposed 
to at the planning stage. This was unexpected as entrepreneurs often enter into 
lease for less than what was indicated in their original project plans. However, the 
possible explanation could be that, acquired land on lease (column three) did not 
represent smaller enterprises, as' the average was affected by fewer but medium to 
large enterprises. 
Table 5.12 Cost of enterprise site (in birr'000) in Addis Ababa 
pointers lease lease 
acquisition acquisition 
requested accorded 
number of enterprises 78 63 
average land (in m2) 3348 10360 
average spending on land ('request' Q birr 392/m 1312 2985 
m2) 
average non-land start up cost 11998 13595 
total start up cost/enterprise 13304 16580 
land cost/total start up cost 9.9% 18% 
Sources: EIA and Addis Ababa Lease Office unpublished data and own calculation 
The Addis Ababa LLO data on 169 plots leased between 1997-98 were further 
analysed. And of these 169 plots 33 of them were allocated to the entrepreneurs 
from free to a maximum of 35 per cent of market price of the lease as shown 
below: 
seven plots were allocated free of charge; 
ten plots were allocated at only less than 20 per cent of market price. 
fourteen plots were allocated at only 20-30 per cent of market value, and 
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two plots were allocated at 35 and 100 per cent of market prices for the plots. 
(ii) Data on the rest of Ethiopia: Enterprises that were starting up in Addis Ababa 
and major urban centres were predominantly manufacturing and services based. 
And in major urban centres land lease was relatively more expensive than rural 
land. For example, in smaller towns of Oromia, and outside 10km radius of Addis 
Ababa, in 1998 land lease per m2 was only birr 2.10 (Tahir Aman, 1998). To reflect 
on circumstances that apply to rural Ethiopia data were organised on agriculture 
based enterprises. By going through EIA data files, applications made to 
undertake agricultural activities in three major regions, Amhara, Oromia and 
Tigray produced 80 enterprises that had data on size of land requirement, 
planned investment and expected jobs (Table 5.13). 
Table 5.13 Agricultural enterprise land costs in Amhara, Oromia and Tigray 
regions 
pointer Amhara Oromia Tigray Total 
no of farms 27 10 43 80 
average farm size (ha) 1261 979 323 721 
land price/ha (birr) 65 150 20 78 
average farm land price/farm (@45 years62, '000 bir 3694 5945 291 2146 
average farm investment on machines ('000 birr) 7319 2631 6326 6199 
average farm building and other capital expenses 
('000 birr) 4746 4996 1071 2802 
average farm total investment ('000 birr) 12065 7627, 7397 9001 
jobs/farm 283 643 389 385 
average farm expenditure on land (2146) as per 19.0% 
cent of total investment (2146+9001=11147) 
Sources: EIA (1998) unpublished data and own calculation 
62 Note that the bases for calculating land prices for Tigray, Oromia and Amhara, respectively, 
were Hammond (1994), Tahir Aman (1998) and AlO (1995). Following the common practice 
in the Oromia region, estimates were made @45 years for all regions so that regional 
variations were compared based on a common denominator. Also note that prices were not 
weighted. 
190 
Table 5.13 showed that size of farms and lease price per hectare varied between 
(and within) regions. There was a big variation in the duration of land lease 
between regions such as 20-50 years in Oromia and mostly 20 years in Amhara 
and Tigray. The official land price/hag for Oromia, Amhara and Tigray regions 
were birr 150,65 and 20 respectively. Overall, the empirical evidence compiled in 
Table 5.12 showed that cost of land was significant, accounting for about 19 per 
cent of the total enterprise start-up cost. 
To sum up, the empirical data presented above strongly suggested that the land 
lease policy played a large part in slow implementation of IIS licensed projects in 
Addis Ababa or pushing businesses to the outskirts of the city. However, some IIS 
licensed projects were assisted to acquire subsidised plots of land. Overall this 
meant that, because of the importance of land and its cost in enterprise start-up 
cost the key factor that shaped the spatial patterns of enterprise start-up around 
Addis Ababa was the land lease policy but not the IIS. The policy implication of 
this was that the government can better influence the spatial pattern of enterprise 
start up through its land policy than the IIS. Section 5.5.2 below considers 
entrepreneurs' access procedures to and cost of electric power and bank credit. 
5.5.2 Access to electric power and bank credit 
Access to Electric Power: Information generated from the Ethiopian Electric 
Power Corporation (EEPCO) showed that in 1998 only 13 percent of the 
population, and 421 out of over 600 urban centres, were supplied with electric 
power. EEPCO was also the sole producer and supplier of electricity in the 
country. Electric power supply to consumers (domestic, industry and service 
sector users) was made in three lines: public (government and public enterprises), 
63 There were also unofficial but limited land leases by peasants. Peasants leased their lands 
with tacit approval of the government, for example, a contractual agreement documented at 
the EIA showed a lease arrangement made between Eskindir Yoseph of the Meskal Flower 
PLC and Edo Burka of Meki town, Oromia Regional State. Meskal Flower paid the said 
peasant birr 350/ha for 20 years. See also Gavian and Gemechu (1994). 
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investors with investment licences, and a category referred to as 'others' such as 
businesses. The interview conducted with Alemu Egiso (1998) showed that the 
procedures for getting access to electric power were based on the ownership 
status of the client and the client's relation to the investment authorities. Public 
institutions and entrepreneurs with investment licences had direct access to power 
upon request (often within a month). Moreover, an EEPCO spokesman stated that 
'... EEPCO provides power to investors who have investment licences yiwal yider 
saibal. - as a matter of urgency' (Sendeku Araya, 1998). The category of 'others', 
however, were rationed energy on the basis of a first-come-first-served principle 
taking, on average, 3-4 months (Alemu Egiso, 1998). 
Access to bank credit as experienced at DBE: According to the interview 
(Getachew, 1998) and additional information I was given, in 1998 the 
Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) provided credits for enterprise development 
(start-ups and expansions). Similar to the land lease office, DBE's loan extensions 
were based on cumbersome procedures. First, a thorough feasibility study of 
proposed projects was made by the bank; and, secondly, entrepreneurs were 
obliged to fulfil the following conditions: (a) have a work permit. (b) provide an 
investment certificate, if there was one. (c) have a certificate of commercial 
registration. (d) have completed land lease agreements with local governments. 
(e) provide proformas of invoices with details of fixed and consumable assets. (f) 
incorporated businesses had to produce memoranda and articles of association; 
and there had to be a designated manager. 
Entrepreneurs, those I studied complained about the banking system because its 
interest rate and collateral requirements were 10.5 per cent and 125 per cent, 
respectively. In addition at least 30 per cent of a project cost had to be paid by 
equity capital. The bank did not provide credit for working capital, and took 3-4 
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months to process loans (largely because it did not have the required number of 
staff). 
However, according to a senior DBE expert (Getachew, 1998), the bank was not 
the only party to blame. Many clients had little management skills and came up 
with business ideas in 'tested but saturated' areas. The people who came up with 
these poorly developed ideas ended up in the less competitive and low quality 
producing activities. Secondly, other factors like currency devaluation raised 
machine and raw material costs, the poor infrastructure (including information 
systems), and the bureaucratic procedures of land allocation all adversely affect 
the operations of the bank as well as the entrepreneurs. 
To sum up, most of the conditions for entrepreneurial access to resources (at DBE 
and EEPCO) were intertwined with the operations (and conditions) of other 
agencies like regional land lease offices. Entrepreneurs were required to go 
through multiple agencies (and units within agencies) to get access to an 
enterprise site, energy source and bank credit. Success in one area progressively 
depended on the outcomes of preceding stages. As, for instance, to extend bank 
loans DBE required proof of a land deed agreement between an entrepreneur and 
the land lease board, and for speedy allocation of land the land lease office 
required an IIS licence. In this inter-linked situation some of the IIS licence holders 
were helped in a coordinated fashion and provided with cheaper and faster access 
to resources like enterprise sites. 
Therefore, the conclusion that followed the foregoing analysis was that, as well 
the IIS benefits from investment incentives, it was easy and cheaper access to 
resources that made some entrepreneurs use the IIS licence and structure. The 
overall development implication of 'access to resources' was immense - in that it 
was making or breaking enterprise start up. As an IIS official Tahir Aman (1998) 
said the 'government needs to seriously consider the effect of land lease on 
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business start-ups'. Among the many implications of this finding was that, 
contrary to the intentions of the government, many non-IIS entrepreneurs were 
switching their plans to activities like services that required less working space. 
5.6 Summary of the major findings 
Drawing on multiple sources of data, this chapter presented the findings from the 
enquiry into the role and impact of the IIS on enterprise development. In brief the 
main findings were that: 
(i) two broad enterprise level direct IIS benefits were identified: first, the 
investment authorities provided limited pre-IIS licence advice on project 
preparation and information input on such areas as market demand that 
assisted entrepreneurs in strengthening their ideas of enterprise start-up. 
Second, exemption from paying import taxes on capital goods generated 
savings to the entrepreneurs that amounted to 13 per cent of cost of 
imported goods. However, entrepreneurs' financial benefits from 
exemptions from paying income taxes were found to be insignificant because 
the SMEs hardly made profits during the leave period and/or were unable 
(or unwilling) to comply with the regulation that required financial record 
keeping. 
(ii) the IIS mediated enterprise start-up: the IIS structure provided some 
assisted enterprises with access to such resources as enterprise sites. Free 
access to an enterprise site alone, for an average manufacturing and 
agricultural enterprise respectively, saved up to 18 and 19 per cent of the 
respective total costs of enterprise start-up. Moreover, providing access to 
subsidised resources like land profoundly affected enterprise start-up pace, 
size and growth. 
(iii) IIS influence over entrepreneurial decisions on enterprise start up was 
limited: at least based on the cases studied, the IIS neither motivated SME 
start-up nor influenced enterprise location. However, the IIS appeared to 
have had marginal influence over the choice of activity type and size of an 
enterprise. The enabling environment for the private sector, entrepreneurs' 
interest in and knowledge and experience of the chosen activity, market and 
physical and social infrastructure were among the crucial factors that 
influenced decisions over the key features of enterprises. 
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(iv) IIS offered limited entrepreneurial benefit but huge social cost: fiscal and 
transaction costs obtaining IIS licence were small that is only birr 200. 
Further, the IIS licensing procedures were clear and simple, and took ten 
days to two months. However, the social costs of the IIS were: (a) 
administration cost of the IIS structure (including paying for up to 500 
employees). (b) a minimum of birr 526 million government revenue from 
import taxes have been foregone over 1992-98. And (c) the IIS caused 
displacement effects to other businesses. This had a different nature: first, to 
take advantage of import duty exemptions, IIS licensed entrepreneurs 
imported capital goods by themselves. This affected companies that import 
and distribute capital goods. Second, direct machine/ equipment import by 
IIS assisted entrepreneurs also adversely affected the entrepreneurs 
themselves. These entrepreneurs incurred more transaction costs like search 
costs of sources and prices of machines, and handling imports, delays in the 
delivery of consignments, and subsequent loses of local advisory support to 
install and maintain machines. Finally, some IIS assisted enterprises in the 
cooking oil processing sector were reported to have caused adverse effects 
on older enterprises. 
In conclusion, therefore, the claim that the IIS policy has supported thousands of 
new enterprise start-ups was misleading and not sustained by the evidence. Over 
1992-98 there were 4642 enterprises licensed for IIS support but only 27 per cent of 
these enterprises actually started up. Of these enterprises that successfully started 
up less than two in five of them actually drew on part of the IIS benefits. 
Moreover, most IIS benefits were appropriated by larger enterprises set up in the 
least supported location of Addis Ababa. Overall, as I will argue in the next 
chapter, most of IIS assisted enterprises would have been set up without 
investment incentives. The IIS, therefore, barely added to enterprise start up and 
early growth. The IIS licence, however, played a superior role by providing access 
to some entrepreneurs to subsidised resources. 
Drawing on the theory (chapter two) and background analysis and discussion on 
Ethiopian enterprise economy (chapter three) and the findings summarised in this 
chapter, in the following two chapters I discuss the two central hypotheses of this 
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thesis. In chapter six I will discuss the extent to which investment incentives 
influenced entrepreneurial decisions over the timing, type, location and size 
enterprises. Chapter seven discusses how IIS mediated successful enterprise start- 
up by offering entrepreneurs easy and cheap access to key enterprise start-up 
resources. 
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6. Discussion on the Role and Impact of the Investment 
Incentives Scheme on Enterprise Start-Up 
6.1 Introduction 
The central objective of this chapter is to discuss the role and influence of 
investment incentives on SMEs start up as set out in hypothesis one (Hl): 
Hl: the influence of investment incentives on the timing, type, location and 
size of IIS assisted SMEs was limited. 
Section 6.2 begins by exploring the link between IIS objectives, instruments and 
rationales. The discussion aims to demonstrate whether IIS objectives were 
justified and had adequate means of implementation. The conclusion that emerges 
from this discussion serves as an early pointer of the likely impacts of the IIS on 
SMEs start ups. 
Section 6.3 outlines the framework for exploring hypothesis one. Then based on 
this framework, section 6.4 explores the links between the IIS and the dimensions 
of enterprise start-up (that is the timing, and the choices of industry, location and 
size and enterprise). Section 6.5 evaluates the performance of the IIS by examining 
IIS benefits and costs at enterprise and macro levels. Section 6.6 discusses the 
explanations for the limited IIS impacts on enterprise development in Ethiopia. 
Finally, section 6.7 provides the conclusion of the chapter. 
6.2 IIS objectives, instruments and rationales 
As indicators of impacts of the IIS, and preliminary step to exploring hypothesis 
one, this section aims to establish whether IIS objectives were justified and had 
adequate means of implementation. 
As recently as 1992 the IIS long term objectives was stated as accelerating social 
and economic development. Following this overarching objective, a list of 
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objectives were published in the 1992 and 1996 investment codes (see summary in 
Table 6.1, column 1). 
First, Table 6.1 shows that the IIS had several objectives, but only investment 
incentives as a means of achieving them. Moreover, a careful matching of IIS 
objectives and instruments (that is the investment incentives) shows that (i) of the 
nine objectives listed only four (objectives 3,4,5 and 6) were directly backed up 
by investment incentivesM. And (ii) investment incentives were only implicitly 
linked to other objectives (objectives 1,2,7/8 and 9). Of these second category of 
objectives, for example, it was not clear how and which particular resources were 
going to be exploited (objective 1). Assuming that 'resource exploitation' referred 
to enterprise start up, as in irrigation farms using ground water, the IIS incentives 
gave attention to the machines and equipment deployed but not to the particular 
resource exploited (say by using alternative labour intensive methods). Similarly, 
it was not clear how incentives that encourage the deployment of more physical 
capital was meant to create more jobs (objective 9). Therefore, I argue, the fact that 
the IIS had several objectives but only limited (and poorly matched) means of 
achieving them had adverse implications for its impacts. 
64 In addition to incentives, the IIS regulations partially lifted prohibitions that limited private 
investment (foreign and domestic) in some sectors of the economy. In particular foreign 
investment (objective 6) was promoted by providing regulations that guaranteed and 
protected investment in Ethiopia. But, in the strictest sense of the term, these do not 
constitute investment incentives (see chapter two, section 2.3). 
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Table 6.1 Objectives and instruments of the IIS and its inferred rationales 
objectives inferred rationales 
1. exploit and develop natural resources sustainability of the production 
system 
2. increase the variety, quantity and quality of promote competition 
goods and services produced 
3. strengthen sectoral linkages linkages and spillover effects 
4. strengthen integrated and balanced regional spillover effect, compensation, and 
development regional development 
5. increase the role of indigenous private competition, compensation for 
sector inadequacies 
6. increase the role of foreign investment competition, knowledge transfer 
and compensation 
7/8. increase foreign exchange earning and increase wealth, infant industry 
save foreign exchange via the production of argument 
import substitutes 
9. create employment reduce unemployment 
Source: (TGE, 1992), (PDRE, 1996a) and COM (1996), and own interpretation 
Second, the other IIS flaw was that reasoning behind the IIS objectives has never 
been articulated. This, as discussed above, resulted in the ambiguous nature of the 
possible outcomes of IIS objectives. The rationales for the IIS discussed below are 
only inferred from the evidence generated for the thesis (Table 6.1, column 2) and 
some of this evidence is directly referred to below: 
(i) strengthening the sustainability of the production system: In support of this 
rationale, a senior government official in charge of IIS policy argued that: 
Our policy direction [the IIS] is to move activities towards a more 
sustainable economic base. This means that, for example, in agriculture 
we have to move away from rain-fed and weather dependent farming 
to irrigation farming. (Tesfaye Belay, 1998) 
Although IIS instruments were weak to cause effect, this rationale was based on 
the fragile nature of the Ethiopian economy and society. Ethiopia's mainstay has 
always been weather dependent agriculture. Moreover, it is common knowledge 
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that the country is vulnerable to drought and famine every time the rain fails. 
Hence public policy that encourages the use of natural resources like water with a 
view to sustaining the production system and cutting dependence on government 
and overseas aid justifies the IIS initiatives. However, the big question was 
whether the IIS was the best policy available and whether in practice it worked 
without adverse effects. For example, in the 1990s there has been a concerted 
government effort in expanding irrigation projects. But the adverse effect of water 
bodies created for expanding irrigation farming was a 'sevenfold increase in 
malaria cases' (Observer, 25 Feb. 2001). 
(ii) promote competition: one key IIS objective (objective two, Table 6.1) was 
meant to promote competition by encouraging more enterprise start ups. The 
economic and political reasons, among other things, included that an increase in 
the number of enterprises in the economy creates healthy competition and 
strengthens the rather weak backward and forward linkages in the production 
processes. Moreover, the argument for competition was signaling the shift from 
state production of goods and services to private sector including the 
participation of foreign direct investment. 
(iii) strengthening linkages and spillover effects: the rationale is that targeted 
sectoral support through the IIS encourages the weak linkages between sectors, 
for example, via subcontracting. Regional linkages also expand the domestic 
market and export, and FID links domestic production with the rest of the world 
and facilitates technology adoption. 
(iv) addressing inequality in regional development and promoting political 
stability: differing activities in levels of development (or the perception of it) 
between regions of the country has been among the causes of political instability 
and regional fragmentation in the country. This also meant that problems of 
regional development cannot be left alone, as the neoclassical economists would 
200 
argue, to 'self-correcting' market mechanisms nor wait until growth benefits 
'trickle down'. Investment incentives, in the view of Ethiopian authorities, are 
therefore one means of addressing regional development problems. 
(v) incentives as compensation: the Ethiopia economy suffers from many kinds of 
distortions such as policy induced taxes, and most of all, spatial differences in the 
distribution of social and physical infrastructure. Hence the investment incentives, 
as an EIA official argued, encourage enterprise start-up and compensate for added 
costs to enterprise start up: 
... in the peripheral parts of 
Ethiopia the business environment is 
extremely poor and hostile. There are hardly any SMEs there. 
Therefore, we grant the best of the IIS support to new enterprise start- 
ups in the peripheries. (Tesfaye Belay, 1998). 
(vi) infant industry argument: as Tesfaye Belay (ibid) argued this was one of the 
strongest rationales for the IIS: 
... in industry the policy 
is to move to basic and strategic industries like 
engineering, machine tools and cement factories. We recognise that 
activities like irrigation, agriculture and basic manufacturing require 
more investment and longer payback periods, thus we prioritise these 
activities through the IIS support. (Tesfaye Belay, 1998) 
The IIS also protected indigenous enterprise start-ups by lowering the entry 
requirement for the IIS relative to foreign investors, and assigning a reserve 
schedule exclusively for indigenous entrepreneurs. However, although the IIS 
protected indigenous enterprises, it did not send positive signals to foreign 
investment and competition. Relatively small foreign owned enterprises were 
systematically prevented from entering Ethiopia, this may have limited the 
opportunity that these enterprises might have contributed by way of skills 
transfer. 
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(vii) reducing unemployment: In the urban centres of Ethiopia the 
unemployment rate was about 40 per cent in the early 1990s MAU, 1995). 
Expanding employment opportunities, therefore, improves the livelihood of the 
unemployed and reduces crime (like theft and vandalism) associated with some 
jobless youth. 
To conclude, the foregoing discussion showed that the IIS had several objectives 
but only limited means of achieving them. Moreover, the rationales for 
investment incentives had not been carefully considered right from the start and 
this led to the ambiguous nature of some possible outcomes of the IIS objectives. 
As discussed in chapter one, the authorities also failed to place enterprise support 
in the context that it produces results - that is they over-identified the investment 
problem and responded with a single-theme solution (investment incentives). 
Furthermore, the authorities barely considered the circumstances that influence 
entrepreneurs' behaviour, their attributes like education level on the take up of 
the IIS. All these, I will argue, are the preliminary pointers to the limited impacts 
that the IIS generated on enterprise start up and development. 
Section 6.3 below outlines the framework for discussing IIS impacts on the key 
dimensions of enterprise start up (the timing, and entrepreneurial choices of 
industry, location and enterprise size). 
6.3 The framework for discussing IIS impacts on enterprise start up 
6.3.1 Conceptualising enterprise start up stages and the theoretical links 
Chapters two and four considered enterprise start-up as a process involving 
decisions to set up an enterprise and mobilising resources to begin operation 
(Birley, 1989). Moreover, chapter two discussed studies which put key enterprise 
start-up processes in stages. Fisher (1988), for example, identified five of these 
stages: idea generation (stage one), validation and conceptualisation of idea (stage 
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two), preparation on start-up (stage three), initial implementation (stage four) and 
stabilisation (stage five). 
These stages, however, dealt with unnecessary details and separated most related 
functions of the entrepreneur. In Fischer (1988), for example, choosing product 
types and alternative location (stages two) was separated from testing the 
feasibility of the business idea (stage three). Moreover, elements of the five stages 
particularly that referred to business plans or marketing strategies (stage three), 
albeit important, were not an essential part of the IIS support. Therefore, in this 
thesis the five stages are condensed into the following three stages (see Figure 6.1): 
" stage one: enterprise idea generation and conceptualisation, 
" stage two: resources mobilisation and project implementation, and 
" stage three: commencing producing goods and services and stabilisation. 
In brief these three stages are conceptualised as follows: 
Enterprise idea generation and conceptualisation (stage one). This stage includes 
enterprise idea generation and conceptualisation leading up the stage of acquiring 
an IIS licence. This means that at this stage the idea to start an enterprise has 
emerged and taken shape. Furthermore, the industry and location of the 
enterprise are chosen. Depending on the motivations and skills of the 
entrepreneurs, the overall viability of the project idea is also tested. In theory the 
test for project viability, among other things, takes into account the possibilities of 
obtaining external assistance (but not all entrepreneurs necessarily follow the 
same strategy). 
The relevant theoretical links here are those that motivate (or impede) 
entrepreneurship (chapter two): the profit motive, risk taking behaviours and 
managerial competence; and social-psychological explanations such as need for 
independence, positive parental influence, religion and cultural attitudes. 
Similarly factors that influence the dimensions of enterprise start up (location, 
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industry and size) include founder's resources, experience and training, 
infrastructure, market and roles of government incentives. 
Resources mobilisation and implementation (stage two). At this stage an SME 
founder, first, mobilises financial and material resources needed to set up the 
enterprise. This refers to the purchase or rent of machines and equipment, 
enterprise site, etc. Second, the entrepreneur implements or performs the physical 
construction of the project and makes it ready for launch (stage three). Moreover, 
access to essential systems like power, communication, water supply, etc. are 
either completed or under implementation. 
Commencing producing goods and services and stabilisation (stage three). 
Among the key functions of the entrepreneur at this stage are employing the 
workforce, assembling the raw materials, completing installations of the necessary 
systems that were not complete in stage two such as communication, organisation 
of work processes. Finally the project is launched. The discussion in section 6.4 
also looks at early stage of growth stabilisation (a stage that IIS income tax 
provisions operate on)65. 
65 There are many functions of the entrepreneur that were not clearly identified in the above 
three stages. One example of these functions is undergoing the business legalisation process. 
In Ethiopia, because there are different forms of business legalisation (like expression of 
intent to set up an enterprise (stage one), building permits (stage two), or licence to start 
offering goods and services (stage three)) it is difficult to put these in one box. As Figure 6.1 
shows some entrepreneurial functions overlap and can be performed concurrently. 
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Figure 6.1 Enterprise start up stages and the role of investment incentives 
IIS duty exemptions IIS location/industry 
(machines, equipment) based income tax 
exemption 
Enterprise idea Resources mobilisation Enterprise launch and 
generation and and project stabilisation 
conceptualisation implementation 
(motivation, choices of 
industry and location, 




machinery, land, etc. ) 
stage 2 stage 3 
As in stage one, stages two and three are linked to theory and practice such as the 
, political economy of access to resources discussed in chapter two, and a host of 
factors that enhance or limit project construction and successful launch. 
As Fig. 6.1 shows the three enterprise start up stages are closely related and often 
overlap. The IIS incentives as a source of motivation to start up an enterprise, and 
influence of entrepreneurial choices of industry, location and enterprise size are 
shown in the framework (that is in the top two boxes). Specifically, duty 
exemptions are meant to impact on stages one and two (and indirectly at start up 
an entrepreneur could also anticipate income tax benefits in stage three). Income 
tax exemption is meant to directly impact on stage three (and IIS benefits at stages 
one and two may have acted as part of the motivations to get to this stage). (Note 
that to avoid complications, indirect impacts of duty and income tax exemptions 
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are not mapped out in Figure 6.1). The big question that follows is whether IIS 
incentives are sufficient to motivate an entrepreneur to start up an enterprise and 
influence his/her decisions over the choices of industry, location and the size of 
the enterprise. 
6.3.2 An outline of hypothesis one (Hl) 
The subject of section 6.4 below is to explore hypothesis one (H1): 
" HI: the influence of investment incentives on the timing, type, location and 
size of IIS assisted SMEs was limited. 
With a view to simplifying the discussion below, H1 was broke down into four 
nested hypotheses. First, 
" on the timing of enterprise start-up (H1.1): the 1990s upsurge in the number 
of IIS licensed projects or assisted enterprises had very little to do with the 
provision of the IIS support. 
This sub-hypothesis considers, among other things, the relaxed regulatory entry 
barriers since the beginning of the 1990s but I argue that the IIS neither created 
nor influenced entrepreneurs who were otherwise reluctant to set up new 
enterprises. Second, 
" on entrepreneurial sector choices (H1.2): for many Ethiopian SMEs founders 
the choice of a sector was largely dictated by the attributes and resources of 
the entrepreneurs such as accumulated capital and their experience in the 
chosen sector. 
Consequently, I will argue that the subsidy to activities received by (or for) the 
entrepreneur would only produce deadweight for the IIS. Third, 
" on entrepreneurial location choices (H1 -3): IIS barely influenced the location 
decisions of SME founders. 
Here I will demonstrate that, among other things, market, physical infrastructure 
(like power and roads), institutional structures (such as business information and 
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banking services), and access to land and premises were key factors for location of 
many SMEs, whereas the IIS was not. Fourth, 
" on the size of an enterprise (H1.4): gain from tax exemptions due to the IIS 
contributed to the size of the new SMEs and/or provided funds for the 
purchase of higher capacity machinery. 
In this respect, therefore, I argue that at start-up the IIS did encourage the increase 
in physical capital of some enterprises. Section 6.4 below thoroughly discusses 
each part of hypothesis one as outlined above. 
6.4 The link between enterprise start-up and the IIS 
This section discusses the extent to which IIS influenced entrepreneurs motives 
and resources (section 6.4.1) and entrepreneurs decisions on the timing of entry, 
enterprise location, sector and size (section 6.4.2). 
6.4.1 The influence of investment incentives on entrepreneurial motives and 
resources 
The IIS as entrepreneur motivating factor: At first inspection of the framework 
for enterprise start-up (Figure 6.1) the IIS appeared to have less relevance to 
initiating enterprise idea generation. However, as Semunesh, head of the 
department for licensing and registration for investment incentives at EIA, 
explained: 
prior to obtaining an investment licence some entrepreneurs visit the 
authority seeking advice and information on potential areas for 
investment, the available investment incentives, and the procedures 
that they go through in order to get an investment licence. (Semunesh 
Demetros, 1998) 
But the consequences of entrepreneurs' visits to the investment licensing agencies 
(the EIA and regional offices) were not obvious. Were advice and information 
obtained effectively used and did they influence entrepreneurs' subsequent 
choices on type, location, and size of an enterprise? Or did the advice and 
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information from the licensing agencies lead to changes to the entrepreneurs' raw 
ideas? The extensive evidence I obtained (and documented in chapter five) did 
not provide strongly affirmative support for either of the above questions. 
To begin with, what entrepreneurs received by way of advice from the licensing 
agencies was technical guidelines on feasibility study of projects. Such advice was 
not only limited in content, but the technicalities involved were also too 
complicated for many entrepreneurs to understand. More importantly, the advice 
provided was less relevant to many entrepreneurs' immediate problems such as 
obtaining an enterprise site. The head of the Oromia Investment Office 
unequivocally admitted these limitations when he stated that 'the advice we give 
to investors is often academic and irrelevant' (Tahir Aman, 1998). 
Advice to entrepreneurs was inadequate mainly because, first, the investment 
offices did not have the required quality and number of people to advise 
entrepreneurs in their key problem areas. Lack of people who coach 
entrepreneurs was inherently a national problem as there were barely any 
agencies (public or private) in the country that were committed to supporting 
entrepreneurs and enterprises, for example, in the areas of machine/technology 
choice and import and entrepreneurial skills development. 
There were consequences of this lack of support to entrepreneurs as clearly 
manifested in the macro statistics used in this study. For fear of risk and/or lack 
of information and guidance, a number of entrepreneurs chose established 
activities or known products, technologies and markets. In short, the project ideas 
of a good number of entrepreneurs were duplicates of what others were doing or 
intended to do. In start-up processes and/or subsequent to start-up some of these 
entrepreneurs failed to perform satisfactorily as more and more of them were 
competing in limited markets. 
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Second, in spite of the fact that the EIA licensing procedures were simple, less 
bureaucratic and less costly, some entrepreneurs saw EIA procedures as 
obstructions to the enterprise start-up process. This misconstrued perception of 
the IIS system was a deterrent to entrepreneurs obtaining the otherwise limited 
advice and guidance. 
As demonstrated from the cases studied and interviews made with the 
authorities, some entrepreneurs seemed to have followed the investment 
authority guidelines but only to a degree. With a view to getting the IIS licence, 
entrepreneurs followed EIA guidance and submitted project documents that 
identified project objectives, main products and lists of machines and enterprise 
locations. However, a full cost benefit analysis that took account of, among other 
things, the IIS benefits was barely made by the entrepreneurs. Consequently, the 
IIS benefits were hardly considered in the analysis of and decision on features of 
the new enterprises such as their location and product choice. 
The following examples from the case studies illuminate how limited the IIS role 
was as a motivating force for starting up enterprises. The owner-manager of UE3 
has worked for the Ethiopian government and a British company ICI. When ICI 
pulled out of Ethiopia in late 1980s the job of the current owner-manager of UE3 
was at stake: 
Three options were available to me: first, working for the same 
company probably in Britain, second, setting-up and running a similar 
company in Ethiopia and, third, seeking a job elsewhere in Ethiopia 
and work for others. As I was heading towards retirement working 
abroad was not a viable option. Working for others was not an option 
either since I was in responsible posts for years..... I therefore decided 
to set up this enterprise and run it by myself because this job has been 
what I did in my adult life and will always want to do for the rest of my 
life. I am trained as an agricultural specialist and I have a wealth of 
experience in the field. Therefore, the motive for setting-up this 
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enterprise was to do with my interest, profession and circumstances at 
the time, notably ICI's withdrawal from Ethiopia. (Markos, 1998) 
In the case of UE3 clearly the trigger for the set-up of the UE3 enterprise was the 
fact that the owner-manager was threatened by the loss of his well paid job. For 
entrepreneur AE1 too, the fact that his two sons were facing the threat of 
unemployment was the key trigger for setting up the enterprise. Other 
entrepreneurs had somewhat different key triggers for setting up their respective 
businesses (as summarised in Table 6.2). Entrepreneurs of AE2, AE3 and UE2 
were motivated by the prospect of making profits. For example, explaining the 
economic motives (and logic) and entrepreneurial attributes for setting-up AE2 
the manager said: 
[In the metal sector] a good proportion of Ethiopia's import consisted 
of processed basic metal which came at a high price. We thought the 
raw import could be locally processed and more value added to it. 
Further there was a huge demand for corrugated iron sheet and other 
roofing materials. As a civil engineer by training [coupled with local 
and international experience] the principal owner knew a lot about the 
sector - these reasons led us to set up the enterprise. (Asegid, Acting 
manager of AE2,1998) 
As for UE1, the owner had run a business in the informal sector for about ten 
years. But it was the lower regulatory barriers introduced in 1991/92 that 
motivated him to set up the new enterprise in the formal sector. 
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Table 6.2 Key enterprise start up drives 
entrepreneur actual key start-up reason given classified key 
trigger 
AE1 ... provide jobs for my two sons who failed threat of 
their school leaving examination unemployment 
AE2 ... huge demand for corrugated iron sheet financial motive 
and roofing materials 
AE3 ... activities chosen are profitable financial motive 
UE1 ... I was receiving constant harassment leaving the from the authorities because I was informal sector 
operating in the 'illegitimate' informal 
sector. Now I wanted to run my business 
legally 
UE2 ... increase in earnings and capital financial motive 
UE3 ... threat of unemployment threat of I unemployment 
Source: Information supplied by the entrepreneurs 
The point of the foregoing quotes and Table 6.2 is that, although the entrepreneurs 
gave more than one motive for setting up their respective enterprises, none said 
that the IIS triggered those motives or even the IIS was associated with one of 
those motives. 
In conclusion, therefore, the IIS to a lesser extent helped entrepreneurs formalise 
their raw enterprising ideas but it neither provided them with new ideas nor 
motivated them to change their original ideas. This conclusion, however, does not 
suggest that if the quality of advice and information were better and/or assisted 
entrepreneurs understood and made use of them then the IIS would have 
influenced decisions on features of enterprises. To the contrary, I argue that the 
IIS, as an instrument of intervention, was too weak to influence entrepreneurs' 
decisions. The fundamental determinants of the features of many Ethiopian SMEs 
were other factors like attributes and resources of the entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurial resources and the IIS: Did the IIS contribute to entrepreneurial 
resources? This, I argue, is an important question because motives and 
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commitments go with resources of the entrepreneurs. Here my starting point, as 
reported in Chapter Five, is that many Ethiopian entrepreneurs are 'resource 
poor'. For investment capital many entrepreneurs depended on traditional 
sources like past savings, ikoub, family and friends and asset sales. For many 
entrepreneurs it was often difficult to get access to bank loans because, in the first 
place, they had to possess property like houses to make collateral arrangements. 
Moreover, entrepreneurs also faced severe land/premises acquisition problems 
and their enterprising ideas were limited by their risk averse behaviour and poor 
state of entrepreneurial skills. Did the IIS help in these regards? 
There are two ways of looking at the IIS contributions. First, as I will explore 
further in the next section, the IIS directly contributed to resources by cutting 
start-up costs and increasing return to activities subsequent to start-up. Secondly, 
and perhaps more importantly, the IIS helped some entrepreneurs get access to 
resources like bank credit and a serviced enterprise site (this unique role of the IIS 
will be the subject of chapter seven). Both these (real or potential) benefits of the 
IIS largely depended on the initial tangible and intangible resources of the 
entrepreneurs. At entry into the IIS system (as documented in chapter five) 
entrepreneurs with a stronger resource base or established life style (possession of 
a house, for example) could afford to put up collateral arrangements for bank 
loans and become eligible to enter the IIS system. 
What is more, the awareness levels of the IIS support also largely depended on the 
education level and networking abilities of the entrepreneurs. Relatively better 
educated entrepreneurs actively sought information and interpreted and used it. 
For example, these entrepreneurs not only knew about most parts of IIS support 
in their proposed activity areas but also knew about it at an earlier stage of 
enterprise idea development. Similarly those who possessed the skills of 
negotiation with officials (or established some kind of connections) made use of 
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the IIS to get access to resources. In this regard, therefore, the IIS did not address 
the unequal pre-IIS entry resources bases of the entrepreneurs that in effect 
determine the take up rate incentives. Consequently, the IIS entry criteria served 
more of the elite and better resourced entrepreneurs. 
Finally, although important, a strong resource base by itself did not guarantee 
success. As evidenced from the case SMEs, success at start-up or better 
performance following start-up were functions of entrepreneurs' skills and 
commitment. What is more, entrepreneurs' capacity to manage businesses, 
capture and process information and marketing skills were the essential 
ingredients for subsequent success. In short, as the evidence from the case studies 
demonstrated, regardless of the IIS support, entrepreneurs who recognised the 
internal and external constraints that faced their enterprises and actively 
developed their staff, sought markets, used installed production capacity, etc. 
have succeeded in growing their enterprise into a multi-million birr business over 
a short space of time. 
6.4.2 The IIS and entrepreneurial decisions on enterprise features: search for 
causal links 
The preceding section showed that the IIS did not feature as an influencing or 
motivating factor for enterprise start-up idea generation. Moving on, the findings 
documented in chapter five (Table 5.10) also showed that: 
" first, the timing for enterprise start-up for the entrepreneurs that took part in 
this research was not affected by the IIS, 
" second, none of the entrepreneurs interviewed said that their preferred 
enterprise location had been (would have been) affected by the IIS, and 
" third, with regards to activity type and size of operation, one (out of the six 
entrepreneurs) in each category said that the IIS had (would have had) a 
marginal effect on their decisions. 
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In the next section I thoroughly examine why the IIS did not affect entrepreneurs' 
decisions (when it did not), and the mechanisms by which it did affect 
entrepreneurs' decisions. As an approach, first, I highlight IIS related outcomes 
and subsequently discuss the causal factors that accounted for these. 
6.4.2.1 Hypothesis H1.1: IIS influence on timing for enterprise start-up 
On the timing of enterprise start-up hypothesis H1.1 stated that: 
" the 1990s upsurge in the number of IIS licensed projects or assisted 
enterprises had very little to do with the provision of the IIS support. 
I start by examining the facts. Between 1992/93 and 1997/98 the number of 
entrepreneurs who sought IIS support rose from a mere 542 to 4246 and actual IIS 
licensed new start-ups, for the same period, increased from 23 to 1163 (chapter 
five, Table 5.1). These developments were significant showing that, relative to any 
previous decades, in the 1990s Ethiopia had the fastest increase in enterprise start- 
ups. To put this in context, in the manufacturing sector alone, by 1997/98 Ethiopia 
had an all time total of 3373 small to large enterprises. Over 1992-98 there were at 
least 497 additions of small to large scale manufacturing enterprises that had an 
IIS licence. This sharp increase in enterprise start-ups over the study period (1992- 
98) was attributed to the IIS by the investment authorities. As Tesfaye Belay 
(1998), head of the EIA policy department, concluded 'investment incentives were 
working and the evidence was that thousands of new start-ups emerged'. 
A search for more evidence on the subject of enterprise start up revealed a rather 
different story. First, some relatively old data (Axe, 1994) showed that up to 44 per 
cent of all new SMEs start ups were not assisted by the IIS. Secondly, the evidence 
I compiled in 1998 (see Table 4.2, chapter four) showed that in Addis Ababa only 
one in three SME start-ups were IIS assisted. What was more significant about the 
second evidence was that unassisted enterprises were setting up in the same 
activity types and locations as the assisted ones. These and similar examples 
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drawn from macro statistics began to suggest that investment incentives did not 
cause start-up. Below I will argue that while the IIS was a positive development, 
its impacts were insignificant compared to the impacts of the wider enabling 
environment on private sector development in general. 
What really favoured more enterprise start-ups in the 1990s? Here it is important 
to take account of some historical developments. To begin with in the early 1990s, 
particularly following the fall of the Derg, some aspects of the economic, social 
and political and (also geographic) scenes of Ethiopia changed. For example, 
Derg's central planning principle of economic management and its socialist 
ideology were abandoned in 1991 in return for a free market economy and 
political pluralism. Power was decentralised to regional governments. 
Furthermore, the economic reform programme that was launched in 1992 opened 
up opportunities for the private sector to participate in the economy. More 
specifically at least three developments that have had a direct bearing on the 
entrepreneurs were 
"a couple of paragraphs (contained in the 1992 investment proclamation) 
opened up a wide range of sectoral activities that used to be in the absolute 
monopoly of the state. 
the absolute limit imposed on the amount of capital to be deployed in 
private enterprises was lifted. 
what used to be a 'one person one business' rule was abolished. 
The above developments also encouraged some informal sector operators to 
operate legally, as for example the founder of UEl did. Moreover, AEI was set up 
because owning more than one business was allowed by the change in policy. 
Encouraged by positive developments on the economic front, in addition to the 
domestic entrepreneurs, some Ethiopians who lived abroad and foreign nationals 
too, started doing business in Ethiopia. Owing to different reasons like the 
economic reform measures and better weather, the economy grew by over six per 
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cent per year for most parts of the first half of the 1990s (Tambek, 1996). Therefore, 
it was the combination of all these factors that generated the condition for more 
enterprise start-ups in the 1990s. 
There was more. Some adverse effects of the economic reform programme in 
some peculiar way helped entrepreneurship. For example, as a consequence of the 
economic reform programme part of the civil service workforce was made 
redundant. According to one estimate 80,059 permanently employed members of 
the civil service (these people, on average, were better educated) were made 
redundant in the early days of the reform programme alone (MOPED, 1992: 37). 
Those people who were made redundant had positively affected not only the 
immediate supply side of the entrepreneurial function but also part of the 
established entrepreneurial culture and attitude of Ethiopia. As the cases studied 
showed, some of these retrenched people became 'entrepreneurs', partners 
and/or senior members of the workforce in the emerging enterprises. Moreover, 
as common place examples show, entrepreneurs and staff in the growing 
computing and consultancy industries and private health sector, by and large, 
were also former government employees. As most skilled personnel who set up 
these new enterprises were not sufficiently trained and experienced immediately 
following the reform measures, it is safe to assume that some enterprise start ups 
were made possible because of transfer of skilled personnel from the public to the 
private sector. The bigger picture of the consequence of this development was that 
one of the prevailing social attitudes that placed 'educated people' in the civil 
service but left business for 'uneducated' or less educated citizens was seriously 
challenged. 
The following evidence from the cases studied clearly corroborates the foregoing 
discussion. The entrepreneurs I had discussions with favourably upheld the 
enabling environment for setting-up enterprises with or without the IIS support. 
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The account given by the manager of AE1 was that '... we started the enterprise 
because it was only after the mixed economy policy (1990) allowed us to own 
more than one business'. Similarly the perspective from UE2 (an enterprise that 
did not receive IIS support) was that: 
... change in public policy was important because it 
has created 
sufficient demand for us. Since the changes in policy many construction 
works have started - private buildings, offices, and public institutions 
such as schools and hospitals. 70 per cent of our demand largely comes 
from the expanding private sector and the other 30 per cent of demand 
comes from the public sector. However, investment incentives did not 
initiate the start-up of this firm - after all we neither sought nor 
received the support. (Semu, Manager of UE2,1998) 
UE3 also reflected on the broader issues: 
... the change in the economic policy 
has helped us in many ways. In 
the past (Derg regime) working out the field with peasants required 
licences, in this regard, therefore, had it not been for the change in the 
system we would not have been set up. (Markos, Manager of UE3, 
1998). 
The accounts given by the other entrepreneurs featured in this study were broadly 
similar. Therefore, as the evidence presented was convincing, this section 
concludes by saying that entrepreneurial attributes and resources, coupled with a 
supportive enabling environment, accounted for the increase in new enterprise 
start-ups in the 1990s. The association between the IIS and enterprise start-ups 
was simply conjectural but not causal. This conclusion, therefore, supports part of 
hypothesis one (H1.1): the influence of investment incentives on the timing of 
enterprise start-up, at best, was small. 
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6.4.2.2. Hypothesis H1.2: IIS influence on entrepreneurial decision on activity 
type 
In this section I argue that the IIS barely played a role in entrepreneurial choice of 
activity type. The arguments made here rest on three sets of evidence that 
emerged from the IIS authorities, case study entrepreneurs and SME theory. 
First, evidence from IIS authorities: A thorough analysis of interviews given by 
officials from the Ethiopian Investment Authority (and regional bureaux) 
provided no evidence to support their claim that the IIS influences entrepreneurial 
sectoral decisions. The statement by Tahir Aman, head of the Oromia Investment 
Office, summarises the prevailing view of the authorities on the subject: 
we provided assistance to enterprise start-ups in selected areas in the 
hope that activities in these areas would help increase local resource 
uses and promote inter -sectoral integration' (Tahir Aman, 1998). 
In short the authorities simply granted incentives to entrepreneurs who happened 
to have chosen 'pioneer' or 'promoted' activity areas. 
Second, evidence from the entrepreneurs: The following voices from the 
entrepreneurs engaged in this study clearly showed that the IIS was in fact a 
docile instrument as it did not influence entrepreneurial choices of industries. 
None of the entrepreneurs (except for AE2) said that their industry choice was 
influenced by the investment incentives. Instead the entrepreneurs focused on 
experience and training in the chosen sectors as the most important factors: 
I have had long experience, as a retailer, in the footwear business. 
However, my sons and I did not have the skills in shoe production but 
we entered into the business by forming a partnership with a person 
who was experienced in producing shoes. (Begashaw, Manager of AE1, 
1998) 
The family ... has been in this business (especially beeswax trading) for 
a long time.... [and] most individuals who joined the enterprise too 
have had long experience in business. So affection for and interest in 
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the profession and experience were some of the key factors that 
enabled us to set up the business. (Amare, Manager, AE3,1998) 
I come from a rural area. When I got in Addis Ababa, first, I became an 
apprentice, then after obtaining some skills, I opened a repair shop 
which also manufactured products that was not officially licensed. 
Finally I moved on to set up this enterprises. (Kadir, Manager of UE1, 
1998) 
I had a strong interest in woodwork right from my childhood.... 
following my training in wood manufacturing I set up this enterprise 
(Semu, Manager of UE2,1998). 
I ... decided to set-up this enterprise and run 
it by myself because this 
job has been what I did in my adult life and will always want to do for 
the rest of my life. I am trained as an agricultural specialist and I have a 
wealth of experience in the field. (Markos, Manager of UE3,1998) 
Even the one enterprise (AE2) that considered IIS incentives emphasized 
experience and training as key causes in the decision on industry: 
The principal owner and founder of this engineering firm is a civil 
engineer by training and experience. (Asegid, Acting Manager, AE2, 
1998). 
As the attributes of all the entrepreneurs discussed in chapter five showed, they 
had fair knowledge of the products they intended to offer and the knowledge 
came from own experience and the organisations (mostly public enterprises) they 
worked for. Therefore, the stories of each entrepreneur clearly demonstrated that 
their choices of activities very much depended on their previous experience, 
formal/informal training, interest and passion for an activity (and, as discussed 
earlier, these were coupled with the presence of market opportunities, ability to 
form a partnership and the enabling environment). 
Third, support from SMEs theory: The theory reviewed in chapter two 
demonstrated that founders often choose a product/sector known to them 
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through experience, hobby, formal or informal training and/or family tradition. 
According to some studies referred to, in the small enterprise sector '... the 
decision as to what to produce is often made before the new entrepreneur has 
actually decided to set up his own business. ' (Rinks and Jennings, 1986: 7). 
Similarly, Fisher (1988: 92) concluded that the choice of product is 'highly 
predetermined by the work experience and history of the potential new firm 
founder'. 
In conclusion, therefore, the three sources of evidence discussed in this section 
supported the idea that in the context of many Ethiopian SME founders, the 
impact of the IIS on their choice of an industry was unimportant. In support of 
hypothesis H1.2, then, the IIS influence over entrepreneurs' choices of an industry 
was small. 
However, the above conclusion is subject to caveats. First, the empirical evidence 
from the SMEs studied was limited in that there were no convincing macro 
statistics that proved or disproved IIS impact on entrepreneurs' choice of 
industries (except for the interviews made with the authorities). Secondly, the 
conclusion that emerged here was largely a consequence of the nature of many 
Ethiopian entrepreneurs. As my discussions from earlier chapters showed in 
Ethiopia, in most cases, ownership and management of an enterprise were 
embedded in the founder(s) and hence entrepreneur attributes (like resources and 
experience) mattered a lot in choosing an industry. In the case of few but 
relatively larger enterprises ownership and management did not necessarily 
depend on individual entrepreneurial experience or location of residence. This 
meant that in the set up of few larger enterprises, entrepreneur related experience 
perhaps was not as important as in SMEs because founders of larger enterprises 
could have afforded to buy in required skills and mobilise resources. Therefore, 
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incentives like the IIS may have played positive roles in setting up relatively 
larger enterprises in a particular sector (and/or location as discussed below). 
6.4.2.3 Hypothesis H1.3: IIS influence on entrepreneurial location decision 
According to the authorities (at EIA and Oromia regional office) the IIS was 
attributed to more new start-ups in the regions outside Addis Ababa and the 
Addis Ababa-Nazareth corridor. Discussing the situation at regional level, Tahir 
Aman, head of Oromia investment office, referred to the evidence where the IIS 
was said to have influenced entrepreneurial location decisions in the Oromia 
region: 
Traditionally entrepreneurs preferred the Debre Zeit-Nazareth corridor 
for enterprise start-ups - this was in spite of the fact that Burayou and 
Sendafa corridors had equal access to Addis Ababa. Instead of the 
Debre-Zeit-Nazareth road, therefore, we provided incentives to 
entrepreneurs who set up enterprises along the Burayou and Sendafa 
lines. In recent years, following incentives, enterprises in the food and 
synthetics sectors were set up along Burayou and Sendafa roads. In 
addition, more recently 50-60 entrepreneurs moved out of the Addis 
Ababa administration and came to our region. Entrepreneurs wanted 
to set up enterprises in Oromia because they were still close enough to 
Addis Ababa. We believe recent entrepreneur behaviour was primarily 
to get advantage of the IIS incentives. (Tahir Aman, 1998) 
But even Tahir Aman was not confident about the IIS impacts a little further from 
the capital, Addis Ababa: 
Overall, I think, regional impacts of incentives were too small. 
Incentives alone will not take investment away from places like Addis 
Ababa. Factors like infrastructure and growing demand in the urban 
centres were key to location decisions. (Tahir Aman, 1998) 
According to the evidence documented in chapter five (section 5.2) in the spatial 
distribution of enterprises the regions that gained most were those neither 
'developed' nor 'least developed' - that is those in the middle like SENNPR and 
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Tigray. The least developed parts of the country, that cover a vast area including 
Afar, Benishangul and Gumz, Gambela, Ethiopian Somali Regions barely had any 
manufacturing enterprise start ups over 1992-98. In spite of being classified as 
'most assisted' through the IIS, these least developed areas did not gain a share in 
the national distribution of manufacturing enterprises. This meant that the IIS did 
not explain the spatial distribution of manufacturing enterprises. 
As discussed in chapter 5, Addis and the corridor enjoy relative advantages of 
better infrastructure, business agglomeration, market and peace over the rest of 
the country. In spite of all these favourable factors, the enterprise start up rate in 
Addis Ababa over the period 1992-98 was low. At the heart of this problem was 
the land lease price, as high as birr 4300/m2 that limited so many IIS licensed 
projects from being implemented in Addis Ababa. 
At a micro level, entrepreneurs' views support my reinterpretation of the 
evidence on spatial aspects of new enterprise start-ups. As noted earlier (chapter 
five, Table 5.11), entrepreneurs' answer to the question whether the IIS influenced 
their decision on enterprise location was unequivocally 'no'. The following voices 
illustrate further the reason why the IIS did not influence enterprise location: 
I did consider setting-up this factory in Bu-i, my home town [about 100 
km south of Addis Ababa]. I discovered that setting-up a shoe factory 
in Bu-i required buying most of the raw material from Addis Ababa. 
Not only the workforce had to be hired from Addis Ababa but also 
moved to and sheltered in Bu-i. Again Bu-i being a small town I had to 
sell the produce elsewhere, perhaps in Addis Ababa. To save on costs 
raw material and the produce had to be transported in bulk (i. e. I 
needed to have bank credit to buy trucks in the first place). I also found 
that road transport in and out of Bu-i was poor. Supply of power and 
utilities too would have been major limitations. I also needed storage 
facilities for raw material and products. In spite of additional 
investment incentives that I would have received these limitations 
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stood against setting-up the factory in Bu-i. I therefore decided to stay 
in Addis Ababa. (Begashaw, Manager of AE1,1998) 
AE2 was typical of others: 
... because of its market and infrastructure advantages, with or without 
the IIS support, the location of this enterprise would have been Addis 
Ababa. (Asegid, Acting Manger of AE2,1998) 
It is not surprising that entrepreneurs in the manufacturing and service sectors 
emphasized infrastructure and demand factors for setting-up in Addis Ababa. 
Those enterprises like AE3 and UE3 which used more agricultural land, however, 
were willing to operate in regions away from the centre with or without 
investment incentives. As UE3 manager stated: 
I did not require incentives or persuasions to operate in regions 
(including peripheral regions). I go to places where maize, coffee and 
cotton grow and I am welcomed. (Markos, Manager of UE3,1998). 
There were other factors taken into account when making location decisions. For 
example, explaining why they did not consider locations outside Addis Ababa, 
one of the reasons given by the acting manager of AE2 was that 'law and order 
fade away as you go out of the capital'. Social and managerial factors too played 
roles in location decisions especially when operating in more than one site. For 
example, the UE2 manager said 'as a manager I would prefer to be close to our 
operation sites. But with my family here in Addis Ababa I cannot operate 
hundreds of kilometres away in places like Mekele' (Semu, 1998). Moreover, 
many entrepreneurs who perform roles of management and functional operations 
like accounts, marketing and repair and maintenance activities were not easily 
able to operate simultaneously in different sites. 
The conclusion that emerged from the macro data and evidence provided by the 
entrepreneurs was that benefits from the IIS support were too small and short 
lived to override other location specific benefits. Entrepreneurs' views, therefore, 
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reinforced the fact that the IIS, as an instrument of influence on entrepreneurial 
location choices, was hardly important. This conclusion was consistent with that 
emerging from the literature reviewed in chapter two (especially that based on 
developing countries). Overall, hypothesis H1.3 was supported: the influence of 
investment incentives on SMEs founders' location decision was small. 
6.4.2.4 Hypothesis H1.4: IIS influence on size of an enterprise 
In this section I argue that, however marginally, the IIS positively affected 
enterprise size. Firstly, as evidenced in chapter five sections 5.2.3 and 5.4.3, by 
reducing the tax on imported machines the IIS saved as much as 13 per cent of 
start-up costs on machinery and equipment. These savings, at least for the case 
SMEs studied like AE1, increased enterprise size by enabling the entrepreneurs to 
buy higher capacity machines or use the funds to pay for working capital and 
workforce. Secondly, by exempting entrepreneurs from paying income tax the IIS 
(potentially) increased return from enterprising activities. Provided these returns 
were used within the enterprise (for expansion purposes) it was possible that the 
size of an enterprise increased. 
As the evidence that emerged from AE1 showed, the IIS (on occasions) provided 
incentives to entrepreneurs to increase investment at start-up. I emphasise that 
such an effect of the IIS was occasional because it directly affected the smallest 
projects that were initiated with start-up capital close to the cut-off point for 
support, that is birr 250 00066. The manager of AE1 who started off with 
investment capital close to the margin for IIS support said that: 
When we approached the investment office we were told that our 
project should have a minimum of birr 250 thousand worth of 
66 This observation has implications for many IIS assisted enterprises. As chapter five (section 
5.2) showed, IIS licensed projects that were proposed with less than birr 500 000 accounted 
for 64 percent of all licensed projects. 
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investment in machines as a condition to receive investment incentives. 
But our investment plan was short of the required minimum. We 
generated additional capital and revised our project plan upwards to 
birr 250 thousand and consequently the office granted us the incentives. 
(Begashaw, Manager of AE1,1998). 
However, such positive impacts of the IIS on enterprise size depended on factors 
including entrepreneurs' ability to raise own funds and/or be able to meet bank 
collateral requirements. As details of AE1 accounts showed, the manager of AE1 
borrowed birr 120000 from the bank (by putting his house up for collateral) and 
imported birr 147925 worth of capital goods. The extra birr investment, in the end, 
saved the entrepreneur birr 37538 in duties and resulted in a relatively larger size 
enterprise. In contrast to smaller enterprises like AE1, however, larger enterprises 
like AE3 did not need to raise their start-up capital to enter the IIS system because 
their sheer size allowed them to appropriate IIS benefits. From the above 
discussion, although the evidence was limited, there were clear indications that 
occasionally the IIS marginally but positively influenced the size of new start-ups. 
And this confirmed that hypothesis H1.4 held true, that is: gain from tax 
exemptions due to the IIS contributed to the size of the new SMEs and/or 
provided funds for the purchase of higher capacity machinery. 
6.4.2.5 The IIS impact on the adoption of technology and jobs creation 
The preceding section on IIS impact on size of an enterprise largely looked at the 
investment capital measure of size, and suggested that IIS encouraged the use of 
capital intensive technique of production. This section describes the process of 
technology adoption by the case SMEs involved and considers IIS impact on 
employment. 
The entrepreneurs involved in the research showed some similarities in terms of 
the process of adopting technology (that is from search to actual installation of 
new machines). For all entrepreneurs (except AE1) technology adoption was an 
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incremental process. As the entrepreneurs decided to set up an enterprise they 
had some knowledge of the products they intended to offer like corrugated iron 
sheet, and they had fair knowledge of the technology used to produce these 
products. Second, following the decision to set up an enterprise, the entrepreneurs 
mobilised skilled personnel that were instrumental in the search for and 
implementing the installation of the new machines. 
Third, at the launch of the enterprises, project plans only partially were 
implemented. This means that operations started on a small scale like using single 
line operation, and deploying a mixture of imported, local and secondhand 
technology. Then a brief period of learning the design of products to the 
satisfaction of the market and Ethiopian standards authorities followed. 
Moreover, the entrepreneurs also learnt how to run the entire organisation of the 
enterprises. In the process of learning, problems with the technology deployed 
were discovered67. Finally, after a 'satisfactory' learning process, the 
entrepreneurs committed to importing the full range of machines and equipment 
that were planned68. 
The entrepreneurs studied, however, followed different routes to technology 
choices. Some entrepreneurs chose to use locally produced tools and machines 
and others used imported tools and/or machines (or a combination of both). 
When entrepreneurs chose to use imported capital goods (new or second-hand) 
they either bought the goods from local dealers or placed direct import orders. 
The distinction between local purchase of capital goods (including that imported 
67 For example, AE2 imported a machine that produced thick corrugated iron sheets (that was 
above the specification of the domestic standard). 
68 Whether project plans that were granted IIS licences were implemented was the subject of 
EIA's follow up teams (chapter five). But the full impact of adopting imported technology 
came at much later data than the official launch of enterprises. Because the tax exemption 
period starts from the date the enterprise was launched, the gradual process of technology 
adoption has limited entrepreneurs from using the full benefits of tax exemptions. 
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by dealers) and placing direct import orders was essential because entrepreneurs 
benefited from the IIS only when they directly imported capital goods. There were 
some crucial implications of these options as the examples of AE1 and UE1 shows. 
When they started both AE1 and UE1 were about the same size and operated in 
the same shoe making business. UE1 did not seek government support largely 
because the owner neither liked approaching some 'corrupt' government 
bureaucrats nor knew enough about the IIS benefits. UE1 used mostly locally 
produced (or some imported but locally distributed) capital goods all purchased 
from local market. AE1 however imported most of the capital goods. By UE1's 
standards AEI's cutting knives (upper sole and insole) and sewing machines were 
technically advanced and all were imported partly with a view to benefiting from 
IIS support. 
As the foregoing discussion showed the manager of AE1 made an exceptional 
effort and borrowed money with a view to importing and benefiting from IIS 
incentives. Hence, as far as AE1 was concerned the IIS encouraged the owner to 
directly import capital goods the results of which were that (i) while AE1 
benefited from the IIS (a tax saving equal to 25.4 per cent of total imported capital) 
UE1 paid this full amount in taxes. (ii) AE1 (also other AEs in general) incurred 
more costs like loss of advisory services at installation, repair and maintenance 
that they would have received from specialised capital importing local companies. 
(iii) AE1 (also AE2) made expensive mistakes in the specification of the ordered 
capital goods which was largely due to lack of experience in importing machines. 
(iv) businesses of local dealers in imported capital goods were also adversely 
affected. 
In terms of workforce, relative to AE1, UE1 had a more experienced and better 
paid workforce. The founder of AE1 paid his average 'semi-skilled' worker birr 
325/month while UE1 paid a similar worker birr 560/month. In terms of output 
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neither produced qualitatively different products, except that AE1 used 
packaging. These and similar pieces of data suggested that UE1, using mostly 
locally produced capital goods, gradually moved from specialised craft 
technology into a factory system whereas AE1 directly entered into a modern 
factory system. The long term and wider consequences were that enterprises like 
AE1 tended to use relatively advanced technology which were likely to be labour 
saving. Most tools (except for a couple of sewing machines) used by UE1 were 
either mechanical or semi-electrical - which meant that UE1 used energy saving 
technology. The fact that enterprises like UE1 depend less on electric energy 
means that, other things being equal, these enterprises are potentially regionally 
flexible. The implication here was that central IIS objectives like jobs and regional 
development could be adversely affected by the use of the very instrument of IIS 
(that is exemption from capital goods import duties). Moreover, by encouraging 
IIS supported enterprises to import duty free capital goods the government loses 
revenue that would have been used in other ways such as expanding the poor 
infrastructure. 
Did the IIS encourage the use of capital intensive technology? Referring to the 
macro statistics, Table 6.3 shows the 1992-98 average investment capital per 
enterprise and job. Prior to start-up the average size of an IIS licensed project (in 
terms of capital investment) was birr 6.7 million. But as enterprises set up this 
average size of a project dropped to birr 4.8 million. As discussed in Section 5.2, 
there were several reasons for lower size of investment. First, at start up as 
entrepreneurs were in the early learning process of using the machines, the full 
range of machines and equipment were not acquired. Second, the IIS licensed 
project plans were often overestimated (with a view to getting better access to 
non-IIS assistance). In terms of permanent jobs the average enterprise size actually 
increased as IIS supported projects became operational. However, compared to 
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the planning stage, investment capital per jobs phenomenally increased as 
enterprises set up, by nearly seven times from birr 13930 to birr 96110. 
Table 6.3 Investment capital-labour ratios (1992-98). 
Indicators IIS Licensed IIS Supported 
Enterprises (plan) New Start-ups 
investment capital/enterprise 6660 4780 
('000 birr) 
permanent 48 50 
employment/ enterprise 
investment capital/ employment 13930 96110 
ratio 
Source: Information organised from EIA unpublished data. 
Because of a lack of benchmarks I found it very difficult to say whether the above 
capital to labour ratio or the cost per job was high or low. But, as the above 
enterprises level technology uses showed, relatively few and large IIS assisted 
enterprises imported and used capital intensive technology. Finally, note that the 
total volume of 'jobs created' in the IIS assisted enterprises was not entirely new. 
The evidence from the cases studied showed that some of the entrepreneurs and 
key members of their staff, notably staff with accumulated knowledge in making 
the products like the engineers, and lawyers and accountants were former 
employees of the public sector. In this regard, therefore, the public sector lost 
twice: first by subsidising capital importing and second by losing its skilled 
workforce to the private sector. The next section considers broader consequences 
of the IIS. 
6.5 Evaluating the performance of the IIS 
This section uses some principles and concepts drawn, among other sources, from 
an OECD document (OECD, 1979) and Bennet and Robson (1999) to assess the 
success of the IIS support system. According to the OECD document, as incentives 
constitute a claim on scarce resources, social benefits should be commensurate 
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with their social costs (OECD, 1979: 13). Bennet and Robson (1999) used levels of 
use of services of 'business link' as a measure of efficiency benchmark against a 
'high' level of 80 per cent set by the British government Department of Trade and 
Industry. However, apart from using the approaches and concepts, I did not 
employ the 'business link' take-up rate as a benchmark because as this will not 
compare like with like. Instead, although dated, I used the available and 
comparable IIS take-up rate from the 1960s. And, secondly, I also considered 
whether IIS objectives were achieved and whether direct and indirect outcomes 
and impacts were produced. 
Below two broader performance measures of the IIS were identified. First, IIS 
outcome measures. These included the number of entrepreneurs who sought and 
successfully set up enterprises with IIS assistance (with their regional and sector 
dimensions). Further, I also used the type and level of the IIS support delivered, 
and the efficiency of the IIS agency itself, for example, in processing applications. 
The second set of measures focused on IIS impacts that looked into, among others 
things, the extent to which IIS objectives were met, the amount of revenue 
foregone and businesses displaced due to the IIS. 
(i) IIS take-up and utilisation rates 
Based on Schwarz et al's (1968) study (reported in chapter three) in the 1960s the 
utilisation rate of investment incentives in Ethiopia was high, which meant that all 
IIS licensed projects were implemented (or under construction at the time). And 
more importantly all projects initiated in the 1960s drew on IIS benefits. But IIS 
take-up rates in the 1990s showed a different picture. First, as Table 6.4 shows, 
between 1992-98 a total of 4246 projects were licensed to benefit from the US 
support. Of this total 1163 enterprises (that is 27 per cent) were successful start- 
ups. EIA sources also showed that of the total IIS licensed projects some 673 (that 
230 
is 16 per cent) were under implementation stage. This left 2410 or 57 per cent of 
the licensed projects that failed to start up enterprises. 
Table 6.4 The efficiency of the IIS take-up (1992-98) 
Major No. of No. of IIS Expected Estimate of 
sectors licensed started-up Efficiency permanent Perm. Jobs 
(1) enterprises enterprises Rate (2/3 * Jobs (5) Created (6) 
(2) (3) 100) 
(4) 
Primary 1164 514 44 49038 26796 
Secondary 1845 497 27 78311 15536 
Tertiary 1237 152 12 75692 15541 
Total 4246 1163 27 203041 57873 
Source: EIA (1998) unpublished data and own calculation 
Enterprise start-up rates in the service and manufacturing sectors (where 
enterprise site and premises have been serious problems) were low, respectively 
12 and 27 per cent (column 4). More expected permanent jobs were also lost in all 
sectors and particularly in the service and manufacturing sectors where project 
implementation was low. Over 1992-98, of the 203041 expected permanent jobs 
only an estimated 57883 jobs were created by assisted enterprises (column 5 and 
6). As earlier discussions showed, at start-up the average investment in physical 
capital formation per licensed project dropped from birr 6.7 million to birr 4.8 
million - that was by around 28 per cent. 
Second, my findings (chapter five, Table 5.6) showed that, first, of the IIS licensed 
projects that have successfully started-up about 64 per cent of them did not draw 
on any kind of IIS benefit. Moreover, the remaining 36 per cent of the enterprises 
drew on only a part of IIS benefits (mainly exemptions from import duties). This 
meant that nationwide only around 419 enterprises received some kind of IIS 
support. 
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Those enterprises that benefited from duty free import of capital goods made 
savings of around 13 per cent of the value of imported capital goods. The situation 
with other types of IIS benefits was even worse. As discussed in chapter three, the 
IIS codes stipulated support to enterprises, in addition to exemptions from import 
and income taxes, through tax relief on expenses incurred on research and 
development, site development, building construction, and machine installations. 
The evidence obtained from the case studies, and corroborated by the investment 
authorities, showed that even fewer than 36 per cent of all assisted enterprises 
drew on exemptions from paying income tax, taxes on research and development 
and site development. Exemption from paying income tax in particular appeared 
to be a key instrument of the IIS - but enterprises did not benefit from income tax 
exemptions owing to the fact that either they did not make profits during the 
grace period and/or requirements for tax related record keeping were expensive. 
Furthermore, as evidenced by the case SMEs, entrepreneurs hardly knew about 
tax relief on other expenses incurred (like on research and development). 
(ii) IIS agencies and staff efficiency 
The Ethiopian Investment Authority (EIA) is a nationwide institution with 
structures laid down at the federal, regional and zonal administration levels. As of 
1998 the whole structure employed at least 500 skilled personnel and was run 
with multi-million birr administration expenses. What has this huge IIS structure, 
solely set up to deliver the IIS, achieved? 
To its credit the IIS structure performed many functions (some of which were not 
quantifiable). For example, it served as a promoter, albeit symbolic, of the private 
sector in general. While I was conducting the field work for this thesis, I also 
closely observed operations of the structure and found it to be one of the least 
bureaucratic institutions in the country. One good example of EIA's efficiency was 
that it was processing most of IIS licence applications within 10 working days -a 
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practice not common in most other government agencies. Although it is difficult 
to compare IIS with other similar structures, in terms of measurable criteria I 
found IIS structure performance short of its potential. The fact that it attracted 
4246 projects over six years (around 707 per year), and assisted not 1163 as crude 
macro statistics suggested, but merely 419 start-ups (that is only 70 per year) 
suggests that its potential was not fulfilled (however, as chapter seven will show, 
an IIS licence helped some entrepreneurs in getting subsidised and quicker access 
to state controlled resources like land and energy sources). 
(iii) the extent to which IIS objectives were fulfilled 
Regarding the fulfilment of IIS objectives, Tesfaye Belay, head of EIA's policy 
department said: 
Over recent years we have had many enterprise start-ups. This showed 
that more quality and quantity of output have been produced, more 
employment has been created and regional development, technology 
and skill development have been promoted. (Tesfaye Belay, 1998) 
I have no doubt that relative to earlier decades, Ethiopia had a faster rate of 
enterprise start-ups in the 1990s. However, the evidence and the arguments I 
made in the preceding sections consistently show that the IIS barely influenced 
location and sectoral decisions and the timing of start-up. Consequently, official 
claims, as in above, were misleading. The fact was that enterprises were setting up 
with or without the IIS support. The IIS did positively influence the size of some 
enterprises but at the expense of a large quantity of imported capital goods that, 
among other things, required the payment of foreign exchange. Overall, there was 
no evidence to suggest that the IIS effectively promoted its key objectives of 
influencing entrepreneurs' decisions over the choice of sector and location. 
(iv) Economic cost and displacement effects of the IIS 
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Head of the policy department of EIA, Tesfaye Belay did not doubt that in pursuit 
of the IIS objectives '... those who collect government tax revenue [were] the 
immediate losers'. He also went on to question that '... on balance, would the 
foregone revenue benefit the enterprises? ' and came up with an interesting 
conclusion: 
Our view is that the foregone revenue was justified because it has 
created more employment, promoted technology and skill 
development. It is worth paying the foregone tax now because this will 
eventually expand the tax base. (Tesfaye Belay, 1998) 
The IIS has certainly helped some entrepreneurs develop their project ideas, albeit 
in a limited way, and offered up to 13 per cent savings on duties from imported 
machines. Nonetheless, the IIS has incurred a considerable amount of economic 
cost to the society. Firstly, between 1992 and 1998, from duty tax alone, an 
estimated amount of birr 526 million revenue has been foregone with a view to 
supporting IIS assisted enterprise start-ups. What the authorities hardly knew was 
the distributed IIS benefits across sectors, regions and sizes of enterprises. This 
thesis shows that new start-ups in the service and manufacturing sectors received 
42 and 50 per cent the revenue foregone, respectively. In terms of regional 
distributions of IIS benefits, Addis Ababa and Tigray between them received 93 
per cent of the revenue foregone (that is 60 and 33 per cent, respectively). Even 
within Addis Ababa and Tigray it was a few highly capital intensive projects that 
benefited from the support. Contrary to the expectations of the policy makers, 
therefore, most of the IIS benefits were appropriated by entrepreneurs based in 
the least supported areas like Addis Ababa. Consequently, the impact of the IIS in 
terms of supporting enterprise start-ups in disadvantaged regions was far from 
being realised. 
Secondly, the IIS has resulted in adverse consequences to some businesses in the 
distributive trade sector that import and distribute capital goods. As explained 
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earlier, with a view to taking advantage of import duty exemptions, some IIS 
licensed entrepreneurs directly imported capital goods - affecting local dealers in 
capital goods. Moreover, entrepreneurs direct machine/equipment imports meant 
higher transaction costs (including search costs of sources and prices of machines, 
and handling imports), delays in the delivery of consignments, and subsequent 
losses of local advisory support in installing and repairing machines. I have also 
noted that partly due to these problems, some IIS licensed entrepreneurs 
(especially those who set-up small enterprises) gave up their duty exemption 
privileges and purchased machines from local dealers. 
Overall, my evaluation of IIS performance in the preceding section, coupled with 
the conclusions I arrived at in section 6.2, portrayed a rather unsatisfactory view 
of the impact of the IIS on enterprise start-up and development. In section 6.6 
below I provide a brief explanation for the limited IIS contribution to enterprise 
start-up and development in Ethiopia. 
6.6 Summary and some explanations for the limited IIS impact on 
enterprise development 
Why was the IIS performance unsatisfactory? This section addresses this question 
by considering the immediate IIS related and broader enterprise development 
problems of Ethiopia. 
6.6.1 Limitations of the IIS System 
I argue that the main IIS limitation was its flawed assumption about the behaviour 
of entrepreneurs. Evidence generated for this thesis and other sources69 showed 
that many entrepreneurs were low resource based with limited external financing, 
were risk averse owing to insufficient information and knowledge about 
opportunities, and had limited managerial and technical skills to run businesses. 
69 See Ayalew, 1995, Yohnnes, 1995, Habtamu, 1995, EEA, 1997b, Korten, 1972 as well as 
chapter 3 Section 3.2.2.4. 
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Many entrepreneurs also set up sole proprietary enterprises that were less 
responsive to activity/location based incentives. The fact that over 85 per cent of 
Ethiopians depend on smallholder farm production and employment was also a 
clear indicator of how small was the critical mass of entrepreneurs in Ethiopia. To 
unlock these structural barriers the IIS tried to do many things (more job creation, 
sector and regional re-allocation of investment, etc. ) but with limited means of tax 
incentives. Tax incentives that were primarily meant to influence entrepreneurs' 
behaviour failed, among others things, as a consequence of the nature of many 
entrepreneurs as outlined above. Moreover, many entrepreneurs' sectoral and 
location choices heavily depended on their accumulated resources, experience, 
market and infrastructure but not on short-lived and marginal IIS incentives. 
The IIS failed to address key enterprise development problems. IIS arbitrary 
classification of activities as pioneer and promoted has created a negative attitude 
towards the unassisted activities such as services. While there is no doubt that 
activities like banks and insurance and hotels are instrumental for the 
development of the rest of the economy, the authorities supported the production 
sector at the expense of the services sector. The evidence generated for this thesis 
challenges the policy stance. I argue that many entrepreneurs with limited 
enterprise start-up resources like finance and enterprise sites chose to enter the 
service sector because (a) entry cost was relatively small and (b) the service sector 
served as a testing ground before entrepreneurs moved on to high capital 
investment activities. Further, the idea of encouraging larger enterprise start-ups 
in peripheral regions was ill-thought out as these enterprises required a central 
market and better infrastructure which were concentrated in the centre. In this 
regard, therefore, the scheme failed to directly address entrepreneurs and 
enterprise problems such as poor infrastructure. 
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The IIS was based on spatial problems that were barely conceptually and 
empirically established. To begin with the country never had regional income 
accounting to show regional inequality in development. The argument for the IIS 
policy was presented as a function of distance from the political centre Addis 
Ababa, in which locations further away from Addis Ababa were considered 
disadvantaged in terms of development. But the authorities used selective 
regional disparity measures such as manufacturing enterprise and road networks 
distributions that truly favoured Addis Ababa and the Addis Ababa-Nazareth 
area. However, these selective measures were area-based rather than people- 
based (for example, a calculation of manufacturing output per person would have 
resulted in a different index of regional development). But the way I perceive 
regional development (or lack of it) is that most sector based developments 
reinforce each other - for example, roads attract manufacturing and energy 
supply, etc. Because of the IIS emphasis on a centre-periphery dichotomy, there 
was a clear flaw in the policy. Take districts like North Shoa and South Wollo that 
are close to Addis Ababa. These districts have been over-populated and the 
farming population who lived there depended on degraded land for living. 
Perhaps what was needed in these areas was alternative employment to farming 
such as manufacturing. But the IIS implicitly discouraged manufacturing in these 
central locations, while encouraging inaccessible peripheral areas that were less 
suited for manufacturing development. 
IIS performance was also unsatisfactory because it was based on an over- 
identified single theme enterprise start-up problem. Crucial problems of 
Ethiopia's enterprise economy such as access to enterprise sites, bank credit and 
energy sources were undermined by 'the investment problem'. Further, even 
delivering limited IIS assistance was constrained by entrepreneurs' misguided 
perception of the scheme - in that some entrepreneurs viewed the scheme as 
paternalistic to a selected group of people and bureaucratic - and consequently 
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they distanced themselves from it. Some other entrepreneurs were not fully aware 
of the IIS assistance owing to, in part, their limited ability to capture, process and 
use information. But most importantly, I argue that entrepreneurs or their 
representatives did not take part in the formation of IIS policy and structure and 
these were not adequately communicated to the targets. Other IIS agency related 
problems may include shortages of staff to provide advice to entrepreneurs, office 
equipment and vehicles. But these are small matters compared to some endemic 
problems of the whole enterprise economy. 
6.6.2 Endemic problems of the Ethiopian enterprise economy 
For a long time the private sector has been constrained by successive government 
policies such as regulatory barriers at entry. Most pervasive was the 1970s and 
1980s where government took a clear anti-private enterprise stance as these 
represented an idolatry of personal gains. This has created a misguided anti- 
private business attitude among sections of the civil service. During the field work 
I noted that every priority (telephone lines, energy, bank credit, land, etc. ) was 
given to state owned (and affiliated) businesses, not because these were efficiently 
performing units (creating and maintaining jobs and profits) but because they 
were 'publicly owned'. 
Furthermore, there was still the long established tradition that undermined 
entrepreneurship. The society still cherishes and grants high profile to warriors 
but not entrepreneurs, and implicitly promotes win-lose attitudes rather than 
cooperation. These cultural barriers, coupled with low levels of income, create less 
opportunity for entrepreneurship and for enterprises to expand. Moreover, the 
enterprise economy was constrained by national structural problems such as (a) 
poor physical infrastructure (like power, roads and telephone lines, and water). 
(b) institutional structures (business information system, promotional services, 
consultancy and advocacy agencies, institutions for developing technical and 
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managerial skills, banking, etc. ). As it emerges strongly from this thesis, there was 
a major problem in providing entrepreneurs access to enterprise site and 
premises. Finally, enterprise start-ups also confronted cumbersome bureaucracy 
in registration and licensing. This pessimistic but realistic assessment of the 
performance of the IIS suggests a thorough review of the approaches, policies and 
institutions of the Ethiopian enterprise economy. This will be the issue that I will 
consider in chapter eight. 
6.7 Conclusion 
For an entrepreneur to maximise the IIS incentives an enterprise had to be set up 
in a pioneer sector and in a peripheral region. However, the best location for a 
particular enterprise, in most cases, did not result in the best IIS support. This 
chapter showed that sector-location decisions were primarily made for many 
entrepreneurs by factors like experience and own resources rather than by the IIS. 
Consequently, many entrepreneurs set up enterprises where they lived, worked, 
generated experience and resources. The IIS did, however, marginally impact on 
the size of new start-ups. Nonetheless, the real determinants of enterprise size 
were the resources of the entrepreneur, social and economic fundamentals in a 
given location such as market and infrastructure. 
The discussion in this chapter also showed that projects of significant size, that is 
those unlikely to depend on state support, appropriated most of the IIS support. 
This meant that IIS assistance, in spite of a huge amount of revenue foregone, was 
very limited. It follows that hypothesis one of the thesis was proved correct: that 
the influence of investment incentives on the timing, type, location, and size of IIS 
assisted SMEs was small. Furthermore, this conclusion was consistent with that 
which emerged from the study of investment incentives in other developing 
countries. 
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The fact that IIS role and impact were limited has serious implications for the 
scheme. Should the government provide essential infrastructure which is likely to 
produce more enterprise development or keep on providing the largely sterile 
IIS? In the concluding chapter of the thesis, I will argue for a different perspective 
to enterprise support initiatives. Next in chapter seven I discuss IIS's unique role 
of moderating entrepreneurial access to state controlled resources like enterprise 
sites. 
Once again the conclusion of this chapter reminds us of the key points made at the 
start of chapter one (section 1.2) - that lack of learning from other countries' 
experiences particularly on SMEs development, and poor integration of the IIS 
into the holistic industrial, SMEs and regional development contributed to its 
failure. 
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7. Discussion on the Role of the Investment Incentives 
Scheme in Enterprise Start-up Resources Mobilisation and 
Business Legalisation 
7.1 Introduction 
The discussion in chapter six showed that the Ethiopian investment incentives 
scheme (IIS) barely influenced entrepreneurs' decisions over location and industry 
choice of enterprise start-up. However, on the positive side, chapter six 
demonstrated that investment incentives helped increase financial gains to the 
assisted enterprises and positively affected the size of some SMEs at start-up. 
This chapter discusses how sometimes the value of the IIS licence was superior to 
the holder when used, not as a device for tax breaks as intended, but as a 
moderator of access (or a gateway) to state controlled resources like a serviced 
enterprise site. Because of the severity of the problem and its significance in 
enterprise start up, this chapter particularly examines why and how the IIS licence 
was used as a means of getting cheaper access to state controlled and distributed 
land. Further, the chapter discusses the nature of economic and non-economic 
decision making, and the behaviour of politicians, bureaucrats and business 
interest groups in resource and incentive distributions and enterprise regulations. 
Second, this chapter also discusses whether the IIS licence eased the bureaucracy 
involved in the business legalisation process. These two core areas of the chapter 
provide explanations for hypothesis two (H2)70: 
H2: some entrepreneurs sought the support of the IIS, in addition to its fiscal 
benefits, for its role as a gateway to resources (land, credit and utility) 
required for enterprise start-up, and to ease the otherwise bureaucratic 
business legalisation processes. 
70 Most of the evidence used in the chapter came from the qualitative and quantitative data set 
documented in chapter five. 
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Section 7.2 below provides the background on why and how the IIS licence was 
used to provide entrepreneurial access to resources and ease the legalisation 
process. Section 7.2 also offers a summary of the arguments and formal 
construction of hypothesis two. Based on hypothesis two, sections 7.3 and 7.4 
present the discussion on IIS actual benefits derived from its moderating roles to 
some IIS holders. Finally section 7.5 provides the conclusions of the chapter. 
7.2 The political economy of state control and distribution of resources 
This section discusses the evolution of state control over key economic resources 
like land. Moreover, the section shows the roles of different government agencies 
in resource and incentive allocation and enterprise regulation. Finally, the section 
explains how a particular business interest group referred to by the government 
circle as 'investors' emerged and influenced the pattern of resource and incentive 
allocations. 
7.2.1 Entrepreneurs' access to resources and enterprise regulation 
7.2.1.1 Background to institutional control over resources 
Because of its great importance to the livelihood of a large segment of the 
population, access to, cost and use of land produce have been major issues for 
generations in Ethiopia. Historically land ownership patterns of Ethiopia were 
diverse, comprising individual or private, kinship, state and church (see, among 
others, Markakis (1974) and Desalegn (1985)). In the past state and church, in 
particular, appropriated the surplus generated from land. The state also used land 
in lieu of salary to pay its civil servants and generate revenue to expand public 
services. But access to land has been politically derived in the form of a grant for 
temporary use (known as gult), life time use, and hereditary use. 
The untenable feudal land relationship and the introduction of commercial farms 
in the 1960s that caused the economic value of land to soar and threatened the 
lives of the peasantry provided the background to the 1974 revolution. The 
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revolutionary Derg government (1974-91) abolished the feudal system of land 
ownership and brought all rural land under 'the collective property of the 
Ethiopian people' (PMGE, 1975b). The rural land reform, among other things, 
limited the size of land allocated to an individual peasant to a maximum of 10 
hectares, prohibited the selling, exchange or mortgage of land and the use of hired 
labour in agriculture. 
As reported in chapter three, undertakings like mining, heavy industries, radio 
and television transmissions, insurance and banking, etc. were also put under the 
exclusive control of the state (PMGE, 1975a). No person with a permanent job was 
allowed to licence as a wholesaler, retailer, importer, exporter or service 
dispenser. No person was allowed to obtain more than one licence nor own more 
than one business or establish a branch (PMGE, 1975c). For nearly two decades 
these and similar developments limited the scope of activities available for private 
sector undertakings. 
Following the change in government in 1991 the economic role of the state 
showed some changes (see details in Befekadu and Berhanu, 2000). Some of the 
activities that had been in the absolute control of the state were opened up for the 
private sector. Nationalised enterprises were put up for privatisation and 
restrictions such as on the amount of capital investment were lifted. In general the 
state moved more towards providing the 'enabling environment' and incentives 
for private sector development. 
However, reforms undertaken by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991- 
95) failed to include land in a meaningful way. Consequently, debates over 
alternative land holding systems focused around three broad alternatives: state 
control, state control with some limited private ownership and freehold 
(Desalegn, 1994, Dejene and Teferri, 1995). The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), the party which ruled the transition period and 
243 
controlled the political landscape since, came out as a clear opponent to private 
ownership of land. EPRDF's argument was essentially based on the premise that 
private ownership of land dispossesses the peasants of land and subsequently 
leads them to urban unemployment. Subsequently, in the 1995 constitution, land 
(except for the limited leasing facilities) was retained under the ownership of the 
state: 
The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural 
resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of 
Ethiopia. Land is a common property ... and shall not be subject to sale 
or to other means of exchange (The Constitution, article 40.3, FRDE, 
1995a). 
Furthermore, constitutional power over the acquisition and transfer of land was 
placed under the regional governments. 
In spite of the constitutional arrangement, land issues continued to attract wider 
debate. Total state control over land has been criticised from different corners 
including academics, NGOs, international institutions like the World Bank 
(Desalegn, 1994, and EEA, 1997a). Opposition to state control of land was based 
on arguments such as the regime's lack of incentives, the state's undue power 
over allocation, and administrative costs of allocation. Moreover, opponents 
argued, under state control the two major land holding problems, namely land 
fragmentation and insecurity, remained unabated. A growing population, 
coupled with limited means of increasing intensive agriculture, lead to ever 
diminishing per capita arable land and produce. To add to the problem, the 
system did not allow access to land use unless peasants permanently lived and 
worked on the land. This, according to Desalegn 'has trapped an enormous 
population in the rural areas, creating the conditions for a Malthusian disaster' 
(EEA, 1997a: 10). 
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Implementing access to land under the current constitutional arrangement has not 
been easy either. As Befekadu observed, primarily, the institutional set-up itself 
was a constraint: 
The current [institutional] arrangement which leaves a lot to 
discretionary power is indeed over-bureaucratised and unnecessarily 
segmented... Investors are required to acquire licences from the central 
government and thereafter negotiate on the terms and conditions of 
acquiring land with the local administrators where the investment is to 
be located. Acquiring a licence does not automatically guarantee the 
provision of land since the two come under distinct and independent 
authorities. (Befekadu, 1994: 38). 
Moreover, under the current government, although the private sector has been 
allowed to take part in the economy, the state remained in control of activities of 
'national' and/or 'public interest' like metallurgy and pharmaceutical industries, 
power and telecommunications, the financial and social sectors. Pressure from 
agencies like the IMF and the government's own desire to attract more foreign 
investment, however, have contributed to some piecemeal changes to state 
monopoly of activities. First, insurance, banking and financial activities were 
opened to the private sector (FDRE, 1996a). And second, similar changes were 
also made to activities like telecommunications, health and education sectors 
(COM, 1998b). The hesitant and piecemeal nature of changes, however, 
contributed to the build up of expectations over major changes in state control 
over resources (including land), and hence, delayed investment (Befekadu, 1994). 
In conclusion, and in spite of the changes that favoured entrepreneurs, key 
enterprise start-up resources like land, power, bank credit and foreign exchange 
were controlled by the state. As of 1998, the implication for entrepreneurs was 
that these scarce resources were distributed in a bureaucratic way through a 
single state supply channel making entrepreneurs dependent on state provision of 
access to these resources. Moreover, to get access to state controlled resources 
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entrepreneurs had to accept agency distribution rules (including the waiting 
time). 
7.2.1.2 Public agencies and enterprise development 
Social and economic ministries (and regional bureaux) of Ethiopia (hereafter 
referred to as public agencies) control and distribute resources like land and 
incentives like the IIS and/or regulate the behaviour of enterprises (FDRE, 1995b). 
For the purpose of this thesis, I studied the functions of the most relevant public 
agencies to enterprise development (see Box 7.1). From my study it emerged that 
the official roles and functions of public agencies were often segmented between 
agencies and hid many of the enterprise development issues, particularly at start- 
up stages. For example, an entrepreneur went through multiple agencies (and 
units within agencies) to get access to an enterprise site, energy source, telephone 
lines, bank credit, etc. The purchase of equipment or leasing enterprise site 
required rigorous inspection and approval by the relevant bureaucrats. What is 
more, bureaucrats' approval of a request in one area progressively depended on 
the outcomes of successive stages. For instance, to extend bank loans the 
Development Bank of Ethiopia required proof of a land deed agreement between 
an entrepreneur and the land lease board. And the land lease board/office 
required an IIS licence as well as other permits such as health and safety from the 
relevant government departments. The IIS licence, in turn, was obtained after 
machines and site layout were identified in a project document. This assumed that 
land would be made available after the licence was obtained. The whole resources 
mobilisation process has become a vicious circle of chain of events with only a 
limited chance of breaking the cycle. 
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Box 7.1 Resources and incentives distribution, regulation and controlling 
powers of public agencies 
This as well as subsequent sections refer to roles of different public agencies in 
enterprise start-up and growth. With a view to enhancing the subsequent 
discussion, following Dunleavy (1991), I have grouped the relevant public 
agencies of all levels (macro, meso and micro) under three broad categories: 
(i) public agencies that produce and distribute outputs/service on mainly a 
commercial basis and using internally generated resources. Examples of these 
agencies are banks and utility companies like the Ethiopian Electric Power 
Corporation. 
(ii) public regulatory agencies that limit or control enterprise behaviour 
through licensing, standards and follow-up systems. All socio-economic 
ministries, notably the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) are put in this 
category. 
(iii) agencies that control and transfer resources. These include, for example, 
regional government bureaux that control and allocate land and premises, 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ethiopian Investment Authority (EIA) that 
subsidise businesses. Agencies under (ii) and (iii) are mostly financed by 
central and/or regional governments. 
It is important to note that these broader agency categories are simplistic in 
that it is not always the case that an agency falls under one category. For 
example, in addition to some regulatory roles most ministries (education, 
health, agriculture) also produce and distribute services. However, the 
institutional processes of enterprise start-up is better understood when the 
allocation and regulatory powers of agencies (and their objectives, functions 
and performance criteria) are known. For instance, owing to differences in 
objectives the MoF and EIA do not necessarily give similar priority support to 
enterprises. MoF's main objective is raising public revenue while EIA is 
entrusted with providing incentives (including fiscal incentives) to 
enterprises. 
It is also important to note sources of agency power (including that given by 
law). Agency power may emerge from the nature of resources administered. 
Whether a resource is scarce and/or vital in the enterprise start-up process is 
crucial. Whether a particular resource is owned and distributed in a 
monopolistic way is also important. For example, unlike bank credit that can 
be overcome by traditional means of mobilising finance, land and energy 
sources are too essential and scarce for start-up. These resources are provided 
only through the channels of public agencies and access to these resources 
may take a long time. 
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Both resources mobilisation and business legalisation, at every agency and layer 
of government, involved a long process of providing and verifying proof that had 
to pass at least two tests. These tests, that were conceptualised following Schaffer 
and Wen-Hsien (1985), were, first, the eligibility criterion (the admission rule to 
obtain incentives and/or get access to resources). And, second, the rule of 
ordering applications (which may be called line rules). The 'line rules' deserve 
more explanation. Entrepreneurs' applications (for a licence or enterprise site) 
may or may not be filed in the order of the application. As I will demonstrate, 
within public agencies, and through the influences of quasi-legal and illegal 
means, altering the order of applications was a common practice. Simple 
principles like 'first come first served' were regularly violated enabling some 
entrepreneurs to jump queues for key enterprise start-up resources. It was under 
these quasi-legal and illegal circumstances that the IIS licence had become an 
effective instrument for breaking the vicious circle of resources mobilisation 
process. 
Business interest groups too, as I will discuss below, influenced the procedures for 
resource and incentive distribution. 
7.2.2 Business interest groups, enterprise start-up strategies and instruments 
State control over resources, notably land, created deep divisions between 
politicians and within the business community. Consequently, in the early 1990s 
many competing groups for political and economic power were set up by 
politicians and business people. Between 1991-94 alone over 60 business 
associations that largely either supported or opposed government policies were 
set up (Borin et al, 1994). Typical examples of business associations that fell in the 
opposite camps were the Ethiopian Private Industries Association (EPIA) and the 
Addis Ababa Private Industries Association (AAPIA). EPIA promoted unreserved 
property rights (including freehold of land) and a limit on the expansion of party 
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owned enterprises (Berhane Mewa, 1998). However, the AAPIA fully supported 
the policies of the current government (Amare Wodajo, 1998). As some key 
Ethiopian scholars noted (for example, Befekadu, 1994), the intensity of division 
over government policy created uncertainty over how and when these issues 
would be settled, and the likely outcome. Consequently, many business 
intentions, as Befekadu argued, failed to materialise largely because of policy 
uncertainty (Befekadu, 1994: 37). 
The interesting development that followed the reintroduction of the IIS in 1992 
was that while those opposed to government policies took the political route to 
getting access to resources/services, hundreds of entrepreneurs received the IIS 
licence and created an identity set known as'investors'71. The fact that some 
entrepreneurs came forward was taken as a sign of success for the government. 
But for many entrepreneurs there was barely any alternative source of key 
resources /services like land and energy sources outside the government sector. 
Investors (or entrepreneurs), therefore, started lobbying for government access to 
resources. The EIA in particular stood by its clients, the 'investors', and lobbied 
other agencies on their behalf for support in mobilising start-up resources. 
Subsequently, the government took account of the influence of investors' interest 
and devised legal means for supporting them: 
The Government may grant freely or without public tendering urban 
land which is to be utilized for investment that the government 
encourages or for social service establishments or other purposes which 
directly benefit the public. (TGE, 1993) 
However, the mechanisms for making land available were not put in place until 
after the passing of the constitution in 1995. In the meantime, using the inadequate 
legal provisions as some argued, a small fraction of the entrepreneurs that were 
71 An investor, in the Ethiopian context, means entrepreneur (see Box 3.2, chapter three). 
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most loyal to the regime (the roots of loyalty being based on party and ethnic 
associations) were given privileged access to resources. A good example of this 
was reported in Hammond (1994) where EPRDF owned company, Hiwot 
Mechanisation Company, was granted 7000 hectares of land for no more than birr 
20/hectare for 20 years in the Humara area. 
By mid 1990s the political system became stable (for example a new constitution 
was introduced and elections recognised by the West were held). With the 
stability of the political system benefits given to few entrepreneurs also became 
increasingly attractive, which led to more and more entrepreneurs seeking the IIS 
support and better access to resources controlled and distributed through public 
agencies. Moreover, entrepreneurs (supported by agencies like the EIA) continued 
lobbying the government for even better access to resources. The chairman of the 
Addis Ababa Private Industries Association (AAPIA), explained to me: 
We believe the government supports businesses [such as through 
incentives] to generate employment and increase the welfare of its 
people. We support these objectives and work with the government to 
see its policies work. But with parts of the policies like the investment 
capital ceiling that discriminated against our members that own small 
businesses or problem of access to land we request the government to 
make the necessary changes. (Amare Wodajo, 1998) 
Indeed these gentle pressures and those that came from the opposition groups 
subsequently bore fruit and led to more legal provisions: 
Whenever [the investment board] deems it necessary, it shall decide on 
new or additional incentives, other than what is provided under the 
Investment Regulations (FDRE, 1998b). 
Implementation of the provisions of 'new or additional incentives' was 
conditional on 'exceptional circumstances', never dearly articulated. The 
vagueness of criteria over free or subsidised access to resources like land has left 
power at the discretion of politicians and bureaucrats. As the managers 
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interviewed for this study explained even when policies were favourable to the 
business community, implementation was slowed by bureaucracy. 
Implementation guidelines have rarely been transparent. 'Guidelines are locked in 
drawers and only revealed upon request ... and guidelines change so quickly and 
it is not easy to keep up to speed with the changes' (Markos, Manager of UE3, 
1998). 
Overall allocation of state controlled resources followed patterns. EIA and the 
regional investment offices supported some entrepreneurs that held IIS licences 
by way of writing letters of support, making direct contacts like paying visits 
and/or phone calls to officials in charge of agencies that control or produce 
enterprise start-up resources. Politicians too influenced entrepreneurial access to 
resources. As I will demonstrate, often these influences were in proportion to 
entrepreneurs' closeness to the politicians. At times entrepreneurial access to 
resources was in exchange for entrepreneurs promoting 'the interest of the public' 
like regional equity. There were also circumstances where the IIS licence was 
over-used to get privileged access to resources such as by using networks of 
friends, former school/work mates, family connections. The political and ethnic 
cards were important too particularly within the context of the new 
ethnic/language based structure of government. As this chapter demonstrates, the 
other aid to access to resources was simple corruption where some entrepreneurs 
unashamedly gave and bureaucrats and politicians received bribes. 
7.2.3 Summary and an outline of Hypothesis Two (H2) 
The foregoing discussion highlighted that entrepreneurs faced access problems to 
resources owing to bureaucratic rules of resource distribution. It was also 
suggested, but yet to be proved, that some entrepreneurs used the IIS licence to 
ease the problem of access to resources. The discussion also suggested two 
broader routes that entrepreneurs take to mobilise one or more of state controlled 
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enterprise start-up resources. Route one was that taken by agency assisted 
enterprise (AEs) start-ups, and route two was taken by those enterprises that set 
up without agency support (UEs). Route two involves going through onerous and 
costly resource mobilising and business legalisation processes. In addition to its 
fiscal benefits, it was in this context that the IIS licence and structure were 
believed to have overcome enterprise start up barriers, as postulated in hypothesis 
two: 
" H2: some entrepreneurs sought the support of the IIS, in addition to its fiscal 
benefits, for its role as a gateway to resources (land, credit and utility) 
required for enterprise start-up, and to ease the otherwise bureaucratic 
business legalisation processes. 
Entrepreneurs who positively perceived the screening process for investment 
incentives and passed the eligibility criteria entered into the IIS system. Upon 
receiving an IIS licence projects became assisted enterprises (AEs). For some AEs 
the IIS licence, along with other institutional support like letters of cooperation, 
served as an instrument for skewing application orders for resources in AEs' 
favour. The IIS licence also made holders look more credible before agency 
officials like bank managers. It is important to note that not all AEs received 
privileged access to all resources. There were some AEs whose IIS benefit was 
limited to exemptions from relevant tax payments. Most of these latter group of 
entrepreneurs were less resourceful (such as in lobbying skills to influence 
politicians and bureaucrats) and/or they preferred to operate on a strictly legal 
basis. These entrepreneurs, like the UEs, took slow and agonising steps to get 
access to resources. 
Unassisted enterprises (UEs) were unassisted by the IIS not because they failed the 
eligibility criteria, but because the entrepreneurs disliked the bureaucratic and 
often 'corrupt' procedures of the support system. It was also the case that some of 
them knew little about the IIS specific assistance. UEs (and some AEs too), as I will 
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demonstrate in the next section, started up enterprises by employing strategies 
like 'buying' state owned premises or land and/or operating in semi-legal way in 
their backyards. What is more, some entrepreneurs may have operated in the 
informal sector and/or simply remained inert and hoped for such time when 
access to resources would be made easier. 
Based on the foregoing background, sections 7.3 and 7.4 below discuss hypothesis 
two (H2). For convenience, however, H2 will be discussed in two parts. In section 
7.3, I discuss IIS's role as a gateway to resources (land, credit and utility) required 
for enterprise start-up. And in section 7.4, I exploring IIS's role in easing the 
otherwise bureaucratic business legalisation processes. 
7.3 The role of the IIS in enterprise start-up resource mobilisation 
The findings of this study (chapter five) showed that enterprise start-up in 
Ethiopia faced critical barriers like access to and cost of enterprise site, and 
shortages of investment capital. Moreover, the acquisition of land or other state 
controlled resources faced onerous bureaucracy and corruption. In this section I 
discuss how entrepreneurs involved in this study overcame access barriers to 
enterprise start-up resources. Further drawing on the evidence from the case 
studies, interviews with the IIS authorities and macro statistics, I will verify 
whether public agencies did provide preferential access to IIS licence holders as 
predicted in hypothesis two. Finally, I will also thoroughly look at the nature and 
scope of the actual benefits, including enterprise start-up time saved, that 
entrepreneurs received. Section 7.3.1 begins the discussion by considering 
entrepreneurial problems and strategies for mobilising resources. 
7.3.1 Problems of and strategies for mobilising enterprise start-up resources 
7.3.1.1 AEs and UEs approaches to resources mobilisation 
With a view to looking at the nature of entrepreneurs coping strategies and hence 
assess the role of the IIS, three of the major constraints to enterprise start-ups, 
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namely shortages of enterprise site and premises, machines and finance are given 
in Table 7.1. Cross-case coping strategies that I labelled as internal and external 
and formal and informal are also summarised in Table 7.1. 
First, clarification of the labels used. In this presentation, if an entrepreneur has 
bought and/or leased resources from public and/or private agencies with an 
explicit application of legal procedures the strategy pursued would be referred to 
as formal and external. However, if an entrepreneur used internally generated 
resources and/or resources were mobilised without an explicit application of the 
legal process then the strategy would be referred to as internal and/or informal. 
Second, the information in Table 7.1 shows AEs' tendency to use more of the 
formal and external means to resource acquisition. The EIA and banks supported 
AEs' machine import and financial requirements. Land Lease Offices too provided 
support to the AEs. By contrast the UEs' approach to resources mobilisation was 
to use more of the internal and informal arrangements. Some of the UEs bought 
(through illegal arrangements) access rights to public property and/or land by 
paying what was locally known as ye'kulf waga (or literally 'payment for the door 
key'). In some cases UEs also started operation in their backyards. 
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Table 7.1 Some enterprise start-up constraints and patterns of coping strategies 
Enterprise start- Coping Strategies nature of strategy 
up 
constraints 
enterprise site AE1 - rented public premises formal/external 
and premises 
AE1 - used own backyard for internal 
production and storage 
AE2 - granted enterprise site, rented formal/external 
public premises 
AE3 - leased enterprise site formal/external 
UE1 - 'bought' access right to kebele informal /external 
premises 
UE1 - leased land formal/external 
UE2 - used own land and premises internal 
UE2 - 'bought' access right to public informal/external 
premises 
UE3 - rented public premises formal/external 
UE3 - bought enterprise site informal /external 
equipment and AE1 and AE3- imported machines reliance on EIA 
machines 
AE2 - imported & local purchase of reliance on EIA 
salvaged machines 
UE1 and UE3 - purchased machines no reliance on EIA 
locally 
UE2 - local purchase and import no reliance on EIA 
finance All AEs - bank credit and own savings external/internal 
sources 
All UEs - own savings and informal internal and 
sources informal means 
Source: Organised from interviews made with the entrepreneurs 
Why did AEs, unlike UEs, adopt strategies that provided them formal and 
external support? I will argue that one key difference between AEs and UEs in 
resource mobilisation was the use of the IIS licence as the following examples 
demonstrate. But for brevity the examples focus only on land acquisition. 
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The owners of AE3 needed an IIS licence to get both tax exemption and quicker 
acquisition of land. An application (accompanied by the IIS licence) was made to 
the Addis Ababa City Administration and subsequently land was made available, 
on a lease basis, to the AE3 only 'a few months' after the application. Similarly 
AE2 used the IIS licence to get access to land and was granted a freehold of 
1800m2 of land. Acting manager of AE2 conceded that the company managed to 
get a freehold privilege because 'the entrepreneur had connections to people in 
government that really mattered'. 
AE1 applied for 1800m2 land on the assumption that it would be granted free of 
charge. However, owing to changed circumstances, AE1 dropped the application 
for land: 
I made an application at the Addis Ababa City Administration for an 
enterprise site... Along with my application I attached my industry 
licence and later my IIS licence. I was in a queue for over three and half 
years. But when the lease policy was introduced in 1993 I gave up the 
idea of acquiring land because I could not have afforded to pay for the 
lease price. (Begashaw, Manager of AE1,1998) 
The size of land requested would have cost AE1 an estimated birr 0.5 million. 
Nonetheless, AE1 used the IIS licence to support his application to get bank loans 
and foreign exchange to import machines. 
In contrast, and in spite of the fact that as a matter of policy land was controlled 
by the state, UEs were not put off from setting up enterprises. UE2 started the 
business on 2500m2 piece of land inherited from the family. However, when the 
business quickly grew around 10 000m2 land was required. But the manager 
explained that: 
... owing to the lease policy I was required to raise birr 3 million in two 
years. I was in fact allowed to pay the lease value in instalments but the 
interest payment would have been too high. Moreover, I needed to 
develop the area that is pay for supply of power, telephone, water, 
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roads, etc. which would have cost even more money. In the end I 
abandoned the idea of leasing government land.... [instead] I paid money 
to a tenant of a public property and transferred the tenancy right to me. 
(Semu, Manager of UE2,1998) [italics added] 
UE2 declined to use the IIS system in the first place on the grounds that the 
requirements for support were thought to be excessively bureaucratic. Moreover, 
machine purchase from local dealers was quicker and payments were made on an 
instalment basis without exacerbating immediate cash flow problems. Similar to 
UE2, both UE1 and UE3 used some informal arrangements for getting access to 
premises and/or enterprise sites by paying money or ye'kulf waga. 
To sum up, clearly the six entrepreneurs used different strategies (legitimate or 
otherwise) to mobilise start-up resources. The AEs that took part in this study 
consistently used their IIS licence to support their case for purchasing and/or 
getting access to resources needed in the enterprise start-up process. These cases I 
studied were by no means exceptions. As I will show in the subsequent sections, 
in Addis Ababa alone dozens of new start-ups that had IIS licences were given 
free/subsidised land and/or quicker access to land. However, UEs' access to state 
controlled resources was tougher and cost more (including in terms of transaction 
cost). UEs, therefore, used more of the informal/ internal strategies to mobilise 
resources. 
7.3.1.2 Verifying institutional support to some AEs 
In support of hypothesis two, institutional support to some AEs from the EIA, 
regional investment offices and/or agencies that control resources can easily be 
verified. 
First, consider the institution that granted investment incentives (and licences 
thereof). In addition to sector/location based tax incentives, the Ethiopian 
Investment Authority (EIA) and the regional investment offices provided support 
to the IIS licence holders. The justification was that: 
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... the key enterprise start-up problems were overall weaknesses in 
making land and utilities available to the entrepreneurs. We [EIA] 
helped entrepreneurs by writing letters of cooperation to sectoral 
ministries and utility companies that control resources and services. 
(Semunesh Demetros, 1998). 
EIA authorities also believed that an IIS licence had more advantages than 
providing mere investment incentives. In this regard Tilahun, head of a 
department at EIA, told me that the presentation of EIA letters of cooperation to 
agency officials controlling resources/services 'created the impression that 
investors' projects were viable and the investors themselves were committed to 
the implementation of the projects' (Tilahun, 1998). Further, during my field work 
I also found that key members of EIA (and the regional offices) sit on committees 
like that of the land lease and influence the distribution of resources in favour of 
the IIS licence holders. Tahir Aman: 
In the Oromia Investment Office we facilitate the land acquisitions 
process to investors. For example, I am the secretary of the Investment 
Board for Oromia that looks into and approves investors' requests for 
land. I, along with other members of the committee, helped investors to 
get access to land shortly after receiving licences for investment 
incentives. (Tahir Aman, 1998). 
The privileges stipulated to investors in the Amhara Regional Government 
investment policy document (A1O, 1997: 20) was even more comprehensive. The 
policy document stated that following some 'considerations' regarding the nature 
of particular projects that qualified for the IIS support, land may be granted freely 
and/or without auction, and access to power, telephones and roads would be on a 
priority basis. Responses to land requests by investors shall be made in 60 days 
and other government departments were also required to help investors. 
Second, the Addis Ababa Land Lease Office (LLO): Generally the Addis Ababa 
LLO, due to its onerous bureaucracy and huge backlog of demand for enterprise 
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site, was the most inaccessible agency to entrepreneurs. Nonetheless the LLO and 
other relevant departments, as reported in chapter five, explicitly supported IIS 
licence holders: 
We [in the lease office] gave priority to licensed projects for investment. 
In the lease board, representatives from the utility companies and 
urban works and development bureau, EIA, all worked in favour of 
these prioritised investment projects. ' (Fikre Buta, 1998). 
There was a similar preferential support to IIS licence holders even before auction 
based land leasing started. As the story went, the lease policy was proclaimed in 
1993, but its auction based leasing did not start until some time in 1995. Between 
1993-95, therefore, entrepreneurial access to land was on the basis of a waiting list. 
According to information I obtained from the LLO some 'objective' and 
'subjective' criteria were used to skew the order of applications in favour of some 
investors. Consequently, regardless of application dates or entrepreneurs' level of 
preparedness on starting projects land was made available to those who (i) 
produced projects with higher investment capital and job opportunities, and (ii) 
had an IIS licence (mainly in the productive sector). 
Third, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO): As discussed in 
chapter five, most EEPCO customers waited in queues, but power connection to 
IIS licensed enterprises was processed on application. 
To sum up, therefore, the foregoing voices of entrepreneurs and government 
officials clearly demonstrated that some IIS licence holders did get preferential 
access to resources. Besides agencies 'willingness' to assist, some IIS licensed 
entrepreneurs used their own inherent qualities to generate external benefits 
(resources) other than that intended in the IIS. Some of the features of the 
entrepreneurs that helped most to mobilise resources were better financial 
position, knowledge of government policies and bureaucracy and connections 
with politicians. The consequences of lack of access to non-IIS licence holders, 
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however, meant that enterprise start-ups were made costly, starved of the 
necessary resources and sometimes failed to materialise. In particular smaller 
enterprises that had lesser resources (for example lobbying skills) were the losers. 
If public policy picks up the very few better off and the winners, the question then 
how can entrepreneurship and enterprise development genuinely be assisted? In 
chapter eight I will address this and other issues. The next section thoroughly 
examines the actual financial benefits derived from institutional backing of the IIS 
assisted enterprises. 
7.3.2 Actual benefits from moderating roles of the IIS licence 
On the part of the government, providing access to resources, notably land, has 
been riddled with dilemmas: free versus lease holding, auction versus non-auction 
leasing, spatial factors in land valuation and transfer of property rights. Before I 
look at the actual IIS licence moderated benefits, especially as it relates to land, in 
the following section I will discuss the dilemmas over access to land. 
7.3.2.1 The dilemma over access to urban and rural land 
Following the introduction of the land lease policy in 1993, in both rural and 
urban Ethiopia, land prices have been increasing. The increase in land prices has 
been attributed (including by the entrepreneurs involved in this study) to the 
current state ownership and lease prices. I argue that this was only partly true. In 
the first place attributing the increase in land prices to state ownership of land was 
not completely correct. As the theory of land economics shows (Harvey, 1996), 
one explanation for the increase in land lease prices could be that 'land uses 
determine land values'. This is because land, unlike other factors of production, 
has unique features in that the natural space (save reclaimed water bodies) is fixed 
in supply. In the 1990s, therefore, the increase in economic activities and 
competition between users such as government, enterprises and households 
caused land prices to rise. Second, the concentration of complementary services 
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like power and roads, negative factors like congestion or the fact that open land 
was available in a hot and disease-ridden area also affected the value of land. 
However, this is not to say that the form of ownership of land did not affect 
supply flexibility and hence price. Owing to the static state of land reallocation, 
land supply (relatively speaking) was inelastic up until the early 1990s. 
As shown above, some entrepreneurs were given free or subsidised access to land 
on a discretionary basis. The argument behind this was that free or subsidised 
access to land increases the capacity to invest in other forms of capital formation. 
However, this argument failed to satisfy the critics who, among other things, 
opposed the state's undue power over land allocation and the administration cost 
of allocation. What was more, the government's stance on land ownership and 
subsidised redistribution was in contradiction with another of its own laws. For 
example, the land lease law (TGE, 1993) was enacted on the basis that inadequate 
infrastructure was attributed to low level of public revenues which, in turn, was 
due to the absence and/or low land use fees. 
Among other agencies, councils of regional states that were empowered to 
oversee land acquisition and transfer strongly debated whether land should be 
allocated on free and/or lease bases72. One eloquently argued rationale for land 
lease was in an Amhara regional government document (AIO, 1995). The 
argument stated that, first, being a key means of production land should be given 
monetary value. However, such monetary valuation, the document stressed, 
should not be in the form of selling and buying because land was owned by the 
state. Second, although individuals may improve or add fixtures to it, 'pure land' 
is a natural wealth that should not belong to any individual. If the contribution of 
72 Peasants and pastoralists have been given constitutional rights (article 4/5) to obtain land 
without payment. Similarly in major cities land is freely given to cooperative societies 
(whose members are of low income groups) that build their own dwelling houses. 
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'pure land' is left to individuals, the argument went, it gives an unfair advantage 
to users. Hence, the document concluded, 'everyone has to pay a fair price for 
land' through a lease system. Following similar reasons elsewhere in the country, 
auction and non-auction based land lease systems were put in action since 1995. 
And the duration of the lease, 60 to 99 years, varied between activity types. 
As I found out in both auction and non-auction land lease systems determining 
the value of the lease was a complicated matter. In theory in an auction-based 
land lease the price was determined by the auction, reflecting the essential 
qualities of a particular piece of land. But unless the minimum expected level of 
revenue was generated, officials rejected bids. In the non-auction system the 
government directly fixed prices. The basis for such direct land lease price 
fixation, especially in rural Ethiopia, was reckoned on the basis of the proportion 
that land contributed to output. However, there was no easy and uniform way of 
calculating land contribution to total output. This was because land productivity 
varied due to labour and technology employed as well as other factors like 
weather, geography and management. Determining all these variables across the 
country, if at all possible, required a large cadasteral survey of land. Such 
procedures of land valuation, as it was applied in the Amhara region, were 
seriously hampering the pace of land being made available to entrepreneurs. 
In some areas where land was occupied by peasants there was a trend (see chapter 
five, section 5.5) that some peasants, with the knowledge of the authorities, passed 
on their tenancy rights to entrepreneurs in exchange for money. In other words 
peasants were selling state property. Without official justification for the practice, 
a peasant sells the land that he/she was granted the use of it by government 
regulation. Would such an individual peasant retire, become self -employed, or 
move to the nearby towns, which the government tried to prevent? These were 
unanswered questions. 
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Overall, as the findings of this study showed there were several reasons for the 
low performance of the auction system. Firstly, as some of the interviewees 
argued, partly because land auction was a new practice to the country, there were 
only a few bidders at one particular time. But it was also obvious that the low 
number of bidders was mainly due to financial and non financial factors that 
limited people to their immediate area. Moreover advertised plots were often not 
to the liking of entrepreneurs (notably in terms of size, location and time of 
availability). Secondly, an auction was expensive to entrepreneurs, in that bidding 
increased the land price. Thirdly, in central places of Addis Ababa where 
complementary services were relatively better, the scarcity of unused land put 
prices up. Overall, procedures for providing access to land were cumbersome and 
land valuation principles unsatisfactory. In the long run, unless the procedures for 
access to land are made easier and clear, and its cost reconsidered enterprise 
development in Ethiopia will remain severely constrained. 
The discussion in section 7.3.1 showed that the IIS licence provided 
entrepreneurial access to one or more resources like land owned and allocated by 
the state. The next sections show the magnitude of entrepreneurial savings from 
privileged access to enterprise sites, bank credit and energy sources. 
7.3.2.2 Entrepreneurial benefits from agency access to urban and rural lands 
In the earlier sections I claimed that the IIS licence provided access not only to the 
cases studied but also to dozens of entrepreneurs from all over the country73. In 
support of my assertion, below I will discuss entrepreneurial savings from 
privileged access to enterprise sites at two stages: macro and enterprise levels. 
First the macro picture: With a view to showing the magnitude of possible 
savings, data that showed information on total enterprise start-up and land costs 
73 Hammond (1994) also provides more evidence and discussion on this subject. 
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were summarised in Table 7.2 (see details in chapter five, section 5.5). The data 
covered 63 and 80 enterprise start-up projects that took place in the 1990s from the 
Addis Ababa region and rest of Ethiopia, respectively. 
Table 7.2 shows that average enterprise start-up cost was lower in the rest of 
Ethiopia than the Addis Ababa region. This was because in Addis Ababa a larger 
proportion of investment was in manufacturing and hotels that required huge 
spending on machines and equipment. But nonetheless, unlike Addis Ababa, in 
the rest of Ethiopia the average land cost per agricultural enterprise was about 19 
per cent of all enterprise start-up cost. This was a reflection of the importance of 
land in production in rural Ethiopia. In Addis Ababa the average cost of land in 
total enterprise start-up cost accounted for 18 per cent. 
As reported in chapter five, hundreds of IIS licensed applications for enterprise 
sites (including some in Addis Ababa) were speedily processed and granted free 
or subsided access. For example, in Addis Ababa as recently as 1997-98 33 new 
start-up projects were granted land at 65-100 per cent of its market value free of 
charge. The significance of Table 7.2 is, therefore, when the IIS licence provided 
free or subsidised access to land, the benefits, in proportion to total enterprise 
start up cost were as high as 18 and 19 per cent in Addis Ababa and the rest of 
Ethiopia respectively. 
Table 7.2 Cost of enterprise site in Addis Ababa and rest of Ethiopia 
pointers Addis Ababa Rest of Ethiopia 
Number of enterprises 63 80 
Total startup cost/enterprise (birr'000) 16580 11147 
of which land cost/enterprise (birr'000) 2985 2146 
Land cost/total start up cost 18% 19% 
Sources: Unpublished EIA data (1998), Addis Ababa Land Lease Office (1998) and own 
calculation 
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As chapter five showed, clearly there were variations in cost between and within 
urban and rural Ethiopia. In the urban context, overall land lease value depended 
on whether a particular site was serviced with the required level of infrastructure 
like roads and electric power. In the outskirts of Addis Ababa the average land 
price per m2 was birr 392, while in the centre of Addis Ababa land per m2 cost up 
to birr 4300. However, in most smaller towns land prices were as low as birr 5/m2. 
With regards to agricultural land, the highest was in Oromia (birr 150/ha) 
whereas only birr 65 and 20 per hectare was paid in Amhara and Tigray 
respectively74. 
Second micro level: Evidence from the cases studied showed that AE2 made 
savings to the tune of birr 0.5 million because the entrepreneur was granted 
1800m2 land free of charge. AE3 acquired 1909m2 land on a lease basis in a 'few 
months', compared to years of waiting for many non-IIS licence holding 
entrepreneurs. Such savings from free/subsidised and quicker access to land, as 
the macro figures in Table 7.2 showed, were not isolated cases. However, 
entrepreneurs who did not go by the identity of 'investors' barely benefited from 
the differential allocation of land. These were 'businesses' including real estate 
development, offices and shops, supermarkets, hotels and many small enterprises. 
These group of businesses paid the highest lease price in the country, and were 
also largely excluded from the IIS direct fiscal support. The anomaly of such a 
policy was that these businesses created both direct and indirect jobs (as those 
supported by IIS) and wealth. What is more, businesses like hotels, banks and 
insurance were strongly linked to tourism and other major sectors of the 
economy. 
74 Another important note was that owing to the cost of land lease entrepreneurs did not enter 
into the maximum period allowed for lease agreement (i. e. 60 to 99 years). Accordingly, the 
evidence showed that in Amhara and Tigray land was generally leased for around 20 years 
and in Oromia leasing up to 45 years was common. 
265 
7.3.2.2 Benefits emerging from agency access to non-land resources and services 
In addition to enterprise sites, owing to shortages or cumbersome procedures of 
access, entrepreneurs faced difficulties in acquiring services like bank credit, 
energy, telephone lines, sanitary water, etc. Like land all these services were 
under state monopoly. For brevity this section looks at entrepreneurial access 
problems to bank credit and energy sources. 
First, Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE): As part of the requirement for 
extending credit the DBE asked for an IIS licence and entrepreneurs also provided 
the licences on the assumption that it makes processes shorter. The IIS licence, 
according to DBE, was used to make a socio-economic appraisal of the proposed 
project. Nonetheless, as the evidence from the case studies showed the IIS licence 
was still used to get quicker access to foreign exchange for imports of machinery. 
And more importantly, the IIS licence made the entrepreneurs more credible 
before the bank managers and disproportionately helped them to get bank credit 
(Tilahun, 1998). 
Second, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO): At EEPCO power 
supply procedures favoured IIS assisted entrepreneurs as they were provided 
power upon request (often within a month). Non-IIS licence holders, however, 
were rationed power on the basis of a first-come-first-served principle which, on 
average, took 3-4 months of waiting before getting power. 
Notwithstanding the fact that IIS licence holders had privileged access, energy 
shortage was a major national problem. The information obtained showed that in 
1998 only 13 percent of the population and 421 out of over 600 urban centres were 
supplied with electric power. According to an engineer at EEPCO, '... every small 
increase in demand added tremendous pressure on EEPCO capacity. At its [1998) 
capacity, EEPCO was in no position to meet all demands for energy' (Alemu 
Egisso, 1998). The other energy related problem was price rises in connection with 
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the recent liberalisation programme. However, in spite of higher energy prices 
users (domestic as well as business) were willing to pay for all access costs such as 
the cost of putting up electric poles, wires and labour. 
A recent IIS code allowed private sector participation in the energy and banking 
sectors. Accordingly, as discussed in chapter three, as of 1997 at least five private 
banks were set up. However, in the energy sector as of 1998 no private investment 
had come forward. Owing to its central role in the economy, energy production 
ought to have received more support (perhaps in excess of the IIS) from the 
investment authorities. I argue that government's effort in redistributing the 
pattern of enterprise start-up is only helped if basic infrastructural services like 
energy sources are made available particularly in less developed parts of the 
country. 
In the next section I consider the role IIS licence played in reducing the time 
required to mobilise and distribute state owned enterprise start-up resources. 
7.3.3 IIS moderating impact on the pace of enterprise start-up 
7.3.3.1 Treating time as an enterprise support outcome 
The literature on the dynamics of the creation, growth, survival and exit of firms 
(for example, Jovanovic (1982), Nafzinger and Terrell (1996), McPherson (1995) 
and Mead and Liedholm (1998)) put forward explanations like entrepreneur and 
firm attributes, location and sector as key determinants of success or failure. 
However, there is barely any literature on the dynamics of intended and realised 
enterprise start-ups. Here following research methods in education and 
psychology (as in Willett and Singer, 1991) I look at time as an outcome of the IIS 
support. I also argue that treating time is important because a better 
understanding of enterprise start-up pace (that is through identification of 
constraints to start-up) helps to design a better enterprise support system. 
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The question, therefore, was how long it took for an enterprise to set up? It was 
difficult to address such questions because answers always depended on factors 
like attributes of entrepreneurs, firms or the political environment. However, here 
I will consider time as an outcome variable only indirectly. Consequently, the 
alternative question would be how long did it take to acquire land, credit, or 
obtain connection to power supply? 
As has been said all along, in Ethiopia enterprise start-up faced institutional 
controls over access to resources and excessive bureaucracy. The view of a senior 
IIS official supported this: 
Land may be allocated on lease or freehold basis but if that comes after 
three years of waiting it hardly constitutes an incentive. Bureaucratic 
efficiency is the key issue here. The best incentive to Ethiopian 
entrepreneurs is to provide them with an efficient bureaucracy. (Tahir 
Aman, 1998). 
With a view to mapping out the long institutional processes of resource 
mobilisation Figure 7.1 is used. Figure 7.1 shows the dynamics of enterprise start- 
up through stages (as those discussed in chapter six): idea generation, project 
planning and receiving an IIS licence, project implementation and commencing 
operation. Hence, in Figure 7.1 columns 2-4 are stages of enterprise start-up that 
show the total project that received the IIS licence (TL), the total projects that went 
under implementation (TI) and total projects that successfully completed or 
became operational (TO). Further, in Fig. 7.1, column one shows period and 
cohort, where a period is one Ethiopian fiscal year (July-June), and projects that 
received an IIS licence in one fiscal year make up one cohort. 
In period one projects that received the IIS licence may have, first, committed 
themselves to implement projects (and became TH) or, second, successfully set-up 
and became (TOl). Third, it was also possible that a project that received an IIS 
licence in period one may have joined period/cohort two to become TL2, T12 and 
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T02 respectively. Projects that dropped out of their cohorts and joined the 
subsequent cohort(s) are shown by dashed vertical and diagonal lines that show 
movements between cohorts. Rows show cohorts (indicated by solid lines) that 
start (and perhaps finish) within the same cohort/period. Overall, therefore, total 
successfully complete and operating enterprises (TO) were those coming from 
different cohorts: TLn, TLn-r, TIn and TIn-r [where n and r referred to cohorts as 
periods; and r= n-11. 
Figure 7.1 An analysis of the dynamics of enterprise start-up through 
cohorts 
total licensed total under total operational 
implementation 
1 TM TIl T01 
2 TL2 TI2 T02 
--A 
n TLn TIn TOn 
total TL TI TO 
My theory here is that by and large, some IIS licensed projects and UEs that did 
not receive sufficient public agency support to get access to key resources 
dropped out of their cohorts. Translating this model into actual data (see Table 5.1 
in chapter five) meant that between 1992-98 there were a total of 4246 licensed 
projects (TL), 673 projects under implementation (TI) and 1163 completed projects 
(TO). The point here is that some projects may have taken from one to seven years 
to complete the start-up process. Moreover, evidence also showed that a good 
number of IIS licensed projects (around 2410 of them) were inert, that is never 
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initiated enterprise start-up. Based on the foregoing model, below I will show 
estimates of entrepreneurial time saved due to the IIS. 
7.3.3.2 IIS role in cutting lead time for enterprise start-up 
Within the institutional context predictors of duration of enterprise start-up pace 
may include the time required to place import orders and the efficiency of 
importing agencies/processes, time that passes to acquire a site, bank credit and 
utilities like power. Table 7.3 gives some of the lead time estimates for the 
mobilisation of key resources. 
According to the evidence I obtained from the agencies involved, making land 
available (at least in theory) took two months for AEs. Only a few UEs got access 
to land and premises and when that happened it came after long waiting and/or 
higher lease price. EEPCO extended power supply to AEs immediately on 
demand. UEs got power supply at a minimum of 3-4 months following 
applications. Gulilat (1994) reported that machine import took up to 6 months (it 
took AE1 4 months to import machines). As machine import was in part a 
function of access to foreign exchange, and relative to UEs, AEs had quicker access 
to foreign exchange. Consequently, I will argue that, the average lead time for 
machine import by UEs was greater than that of AEs. 
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Table 7.3 Lead times for enterprise start-up75 




acquiring land Regional Govt. 2 months >a year 
machine import EIA/Customs Auth. 6 months >6 months 
credit DBE/CBE 4 months >4 months 
electric power EEPCO 1 month 3-4 month 
Source: Data organised from agencies involved 
However, being a holder of an IIS licence did not always save time for an 
entrepreneur. For example, AE2 started at a much smaller capacity than planned 
in 1994 but it took three more years to complete the project according to the 
original plan. According to the acting manager, as a consequence of a mistake 
made in ordering, time and money were wasted in reordering machines. There 
was a shortage of money to import all the machines required to complete the 
project. UE2, with a view to overcoming these same problems, purchased 
machines from local dealers. Moreover, according UE2 manager, about four 
months of start-up time was saved by not applying for the IIS licence and 
subsequently foreign exchange for machine imports. 
This section highlighted that time is a vital resource to the entrepreneurs, and can 
be wasted due to slow distribution of state controlled resources. The discussion 
showed that for many unassisted entrepreneurs the pace of start-up was made 
unnecessarily longer. As I stated in hypothesis two (H2), the discussion so far 
proved that the IIS licence, in addition to its fiscal benefits, performed two key 
roles: it assisted some entrepreneurs to get access to state controlled resources like 
enterprise site and reduced the average time required to mobilise such resources. 
However, H2 also referred to the IIS licence easing the 'bureaucracy involved in 
75 Lead time is based on the assumption that UEi/AEi pursue similar strategies to resources 
mobilisation. 
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business legalisation'. Hence section 7.4 below specifically looks at whether the IIS 
has achieved this. 
7.4 The role of the IIS in reducing the business legalisation process 
The discussion in this section begins by outlining the business legalisation 
procedures and then looks at the IIS role in this regard. 
7.4.1 Business registration and licensing 
Business registration and licensing were conducted following the commercial 
code of Ethiopia (IGE, 1960). First, as a demonstration of intent, businesses register 
at the Ministry of Trade and Industry or other delegated public agencies prior to 
starting operation and/or trading. Business registration procedures depend on 
the rules governing forms of business organisations such as sole trader and 
limited company. For example, micro-businesses that set up with less than birr 
5000 capital were not required to register (COM, 1997b). But a private limited 
company (in addition to other legal requirements) was required to submit to the 
authorities (a) memorandum and article of association, (b) publication of a notice 
(to third parties) about the formation of a business in a national newspaper. (c) if a 
business had operated in a region other than its origin then it should also register 
with the Ministry of justice. 
Second, to commence production and/or trading a business was required to 
obtain a business licence from Ministry of Trade and Industry or delegated 
agencies. Obtaining a business licence, in addition to being on the business 
register, in some instances required a 'certificate of competence' to run a business 
from the pertinent government institution (COM, 1997a). Third, between business 
registration and licensing, trade name registration was the other requirement to 
be fulfilled. 
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7.4.2 Benefits and costs of business legalisation 
The main thrust of business registration and licensing (as stipulated in FDRE, 
1997) was making businesses legal. Legal businesses are beneficial to the 
government, firstly, as sources of short and long term revenues (that is from 
registration and licence fees and business taxes). Secondly, legalisation creates and 
encourages lawful activities including adherence to public health and safety, 
labour standards and environmental regulations. Thirdly, registration and 
licensing enables the creation of databases on businesses that can be used, among 
other things, for the analysis and design of support for businesses themselves. 
These positive aspects of business legalisation resulted in some costs to the 
entrepreneurs. First, depending on the form of business organisation and capital 
employed, entrepreneurs paid registration and legalisation fees that constituted a 
few hundred birr (Table 7.4)76. 
Table 7.4 Business registration and licence fees 
activity estimated fees (Girr) 
commercial registration 5 (to 105) 
temporary business licence 200 
permanent business licence 25 (to 225) 
trade name registration 5 (to 105) 
IIS licence (AEs only) 200 
Source: FDRE (1997) and COM (1997a). 
Second, and more importantly, entrepreneurs incurred transaction costs in an 
effort to produce evidence of entrepreneurial competence in their chosen business 
activity. Agencies that perform business licensing required 'specific professional 
76 Table 7.4 did not show all business registration and licensing fees. For example, fees for 
licence renewal, summary registration, registration of commercial representation, 
publication of legal notices, etc. were not included. Further, application forms for each type 
of registration or licence cost birr 2. Also note that figures in brackets referred to minimum 
and maximum fees which were based on the amount of paid up capital. 
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qualification or certification of competence'. The purpose of this requirement was 
preventing damage to public health and the national economy (such as 
environmental protection) (FDRE, 1997). 
The institutional cost of business licensing was even more costly when viewed 
within the context of the new devolved government structure of Ethiopia. Federal, 
regional states and local level government structures all competed for and 
replicated the processes of business legalisation. The problem for a new business 
that operated within and outside the region of its origin was that it underwent 
similar legalisation processes over and over again. The experience of the manager 
of UE3 was a good example: 
Recently we lost three cropping seasons simply to get an operating 
licence in Nazareth, Oromia Regional State. We bought premises from 
Nazareth Municipality Office and recruited staff to run the branch. In 
spite of the fact that we have had a federal business licence, 
representatives of the bureaux of agriculture, health and trade and 
industry would not allow us to operate without prior registration and 
obtaining an operation licence from them. For the officials the fact that 
we dealt with chemicals made us a public health risk business. But the 
truth of the matter was that officials were tough on us simply because 
we were legal and professional operators. Trade in food grains were 
not subject to such tough controls. Nor were people who sold chemicals 
and drugs, as side businesses, along with sugar and flour. (Markos, 
Manager of UE3,1998) 
Businesses, as the UE3 manager explained, were not against regulations but over- 
regulations that came even before the business took off. As agencies at all levels 
become registrars and licensing bodies the business community was left with very 
little time to work on the actual implementation of projects. An estimate showed 
that entrepreneurs passed more than 40 steps within and between agencies. And 
the whole legalisation process on average took 3-6 months (Taye Berhanu, 1995: 
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253). All this time, money and effort were prices that business in the formal sector 
paid (and these were in addition to competition from the informal sector). 
Longer processes of registration and licensing also encouraged corruption. The 
experience of AE1 manager was telling: 
My problem was getting a business operating licence. The legalisation 
process put me in the hands of some corrupt individuals in the then 
Addis Ababa municipality office. In order to get the licence the usual 
procedures like safety and sanitary conditions were checked by the 
relevant units. I satisfied all the requirements with some difficulty 
including unnecessary delays and paying bribes on three occasions. 
However, the main difficulty came later when my documents were 
deliberately held back by a lower level official who asked for a huge 
sum of money in return for passing the documents to the Ministry of 
Industry for the licensing process to take effect. I was unhappy about it 
and refused to pay any bribe. In between some three months passed. 
Eventually the excuse for the bribe changed. This time I was told to 
start the clearance all over again because the earlier clearance happened 
to be in the previous calendar year. Unwillingly I paid what was 
demanded but it constituted toor77.... you cannot even complain about 
this matter because the chances of proving your innocence were slim. 
Corrupt officials operate in some kind of networks and if you complain 
about them they will make sure that your business is ruined. 
(Begashaw, 1998). 
AE1 manager believed that staff and officials in public agencies did not appreciate 
what he was trying to do for himself, family and community. It was also the view 
of other entrepreneurs that some bureaucrats saw entrepreneurs as greedy and 
their efforts as unworthy. Those, however, that conversed in terms of public 
policy, whatever their motives may be, were given priority. 
77 Wrongdoing - which, according to traditional belief eventually harms the offender in a 
backlash. 
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AE1's experience, however, was not an isolated case. Corruption was a 
widespread practice (Reporter, 1998). Some bureaucrats considered their services 
to entrepreneurs as favours, not as fulfilling their duties required by the law. 
Bureaucrats received 'incentives' for performing legal duties like leasing land, 
issuing licences, or exempting investors from taxes. Entrepreneurs too paid 
'incentives' to get services that they were entitled to by right. According to the 
newspaper Reporter, up to 10 per cent of some bank loans were appropriated by 
corrupt officials for facilitating the loans. Such prevalence of corruption was 
known to the government but until recently the legal system was weak in 
addressing it. Recently, however, the government started penalising corrupt 
officials (for example, by a minimum of 15 years imprisonment) (Addis Tribune, 
March 20,1998). The erosion of faith in traditional Ethiopian values like toor also 
made corruption worse. 
7.4.3 IIS and business legalisation: the role of One Stop Shop (OSS) facilities 
Did the IIS ease business legalisation processes? In 1996 EIA, in addition to the 
standard fiscal incentives, started delivering a service referred to as a one-stop- 
shop (OSS) (FDRE, 1996a). The OSS, offered only to AEs, was essentially an 
institutional mechanism to deliver existing (but dispersed) business registration 
and licensing processes (as outlined above) in a centralised manner. As I was 
'piloting' my field work, Semunesh, head of a department at EIA, told me that 
since the set-up of the OSS some entrepreneurs used the facility and avoided all 
the bureaucratic processes of business legalisation. I followed up this piece of 
information and was convinced that when entrepreneurs sought the IIS support 
they also looked for the OSS services. However, in my subsequent fieldwork I 
discovered that it was only a handful of AEs and foreign owned companies that 
benefited from the OSS services. For these few AEs the OSS service helped in 
processing registration, operating licences and work permits for expatriate 
employees and hence saved time and money. 
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As far as the link between IIS licence and OSS benefits was concerned, therefore, 
there was very little evidence from case SMEs to report on and discuss. These 
entrepreneurs would have liked easier business legalisation processes but none of 
them benefited from OSS services. The fact that the OSS service started in 1996 
(after the cases studied started full operation) was of no consequence for the 
missing link between the IIS-OSS relationship as suggested in part of hypothesis 
two 'some entrepreneurs sought the support of the IIS... to ease the otherwise 
bureaucratic business legalisation processes'. 
Many entrepreneurs who sought the IIS support would have neither known nor 
anticipated that the IIS licence (through the OSS service) eased the bureaucratic 
business legalisation processes. Between 1992-98 over 4246 entrepreneurs (or start- 
up projects) received an IIS licence, 63 per cent of which received licences before 
the set-up of the OSS service in 1996. The rate at which entrepreneurs received IIS 
licences, on average 707 per year, did not show a particular increase following the 
introduction of the OSS service either. In fact a record number of 987 
entrepreneurs received IIS licences in 1995 before the OSS was introduced. 
Furthermore, in 1996 there was a new business registration and licensing 
procedure in the making. Hence regions like Oromia did not rush to introduce 
OSS but waited for the enactment of the new law. The new registration and 
licensing procedure (similar in content to the OSS services) was enacted in 1997 
and its implementation and supervision powers were given to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MTI). Consequently, since 1997, the bulk of business 
registration and legalisation (for both AEs and UEs) has been run by the MTI and 
the bureaux of trade and industry. It was obvious that the MTI and bureaux of 
trade and industry were entirely separate from the institutions that deliver IIS 
support to businesses. It can, therefore, be concluded that there was no systematic 
link between seeking the IIS support and the introduction of the OSS services. 
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Consequently, the hypothesis that 'some entrepreneurs sought the support of the 
IIS... to ease the otherwise bureaucratic business legalisation processes' was not 
supported by the evidence. 
But, even in 1997/98, why were operations of the IIS/OSS limited? As I found out 
there were several difficulties associated with IIS/OSS. Firstly, relinquishing 
regional and sectoral powers over business legalisation to the OSS institution has 
become a political issue. For example, the Addis Ababa regional government (at 
least while this fieldwork was in process in 1998) was not willing to transfer the 
business legalisation procedure to the EIA (hence OSS). The main issue was the 
conflict between the objectives of raising revenue and promoting investment. In 
the view of Addis Ababa regional government the EIA was undermining its 
revenue sources by offering fiscal incentives and subsidising resources like land to 
businesses. 
Secondly, the OSS set-up was over-centralised in Addis Ababa and/or a few 
regional capitals. Entrepreneurs (for example, from remote coffee growing zones 
like Gimbi) had to travel hundreds of kilometres to Addis Ababa and fulfil (shop 
for) all business licensing requirements. Thirdly, OSS services were narrowly 
conceptualised to cover only the business legalisation process. At least services 
like providing potential information for business start-ups should have been part 
of the OSS functions. 
Finally it was important to note that there was a minority of people that would 
lose out if transparent and streamlined bureaucracy (as in OSS) was put in place. 
In the long business registration and licensing process, entrepreneurs and 
bureaucrats come face to face at several stages. According to Tahir Aman (1998) 
some of these entrepreneurs and bureaucrats were not keen on the very concept of 
the OSS. Even when easier legal avenues were open, Tahir argued, it was in the 
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interest of some of these entrepreneurs to conduct business informally, including 
through offering bribes to officials and securing unfair advantages. 
Conclusion on IIS moderating role on resource mobilisation: Originally the IIS 
was meant to provide support to enterprises (at start-up and early growth stages) 
by way of exemptions from paying duties and income taxes. The discussion in this 
chapter convincingly showed that sometimes the value of the IIS licence was 
superior to the holder when used, not as it was intended to serve as a device for 
tax breaks, but as a moderator of access to state controlled resources like a 
serviced enterprise site. Based on the evidence from case SMEs, Table 7.5 
summarises these intended and unintended benefits of the IIS. As chapter six 
showed, although not all new start-up enterprises benefited, some enterprises did 
receive the intended IIS benefits as those given in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5 Summary of intended and moderated benefits of the IIS 
enterprise intended IIS Roles and Benefits (H1) IIS Moderated Benefits (H2) 
AE1 ... exemptions from paying duties, ... access to loans and foreign 
... the feeling of being supported like 
exchange 
advice on project feasibility study 
AE2 ... exemptions 
from paying duties, ... access to land and utilities 
... the 
feeling of being supported (especially power and water) 
AE3 ... exemption from paying duties ... support in land 
acquisition 
Source: Organised from interviews made with the entrepreneurs 
A more grounded exploration of enterprise start-up processes and the IIS system 
led to the enquiry into an additional relationship (other than fiscal incentives) 
between the IIS and IIS assisted enterprise start-ups and proved that some 
entrepreneurs sought the support of the IIS, in addition to the fiscal incentives, for 
its role as a gateway to resources (land, credit and utility) required for enterprise 
start-up. 
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AEs involved in this study (and many other AEs) received these additional 
supports. As this chapter demonstrated some IIS licence holders, with the backing 
of institutions, politicians and bureaucrats, were allowed to have a special 
(subsidised and/or quicker) access to state owned resources /services like land. 
More importantly, the value of these IIS moderated additional benefits, when 
appropriated, were superior to the intended fiscal incentives of the IIS. As I 
consistently showed, from IIS fiscal incentives (from tax duties alone) some 
entrepreneurs saved up to 13 per cent of the start-up cost of machinery. But free 
access to an enterprise site alone, on average, saved an entrepreneur about 18 per 
cent of all start-up costs of an enterprise in Addis Ababa. Therefore, hypothesis 
two held but with minor proviso that, as I originally expected, IIS did not ease the 
bureaucracy for business legalisation. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Earlier chapters clearly showed that the IIS was originally meant to increase 
'modern' industry. It was further developed to help with indigenisation and SMEs 
start ups. Now this chapter demonstrated that the IIS license was used to relax 
state rules over the allocation of scarce resources like land. Consequently, some 
AEs got those resources at cheaper prices and quicker than UEs. However, there 
was barely any evidence to confirm that the IIS licence actually helped to ease the 
business legalisation process through the OSS services. This was because (i) the IIS 
and OSS services, except in limited instances, come under independent agencies 
and (ii) the short time that OSS services were put in action. 
The chapter also looked into how economic and non-economic decision making 
by politicians and entrepreneurs influenced enterprise start-ups. The discussion 
showed that in many instances entrepreneurs' access to state controlled resources 
like land was made in exchange for promoting some 'public interest' and/or 
recognition of the legitimacy of the system. Moreover, using the fluid nature of 
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property right over land and the vague distribution guidelines, some rent-seeking 
behaviour was observed, for example, some corrupt bureaucrats received bribes. 
The consequences of these exchanges were that entrepreneurs who were not likely 
to influence politicians and bureaucrats (like owners of smaller enterprises) lost 
out. 
Many issues also emerged from the foregoing discussion: that, firstly, access to 
and cost of land has become the main bottleneck to enterprise development in the 
country. This meant that potential incentives to enterprise start-up and growth lie 
in addressing constraints like access to land and making land available using 
transparent and consistent criteria. 
Secondly, owing to the land lease system, exit from business has become as 
prohibitive as entry into business. Transferring privately developed land also 
requires the new entrant to get into a new lease deal with the government. But 
there were no clear provisions as to how to handle the property (buildings and 
premises) of the exiting entrepreneur. Consequently, some entrepreneurs found 
themselves tied up in their first lease deal and business indefinitely. 
The discussion in this chapter also showed the contradiction between short-run 
and long term objectives, as in revenue foregone today versus investment created 
for tomorrow. In this regard agencies like EIA that distribute investment 
incentives and the land lease boards of regional governments sometimes worked 
in opposite directions. Particularly in Addis Ababa, motivated by higher 
revenues, the land lease board put up land lease prices at the expense of deterring 
enterprise start-ups. The next, and concluding chapter of the thesis, looks at such 
bigger issues that emerged from the discussions in the thesis. 
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8. Thesis Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
Ethiopia was a pioneer in 1950s Africa in the use of investment incentives to 
attract FDI in 'modern' industry and hence technology transfer. It was also a 
pioneer in promoting its indigenous enterprises in the early 1960s. However, it 
used the same investment incentives for this as it had for attracting FDI and 
technology transfer. When the IIS was reintroduced in the early 1990s, first, it 
failed to address problems of SMEs such as entrepreneurship development. It also 
failed to learn from other countries' experiences on local and SMEs development. 
As in the previous decades Ethiopian policy makers provided local enterprises 
and foreign investors with the same old investment incentives (that came in the 
form of exemptions from the payment of import duties and income taxes). The 
core objectives of these incentives were to encourage enterprise start-up and 
growth in selected industries and locations. 
There were two major reasons for undertaking this thesis. First, very little was 
known about the rationales for and consequences of investment incentives on 
enterprise start-up and growth in Ethiopia. Second, investment incentives as an 
idea of enterprise support initiative was a contested concept. That is, unlike in 
some developed countries, the theory and practice on investment incentives did 
not favour the use of these instruments in developing countries like Ethiopia. 
These concerns, among others, led to the formulation of two hypotheses. First, it 
was proposed that owing to the social and economic constraints to setting up 
enterprises in Ethiopia, the influence of investment incentives on the timing, type, 
location and size of IIS assisted SMEs was limited. Second, based on grounded 
exploration of the functions of the IIS, it was hypothesised that some SME 
founders sought the support of the IIS, in addition to its fiscal incentives, for its 
role as gateway to state controlled and allocated resources like enterprise sites and 
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bank credit. Moreover, the research raised questions about the link between 
enterprise start-up (and early growth) and IIS support. 
Answers to the key research questions and the exploration of the hypotheses were 
based on wide ranging sources of evidence. Macro statistics on 4246 IIS licensed 
projects over the period 1992-98 were used. Moreover, new evidence was 
generated from a follow up in-depth investigation of six case study SMEs, and 
extensive interviews made with senior enterprise policy makers in Ethiopia. As a 
methodological device, the thesis explored possible influences of the IIS on the 
process of enterprise start-up by identifying stages of enterprise idea generation, 
physical construction of projects and commencing operation. The thesis also drew 
on theories that showed strengths of SMEs (such as in job creation) and provided 
the rationales for agency intervention, and different segments of the disciplines of 
economics and social psychology that underpinned the complex factors that 
motivate entrepreneurs to start up SMEs and influence their choices of industry, 
location and size of enterprise. The rest of this chapter presents a summary of the 
findings, conclusion and recommendations of the thesis. 
8.2 Summary of major findings of the thesis 
The rationales for investment incentives: The IIS had several objectives including 
using and maintaining natural resources, creating more jobs and promoting a 
balanced development of regions. However, the thesis found that the rationales 
behind these objectives were neither explicitly articulated nor had adequate 
means of implementation. The IIS objectives also suggested ambiguous outcomes. 
The dimensions of enterprises (industry, location and size) that the thesis 
investigated were supported by limited tax incentives. Therefore, from the start, 
investment incentives did not promise significant impacts on enterprise start up 
and growth. 
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New evidence generated for the thesis showed that, among other things, the IIS 
was meant to enhance the sustainability of resource use, promote enterprise 
competition, strengthen linkages and spillover effects across locations and 
activities, and protect and encourage indigenous enterprise development. Some of 
these reasons for investment incentives, especially those referring to 
sustainability, resource use and competition, add to the theoretical literature 
reviewed in chapter two. 
Answers to the questions and exploration of hypotheses of the thesis. Although 
it lacked adequate means of implementation, the IIS was meant to influence the 
timing of enterprise start up and entrepreneurs' decisions over the choices of 
location, activity type and size of enterprise. Following hypothesis one, the 
evidence and discussions made in the thesis showed that: 
First, IIS had hardly any impact on the timing of enterprise start-up. 
There were more enterprise start ups in the 1990s. But there was hardly any 
evidence to suggest that there was a causal relationship (except conjectural) 
between the IIS and the increase in enterprise start up over 1992-98. The evidence 
says it all: over 1992-98 there were 4642 IIS licensed projects, of which 1163 (27 per 
cent) started up. Of the actual start ups only 419 (about 10 per cent of total IIS 
licensed) drew on the benefits from IIS assistance. Most importantly, as discussed 
below, those that drew on IIS assistance were large scale projects that hardly 
needed incentives to start up. 
The thesis found at a macro level that real factors that contributed to the increase 
in enterprise start-up were the cessation of the civil war in 1991 and the 
subsequent introduction of a better environment for the private sector. Moreover, 
some adverse effects of the adjustment programme conducted during this period 
(like retrenchment) forced some members of the former civil service to become 
'entrepreneurs' and set up enterprises. In short, enterprise level triggers for 
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founding SMEs (as evidenced from the case studies) were factors like threat of 
losing employment and/or presence of opportunities for starting up an 
enterprise, but not the provision of investment incentives. 
Second, there was barely any evidence of IIS's influence over entrepreneurs' decisions on 
the choices of location and activity type of the new SMEs. 
Based on macro statistics and enterprise level evidence, the thesis found that for 
many SME founders, formal/informal training, accumulated experience and 
interest in the chosen sector, the threat of unemployment and market 
opportunities were some of the factors that provoked start- up in a particular 
activity type. At the national and regional levels the incentives were granted 
simply because the entrepreneurs happened to have chosen activities that the 
authorities preferred to encourage through the IIS. Moreover, over 1992-98 the 
scheme appeared to have contributed to a small shift in the traditional spatial 
pattern of enterprises, creating relatively more enterprises outside the dominant 
region Addis Ababa. However, new evidence that this research generated showed 
that central locations like Addis Ababa relatively lost share in the spatial pattern 
of enterprises due to at least the following reasons: 
" lack of access to and/or exceptionally high cost of enterprise sites in Addis 
Ababa deterred enterprise start-up. And, 
" relative to Addis Ababa some other regions performed better but not due to 
the IIS. Regions that were ravaged by internal conflict like Tigray hugely 
benefited from the cessation of civil war since the early 1990s and created a 
better environment and more confidence for enterprise start-up. 
The evidence documented in the thesis also showed that a vast area of the country 
that was meant to be most assisted through the IIS did not gain from IIS benefits 
and hence did not improve its share in the national distribution of enterprises 
(especially manufacturing enterprises). 
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Finally, although the generalisation was limited to the cases studied, the accounts 
of the entrepreneurs demonstrated that the IIS did not influence their location 
decisions because IIS location benefits were too small to compensate for costs like 
loss of central market and better infrastructure. 
Third, the IIS did have a marginal influence over the size of an enterprise. 
This study found that the IIS positively contributed to the financial resources of 
the entrepreneurs that marginally influenced enterprise size at start-up. This 
influence was created in two ways, first, duty exemptions from importing capital 
goods increased savings to the entrepreneurs by about 13 per cent of the total cost 
of machinery. And second, with a view to meeting IIS entry criteria, some 
entrepreneurs that intended to set up relatively small enterprises increased their 
start-up capital. But the downside of this, in terms of maximising job creation, was 
that IIS assisted enterprises adopted relatively advanced technology that did save 
labour. 
Overall, based on the foregoing conclusions, hypothesis one (Hl) was confirmed: 
the influence of investment incentives on the timing, type, location and size of IIS 
assisted SME was limited. Moreover, this conclusion was broadly consistent with 
that which emerged from studies on the impacts of investment incentives in 
developing countries. 
Fourth, the IIS mediated access to resources and eased the bureaucratic procedures thereof 
In confirmation of hypothesis two (H2)78, the IIS licence and structure were 
instrumental in providing some entrepreneurs with subsidised access to 
resources. The thesis found that entrepreneurs that had free access to enterprise 
sites saved about 18 per cent of the total enterprise start-up cost (whereas IIS free 
78 As discussed in chapter seven, part of H2 that referred to easing the bureaucratic business 
legalisation processes was not confirmed. 
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duty import generated about 13 per cent cost of the goods imported). Additional 
institutional support provided to some IIS assisted entrepreneurs also 
considerably cut the lead time for acquiring state controlled and allocated 
resources like power and enterprise sites. 
Evaluating the performance of the IIS: In the thesis, IIS support take-up rate, 
level of support delivered and revenue foregone were used as criteria to assess the 
performance of the IIS. As discussed above, during 1992-98, the IIS gross take-up 
rate was low, that is only 27 per cent of IIS licensed projects started up, and about 
10 per cent of start ups (that is 419) drew on the IIS benefit. This performance rate 
also compared badly with a similar criterion used in the 1960s where almost all IIS 
licensees drew on the IIS benefits and implemented projects. The thesis, therefore, 
concluded that the claim by the investment authorities that IIS assisted thousands 
of enterprise start ups over 1992-98 was simply misleading and not sustained by 
the evidence. 
On the type and level of the IIS support delivered, entrepreneurs' benefit was 
largely drawn from duty free import of capital goods as these accrued to them 
following direct importing of goods (as the law required) by the entrepreneurs 
themselves. Consequently, operations of local dealers in imported capital goods 
were adversely affected as they lost their business now taken over by the 
entrepreneurs themselves. As a consequence of importing capital goods, 
entrepreneurs incurred additional costs like loss of advisory services on 
installation and repair and maintenance that they would have received from 
specialised capital importing local companies. Moreover, there were also 
incidences where the entrepreneurs made expensive mistakes in the specification 
of the orders for capital goods which was largely due to lack of experience in 
importing machines. 
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At the national level the thesis uncovered new evidence on the level of tax 
revenue foregone due to the IIS. Accordingly, over 1992-98 from exemption on 
imported capital goods alone, an estimated birr 526 million revenue has been 
foregone. Moreover, over 90 per cent of the revenue foregone (as well as other 
indirect IIS assistance) went to assist a few large scale projects in Addis Ababa and 
Tigray that were least dependent on government assistance to start up enterprises. 
Evidence from the case studies also strongly suggested that income tax based IIS 
benefits were limited because shortly after start-up (that is during the grace 
period) enterprises barely produced any profits and entrepreneurs were unable 
(or unwilling) to comply with the costly regulations that required financial record 
keeping. Consequently, guiding enterprise start ups across selected locations and 
industries through IIS income tax incentives was largely ineffective. 
8.3 Conclusion and Recommendation 
The two major conclusions that emerged from this study were that, first, the 
influence of investment incentives on the timing, type, location and size of IIS 
assisted SME was limited. And second, the IIS licence and structure played a vital 
role in mediating entrepreneurial access to enterprise start up resources. But what 
does the low impact of the IIS suggest, and more importantly, what lessons 
emerge from this study? With a view to leading to the recommendations of the 
thesis, the next section deals with these questions. 
8.3.1 A re-examination of issues and the bigger picture 
The reasons why the IIS proposition was flawed and why the IIS mediated access 
to resources were very much interrelated. The thesis showed that investment 
incentives did not influence the behaviour of entrepreneurs because, first, many 
entrepreneurs' decisions relating to starting enterprises were triggered by their 
experience, resources and attributes like education level. These factors, in turn, 
influenced the limited take up rate of the IIS assistance. The fact that financial 
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resources were so meagre (and external financing so inadequate) also limited the 
size of enterprises as well as opportunities to look for activities and locations that 
were less familiar to the entrepreneurs. Infrastructure and social and 
psychological reasons (such as entrepreneurs' attachment to areas where they 
lived) also limited SME founders' mobility between sectors and locations. 
Therefore, as discussed above, it was only a few projects of significant size and 
mobile across sectors and locations that appropriated most of the IIS support. It 
follows, therefore, the IIS barely added to SMEs start-up and growth in Ethiopia. 
Second, the IIS licence mediated entrepreneurial access to resources that the 
government controlled and allocated like enterprise sites. This was in part because 
the IIS, as a single-theme enterprise support initiative, did not consider the 
broader problems of enterprise start up and growth (like policy related problems 
and inadequate technical and managerial skills of entrepreneurs). Entrepreneurs' 
access to resources was also facilitated in exchange for the entrepreneurs 
promoting the interests of the government including recognition of its stance on 
the control and allocation of resources (chiefly land). 
Therefore, among other things, limited size and entrepreneurial quality of SME 
founders, the constraining environment for enterprise start up and IIS assistance 
being limited to physical capital accumulation made the IIS initiative and 
objectives largely unsuccessful. Reflecting on the mistakes in enterprise policy 
making and constraints to the implementation of the IIS, below I draw out the 
lessons from the study (these lessons also have broader implications for enterprise 
development). In the discussion, I focus not on rejecting government enterprise 
support initiatives per se but on why and when intervention in the enterprise 
sector is likely to fail. 
The major mistakes in enterprise policy making (especially the IIS) and constraints 
to the implementation of the IIS were: 
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First, over-identification of the problems of enterprise start-up 
The thesis documented a wide range of constraints to enterprise development 
including lack of serviced enterprise sites and bureaucratic government 
regulations. Without sufficiently involving stakeholders (particularly the 
entrepreneurs), policy makers singled out shortage of investment as the main 
problem of enterprise development. And thereby they assisted enterprise 
development by subsidising investment in physical assets at start up and early 
growth stages enterprises. The emphasis on physical assets accumulation, albeit 
essential, was misplaced because, among other things, these assets cannot be used 
without the technical and managerial abilities of the entrepreneurs. 
Second, a limited range of tax incentives was used to act on multiple problems and 
government objectives. 
The government used investment incentives to address multiple objectives like 
regionally balanced enterprise start-up. Most of these objectives were poorly 
matched by the means to implement them. Moreover, by way of assisting 
entrepreneurs, the government chose to enter into a unique relationship with 
them and provided some of them with a gateway to resources. The consequences 
of this state-private sector relationship was significant. In the short run, 
entrepreneurs that would not otherwise have required IIS assistance for enterprise 
start-up joined the scheme. The long term consequence was that, in a piecemeal 
way and against the constitution of the country, the IIS was serving as a device to 
change the structure of property rights over land in favour of private ownership. 
Third, institutions that promoted investment incentives were resistant to change and less 
keen to learn from experience 
The Ethiopian Investment Authority and the regional offices gradually became 
larger and centralised. Moreover, as the IIS was reintroduced in the early 1990s it 
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failed to address problems of SMEs such as in entrepreneurship development. It 
also failed to learn from other countries' experiences on local and SMEs 
development. Instead Ethiopian policy makers used the same old investment 
incentives (as they did in the 1950s and 1960s) to support local enterprises, SMEs 
development and attracting FDI. In short IIS policy and institutions resisted 
changing with the changing environment to provide entrepreneurs with support 
in the areas they needed most. 
Four, endemic problems of the Ethiopian enterprise economy as constraints to 
implementing enterprise support initiatives 
In addition to the immediate IIS related problems, there were endemic problems 
in the enterprise economy. These problems included misguided government 
policies such as regulatory barriers at entry and long established cultural and 
religious barriers such as the stigmatisation of entrepreneurs. Added to these were 
national structural problems such as poor physical infrastructure (like power and 
roads) and institutional structures (banking, business information system, 
promotional services, advocacy agencies and institutions for developing technical 
and managerial skills). 
The bigger issues that emerged from the thesis were, therefore, how to identify 
enterprise development problems, and the means to address these problems 
(including human and financial resources and institutions). Equally important 
was the issue of coordinating enterprise support policies across themes. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the lessons that emerged from this thesis 
were: 
" that if an enterprise support initiative does not fit into the socio-economic 
environment (as the IIS largely did not) then the initiative is bound to be 
ineffective. 
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if an enterprise support initiative over-identifies enterprise or entrepreneurs' 
problems or becomes too prescriptive (as the IIS did) then it is likely to be 
ineffective. And, 
if an enterprise support initiative attempts to address multiple objectives but 
with inadequate and inappropriate means (as the IIS did) then it is unlikely 
to meet its objectives. 
The foregoing discussion and these lessons form the perspective that this study 
suggests for the future development of the Ethiopian enterprise economy. 
8.3.2 Perspectives on the enterprise support agenda 
This thesis on the role and impact of the Ethiopian investment incentives scheme 
showed a distinctive source of enterprise support policy that may be referred to as 
promoter-centred. The scheme, which was an innovation at the time, emerged in 
1950. And with the exception of 1975-90 it prevailed as the most important 
enterprise support initiative in the land. However, even when it was reintroduced 
in the 1990s it was driven by the political decision making domain with very little 
contribution from the broader system of enterprise development (comprising the 
entrepreneurs, professional associations, chambers of commerce, financial and 
training institutions, etc. ). 
Moreover, a scheme that was originally meant to increase 'modern' industry got 
added to to help indigenisation and SMEs start ups. However, the basic 
instruments remained and were not up to the bigger job. Hence the IIS ended up 
in the 1990s being used as much as a way of getting 'formal' approval for an 
investment (that can then be used to get land, energy supply, etc. ) as to develop 
enterprises. 
This thesis suggests that, as a perspective to enterprise development, an enterprise 
support initiative should primarily consider needs, potentials and constraints of 
the enterprises and entrepreneurs. Stakeholders (such as the entrepreneurs, 
professional associations, financial and training institutions, relevant government 
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and non-governmental agencies) have to take part in enterprise policy initiation, 
decision and implementation. This is a difficult (but necessary) task because in 
practice it means debate over enterprise development problems, potentials, 
identification of solutions and beneficiaries, resources and institutions has to be 
widely carried out and the negotiated outcome of such debates between and 
within stakeholders should result in enterprise development initiatives. As it 
stands in Ethiopia institutional arrangements for making stakeholders participate 
in the policy making processes (especially for small enterprises) hardly exist. Even 
within the small circle of policy makers there has barely been enough time given 
for discussion on enterprise policies79. 
The background research to this thesis (chapter three) showed that existing and 
emerging enterprise support initiatives (like engineering design and tools 
enterprise) were barely coordinated. Moreover, none of these initiatives were 
demand driven nor had adequate rationales to merit the commitment of 
resources. Nor were the few enterprise initiatives that the country had based on 
networks and collectives that minimised costs and maximised external benefits. 
Furthermore, due to lack of coordination and central guidance, conflict between 
government agencies was created (as between the EIA that offered investment 
incentives and the Ministry of Finance and the land lease boards that lost 
revenues). Therefore, as a second perspective, the thesis suggests that enterprise 
promotion initiatives need to be coordinated. 
The benefits from coordinating enterprise support initiatives is well documented 
(see for example, Evans, 1992 and Rodrik, 1995). In fact lack of coordination and 
guidance for enterprise development could be the key difference between 
79 Since the mid 1990s some interested parties have started commenting about policies through 
the media, and have written to and/or phoned the relevant agencies that initiated the 
policies (Amare Wodajo, 1998). Such initiatives need to be encouraged. 
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Ethiopia and South East Asian countries that followed similar but successful 
investment incentives schemes (Evans, 1992 and Rodrik, 1995). For example, 
according to Rodrik (1995), South Korea and Taiwan increased private return for 
investment by removing impediments to entry and coordinating and leading 
investment into socially desired areas. Both South Korea and Taiwan used 
comprehensive incentives schemes through which they created the investment 
climate, offered a range of incentives like cheap credit, insured risky investment in 
specific sectors, provided tax incentives such as reduced income tax from 
company earnings, and offered holidays for tax exemptions. Partly because 
Ethiopia's scheme was not as comprehensive and coordinated as that of South 
Korea and Taiwan, it bore little fruit. 
I reiterate that the explanations for inadequate enterprise development in Ethiopia 
were many including errors in policy making, cultural barriers, resources 
limitations and natural disasters. But solutions were not as diverse and 
coordinated as they should have been. Consequently, many discrete Ethiopian 
enterprise policies suffered successive pitfalls. For example, there was excessive 
sector and spatial dichotomy. Policy making, as showed in this thesis, lacked 
evidence and merit to suggest manufacturing should be promoted over 
agriculture or the other way round. Similarly, there was very little evidence for 
the centre-periphery dichotomy nor whether the policies actually produced 




First, change the paradigm of the enterprise support system, and place enterprise 
development at the heart of social and economic development policy 
At the heart of this recommendation is change in the paradigm of the enterprise 
support system (the thinking, institutions and instruments of support)80. This 
change needs to recognise, first, that the critical mass of entrepreneurs is small 
and needs wide ranging support. As demonstrated in the thesis, the current 
emphasis on encouraging enterprise development through subsidising physical 
asset accumulation may add to entrepreneurs' resources but it is not going to 
increase the number of entrepreneurs (especially SME founders). The evidence 
from the case studies consistently demonstrated that the major driving forces of 
enterprise start ups were entrepreneurs' technical and managerial skills, and 
internally generated resources (including finance). Moreover, enterprise start ups 
were supported where there was better infrastructure, market and a broader 
enabling environment. The implications are clear: assist enterprise development 
through the developing infrastructure, the education system (particularly 
technical education), eliminating bureaucratic constraints. 
Second, the perception and idiom 'industrialisation is the engine of growth' needs 
some consideration. To create dynamism in the economy Ethiopia needs 
enterprises of all sizes (not just larger manufacturing enterprises). The 
industrialisation drive (often meaning manufacturing enterprises) is desirable, but 
needs to be part of the whole enterprise economy. SMEs in all industries, 
particular for their strengths in job creation, assist in addressing the catalogue of 
80 Removing the privileges of tax exemptions from duties on imported capital goods and 
company tax is not what is suggested here (as this would cause adverse reactions from the 
entrepreneurs and multinational financial institutions like the World Bank). More 
importantly, it is the fundamental thinking that gives utmost importance to the IIS initiative 
and the huge institution that supports it that need changing. 
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development problems that the country faces. It is such a broader view on 
enterprise development that leads to the consideration of a juxtaposition of factors 
(like the development of entrepreneurship by addressing destructive cultural 
practices and bureaucratic constraints). 
Finally, involving stakeholders (professional associations, enterprises, NGOs, 
government at all levels, relevant departments such education) in policy 
development and implementation avoids mistakes in policy making and 
maximises the dividends from policy initiatives. It is suggested that these views 
on enterprise development need to be placed at the heart of wider social and 
economic development policy making in the country. 
Second, create an enterprise development structure. 
Such a structure (an 'enterprise development agency') needs to perform a wide 
raging functions like attracting inward investment and local enterprise 
development, as for example, Scottish Enterprise does (McQuaid, 1997). 
Moreover, such structure has to work with stakeholders, coordinate enterprise 
initiatives at all levels and produce pragmatic and cost effective solutions to 
concrete problems. Such a structure should assist the development of demand led, 
and well financed enterprise initiatives. Moreover, it is also important for an 
enterprise development agency to see ways in which indigenous institutions (like 
ikoub) are imaginatively used in resource mobilisation for enterprise 
development. 
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Third, critically re-examine property rights issues especially those related to land. 
Even within existing ownership patterns, just and timely allocation of land makes 
more difference to enterprise start-up and growth than the IIS did. 
Finally, I strongly recommend that an enterprise support initiative should be regularly 
monitored, and also occasionally evaluated to ensure that it has created impacts. 
Taking the foregoing recommendations on board is a hugely challenging task and 
requires resources (people, finance and institutions). My view on this is that part 
of the essential resources already exist, for example, EIA structure and staff can be 
redeployed to fit these recommendations. Most of all, the emphasis on promoting 
investment incentives has to be balanced by providing such assistance as relevant 
information, advice and training that the entrepreneurs require. Moreover, 
without dwelling on the details, additional resources have to be generated to 
support key areas of enterprise development (as in energy sources development). 
8.4 Limits to generalisation and agenda for further research 
In terms of its sources of evidence and methodological devices, this thesis on the 
role and impact of investment incentives on enterprise start-up and growth in 
Ethiopia was the first comprehensive study undertaken. Compelling evidence 
emerges which justifies the formulation of generalisations about the role and 
impact of investment incentives on the sections of Ethiopian enterprises (SMEs) 
studied. 
In brief the conclusions of the study were that, first, the influence of investment 
incentives on the timing, industry, location and size of IIS assisted SME was 
limited. This conclusion has significant implications not only for Ethiopia but also 
for many LDCs that extensively use the instrument of investment incentives 
(especially a small range of tax exemptions) to assist their enterprise sector across 
selected industries and regions. Second, and on a more positive note, the IIS 
297 
licence and structure played an important role in mediating entrepreneurial access 
to enterprise start up resources. These conclusions are testimonies to the fact that 
the relevant research questions were answered and the hypotheses were explored, 
and hence the objectives of the study were achieved. However, some factors limit 
whether the conclusions made about the role and impact of the IIS in Ethiopia 
apply to other LDCs. Some of these factors that limit generalisation and require 
further research are: 
First, for the reason discussed in chapter one, some elements of the IIS were not 
sufficiently explored. For example, IIS impacts on indigenous but large scale 
enterprises and foreign direct investment were not adequately researched. 
Enterprise growth in the thesis was also narrowly applied to the formative stage 
of IIS assisted SMEs. Finally, the thesis did not thoroughly study all the possible 
indirect impacts of the IIS on enterprise development. Future research should 
consider these areas. 
Second, clearly the conclusions of the study, in particular that referring to the 
limited influence of investment incentives on the industry and location of SMEs, 
were broadly consistent with those emerging from studies on developing 
countries (with the exception of some Southeast Asian countries like South Korea 
where investment incentives seemed to have worked). However, the available 
country studies on the role and impacts of investment incentives were generally 
few in number and often considered limited aspects of investment incentives like 
spatial effects. Therefore, more comprehensive studies are required to establish 
generalisable roles and impacts of investment incentives in LDCs. Furthermore, 
the case for more research emerges from the fact that one of the important 
conclusions of the thesis, that is the IIS licence and structure played a vital role in 
mediating entrepreneurial access to enterprise start up resources, rested on the 
particular setting for enterprise development put in place in Ethiopia (this setting, 
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like the procedures for access to enterprise sites, may not necessarily be the same 
in other countries). Therefore, any generalisation about the overall role and 
impact of investment incentives needs to take account of the results of such 
studies. 
Third, and outside the IIS system, areas that need future research and surveys in 
Ethiopia include the birth and attrition rates of enterprises (these were not 
available to build a background analysis on the study of Ethiopian enterprises). 
Several impact based studies on existing enterprise support initiatives also need to 
be considered. Most important of these is the initiative that seeks to create an 
indigenous technology base for the development of SMEs (recall that the IIS's 
fundamental proposition largely rested on technology transfer). This initiative is 
promoted by the Ethiopian Engineering Design and Tools Enterprise (EEDTE). 
Therefore, it will be interesting to study the extent to which the EEDTE has 
created the environment that produces technology appropriate to the Ethiopian 
conditions. 
To conclude, it has to be noted that, in spite of its constraints, there are prospects 
for enterprise development in Ethiopia. These prospects are accentuated by, 
among other things, a huge supply of low wage labour, land and land based 
resources, high domestic demand for consumer goods, and an improved political 
climate for enterprise development. It is hoped, therefore, that the conclusions 
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PART ONE: GENERAL INFORMATION 
1. Name of the enterprise: ......................................................................................... 
2. Address of the enterprise: Woreda and Kebele ................................................ 
House No .................................................................. 
Tel .............................................................................. 
Fax: ............................................................................. 
P. O. Box .................................................................... 
3. Name(s) of owner(s) ................................................................................................ 
4. Name(s) of manager(s) ........................................................................................... 
................................................................................................. 
5. Date of establishment .............................................................................................. 
6. Sector and sub-sector of the enterprise ................................................................ 
7. Major product/service of the enterprise: 
Product/service 1 ........................................................................................ 
Product/service 2 ............... '......................................................................... 
Product/service 3 ........................................................................................ 
9. Numbers of activity lines: 
Branches of production/service units ...................................................... 
Branches of dist. /sales units ...................................................................... 
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PART TWO: THE ROAD TO ENTERPRISE START-UP 
Section I: Why and how to start up an enterprise? 
1. What motivated you to set up this enterprise? 
2. Explain and rank the importance of the following motives in setting up this 
enterprise: 
(a) the desire to be independent 
(b) threat of unemployment 
(c) financial motives 
(d) providing jobs to relatives and others 
(e) satisfaction in enterprise building 
(f) changes in public policy: o/w 
- the general drive to creating a capitalist society 
- provision of investment incentives 
[Use a scale for ranking, where 1=not important, 2=not very important, 
3=important, 4=very important] 
3. Please provide the following information about the owners' characteristics 
[Note that S=success, and F=failure, and list as many major owners as 
possible] 
Owner sex age education business 
experience 







4. Amount of financial capital raised for the set-up of the enterprise (by major 











5. Please state if you have owned (and thus deployed) the following resources 
for the set-up of this enterprise: 







6. Which of the following resources did you have to acquire for the start-up of 
the enterprise? [m=month, and y=year, and give as many items as possible 
for each category of resource] 
Resource Supporting Appl. Permit no. of fees Was 
(consulted) made granted visits paid invt. 






(d) equipment (i) 




(f) utilities (i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(g) bank credit 
(h) foreign 
exchange 
(i) export or 
import licence 
(j) other 
7. If you had to had to acquire land, please describe the procedures and 
challenges (from start to finish) you went through. 
323 
8. Please give estimates of time taken for the following: 
(a) thinking about and deciding on setting up the enterprise 
(b) implementing the project (site development - housing the enterprise, 
etc. ) 
9. What were the problems you faced: 
(a) to get ahead with setting-up the enterprise? 
(b) during project implementation? 
10. Becoming a legal entity: 
(a) What is the legal form of the enterprise? And why did you choose this 
particular legal form? 
(b) Please explain the procedures and challenges (from start to finish) you 
went through to get registered as a legal business (including procedures of 
host ministries). 
11. Why did you select this particular activity (sector)? 
12. Why did you select this location? 
Section II: Investment Incentives and Enterprises Start-up 
A: General Information 
1. While you were preparing to establish an enterprise, were you aware of 
government provision of the investment incentives scheme? 
(a) government's provision of support in general? If yes, at what stage (in 
relation to developing your business ideas) and how did you hear about it? 
(b) government's provision of support in your proposed activity area? If yes, 
at what stage (in relation to developing your business ideas) and how did 
you hear about it? 
2. Is your enterprise supported by the investment incentives scheme? If yes, in 
what particular ways? 
(a) direct exemptions (including duties, and income taxes) 
(b) indirect supports (provide detailed accounts such as accesses to utilities if 
there were any) 
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3. Please provide information on major imports (or purchases) made for the 
set-up of the enterprise. 
(a) purchase/imports of value duty other duty and 
equipment and machinery (birr) rate tax tax paid 




(b) purchase/imports of vehicles 
(c) raw materials 
4. Was tax relief (or any other benefit) extended to you on expenses such as 
land development, building construction, and machine installation? 
5. (a) Did you seek or receive business advice from institutions (private or 
public) on any of the following areas? [level of support: 1=no support, 
2=min. support, 3=lots of support] 







project feasibility study 
site or building 
development 
others 
(b) Were you supported by friends/relatives (or did you give favours) to get 
support at some of these levels? 
6. Were there particular risks involved during the start-up process? If yes 
explain these risks and how you overcame them. 
Other taxes = transaction, import and municipal taxes - information from inland revenue authority. 
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B: Assisted Enterprises 
1. If you had not received incentives from the EIA, would you have set up this 
enterprise? If yes 
(i) in this sector? 
(ii) in this location? 
(iii) at this scale? 
(iv) at this time? 
2. (a) Please explain the procedures and challenges (from start to finish) you 
went though in order to get an investment licence. 
(b) How long did it take you to get an investment licence? 
Applications made to: Appli. made Licence no. of no of 
(institutions approached) (m/y) obtained visits desks or 





3. How much did the investment licence cost? 
(i) licence fee 
(ii) renewal fee (how many times) 
(iii) other fees 
4 Overall would you say that the support you received was essential for the 
set-up of the enterprise? Why or why not? 
5. What particular other support would you have sought? 
C: Unassisted Enterprises 
1. Did you seek to receive an investment incentive? If not, why not? If yes, do 
you know why you were refused? 
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2. Given that incentives are available for other activities why did you not invest 
in a particularly supported activity? 
3. If you had received incentives from the investment authorities, would you 
have set up this enterprise? 
(i) in different location? 
(ii) at a different scale? 
OR) at different time? 
4. What particular public supports would have helped you most in setting up 
this enterprise? 
PART THREE: ENTERPRISE GROWTH 
Section I: Enterprise Dynamics 
Please provide the following details about your enterprise: 
1. Type and size of capital investment (provide as many as possible): 











3. Categories of Staff (full time equivalent) 
II 







4. Skill Composition of workforce (the working definition of skills is in the 
making). 






































(ii) rent: land 
(iii) rent: utilities 




7. Please supply the following information: 
indicator end of the year 
enterprise 
started 
end of last year 
(i) gross value (sale or 
output) 
(ii) total operating costs 
(iii) gross profit or value 
added 
(iv) capital output ratio 
(v) uses of profit: 
dividends 
reinvestment 
taxes (saved or paid) 
NO foreign exchange 
earned 
8. Sources of raw materials (give as many as possible) 




9. Output destination: 
(a) export (b) domestic (by regions) 
10. Do you have excess capacity in production? [If yes, in what areas and why? ] 
11. Explain your strategies (if any) in staff/management training, planning, 
marketing, export development. Also explain other strategies if there are 
any. 
12. Specifically do you have an investment plan in the coming (a) 1-2 years, and 
(b) 3-5 years? If yes would it be in: 
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- new product or service development, and or 
- new branch/site development 
- any other future plans? 
Section II: Specific Constraints and Issues 
1. (a) Do you have internal problems? (Internal problems are meant to include: 
low morale, owners or family related problems; problems of cross-functional 
skills like manpower, accounts, and technology management. ) 
(b) If yes to 'a' above how do you intend to overcome these problems? 
2. (a) Do you have supply related problems (these may include infrastructure 
such as utilities, raw material, foreign exchange, premises, technically skilled 
staff, etc. )? 
(b) If yes to 'a' above how do you intend to overcome these problems? 
3. (a) Do you have demand related problems such as domestic market, 
competitors, general income levels, and others? 
(b) If yes to 'a' above how do you intend to overcome these problems? 
4. (a) Do you have policy related problems? 
(b) If yes to 'a' above state the particular guidelines or regulations, and 
aspects of the problems? 
5. (a) Do you belong to professional associations? 
(b) If yes to 'a' above then state the organisation, and the benefits and costs of 
being a member? 
6. Is the enterprise's management influenced by family involvement? If 'yes' 
please state the advantages and/or disadvantages of being a family 
dominated enterprise. 
7. What factors are critical in the growth of your enterprise? 
8. How do you measure your success? 
Section III: The role of incentives in enterprise growth 
1. (a) In what ways did exemptions from paying income tax benefit the 
enterprise? 
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(b) Does the enterprise make profits? If yes, without tax exemptions would 
the enterprise be profitable? 
(c) Explain the importance of exemptions from paying taxes on research and 
development activities for your enterprise (if you do R&D)? 
2. If you did not get incentives (income tax exemptions) would you set up the 





Section IV: Regional Dimension of Income Tax Relief 
(a) If you were given more relief from income taxes would you set up an 
enterprise or invest in a remote region? [Yes or No] 
(b) If yes to 'a' above, how many years of concession would influence you to 
go to other areas? 
2. Are there other factors and/or incentives you consider important to invest in 
other locations? [If yes please state these factors and incentives] 
PART FOUR: VIEWS OF SUPPORT INSTITUTIONS, AND EXPER 
Section I: Policy Makers and Planners 
EIA and Regional Bureau for Investment, and professionals in the field 
1. What are the most important problems of SMEs* in Ethiopia today? 
(a) start-up problems and (b) growth problems 
2. Do you think SMEs need support? Why or why not? 
3. Currently what ranges of policies (programmes) support SME start-ups and 
growth? 
SMEs refers to small and medium size enterprises, employing 6-50 people, and that meet the IIS 
criteria for support. 
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4. Is support to SMEs at the expense of other activities? (Which activities are 
the losers? ) 
5. Do you think investment incentives help these SMEs, and if so how? 
6. (a) What are the reasons for providing more support for a 'pioneer' area as 
opposed to 'promoted' areas? 
(b) What are the bases for supporting larger enterprises as opposed to 
smaller enterprises? 
(c) The government grants more support to enterprises setting-up in poorer 
regions. Why and do such grants influence investors' behaviour? 
7. Why do you think most entrepreneurs who have investment licenses fail to 
start business? 
8. Are there other (perhaps better) ways of supporting SMEs? 
9. Please describe the procedures you follow when potential investors 
approach your institution: 
(a) where do investors start? 
(b) through which subsequent units/departments do investors have to go 
before they are granted (or refused) investment incentives? 
(c) what other services (other than fiscal incentives) do you offer potential 
investors? 
10. Do you think the process of granting investment incentives is efficient? If 
there are problems with the governance structure, how would you like them 
to be changed? 
11. (a) How is the 'one stop shop' designed? 
(b) Is the 'one stop shop' working? [Whether your answer is 'yes' or 'no' 
please explain your reasons] 
12. Do you follow-up the progress of AEs? If yes, how, and what are the criteria, 
and outcomes of your monitoring? 
13. Should SMEs be involved in the policy making process? If so how? 
Section II: Financial Institutions 
1. Do you serve the SME sector, and if so in what way? 
2. (a) What requirements do SMEs fulfil in order to get loans? 
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(b) Do enterprise size, sector, and owner traits influence your decisions? If 
yes, how? 
3. What are the major problems of your bank regarding lending to SMEs? 
4. How do you think SMEs are best served through: 
(a) the financial system? (b) the public sector, say to get finance? 
Section III: City Council, and others 
1. How strong is demand for enterprise sites (plots of land) and office premises 
by investors? [Please provide evidence] 
2. How do you prioritize demand for land (say demand for industrial site and 
residential houses)? 
3. What proportion of these demands are met, and is this satisfactory? 
4. What procedures are involved to grant either a plot of land or office 
premises to applicants? 
5. How long (on the average) does it take you to allocate (a) a plot of industrial 
site for an investor? (b) office premises for businesses? 
Section IV: Professional Associations 
1. What are the most important problems of SMEs in Ethiopia today? (both 
start-ups and growth) 
2. In what ways does your organisation help enterprise start-ups and existing 
enterprises? 
3. Currently what important public policies support SMEs start-ups and 
growth? 
4. (a) Were investment incentives what you asked for support? If not what 
were your priorities? 
(b) Do you think investment incentives equally help all categories (size and 
sector) of SMEs, and if so how? 
5. (a) Do you think that the current practice of granting more support for one 
sector or region against the other is justifiable? Why or why not? 
(b) Do you think larger enterprises need more support as opposed to small 
enterprises? Why or why not? 
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6. Are there other (other than investment incentives) better ways of supporting 
SMEs? If yes - which ones? 
7. Do you think the process of granting investment incentives (by institutions 
like EIA) is efficient? If there are problems with the governance structure, 
how would you like them to be changed? 
8. (a) To what extent is the bureaucratic channel a constraint to SME start-ups? 
(b) Is the 'one stop shop' working? If not how would you like the 'one stop 
shop' designed? 
9. Should SMEs be involved in the policy making process? If so how? 
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Appendix Two: Letters of Cooperation 
The Open Development Studies 
University The Open University Walton Hall 
Milton Keynes 
United Kingdom MID 6AA 
Telephone (01908) 653462 
Private tel: (01908) 310776 
Faculty of Technology Fax(01908)652175 
e-mail: 
s. ayele@open. ac. uk 
Dear 
I am an Open University PhD research student, based in Milton Keynes, England. I am 
conducting a study on enterprise start-ups and growth in Ethiopia with the hope of 
generating support frameworks (and policies) for enterprises. The study focuses on the 
role and efficiency of existing policies such as the investment incentives, and considers 
other possible support measures for enterprise start-ups and growth. 
In this research your enterprise (and other enterprises) has been randomly selected. I 
should state that this study is conducted independently - it is neither sponsored by nor 
conducted on behalf of any organisation. All information you give will be treated as 
strictly confidential. 
I understand that the questions require your time and attention. But your cooperation will 
enable me to properly understand the Ethiopian enterprise sector. I thank you for your 




Faculty of Technology 
Dear 
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The Open University 
Walton üall 
Milton Keynes 
United Kingdom Mio 6AA 
Telephone (01908) 653462 
Private tel: (01908) 310776 
Fax (01908)652175 
e-mail: 
s. ayele@open. ac. uk 
I am an Open University PhD research student, based in Milton Keynes, England. 
I am conducting a study on enterprise start-ups and growth in Ethiopia with the 
hope of generating support frameworks (and policies) for enterprises. The study 
focuses on the role and efficiency of existing policies such as the investment 
incentives, and considers other possible support measures for enterprise start-ups 
and growth. 
Considering your responsibilities and experience in the area, I would be very 
grateful if you would kindly take the time to answer the enclosed questionnaire. 
I should state that this study is conducted independently - it is neither sponsored 
by nor conducted on behalf of any organisation. All information you give will be 
treated as strictly confidential. 
I understand that the questions require your time and attention. But your 
cooperation will enable me to properly understand the Ethiopian enterprise 
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The Open Univeräity 
Business Schoä1 :. 
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INVESTOR IN Milton K 
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Telephone (01908) 655888 
Fax (01908) 655898 - 
Intemationa1 No. '+ 441908 655888 
http: / /oubs. open. ac. uk 
Direct Line: +44 1908 6538§9 
e-mail: c. wj. a. gr2y@open. ac. uk 
This is to confirm that Seife Ayele is 'registered as a part-time external postgraduate research student at 
the Open University, UK. He is researching small and medium-sized enterprise development, with a 
particular focus on Ethiopia. 
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